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| author | serue@us.ibm.com <serue@us.ibm.com> | 2007-12-05 21:55:36 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> | 2009-06-27 22:37:36 +0200 |
| commit | 2759563e3f05fc4fdb00f162641f8e2a0d287c91 (patch) | |
| tree | fa78d5c2ed13dac0ad51e3e717ae7b1b2e488778 | |
| parent | 14a0ed47e2c8c2eadf03d99caa566eff9072b491 (diff) | |
| download | linux-2.4-2759563e3f05fc4fdb00f162641f8e2a0d287c91.tar.gz | |
agp: remove uid comparison as security check
In the face of containers and user namespaces, a uid==0 check for
security is not safe. Switch to a capability check.
I'm not sure I picked the right capability, but this being AGP
CAP_SYS_RAWIO seemed to make sense.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/agp/agpgart_fe.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/agp/agpgart_fe.c b/drivers/char/agp/agpgart_fe.c index cb22b75a497744..858c7ba20e968f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/agp/agpgart_fe.c +++ b/drivers/char/agp/agpgart_fe.c @@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ static int agp_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) set_bit(AGP_FF_ALLOW_CLIENT, &priv->access_flags); priv->my_pid = current->pid; - if ((current->uid == 0) || (current->suid == 0)) { + if (capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) { /* Root priv, can be controller */ set_bit(AGP_FF_ALLOW_CONTROLLER, &priv->access_flags); } |