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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2021-02-26 09:50:09 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2021-02-26 09:50:09 -0800
commit245137cdf0cd92077dad37868fe4859c90dada36 (patch)
treede7b3718b7537a260148e99746f58e9de5819aa0
parent1c9077cdecd027714736e70704da432ee2b946bb (diff)
parentf685a533a7fab35c5d069dcd663f59c8e4171a75 (diff)
downloadlinux-leds-245137cdf0cd92077dad37868fe4859c90dada36.tar.gz
Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton: "118 patches: - The rest of MM. Includes kfence - another runtime memory validator. Not as thorough as KASAN, but it has unmeasurable overhead and is intended to be usable in production builds. - Everything else Subsystems affected by this patch series: alpha, procfs, sysctl, misc, core-kernel, MAINTAINERS, lib, bitops, checkpatch, init, coredump, seq_file, gdb, ubsan, initramfs, and mm (thp, cma, vmstat, memory-hotplug, mlock, rmap, zswap, zsmalloc, cleanups, kfence, kasan2, and pagemap2)" * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (118 commits) MIPS: make userspace mapping young by default initramfs: panic with memory information ubsan: remove overflow checks kgdb: fix to kill breakpoints on initmem after boot scripts/gdb: fix list_for_each x86: fix seq_file iteration for pat/memtype.c seq_file: document how per-entry resources are managed. fs/coredump: use kmap_local_page() init/Kconfig: fix a typo in CC_VERSION_TEXT help text init: clean up early_param_on_off() macro init/version.c: remove Version_<LINUX_VERSION_CODE> symbol checkpatch: do not apply "initialise globals to 0" check to BPF progs checkpatch: don't warn about colon termination in linker scripts checkpatch: add kmalloc_array_node to unnecessary OOM message check checkpatch: add warning for avoiding .L prefix symbols in assembly files checkpatch: improve TYPECAST_INT_CONSTANT test message checkpatch: prefer ftrace over function entry/exit printks checkpatch: trivial style fixes checkpatch: ignore warning designated initializers using NR_CPUS checkpatch: improve blank line after declaration test ...
-rw-r--r--.mailmap1
-rw-r--r--CREDITS9
-rw-r--r--Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-memory58
-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/auxdisplay/cfag12864b.rst2
-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/auxdisplay/ks0108.rst2
-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt6
-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/mm/memory-hotplug.rst20
-rw-r--r--Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst1
-rw-r--r--Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst8
-rw-r--r--Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst298
-rw-r--r--Documentation/filesystems/seq_file.rst6
-rw-r--r--MAINTAINERS26
-rw-r--r--arch/alpha/configs/defconfig1
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/include/asm/cache.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h22
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-def.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h65
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c46
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/lib/mte.S16
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/mm/fault.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c21
-rw-r--r--arch/mips/mm/cache.c30
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/mm/init.c1
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/mm/vmem.c14
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h64
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/fault.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c4
-rw-r--r--drivers/auxdisplay/cfag12864b.c4
-rw-r--r--drivers/auxdisplay/cfag12864bfb.c4
-rw-r--r--drivers/auxdisplay/ks0108.c4
-rw-r--r--drivers/base/memory.c35
-rw-r--r--drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c2
-rw-r--r--drivers/hv/hv_balloon.c2
-rw-r--r--drivers/virtio/virtio_mem.c43
-rw-r--r--drivers/xen/balloon.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/coredump.c4
-rw-r--r--fs/iomap/seek.c125
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/base.c19
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c4
-rw-r--r--include/linux/bitops.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/cfag12864b.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/cred.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/fortify-string.h302
-rw-r--r--include/linux/gfp.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/init.h4
-rw-r--r--include/linux/kasan.h25
-rw-r--r--include/linux/kfence.h222
-rw-r--r--include/linux/kgdb.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/khugepaged.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/ks0108.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/mdev.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/memory.h3
-rw-r--r--include/linux/memory_hotplug.h33
-rw-r--r--include/linux/memremap.h6
-rw-r--r--include/linux/mmzone.h49
-rw-r--r--include/linux/page-flags.h4
-rw-r--r--include/linux/pagemap.h6
-rw-r--r--include/linux/pagevec.h4
-rw-r--r--include/linux/pgtable.h8
-rw-r--r--include/linux/ptrace.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/rmap.h3
-rw-r--r--include/linux/slab_def.h3
-rw-r--r--include/linux/slub_def.h3
-rw-r--r--include/linux/stackdepot.h9
-rw-r--r--include/linux/string.h282
-rw-r--r--include/linux/vmstat.h6
-rw-r--r--include/linux/zpool.h3
-rw-r--r--include/linux/zsmalloc.h2
-rw-r--r--include/trace/events/error_report.h74
-rw-r--r--include/uapi/linux/firewire-cdev.h2
-rw-r--r--include/uapi/linux/input.h2
-rw-r--r--init/Kconfig2
-rw-r--r--init/initramfs.c19
-rw-r--r--init/main.c6
-rw-r--r--init/version.c8
-rw-r--r--kernel/debug/debug_core.c11
-rw-r--r--kernel/events/core.c8
-rw-r--r--kernel/events/uprobes.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/groups.c7
-rw-r--r--kernel/locking/rtmutex.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/locking/rwsem.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/locking/semaphore.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/sched/fair.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/sched/membarrier.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/sysctl.c8
-rw-r--r--kernel/trace/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--kernel/trace/error_report-traces.c11
-rw-r--r--lib/Kconfig9
-rw-r--r--lib/Kconfig.debug1
-rw-r--r--lib/Kconfig.kfence82
-rw-r--r--lib/Kconfig.ubsan17
-rw-r--r--lib/cmdline.c7
-rw-r--r--lib/genalloc.c3
-rw-r--r--lib/stackdepot.c37
-rw-r--r--lib/test_kasan.c111
-rw-r--r--lib/test_ubsan.c49
-rw-r--r--lib/ubsan.c68
-rw-r--r--mm/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--mm/backing-dev.c3
-rw-r--r--mm/cma.c64
-rw-r--r--mm/dmapool.c3
-rw-r--r--mm/early_ioremap.c12
-rw-r--r--mm/filemap.c343
-rw-r--r--mm/huge_memory.c6
-rw-r--r--mm/internal.h4
-rw-r--r--mm/kasan/common.c193
-rw-r--r--mm/kasan/generic.c3
-rw-r--r--mm/kasan/hw_tags.c2
-rw-r--r--mm/kasan/kasan.h77
-rw-r--r--mm/kasan/report.c8
-rw-r--r--mm/kasan/shadow.c62
-rw-r--r--mm/kfence/Makefile6
-rw-r--r--mm/kfence/core.c841
-rw-r--r--mm/kfence/kfence.h106
-rw-r--r--mm/kfence/kfence_test.c858
-rw-r--r--mm/kfence/report.c262
-rw-r--r--mm/khugepaged.c22
-rw-r--r--mm/memory-failure.c6
-rw-r--r--mm/memory.c4
-rw-r--r--mm/memory_hotplug.c160
-rw-r--r--mm/memremap.c23
-rw-r--r--mm/mlock.c2
-rw-r--r--mm/page_alloc.c1
-rw-r--r--mm/rmap.c22
-rw-r--r--mm/shmem.c154
-rw-r--r--mm/slab.c38
-rw-r--r--mm/slab_common.c23
-rw-r--r--mm/slub.c63
-rw-r--r--mm/swap.c38
-rw-r--r--mm/swap_state.c7
-rw-r--r--mm/truncate.c131
-rw-r--r--mm/vmstat.c35
-rw-r--r--mm/z3fold.c1
-rw-r--r--mm/zbud.c1
-rw-r--r--mm/zpool.c13
-rw-r--r--mm/zsmalloc.c22
-rw-r--r--mm/zswap.c57
-rw-r--r--samples/auxdisplay/cfag12864b-example.c2
-rw-r--r--scripts/Makefile.ubsan2
-rwxr-xr-xscripts/checkpatch.pl152
-rw-r--r--scripts/gdb/linux/lists.py5
145 files changed, 4870 insertions, 1507 deletions
diff --git a/.mailmap b/.mailmap
index 87a8bbdbf74904..85b93cdefc87bb 100644
--- a/.mailmap
+++ b/.mailmap
@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org> <maxime.ripard@free-electrons.com>
Mayuresh Janorkar <mayur@ti.com>
Michael Buesch <m@bues.ch>
Michel Dänzer <michel@tungstengraphics.com>
+Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> <mike@compulab.co.il>
Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> <mike.rapoport@gmail.com>
Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
diff --git a/CREDITS b/CREDITS
index be097156bd71bc..cef83b958cbeb7 100644
--- a/CREDITS
+++ b/CREDITS
@@ -2841,14 +2841,11 @@ S: Subiaco, 6008
S: Perth, Western Australia
S: Australia
-N: Miguel Ojeda Sandonis
-E: miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com
-W: http://miguelojeda.es
-W: http://jair.lab.fi.uva.es/~migojed/
+N: Miguel Ojeda
+E: ojeda@kernel.org
+W: https://ojeda.dev
D: Author of the ks0108, cfag12864b and cfag12864bfb auxiliary display drivers.
D: Maintainer of the auxiliary display drivers tree (drivers/auxdisplay/*)
-S: C/ Mieses 20, 9-B
-S: Valladolid 47009
S: Spain
N: Peter Oruba
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-memory b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-memory
index 246a45b96d22a9..d8b0f80b9e33cf 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-memory
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-memory
@@ -13,21 +13,22 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/removable
Date: June 2008
Contact: Badari Pulavarty <pbadari@us.ibm.com>
Description:
- The file /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/removable
- indicates whether this memory block is removable or not.
- This is useful for a user-level agent to determine
- identify removable sections of the memory before attempting
- potentially expensive hot-remove memory operation
+ The file /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/removable is a
+ legacy interface used to indicated whether a memory block is
+ likely to be offlineable or not. Newer kernel versions return
+ "1" if and only if the kernel supports memory offlining.
Users: hotplug memory remove tools
http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/wikis/display/LinuxP/powerpc-utils
+ lsmem/chmem part of util-linux
What: /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device
Date: September 2008
Contact: Badari Pulavarty <pbadari@us.ibm.com>
Description:
The file /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device
- is read-only and is designed to show the name of physical
- memory device. Implementation is currently incomplete.
+ is read-only; it is a legacy interface only ever used on s390x
+ to expose the covered storage increment.
+Users: Legacy s390-tools lsmem/chmem
What: /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_index
Date: September 2008
@@ -43,23 +44,25 @@ Date: September 2008
Contact: Badari Pulavarty <pbadari@us.ibm.com>
Description:
The file /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/state
- is read-write. When read, its contents show the
- online/offline state of the memory section. When written,
- root can toggle the the online/offline state of a removable
- memory section (see removable file description above)
- using the following commands::
+ is read-write. When read, it returns the online/offline
+ state of the memory block. When written, root can toggle
+ the online/offline state of a memory block using the following
+ commands::
# echo online > /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/state
# echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/state
- For example, if /sys/devices/system/memory/memory22/removable
- contains a value of 1 and
- /sys/devices/system/memory/memory22/state contains the
- string "online" the following command can be executed by
- by root to offline that section::
-
- # echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory22/state
-
+ On newer kernel versions, advanced states can be specified
+ when onlining to select a target zone: "online_movable"
+ selects the movable zone. "online_kernel" selects the
+ applicable kernel zone (DMA, DMA32, or Normal). However,
+ after successfully setting one of the advanced states,
+ reading the file will return "online"; the zone information
+ can be obtained via "valid_zones" instead.
+
+ While onlining is unlikely to fail, there are no guarantees
+ that offlining will succeed. Offlining is more likely to
+ succeed if "valid_zones" indicates "Movable".
Users: hotplug memory remove tools
http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/wikis/display/LinuxP/powerpc-utils
@@ -69,8 +72,19 @@ Date: July 2014
Contact: Zhang Zhen <zhenzhang.zhang@huawei.com>
Description:
The file /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/valid_zones is
- read-only and is designed to show which zone this memory
- block can be onlined to.
+ read-only.
+
+ For online memory blocks, it returns in which zone memory
+ provided by a memory block is managed. If multiple zones
+ apply (not applicable for hotplugged memory), "None" is returned
+ and the memory block cannot be offlined.
+
+ For offline memory blocks, it returns by which zone memory
+ provided by a memory block can be managed when onlining.
+ The first returned zone ("default") will be used when setting
+ the state of an offline memory block to "online". Only one of
+ the kernel zones (DMA, DMA32, Normal) is applicable for a single
+ memory block.
What: /sys/devices/system/memoryX/nodeY
Date: October 2009
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/auxdisplay/cfag12864b.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/auxdisplay/cfag12864b.rst
index 18c2865bd32230..da385d851acc88 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/auxdisplay/cfag12864b.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/auxdisplay/cfag12864b.rst
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ cfag12864b LCD Driver Documentation
===================================
:License: GPLv2
-:Author & Maintainer: Miguel Ojeda Sandonis
+:Author & Maintainer: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
:Date: 2006-10-27
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/auxdisplay/ks0108.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/auxdisplay/ks0108.rst
index c0b7faf7313612..a7d3fe5093730a 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/auxdisplay/ks0108.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/auxdisplay/ks0108.rst
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ ks0108 LCD Controller Driver Documentation
==========================================
:License: GPLv2
-:Author & Maintainer: Miguel Ojeda Sandonis
+:Author & Maintainer: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
:Date: 2006-10-27
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index bab6a8b01202eb..04545725f187ff 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -5182,6 +5182,12 @@
growing up) the main stack are reserved for no other
mapping. Default value is 256 pages.
+ stack_depot_disable= [KNL]
+ Setting this to true through kernel command line will
+ disable the stack depot thereby saving the static memory
+ consumed by the stack hash table. By default this is set
+ to false.
+
stacktrace [FTRACE]
Enabled the stack tracer on boot up.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/mm/memory-hotplug.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/mm/memory-hotplug.rst
index 5c4432c96c4b6d..5307f90738aa9a 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/mm/memory-hotplug.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/mm/memory-hotplug.rst
@@ -160,16 +160,16 @@ Under each memory block, you can see 5 files:
"online_movable", "online", "offline" command
which will be performed on all sections in the block.
-``phys_device`` read-only: designed to show the name of physical memory
- device. This is not well implemented now.
-``removable`` read-only: contains an integer value indicating
- whether the memory block is removable or not
- removable. A value of 1 indicates that the memory
- block is removable and a value of 0 indicates that
- it is not removable. A memory block is removable only if
- every section in the block is removable.
-``valid_zones`` read-only: designed to show which zones this memory block
- can be onlined to.
+``phys_device`` read-only: legacy interface only ever used on s390x to
+ expose the covered storage increment.
+``removable`` read-only: legacy interface that indicated whether a memory
+ block was likely to be offlineable or not. Newer kernel
+ versions return "1" if and only if the kernel supports
+ memory offlining.
+``valid_zones`` read-only: designed to show by which zone memory provided by
+ a memory block is managed, and to show by which zone memory
+ provided by an offline memory block could be managed when
+ onlining.
The first column shows it`s default zone.
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst
index f7809c7b1ba9e2..1b1cf4f5c9d903 100644
--- a/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ whole; patches welcome!
ubsan
kmemleak
kcsan
+ kfence
gdb-kernel-debugging
kgdb
kselftest
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
index cde14aeefca7d2..ddf4239a58908c 100644
--- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ Boot parameters
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Hardware tag-based KASAN mode (see the section about various modes below) is
-intended for use in production as a security mitigation. Therefore it supports
+intended for use in production as a security mitigation. Therefore, it supports
boot parameters that allow to disable KASAN competely or otherwise control
particular KASAN features.
@@ -165,7 +165,8 @@ particular KASAN features.
traces collection (default: ``on``).
- ``kasan.fault=report`` or ``=panic`` controls whether to only print a KASAN
- report or also panic the kernel (default: ``report``).
+ report or also panic the kernel (default: ``report``). Note, that tag
+ checking gets disabled after the first reported bug.
For developers
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
@@ -295,6 +296,9 @@ Note, that enabling CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS always results in in-kernel TBI being
enabled. Even when kasan.mode=off is provided, or when the hardware doesn't
support MTE (but supports TBI).
+Hardware tag-based KASAN only reports the first found bug. After that MTE tag
+checking gets disabled.
+
What memory accesses are sanitised by KASAN?
--------------------------------------------
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..fdf04e741ea575
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+.. Copyright (C) 2020, Google LLC.
+
+Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE)
+==============================
+
+Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) is a low-overhead sampling-based memory safety
+error detector. KFENCE detects heap out-of-bounds access, use-after-free, and
+invalid-free errors.
+
+KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels, and has near zero
+performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance for
+precision. The main motivation behind KFENCE's design, is that with enough
+total uptime KFENCE will detect bugs in code paths not typically exercised by
+non-production test workloads. One way to quickly achieve a large enough total
+uptime is when the tool is deployed across a large fleet of machines.
+
+Usage
+-----
+
+To enable KFENCE, configure the kernel with::
+
+ CONFIG_KFENCE=y
+
+To build a kernel with KFENCE support, but disabled by default (to enable, set
+``kfence.sample_interval`` to non-zero value), configure the kernel with::
+
+ CONFIG_KFENCE=y
+ CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL=0
+
+KFENCE provides several other configuration options to customize behaviour (see
+the respective help text in ``lib/Kconfig.kfence`` for more info).
+
+Tuning performance
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The most important parameter is KFENCE's sample interval, which can be set via
+the kernel boot parameter ``kfence.sample_interval`` in milliseconds. The
+sample interval determines the frequency with which heap allocations will be
+guarded by KFENCE. The default is configurable via the Kconfig option
+``CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL``. Setting ``kfence.sample_interval=0``
+disables KFENCE.
+
+The KFENCE memory pool is of fixed size, and if the pool is exhausted, no
+further KFENCE allocations occur. With ``CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS`` (default
+255), the number of available guarded objects can be controlled. Each object
+requires 2 pages, one for the object itself and the other one used as a guard
+page; object pages are interleaved with guard pages, and every object page is
+therefore surrounded by two guard pages.
+
+The total memory dedicated to the KFENCE memory pool can be computed as::
+
+ ( #objects + 1 ) * 2 * PAGE_SIZE
+
+Using the default config, and assuming a page size of 4 KiB, results in
+dedicating 2 MiB to the KFENCE memory pool.
+
+Note: On architectures that support huge pages, KFENCE will ensure that the
+pool is using pages of size ``PAGE_SIZE``. This will result in additional page
+tables being allocated.
+
+Error reports
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+A typical out-of-bounds access looks like this::
+
+ ==================================================================
+ BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds read in test_out_of_bounds_read+0xa3/0x22b
+
+ Out-of-bounds read at 0xffffffffb672efff (1B left of kfence-#17):
+ test_out_of_bounds_read+0xa3/0x22b
+ kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+ kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+ kthread+0x137/0x160
+ ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+ kfence-#17 [0xffffffffb672f000-0xffffffffb672f01f, size=32, cache=kmalloc-32] allocated by task 507:
+ test_alloc+0xf3/0x25b
+ test_out_of_bounds_read+0x98/0x22b
+ kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+ kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+ kthread+0x137/0x160
+ ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+ CPU: 4 PID: 107 Comm: kunit_try_catch Not tainted 5.8.0-rc6+ #7
+ Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014
+ ==================================================================
+
+The header of the report provides a short summary of the function involved in
+the access. It is followed by more detailed information about the access and
+its origin. Note that, real kernel addresses are only shown when using the
+kernel command line option ``no_hash_pointers``.
+
+Use-after-free accesses are reported as::
+
+ ==================================================================
+ BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in test_use_after_free_read+0xb3/0x143
+
+ Use-after-free read at 0xffffffffb673dfe0 (in kfence-#24):
+ test_use_after_free_read+0xb3/0x143
+ kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+ kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+ kthread+0x137/0x160
+ ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+ kfence-#24 [0xffffffffb673dfe0-0xffffffffb673dfff, size=32, cache=kmalloc-32] allocated by task 507:
+ test_alloc+0xf3/0x25b
+ test_use_after_free_read+0x76/0x143
+ kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+ kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+ kthread+0x137/0x160
+ ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+ freed by task 507:
+ test_use_after_free_read+0xa8/0x143
+ kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+ kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+ kthread+0x137/0x160
+ ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+ CPU: 4 PID: 109 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G W 5.8.0-rc6+ #7
+ Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014
+ ==================================================================
+
+KFENCE also reports on invalid frees, such as double-frees::
+
+ ==================================================================
+ BUG: KFENCE: invalid free in test_double_free+0xdc/0x171
+
+ Invalid free of 0xffffffffb6741000:
+ test_double_free+0xdc/0x171
+ kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+ kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+ kthread+0x137/0x160
+ ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+ kfence-#26 [0xffffffffb6741000-0xffffffffb674101f, size=32, cache=kmalloc-32] allocated by task 507:
+ test_alloc+0xf3/0x25b
+ test_double_free+0x76/0x171
+ kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+ kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+ kthread+0x137/0x160
+ ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+ freed by task 507:
+ test_double_free+0xa8/0x171
+ kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+ kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+ kthread+0x137/0x160
+ ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+ CPU: 4 PID: 111 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G W 5.8.0-rc6+ #7
+ Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014
+ ==================================================================
+
+KFENCE also uses pattern-based redzones on the other side of an object's guard
+page, to detect out-of-bounds writes on the unprotected side of the object.
+These are reported on frees::
+
+ ==================================================================
+ BUG: KFENCE: memory corruption in test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_write+0xef/0x184
+
+ Corrupted memory at 0xffffffffb6797ff9 [ 0xac . . . . . . ] (in kfence-#69):
+ test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_write+0xef/0x184
+ kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+ kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+ kthread+0x137/0x160
+ ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+ kfence-#69 [0xffffffffb6797fb0-0xffffffffb6797ff8, size=73, cache=kmalloc-96] allocated by task 507:
+ test_alloc+0xf3/0x25b
+ test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_write+0x57/0x184
+ kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+ kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+ kthread+0x137/0x160
+ ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+ CPU: 4 PID: 120 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G W 5.8.0-rc6+ #7
+ Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014
+ ==================================================================
+
+For such errors, the address where the corruption occurred as well as the
+invalidly written bytes (offset from the address) are shown; in this
+representation, '.' denote untouched bytes. In the example above ``0xac`` is
+the value written to the invalid address at offset 0, and the remaining '.'
+denote that no following bytes have been touched. Note that, real values are
+only shown if the kernel was booted with ``no_hash_pointers``; to avoid
+information disclosure otherwise, '!' is used instead to denote invalidly
+written bytes.
+
+And finally, KFENCE may also report on invalid accesses to any protected page
+where it was not possible to determine an associated object, e.g. if adjacent
+object pages had not yet been allocated::
+
+ ==================================================================
+ BUG: KFENCE: invalid read in test_invalid_access+0x26/0xe0
+
+ Invalid read at 0xffffffffb670b00a:
+ test_invalid_access+0x26/0xe0
+ kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+ kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+ kthread+0x137/0x160
+ ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+ CPU: 4 PID: 124 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G W 5.8.0-rc6+ #7
+ Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014
+ ==================================================================
+
+DebugFS interface
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Some debugging information is exposed via debugfs:
+
+* The file ``/sys/kernel/debug/kfence/stats`` provides runtime statistics.
+
+* The file ``/sys/kernel/debug/kfence/objects`` provides a list of objects
+ allocated via KFENCE, including those already freed but protected.
+
+Implementation Details
+----------------------
+
+Guarded allocations are set up based on the sample interval. After expiration
+of the sample interval, the next allocation through the main allocator (SLAB or
+SLUB) returns a guarded allocation from the KFENCE object pool (allocation
+sizes up to PAGE_SIZE are supported). At this point, the timer is reset, and
+the next allocation is set up after the expiration of the interval. To "gate" a
+KFENCE allocation through the main allocator's fast-path without overhead,
+KFENCE relies on static branches via the static keys infrastructure. The static
+branch is toggled to redirect the allocation to KFENCE.
+
+KFENCE objects each reside on a dedicated page, at either the left or right
+page boundaries selected at random. The pages to the left and right of the
+object page are "guard pages", whose attributes are changed to a protected
+state, and cause page faults on any attempted access. Such page faults are then
+intercepted by KFENCE, which handles the fault gracefully by reporting an
+out-of-bounds access, and marking the page as accessible so that the faulting
+code can (wrongly) continue executing (set ``panic_on_warn`` to panic instead).
+
+To detect out-of-bounds writes to memory within the object's page itself,
+KFENCE also uses pattern-based redzones. For each object page, a redzone is set
+up for all non-object memory. For typical alignments, the redzone is only
+required on the unguarded side of an object. Because KFENCE must honor the
+cache's requested alignment, special alignments may result in unprotected gaps
+on either side of an object, all of which are redzoned.
+
+The following figure illustrates the page layout::
+
+ ---+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+---
+ | xxxxxxxxx | O : | xxxxxxxxx | : O | xxxxxxxxx |
+ | xxxxxxxxx | B : | xxxxxxxxx | : B | xxxxxxxxx |
+ | x GUARD x | J : RED- | x GUARD x | RED- : J | x GUARD x |
+ | xxxxxxxxx | E : ZONE | xxxxxxxxx | ZONE : E | xxxxxxxxx |
+ | xxxxxxxxx | C : | xxxxxxxxx | : C | xxxxxxxxx |
+ | xxxxxxxxx | T : | xxxxxxxxx | : T | xxxxxxxxx |
+ ---+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+---
+
+Upon deallocation of a KFENCE object, the object's page is again protected and
+the object is marked as freed. Any further access to the object causes a fault
+and KFENCE reports a use-after-free access. Freed objects are inserted at the
+tail of KFENCE's freelist, so that the least recently freed objects are reused
+first, and the chances of detecting use-after-frees of recently freed objects
+is increased.
+
+Interface
+---------
+
+The following describes the functions which are used by allocators as well as
+page handling code to set up and deal with KFENCE allocations.
+
+.. kernel-doc:: include/linux/kfence.h
+ :functions: is_kfence_address
+ kfence_shutdown_cache
+ kfence_alloc kfence_free __kfence_free
+ kfence_ksize kfence_object_start
+ kfence_handle_page_fault
+
+Related Tools
+-------------
+
+In userspace, a similar approach is taken by `GWP-ASan
+<http://llvm.org/docs/GwpAsan.html>`_. GWP-ASan also relies on guard pages and
+a sampling strategy to detect memory unsafety bugs at scale. KFENCE's design is
+directly influenced by GWP-ASan, and can be seen as its kernel sibling. Another
+similar but non-sampling approach, that also inspired the name "KFENCE", can be
+found in the userspace `Electric Fence Malloc Debugger
+<https://linux.die.net/man/3/efence>`_.
+
+In the kernel, several tools exist to debug memory access errors, and in
+particular KASAN can detect all bug classes that KFENCE can detect. While KASAN
+is more precise, relying on compiler instrumentation, this comes at a
+performance cost.
+
+It is worth highlighting that KASAN and KFENCE are complementary, with
+different target environments. For instance, KASAN is the better debugging-aid,
+where test cases or reproducers exists: due to the lower chance to detect the
+error, it would require more effort using KFENCE to debug. Deployments at scale
+that cannot afford to enable KASAN, however, would benefit from using KFENCE to
+discover bugs due to code paths not exercised by test cases or fuzzers.
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/seq_file.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/seq_file.rst
index 56856481dc8d8e..a6726082a7c257 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/seq_file.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/seq_file.rst
@@ -217,6 +217,12 @@ between the calls to start() and stop(), so holding a lock during that time
is a reasonable thing to do. The seq_file code will also avoid taking any
other locks while the iterator is active.
+The iterater value returned by start() or next() is guaranteed to be
+passed to a subsequent next() or stop() call. This allows resources
+such as locks that were taken to be reliably released. There is *no*
+guarantee that the iterator will be passed to show(), though in practice
+it often will be.
+
Formatted output
================
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index c71664ca8bfdc3..498cc779e354b5 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -261,6 +261,8 @@ ABI/API
L: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
F: include/linux/syscalls.h
F: kernel/sys_ni.c
+F: include/uapi/
+F: arch/*/include/uapi/
ABIT UGURU 1,2 HARDWARE MONITOR DRIVER
M: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
@@ -2982,7 +2984,7 @@ F: include/uapi/linux/audit.h
F: kernel/audit*
AUXILIARY DISPLAY DRIVERS
-M: Miguel Ojeda Sandonis <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
+M: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
S: Maintained
F: drivers/auxdisplay/
F: include/linux/cfag12864b.h
@@ -4128,13 +4130,13 @@ F: scripts/extract-cert.c
F: scripts/sign-file.c
CFAG12864B LCD DRIVER
-M: Miguel Ojeda Sandonis <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
+M: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
S: Maintained
F: drivers/auxdisplay/cfag12864b.c
F: include/linux/cfag12864b.h
CFAG12864BFB LCD FRAMEBUFFER DRIVER
-M: Miguel Ojeda Sandonis <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
+M: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
S: Maintained
F: drivers/auxdisplay/cfag12864bfb.c
F: include/linux/cfag12864b.h
@@ -4304,7 +4306,7 @@ S: Supported
F: drivers/infiniband/hw/usnic/
CLANG-FORMAT FILE
-M: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
+M: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
S: Maintained
F: .clang-format
@@ -4444,7 +4446,7 @@ S: Maintained
F: drivers/platform/x86/compal-laptop.c
COMPILER ATTRIBUTES
-M: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
+M: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
S: Maintained
F: include/linux/compiler_attributes.h
@@ -9867,6 +9869,18 @@ F: include/linux/keyctl.h
F: include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
F: security/keys/
+KFENCE
+M: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
+M: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
+R: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
+L: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
+S: Maintained
+F: Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
+F: arch/*/include/asm/kfence.h
+F: include/linux/kfence.h
+F: lib/Kconfig.kfence
+F: mm/kfence/
+
KFIFO
M: Stefani Seibold <stefani@seibold.net>
S: Maintained
@@ -9927,7 +9941,7 @@ F: include/linux/kprobes.h
F: kernel/kprobes.c
KS0108 LCD CONTROLLER DRIVER
-M: Miguel Ojeda Sandonis <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
+M: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
S: Maintained
F: Documentation/admin-guide/auxdisplay/ks0108.rst
F: drivers/auxdisplay/ks0108.c
diff --git a/arch/alpha/configs/defconfig b/arch/alpha/configs/defconfig
index 6293675db1644a..724c4075df408e 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/configs/defconfig
+++ b/arch/alpha/configs/defconfig
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-CONFIG_EXPERIMENTAL=y
CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y
CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y
CONFIG_LOG_BUF_SHIFT=14
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index fc0ce2a1f3bfa6..a254f4871683f0 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ config ARM64
select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if !(ARM64_16K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_48)
select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS if HAVE_ARCH_KASAN
select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_HW_TAGS if (HAVE_ARCH_KASAN && ARM64_MTE)
+ select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE
select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cache.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cache.h
index 77cbbe3625f215..a074459f8f2fb7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cache.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cache.h
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
#define __ASM_CACHE_H
#include <asm/cputype.h>
-#include <asm/mte-kasan.h>
#define CTR_L1IP_SHIFT 14
#define CTR_L1IP_MASK 3
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h
index 0aaf9044cd6a5d..12d5f47f7dbec6 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/memory.h>
+#include <asm/mte-kasan.h>
#include <asm/pgtable-types.h>
#define arch_kasan_set_tag(addr, tag) __tag_set(addr, tag)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..d061176d57ea17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * arm64 KFENCE support.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, Google LLC.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __ASM_KFENCE_H
+#define __ASM_KFENCE_H
+
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+
+static inline bool arch_kfence_init_pool(void) { return true; }
+
+static inline bool kfence_protect_page(unsigned long addr, bool protect)
+{
+ set_memory_valid(addr, 1, !protect);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+#endif /* __ASM_KFENCE_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-def.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-def.h
index 2d73a1612f099a..cf241b0f0a425a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-def.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-def.h
@@ -11,4 +11,6 @@
#define MTE_TAG_SIZE 4
#define MTE_TAG_MASK GENMASK((MTE_TAG_SHIFT + (MTE_TAG_SIZE - 1)), MTE_TAG_SHIFT)
+#define __MTE_PREAMBLE ARM64_ASM_PREAMBLE ".arch_extension memtag\n"
+
#endif /* __ASM_MTE_DEF_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h
index 3748d5bb88c023..7ab500e2ad1762 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h
@@ -11,11 +11,14 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE
+
/*
- * The functions below are meant to be used only for the
- * KASAN_HW_TAGS interface defined in asm/memory.h.
+ * These functions are meant to be only used from KASAN runtime through
+ * the arch_*() interface defined in asm/memory.h.
+ * These functions don't include system_supports_mte() checks,
+ * as KASAN only calls them when MTE is supported and enabled.
*/
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE
static inline u8 mte_get_ptr_tag(void *ptr)
{
@@ -25,9 +28,54 @@ static inline u8 mte_get_ptr_tag(void *ptr)
return tag;
}
-u8 mte_get_mem_tag(void *addr);
-u8 mte_get_random_tag(void);
-void *mte_set_mem_tag_range(void *addr, size_t size, u8 tag);
+/* Get allocation tag for the address. */
+static inline u8 mte_get_mem_tag(void *addr)
+{
+ asm(__MTE_PREAMBLE "ldg %0, [%0]"
+ : "+r" (addr));
+
+ return mte_get_ptr_tag(addr);
+}
+
+/* Generate a random tag. */
+static inline u8 mte_get_random_tag(void)
+{
+ void *addr;
+
+ asm(__MTE_PREAMBLE "irg %0, %0"
+ : "=r" (addr));
+
+ return mte_get_ptr_tag(addr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Assign allocation tags for a region of memory based on the pointer tag.
+ * Note: The address must be non-NULL and MTE_GRANULE_SIZE aligned and
+ * size must be non-zero and MTE_GRANULE_SIZE aligned.
+ */
+static inline void mte_set_mem_tag_range(void *addr, size_t size, u8 tag)
+{
+ u64 curr, end;
+
+ if (!size)
+ return;
+
+ curr = (u64)__tag_set(addr, tag);
+ end = curr + size;
+
+ do {
+ /*
+ * 'asm volatile' is required to prevent the compiler to move
+ * the statement outside of the loop.
+ */
+ asm volatile(__MTE_PREAMBLE "stg %0, [%0]"
+ :
+ : "r" (curr)
+ : "memory");
+
+ curr += MTE_GRANULE_SIZE;
+ } while (curr != end);
+}
void mte_enable_kernel(void);
void mte_init_tags(u64 max_tag);
@@ -46,13 +94,14 @@ static inline u8 mte_get_mem_tag(void *addr)
{
return 0xFF;
}
+
static inline u8 mte_get_random_tag(void)
{
return 0xFF;
}
-static inline void *mte_set_mem_tag_range(void *addr, size_t size, u8 tag)
+
+static inline void mte_set_mem_tag_range(void *addr, size_t size, u8 tag)
{
- return addr;
}
static inline void mte_enable_kernel(void)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h
index d02aff9f493d09..9b557a457f244c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h
@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@
#include <asm/compiler.h>
#include <asm/mte-def.h>
-#define __MTE_PREAMBLE ARM64_ASM_PREAMBLE ".arch_extension memtag\n"
-
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
#include <linux/bitfield.h>
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c
index 2cfc850809ce7a..b3c70a612c7a93 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
#include <asm/barrier.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/mte.h>
-#include <asm/mte-kasan.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/sysreg.h>
@@ -88,51 +87,6 @@ int memcmp_pages(struct page *page1, struct page *page2)
return ret;
}
-u8 mte_get_mem_tag(void *addr)
-{
- if (!system_supports_mte())
- return 0xFF;
-
- asm(__MTE_PREAMBLE "ldg %0, [%0]"
- : "+r" (addr));
-
- return mte_get_ptr_tag(addr);
-}
-
-u8 mte_get_random_tag(void)
-{
- void *addr;
-
- if (!system_supports_mte())
- return 0xFF;
-
- asm(__MTE_PREAMBLE "irg %0, %0"
- : "+r" (addr));
-
- return mte_get_ptr_tag(addr);
-}
-
-void *mte_set_mem_tag_range(void *addr, size_t size, u8 tag)
-{
- void *ptr = addr;
-
- if ((!system_supports_mte()) || (size == 0))
- return addr;
-
- /* Make sure that size is MTE granule aligned. */
- WARN_ON(size & (MTE_GRANULE_SIZE - 1));
-
- /* Make sure that the address is MTE granule aligned. */
- WARN_ON((u64)addr & (MTE_GRANULE_SIZE - 1));
-
- tag = 0xF0 | tag;
- ptr = (void *)__tag_set(ptr, tag);
-
- mte_assign_mem_tag_range(ptr, size);
-
- return ptr;
-}
-
void mte_init_tags(u64 max_tag)
{
static bool gcr_kernel_excl_initialized;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/mte.S b/arch/arm64/lib/mte.S
index 9e1a12e1005336..351537c12f36ea 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/lib/mte.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/lib/mte.S
@@ -149,19 +149,3 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(mte_restore_page_tags)
ret
SYM_FUNC_END(mte_restore_page_tags)
-
-/*
- * Assign allocation tags for a region of memory based on the pointer tag
- * x0 - source pointer
- * x1 - size
- *
- * Note: The address must be non-NULL and MTE_GRANULE_SIZE aligned and
- * size must be non-zero and MTE_GRANULE_SIZE aligned.
- */
-SYM_FUNC_START(mte_assign_mem_tag_range)
-1: stg x0, [x0]
- add x0, x0, #MTE_GRANULE_SIZE
- subs x1, x1, #MTE_GRANULE_SIZE
- b.gt 1b
- ret
-SYM_FUNC_END(mte_assign_mem_tag_range)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
index dc9f96442edced..f37d4e3830b79a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/acpi.h>
#include <linux/bitfield.h>
#include <linux/extable.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/hardirq.h>
@@ -389,6 +390,9 @@ static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
} else if (addr < PAGE_SIZE) {
msg = "NULL pointer dereference";
} else {
+ if (kfence_handle_page_fault(addr, esr & ESR_ELx_WNR, regs))
+ return;
+
msg = "paging request";
}
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
index 25af183e4bed9d..ef7698c4e2f083 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
@@ -1444,16 +1444,19 @@ static void __remove_pgd_mapping(pgd_t *pgdir, unsigned long start, u64 size)
free_empty_tables(start, end, PAGE_OFFSET, PAGE_END);
}
-static bool inside_linear_region(u64 start, u64 size)
+struct range arch_get_mappable_range(void)
{
+ struct range mhp_range;
+
/*
* Linear mapping region is the range [PAGE_OFFSET..(PAGE_END - 1)]
* accommodating both its ends but excluding PAGE_END. Max physical
* range which can be mapped inside this linear mapping range, must
* also be derived from its end points.
*/
- return start >= __pa(_PAGE_OFFSET(vabits_actual)) &&
- (start + size - 1) <= __pa(PAGE_END - 1);
+ mhp_range.start = __pa(_PAGE_OFFSET(vabits_actual));
+ mhp_range.end = __pa(PAGE_END - 1);
+ return mhp_range;
}
int arch_add_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size,
@@ -1461,12 +1464,14 @@ int arch_add_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size,
{
int ret, flags = 0;
- if (!inside_linear_region(start, size)) {
- pr_err("[%llx %llx] is outside linear mapping region\n", start, start + size);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ VM_BUG_ON(!mhp_range_allowed(start, size, true));
- if (rodata_full || debug_pagealloc_enabled())
+ /*
+ * KFENCE requires linear map to be mapped at page granularity, so that
+ * it is possible to protect/unprotect single pages in the KFENCE pool.
+ */
+ if (rodata_full || debug_pagealloc_enabled() ||
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE))
flags = NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_CONT_MAPPINGS;
__create_pgd_mapping(swapper_pg_dir, start, __phys_to_virt(start),
diff --git a/arch/mips/mm/cache.c b/arch/mips/mm/cache.c
index 1754498b071744..7719d632df8dfa 100644
--- a/arch/mips/mm/cache.c
+++ b/arch/mips/mm/cache.c
@@ -157,29 +157,31 @@ unsigned long _page_cachable_default;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(_page_cachable_default);
#define PM(p) __pgprot(_page_cachable_default | (p))
+#define PVA(p) PM(_PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_ACCESSED | (p))
static inline void setup_protection_map(void)
{
protection_map[0] = PM(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_NO_EXEC | _PAGE_NO_READ);
- protection_map[1] = PM(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_NO_EXEC);
- protection_map[2] = PM(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_NO_EXEC | _PAGE_NO_READ);
- protection_map[3] = PM(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_NO_EXEC);
- protection_map[4] = PM(_PAGE_PRESENT);
- protection_map[5] = PM(_PAGE_PRESENT);
- protection_map[6] = PM(_PAGE_PRESENT);
- protection_map[7] = PM(_PAGE_PRESENT);
+ protection_map[1] = PVA(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_NO_EXEC);
+ protection_map[2] = PVA(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_NO_EXEC | _PAGE_NO_READ);
+ protection_map[3] = PVA(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_NO_EXEC);
+ protection_map[4] = PVA(_PAGE_PRESENT);
+ protection_map[5] = PVA(_PAGE_PRESENT);
+ protection_map[6] = PVA(_PAGE_PRESENT);
+ protection_map[7] = PVA(_PAGE_PRESENT);
protection_map[8] = PM(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_NO_EXEC | _PAGE_NO_READ);
- protection_map[9] = PM(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_NO_EXEC);
- protection_map[10] = PM(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_NO_EXEC | _PAGE_WRITE |
+ protection_map[9] = PVA(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_NO_EXEC);
+ protection_map[10] = PVA(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_NO_EXEC | _PAGE_WRITE |
_PAGE_NO_READ);
- protection_map[11] = PM(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_NO_EXEC | _PAGE_WRITE);
- protection_map[12] = PM(_PAGE_PRESENT);
- protection_map[13] = PM(_PAGE_PRESENT);
- protection_map[14] = PM(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_WRITE);
- protection_map[15] = PM(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_WRITE);
+ protection_map[11] = PVA(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_NO_EXEC | _PAGE_WRITE);
+ protection_map[12] = PVA(_PAGE_PRESENT);
+ protection_map[13] = PVA(_PAGE_PRESENT);
+ protection_map[14] = PVA(_PAGE_PRESENT);
+ protection_map[15] = PVA(_PAGE_PRESENT);
}
+#undef _PVA
#undef PM
void cpu_cache_init(void)
diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/init.c b/arch/s390/mm/init.c
index 73a163065b95f6..0e76b2127dc6b8 100644
--- a/arch/s390/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/init.c
@@ -297,6 +297,7 @@ int arch_add_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size,
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(params->pgprot.pgprot != PAGE_KERNEL.pgprot))
return -EINVAL;
+ VM_BUG_ON(!mhp_range_allowed(start, size, true));
rc = vmem_add_mapping(start, size);
if (rc)
return rc;
diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/vmem.c b/arch/s390/mm/vmem.c
index 01f3a5f58e6420..82dbf945010583 100644
--- a/arch/s390/mm/vmem.c
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/vmem.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
* Author(s): Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
*/
+#include <linux/memory_hotplug.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/pfn.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
@@ -532,11 +533,22 @@ void vmem_remove_mapping(unsigned long start, unsigned long size)
mutex_unlock(&vmem_mutex);
}
+struct range arch_get_mappable_range(void)
+{
+ struct range mhp_range;
+
+ mhp_range.start = 0;
+ mhp_range.end = VMEM_MAX_PHYS - 1;
+ return mhp_range;
+}
+
int vmem_add_mapping(unsigned long start, unsigned long size)
{
+ struct range range = arch_get_mappable_range();
int ret;
- if (start + size > VMEM_MAX_PHYS ||
+ if (start < range.start ||
+ start + size > range.end + 1 ||
start + size < start)
return -ERANGE;
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index cd4b9b1204a81a..2792879d398ee4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ config X86
select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVE
select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if X86_64
select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC if X86_64
+ select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE
select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU
select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if MMU && COMPAT
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..97bbb4a9083a76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * x86 KFENCE support.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, Google LLC.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_KFENCE_H
+#define _ASM_X86_KFENCE_H
+
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
+
+#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/set_memory.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+
+/* Force 4K pages for __kfence_pool. */
+static inline bool arch_kfence_init_pool(void)
+{
+ unsigned long addr;
+
+ for (addr = (unsigned long)__kfence_pool; is_kfence_address((void *)addr);
+ addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ unsigned int level;
+
+ if (!lookup_address(addr, &level))
+ return false;
+
+ if (level != PG_LEVEL_4K)
+ set_memory_4k(addr, 1);
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/* Protect the given page and flush TLB. */
+static inline bool kfence_protect_page(unsigned long addr, bool protect)
+{
+ unsigned int level;
+ pte_t *pte = lookup_address(addr, &level);
+
+ if (WARN_ON(!pte || level != PG_LEVEL_4K))
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * We need to avoid IPIs, as we may get KFENCE allocations or faults
+ * with interrupts disabled. Therefore, the below is best-effort, and
+ * does not flush TLBs on all CPUs. We can tolerate some inaccuracy;
+ * lazy fault handling takes care of faults after the page is PRESENT.
+ */
+
+ if (protect)
+ set_pte(pte, __pte(pte_val(*pte) & ~_PAGE_PRESENT));
+ else
+ set_pte(pte, __pte(pte_val(*pte) | _PAGE_PRESENT));
+
+ /* Flush this CPU's TLB. */
+ flush_tlb_one_kernel(addr);
+ return true;
+}
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_KFENCE_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 525197381baa81..a73347e2cdfc56 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/kdebug.h> /* oops_begin/end, ... */
#include <linux/extable.h> /* search_exception_tables */
#include <linux/memblock.h> /* max_low_pfn */
+#include <linux/kfence.h> /* kfence_handle_page_fault */
#include <linux/kprobes.h> /* NOKPROBE_SYMBOL, ... */
#include <linux/mmiotrace.h> /* kmmio_handler, ... */
#include <linux/perf_event.h> /* perf_sw_event */
@@ -680,6 +681,11 @@ page_fault_oops(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI))
efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault(address);
+ /* Only not-present faults should be handled by KFENCE. */
+ if (!(error_code & X86_PF_PROT) &&
+ kfence_handle_page_fault(address, error_code & X86_PF_WRITE, regs))
+ return;
+
oops:
/*
* Oops. The kernel tried to access some bad page. We'll have to
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c
index 8f665c352bf0d3..ca311aaa67b889 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c
@@ -1164,12 +1164,14 @@ static void *memtype_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
static void *memtype_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
+ kfree(v);
++*pos;
return memtype_get_idx(*pos);
}
static void memtype_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
+ kfree(v);
}
static int memtype_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
@@ -1181,8 +1183,6 @@ static int memtype_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
entry_print->end,
cattr_name(entry_print->type));
- kfree(entry_print);
-
return 0;
}
diff --git a/drivers/auxdisplay/cfag12864b.c b/drivers/auxdisplay/cfag12864b.c
index 7eebae7e322c60..fd430e6866a117 100644
--- a/drivers/auxdisplay/cfag12864b.c
+++ b/drivers/auxdisplay/cfag12864b.c
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
* Description: cfag12864b LCD driver
* Depends: ks0108
*
- * Author: Copyright (C) Miguel Ojeda Sandonis
+ * Author: Copyright (C) Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
* Date: 2006-10-31
*/
@@ -376,5 +376,5 @@ module_init(cfag12864b_init);
module_exit(cfag12864b_exit);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
-MODULE_AUTHOR("Miguel Ojeda Sandonis <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("cfag12864b LCD driver");
diff --git a/drivers/auxdisplay/cfag12864bfb.c b/drivers/auxdisplay/cfag12864bfb.c
index 2002291ab33882..d66821adf45324 100644
--- a/drivers/auxdisplay/cfag12864bfb.c
+++ b/drivers/auxdisplay/cfag12864bfb.c
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
* Description: cfag12864b LCD framebuffer driver
* Depends: cfag12864b
*
- * Author: Copyright (C) Miguel Ojeda Sandonis
+ * Author: Copyright (C) Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
* Date: 2006-10-31
*/
@@ -171,5 +171,5 @@ module_init(cfag12864bfb_init);
module_exit(cfag12864bfb_exit);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
-MODULE_AUTHOR("Miguel Ojeda Sandonis <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("cfag12864b LCD framebuffer driver");
diff --git a/drivers/auxdisplay/ks0108.c b/drivers/auxdisplay/ks0108.c
index abfe3fa9e6f459..03c95ad4216c5a 100644
--- a/drivers/auxdisplay/ks0108.c
+++ b/drivers/auxdisplay/ks0108.c
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
* Description: ks0108 LCD Controller driver
* Depends: parport
*
- * Author: Copyright (C) Miguel Ojeda Sandonis
+ * Author: Copyright (C) Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
* Date: 2006-10-31
*/
@@ -182,6 +182,6 @@ module_init(ks0108_init);
module_exit(ks0108_exit);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
-MODULE_AUTHOR("Miguel Ojeda Sandonis <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ks0108 LCD Controller driver");
diff --git a/drivers/base/memory.c b/drivers/base/memory.c
index eef4ffb6122c9f..f35298425575ef 100644
--- a/drivers/base/memory.c
+++ b/drivers/base/memory.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static const char *const online_type_to_str[] = {
[MMOP_ONLINE_MOVABLE] = "online_movable",
};
-int memhp_online_type_from_str(const char *str)
+int mhp_online_type_from_str(const char *str)
{
int i;
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ static int memory_subsys_offline(struct device *dev)
static ssize_t state_store(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t count)
{
- const int online_type = memhp_online_type_from_str(buf);
+ const int online_type = mhp_online_type_from_str(buf);
struct memory_block *mem = to_memory_block(dev);
int ret;
@@ -290,20 +290,20 @@ static ssize_t state_store(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
}
/*
- * phys_device is a bad name for this. What I really want
- * is a way to differentiate between memory ranges that
- * are part of physical devices that constitute
- * a complete removable unit or fru.
- * i.e. do these ranges belong to the same physical device,
- * s.t. if I offline all of these sections I can then
- * remove the physical device?
+ * Legacy interface that we cannot remove: s390x exposes the storage increment
+ * covered by a memory block, allowing for identifying which memory blocks
+ * comprise a storage increment. Since a memory block spans complete
+ * storage increments nowadays, this interface is basically unused. Other
+ * archs never exposed != 0.
*/
static ssize_t phys_device_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct memory_block *mem = to_memory_block(dev);
+ unsigned long start_pfn = section_nr_to_pfn(mem->start_section_nr);
- return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", mem->phys_device);
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n",
+ arch_get_memory_phys_device(start_pfn));
}
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE
@@ -387,19 +387,19 @@ static ssize_t auto_online_blocks_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n",
- online_type_to_str[memhp_default_online_type]);
+ online_type_to_str[mhp_default_online_type]);
}
static ssize_t auto_online_blocks_store(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t count)
{
- const int online_type = memhp_online_type_from_str(buf);
+ const int online_type = mhp_online_type_from_str(buf);
if (online_type < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- memhp_default_online_type = online_type;
+ mhp_default_online_type = online_type;
return count;
}
@@ -488,11 +488,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR_WO(soft_offline_page);
static DEVICE_ATTR_WO(hard_offline_page);
#endif
-/*
- * Note that phys_device is optional. It is here to allow for
- * differentiation between which *physical* devices each
- * section belongs to...
- */
+/* See phys_device_show(). */
int __weak arch_get_memory_phys_device(unsigned long start_pfn)
{
return 0;
@@ -574,7 +570,6 @@ int register_memory(struct memory_block *memory)
static int init_memory_block(unsigned long block_id, unsigned long state)
{
struct memory_block *mem;
- unsigned long start_pfn;
int ret = 0;
mem = find_memory_block_by_id(block_id);
@@ -588,8 +583,6 @@ static int init_memory_block(unsigned long block_id, unsigned long state)
mem->start_section_nr = block_id * sections_per_block;
mem->state = state;
- start_pfn = section_nr_to_pfn(mem->start_section_nr);
- mem->phys_device = arch_get_memory_phys_device(start_pfn);
mem->nid = NUMA_NO_NODE;
ret = register_memory(mem);
diff --git a/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c b/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c
index d7018543842e02..a711a2e2a7946b 100644
--- a/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c
@@ -1081,7 +1081,7 @@ static ssize_t mm_stat_show(struct device *dev,
zram->limit_pages << PAGE_SHIFT,
max_used << PAGE_SHIFT,
(u64)atomic64_read(&zram->stats.same_pages),
- pool_stats.pages_compacted,
+ atomic_long_read(&pool_stats.pages_compacted),
(u64)atomic64_read(&zram->stats.huge_pages),
(u64)atomic64_read(&zram->stats.huge_pages_since));
up_read(&zram->init_lock);
diff --git a/drivers/hv/hv_balloon.c b/drivers/hv/hv_balloon.c
index 8c471823a5afa8..2f776d78e3c1a2 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/hv_balloon.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/hv_balloon.c
@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ static void hv_mem_hot_add(unsigned long start, unsigned long size,
nid = memory_add_physaddr_to_nid(PFN_PHYS(start_pfn));
ret = add_memory(nid, PFN_PHYS((start_pfn)),
- (HA_CHUNK << PAGE_SHIFT), MEMHP_MERGE_RESOURCE);
+ (HA_CHUNK << PAGE_SHIFT), MHP_MERGE_RESOURCE);
if (ret) {
pr_err("hot_add memory failed error is %d\n", ret);
diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_mem.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_mem.c
index 85a272c9978efe..10ec60d81e847b 100644
--- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_mem.c
+++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_mem.c
@@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ static int virtio_mem_add_memory(struct virtio_mem *vm, uint64_t addr,
/* Memory might get onlined immediately. */
atomic64_add(size, &vm->offline_size);
rc = add_memory_driver_managed(vm->nid, addr, size, vm->resource_name,
- MEMHP_MERGE_RESOURCE);
+ MHP_MERGE_RESOURCE);
if (rc) {
atomic64_sub(size, &vm->offline_size);
dev_warn(&vm->vdev->dev, "adding memory failed: %d\n", rc);
@@ -2222,7 +2222,7 @@ static int virtio_mem_unplug_pending_mb(struct virtio_mem *vm)
*/
static void virtio_mem_refresh_config(struct virtio_mem *vm)
{
- const uint64_t phys_limit = 1UL << MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS;
+ const struct range pluggable_range = mhp_get_pluggable_range(true);
uint64_t new_plugged_size, usable_region_size, end_addr;
/* the plugged_size is just a reflection of what _we_ did previously */
@@ -2234,15 +2234,25 @@ static void virtio_mem_refresh_config(struct virtio_mem *vm)
/* calculate the last usable memory block id */
virtio_cread_le(vm->vdev, struct virtio_mem_config,
usable_region_size, &usable_region_size);
- end_addr = vm->addr + usable_region_size;
- end_addr = min(end_addr, phys_limit);
+ end_addr = min(vm->addr + usable_region_size - 1,
+ pluggable_range.end);
- if (vm->in_sbm)
- vm->sbm.last_usable_mb_id =
- virtio_mem_phys_to_mb_id(end_addr) - 1;
- else
- vm->bbm.last_usable_bb_id =
- virtio_mem_phys_to_bb_id(vm, end_addr) - 1;
+ if (vm->in_sbm) {
+ vm->sbm.last_usable_mb_id = virtio_mem_phys_to_mb_id(end_addr);
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(end_addr + 1, memory_block_size_bytes()))
+ vm->sbm.last_usable_mb_id--;
+ } else {
+ vm->bbm.last_usable_bb_id = virtio_mem_phys_to_bb_id(vm,
+ end_addr);
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(end_addr + 1, vm->bbm.bb_size))
+ vm->bbm.last_usable_bb_id--;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we cannot plug any of our device memory (e.g., nothing in the
+ * usable region is addressable), the last usable memory block id will
+ * be smaller than the first usable memory block id. We'll stop
+ * attempting to add memory with -ENOSPC from our main loop.
+ */
/* see if there is a request to change the size */
virtio_cread_le(vm->vdev, struct virtio_mem_config, requested_size,
@@ -2364,7 +2374,7 @@ static int virtio_mem_init_vq(struct virtio_mem *vm)
static int virtio_mem_init(struct virtio_mem *vm)
{
- const uint64_t phys_limit = 1UL << MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS;
+ const struct range pluggable_range = mhp_get_pluggable_range(true);
uint64_t sb_size, addr;
uint16_t node_id;
@@ -2405,9 +2415,10 @@ static int virtio_mem_init(struct virtio_mem *vm)
if (!IS_ALIGNED(vm->addr + vm->region_size, memory_block_size_bytes()))
dev_warn(&vm->vdev->dev,
"The alignment of the physical end address can make some memory unusable.\n");
- if (vm->addr + vm->region_size > phys_limit)
+ if (vm->addr < pluggable_range.start ||
+ vm->addr + vm->region_size - 1 > pluggable_range.end)
dev_warn(&vm->vdev->dev,
- "Some memory is not addressable. This can make some memory unusable.\n");
+ "Some device memory is not addressable/pluggable. This can make some memory unusable.\n");
/*
* We want subblocks to span at least MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES and
@@ -2429,7 +2440,8 @@ static int virtio_mem_init(struct virtio_mem *vm)
vm->sbm.sb_size;
/* Round up to the next full memory block */
- addr = vm->addr + memory_block_size_bytes() - 1;
+ addr = max_t(uint64_t, vm->addr, pluggable_range.start) +
+ memory_block_size_bytes() - 1;
vm->sbm.first_mb_id = virtio_mem_phys_to_mb_id(addr);
vm->sbm.next_mb_id = vm->sbm.first_mb_id;
} else {
@@ -2450,7 +2462,8 @@ static int virtio_mem_init(struct virtio_mem *vm)
}
/* Round up to the next aligned big block */
- addr = vm->addr + vm->bbm.bb_size - 1;
+ addr = max_t(uint64_t, vm->addr, pluggable_range.start) +
+ vm->bbm.bb_size - 1;
vm->bbm.first_bb_id = virtio_mem_phys_to_bb_id(vm, addr);
vm->bbm.next_bb_id = vm->bbm.first_bb_id;
}
diff --git a/drivers/xen/balloon.c b/drivers/xen/balloon.c
index b57b2067ecbfb8..671c71245a7b2f 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/balloon.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/balloon.c
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ static enum bp_state reserve_additional_memory(void)
mutex_unlock(&balloon_mutex);
/* add_memory_resource() requires the device_hotplug lock */
lock_device_hotplug();
- rc = add_memory_resource(nid, resource, MEMHP_MERGE_RESOURCE);
+ rc = add_memory_resource(nid, resource, MHP_MERGE_RESOURCE);
unlock_device_hotplug();
mutex_lock(&balloon_mutex);
diff --git a/fs/coredump.c b/fs/coredump.c
index ae778937a1ffe6..1c0fdc1aa70b4a 100644
--- a/fs/coredump.c
+++ b/fs/coredump.c
@@ -897,10 +897,10 @@ int dump_user_range(struct coredump_params *cprm, unsigned long start,
*/
page = get_dump_page(addr);
if (page) {
- void *kaddr = kmap(page);
+ void *kaddr = kmap_local_page(page);
stop = !dump_emit(cprm, kaddr, PAGE_SIZE);
- kunmap(page);
+ kunmap_local(kaddr);
put_page(page);
} else {
stop = !dump_skip(cprm, PAGE_SIZE);
diff --git a/fs/iomap/seek.c b/fs/iomap/seek.c
index 107ee80c356833..dab1b02eba5b7f 100644
--- a/fs/iomap/seek.c
+++ b/fs/iomap/seek.c
@@ -10,122 +10,17 @@
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/pagevec.h>
-/*
- * Seek for SEEK_DATA / SEEK_HOLE within @page, starting at @lastoff.
- * Returns true if found and updates @lastoff to the offset in file.
- */
-static bool
-page_seek_hole_data(struct inode *inode, struct page *page, loff_t *lastoff,
- int whence)
-{
- const struct address_space_operations *ops = inode->i_mapping->a_ops;
- unsigned int bsize = i_blocksize(inode), off;
- bool seek_data = whence == SEEK_DATA;
- loff_t poff = page_offset(page);
-
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(*lastoff >= poff + PAGE_SIZE))
- return false;
-
- if (*lastoff < poff) {
- /*
- * Last offset smaller than the start of the page means we found
- * a hole:
- */
- if (whence == SEEK_HOLE)
- return true;
- *lastoff = poff;
- }
-
- /*
- * Just check the page unless we can and should check block ranges:
- */
- if (bsize == PAGE_SIZE || !ops->is_partially_uptodate)
- return PageUptodate(page) == seek_data;
-
- lock_page(page);
- if (unlikely(page->mapping != inode->i_mapping))
- goto out_unlock_not_found;
-
- for (off = 0; off < PAGE_SIZE; off += bsize) {
- if (offset_in_page(*lastoff) >= off + bsize)
- continue;
- if (ops->is_partially_uptodate(page, off, bsize) == seek_data) {
- unlock_page(page);
- return true;
- }
- *lastoff = poff + off + bsize;
- }
-
-out_unlock_not_found:
- unlock_page(page);
- return false;
-}
-
-/*
- * Seek for SEEK_DATA / SEEK_HOLE in the page cache.
- *
- * Within unwritten extents, the page cache determines which parts are holes
- * and which are data: uptodate buffer heads count as data; everything else
- * counts as a hole.
- *
- * Returns the resulting offset on successs, and -ENOENT otherwise.
- */
static loff_t
-page_cache_seek_hole_data(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t length,
- int whence)
-{
- pgoff_t index = offset >> PAGE_SHIFT;
- pgoff_t end = DIV_ROUND_UP(offset + length, PAGE_SIZE);
- loff_t lastoff = offset;
- struct pagevec pvec;
-
- if (length <= 0)
- return -ENOENT;
-
- pagevec_init(&pvec);
-
- do {
- unsigned nr_pages, i;
-
- nr_pages = pagevec_lookup_range(&pvec, inode->i_mapping, &index,
- end - 1);
- if (nr_pages == 0)
- break;
-
- for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
- struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
-
- if (page_seek_hole_data(inode, page, &lastoff, whence))
- goto check_range;
- lastoff = page_offset(page) + PAGE_SIZE;
- }
- pagevec_release(&pvec);
- } while (index < end);
-
- /* When no page at lastoff and we are not done, we found a hole. */
- if (whence != SEEK_HOLE)
- goto not_found;
-
-check_range:
- if (lastoff < offset + length)
- goto out;
-not_found:
- lastoff = -ENOENT;
-out:
- pagevec_release(&pvec);
- return lastoff;
-}
-
-
-static loff_t
-iomap_seek_hole_actor(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t length,
+iomap_seek_hole_actor(struct inode *inode, loff_t start, loff_t length,
void *data, struct iomap *iomap, struct iomap *srcmap)
{
+ loff_t offset = start;
+
switch (iomap->type) {
case IOMAP_UNWRITTEN:
- offset = page_cache_seek_hole_data(inode, offset, length,
- SEEK_HOLE);
- if (offset < 0)
+ offset = mapping_seek_hole_data(inode->i_mapping, start,
+ start + length, SEEK_HOLE);
+ if (offset == start + length)
return length;
fallthrough;
case IOMAP_HOLE:
@@ -164,15 +59,17 @@ iomap_seek_hole(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, const struct iomap_ops *ops)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(iomap_seek_hole);
static loff_t
-iomap_seek_data_actor(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t length,
+iomap_seek_data_actor(struct inode *inode, loff_t start, loff_t length,
void *data, struct iomap *iomap, struct iomap *srcmap)
{
+ loff_t offset = start;
+
switch (iomap->type) {
case IOMAP_HOLE:
return length;
case IOMAP_UNWRITTEN:
- offset = page_cache_seek_hole_data(inode, offset, length,
- SEEK_DATA);
+ offset = mapping_seek_hole_data(inode->i_mapping, start,
+ start + length, SEEK_DATA);
if (offset < 0)
return length;
fallthrough;
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 56bf143161227e..3851bfcdba56ef 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -67,7 +67,6 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
-#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
#include <linux/resource.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -386,19 +385,17 @@ static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
{
unsigned long wchan;
- char symname[KSYM_NAME_LEN];
- if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS))
- goto print0;
+ if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS))
+ wchan = get_wchan(task);
+ else
+ wchan = 0;
- wchan = get_wchan(task);
- if (wchan && !lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname)) {
- seq_puts(m, symname);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (wchan)
+ seq_printf(m, "%ps", (void *) wchan);
+ else
+ seq_putc(m, '0');
-print0:
- seq_putc(m, '0');
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KALLSYMS */
diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
index 656ba24c317d4c..984e42f8cb112a 100644
--- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
+++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_sys_call_handler(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter,
error = -ENOMEM;
if (count >= KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE)
goto out;
- kbuf = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ kbuf = kvzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kbuf)
goto out;
@@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_sys_call_handler(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter,
error = count;
out_free_buf:
- kfree(kbuf);
+ kvfree(kbuf);
out:
sysctl_head_finish(head);
diff --git a/include/linux/bitops.h b/include/linux/bitops.h
index a61f192c096b3a..a5a48303b0f111 100644
--- a/include/linux/bitops.h
+++ b/include/linux/bitops.h
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static inline int get_count_order_long(unsigned long l)
* __ffs64 - find first set bit in a 64 bit word
* @word: The 64 bit word
*
- * On 64 bit arches this is a synomyn for __ffs
+ * On 64 bit arches this is a synonym for __ffs
* The result is not defined if no bits are set, so check that @word
* is non-zero before calling this.
*/
diff --git a/include/linux/cfag12864b.h b/include/linux/cfag12864b.h
index 4060004968c813..6617d9c68d863b 100644
--- a/include/linux/cfag12864b.h
+++ b/include/linux/cfag12864b.h
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* Version: 0.1.0
* Description: cfag12864b LCD driver header
*
- * Author: Copyright (C) Miguel Ojeda Sandonis
+ * Author: Copyright (C) Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
* Date: 2006-10-12
*/
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 18639c069263fb..4c635050369777 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ struct inode;
struct group_info {
atomic_t usage;
int ngroups;
- kgid_t gid[0];
+ kgid_t gid[];
} __randomize_layout;
/**
diff --git a/include/linux/fortify-string.h b/include/linux/fortify-string.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..c1be37437e7780
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/fortify-string.h
@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _LINUX_FORTIFY_STRING_H_
+#define _LINUX_FORTIFY_STRING_H_
+
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
+extern void *__underlying_memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memchr);
+extern int __underlying_memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcmp);
+extern void *__underlying_memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcpy);
+extern void *__underlying_memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memmove);
+extern void *__underlying_memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memset);
+extern char *__underlying_strcat(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcat);
+extern char *__underlying_strcpy(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcpy);
+extern __kernel_size_t __underlying_strlen(const char *p) __RENAME(strlen);
+extern char *__underlying_strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count) __RENAME(strncat);
+extern char *__underlying_strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(strncpy);
+#else
+#define __underlying_memchr __builtin_memchr
+#define __underlying_memcmp __builtin_memcmp
+#define __underlying_memcpy __builtin_memcpy
+#define __underlying_memmove __builtin_memmove
+#define __underlying_memset __builtin_memset
+#define __underlying_strcat __builtin_strcat
+#define __underlying_strcpy __builtin_strcpy
+#define __underlying_strlen __builtin_strlen
+#define __underlying_strncat __builtin_strncat
+#define __underlying_strncpy __builtin_strncpy
+#endif
+
+__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
+{
+ size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
+
+ if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
+ __write_overflow();
+ if (p_size < size)
+ fortify_panic(__func__);
+ return __underlying_strncpy(p, q, size);
+}
+
+__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q)
+{
+ size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
+
+ if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
+ return __underlying_strcat(p, q);
+ if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size)
+ fortify_panic(__func__);
+ return p;
+}
+
+__FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p)
+{
+ __kernel_size_t ret;
+ size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
+
+ /* Work around gcc excess stack consumption issue */
+ if (p_size == (size_t)-1 ||
+ (__builtin_constant_p(p[p_size - 1]) && p[p_size - 1] == '\0'))
+ return __underlying_strlen(p);
+ ret = strnlen(p, p_size);
+ if (p_size <= ret)
+ fortify_panic(__func__);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+extern __kernel_size_t __real_strnlen(const char *, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(strnlen);
+__FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char *p, __kernel_size_t maxlen)
+{
+ size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
+ __kernel_size_t ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size);
+
+ if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret)
+ fortify_panic(__func__);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* defined after fortified strlen to reuse it */
+extern size_t __real_strlcpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strlcpy);
+__FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size)
+{
+ size_t ret;
+ size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
+ size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1);
+
+ if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
+ return __real_strlcpy(p, q, size);
+ ret = strlen(q);
+ if (size) {
+ size_t len = (ret >= size) ? size - 1 : ret;
+
+ if (__builtin_constant_p(len) && len >= p_size)
+ __write_overflow();
+ if (len >= p_size)
+ fortify_panic(__func__);
+ __underlying_memcpy(p, q, len);
+ p[len] = '\0';
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* defined after fortified strnlen to reuse it */
+extern ssize_t __real_strscpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strscpy);
+__FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t strscpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ /* Use string size rather than possible enclosing struct size. */
+ size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
+ size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1);
+
+ /* If we cannot get size of p and q default to call strscpy. */
+ if (p_size == (size_t) -1 && q_size == (size_t) -1)
+ return __real_strscpy(p, q, size);
+
+ /*
+ * If size can be known at compile time and is greater than
+ * p_size, generate a compile time write overflow error.
+ */
+ if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && size > p_size)
+ __write_overflow();
+
+ /*
+ * This call protects from read overflow, because len will default to q
+ * length if it smaller than size.
+ */
+ len = strnlen(q, size);
+ /*
+ * If len equals size, we will copy only size bytes which leads to
+ * -E2BIG being returned.
+ * Otherwise we will copy len + 1 because of the final '\O'.
+ */
+ len = len == size ? size : len + 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Generate a runtime write overflow error if len is greater than
+ * p_size.
+ */
+ if (len > p_size)
+ fortify_panic(__func__);
+
+ /*
+ * We can now safely call vanilla strscpy because we are protected from:
+ * 1. Read overflow thanks to call to strnlen().
+ * 2. Write overflow thanks to above ifs.
+ */
+ return __real_strscpy(p, q, len);
+}
+
+/* defined after fortified strlen and strnlen to reuse them */
+__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count)
+{
+ size_t p_len, copy_len;
+ size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
+ size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1);
+
+ if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
+ return __underlying_strncat(p, q, count);
+ p_len = strlen(p);
+ copy_len = strnlen(q, count);
+ if (p_size < p_len + copy_len + 1)
+ fortify_panic(__func__);
+ __underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
+ p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0';
+ return p;
+}
+
+__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
+{
+ size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+
+ if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
+ __write_overflow();
+ if (p_size < size)
+ fortify_panic(__func__);
+ return __underlying_memset(p, c, size);
+}
+
+__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
+{
+ size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+ size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
+
+ if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
+ if (p_size < size)
+ __write_overflow();
+ if (q_size < size)
+ __read_overflow2();
+ }
+ if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
+ fortify_panic(__func__);
+ return __underlying_memcpy(p, q, size);
+}
+
+__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
+{
+ size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+ size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
+
+ if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
+ if (p_size < size)
+ __write_overflow();
+ if (q_size < size)
+ __read_overflow2();
+ }
+ if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
+ fortify_panic(__func__);
+ return __underlying_memmove(p, q, size);
+}
+
+extern void *__real_memscan(void *, int, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(memscan);
+__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memscan(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
+{
+ size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+
+ if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
+ __read_overflow();
+ if (p_size < size)
+ fortify_panic(__func__);
+ return __real_memscan(p, c, size);
+}
+
+__FORTIFY_INLINE int memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
+{
+ size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+ size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
+
+ if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
+ if (p_size < size)
+ __read_overflow();
+ if (q_size < size)
+ __read_overflow2();
+ }
+ if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
+ fortify_panic(__func__);
+ return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size);
+}
+
+__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
+{
+ size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+
+ if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
+ __read_overflow();
+ if (p_size < size)
+ fortify_panic(__func__);
+ return __underlying_memchr(p, c, size);
+}
+
+void *__real_memchr_inv(const void *s, int c, size_t n) __RENAME(memchr_inv);
+__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr_inv(const void *p, int c, size_t size)
+{
+ size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+
+ if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
+ __read_overflow();
+ if (p_size < size)
+ fortify_panic(__func__);
+ return __real_memchr_inv(p, c, size);
+}
+
+extern void *__real_kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp) __RENAME(kmemdup);
+__FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void *p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+
+ if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
+ __read_overflow();
+ if (p_size < size)
+ fortify_panic(__func__);
+ return __real_kmemdup(p, size, gfp);
+}
+
+/* defined after fortified strlen and memcpy to reuse them */
+__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcpy(char *p, const char *q)
+{
+ size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
+ size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1);
+ size_t size;
+
+ if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
+ return __underlying_strcpy(p, q);
+ size = strlen(q) + 1;
+ /* test here to use the more stringent object size */
+ if (p_size < size)
+ fortify_panic(__func__);
+ memcpy(p, q, size);
+ return p;
+}
+
+/* Don't use these outside the FORITFY_SOURCE implementation */
+#undef __underlying_memchr
+#undef __underlying_memcmp
+#undef __underlying_memcpy
+#undef __underlying_memmove
+#undef __underlying_memset
+#undef __underlying_strcat
+#undef __underlying_strcpy
+#undef __underlying_strlen
+#undef __underlying_strncat
+#undef __underlying_strncpy
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_FORTIFY_STRING_H_ */
diff --git a/include/linux/gfp.h b/include/linux/gfp.h
index 220cd553a9e7db..8572a1474e16fb 100644
--- a/include/linux/gfp.h
+++ b/include/linux/gfp.h
@@ -634,6 +634,8 @@ bool gfp_pfmemalloc_allowed(gfp_t gfp_mask);
extern void pm_restrict_gfp_mask(void);
extern void pm_restore_gfp_mask(void);
+extern gfp_t vma_thp_gfp_mask(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
extern bool pm_suspended_storage(void);
#else
diff --git a/include/linux/init.h b/include/linux/init.h
index a01f01c1a5c541..31f54de5842985 100644
--- a/include/linux/init.h
+++ b/include/linux/init.h
@@ -338,14 +338,14 @@ struct obs_kernel_param {
var = 1; \
return 0; \
} \
- __setup_param(str_on, parse_##var##_on, parse_##var##_on, 1); \
+ early_param(str_on, parse_##var##_on); \
\
static int __init parse_##var##_off(char *arg) \
{ \
var = 0; \
return 0; \
} \
- __setup_param(str_off, parse_##var##_off, parse_##var##_off, 1)
+ early_param(str_off, parse_##var##_off)
/* Relies on boot_command_line being set */
void __init parse_early_param(void);
diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index 7eaf2d9effb49f..b91732bd05d781 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
struct kasan_cache {
int alloc_meta_offset;
int free_meta_offset;
+ bool is_kmalloc;
};
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
@@ -143,6 +144,13 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache,
__kasan_cache_create(cache, size, flags);
}
+void __kasan_cache_create_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache);
+static __always_inline void kasan_cache_create_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache)
+{
+ if (kasan_enabled())
+ __kasan_cache_create_kmalloc(cache);
+}
+
size_t __kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache);
static __always_inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)
{
@@ -192,6 +200,13 @@ static __always_inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
return false;
}
+void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
+static __always_inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr)
+{
+ if (kasan_enabled())
+ __kasan_kfree_large(ptr, _RET_IP_);
+}
+
void __kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
static __always_inline void kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr)
{
@@ -239,13 +254,6 @@ static __always_inline void * __must_check kasan_krealloc(const void *object,
return (void *)object;
}
-void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
-static __always_inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr)
-{
- if (kasan_enabled())
- __kasan_kfree_large(ptr, _RET_IP_);
-}
-
/*
* Unlike kasan_check_read/write(), kasan_check_byte() is performed even for
* the hardware tag-based mode that doesn't rely on compiler instrumentation.
@@ -278,6 +286,7 @@ static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
static inline void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache,
unsigned int *size,
slab_flags_t *flags) {}
+static inline void kasan_cache_create_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache) {}
static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
static inline void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page) {}
static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache,
@@ -293,6 +302,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
{
return false;
}
+static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr) {}
static inline void kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr) {}
static inline void *kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
gfp_t flags)
@@ -313,7 +323,6 @@ static inline void *kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size,
{
return (void *)object;
}
-static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr) {}
static inline bool kasan_check_byte(const void *address)
{
return true;
diff --git a/include/linux/kfence.h b/include/linux/kfence.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..a70d1ea0353252
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/kfence.h
@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE). Public interface for allocator and fault
+ * handler integration. For more info see Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, Google LLC.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_KFENCE_H
+#define _LINUX_KFENCE_H
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE
+
+/*
+ * We allocate an even number of pages, as it simplifies calculations to map
+ * address to metadata indices; effectively, the very first page serves as an
+ * extended guard page, but otherwise has no special purpose.
+ */
+#define KFENCE_POOL_SIZE ((CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS + 1) * 2 * PAGE_SIZE)
+extern char *__kfence_pool;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS
+#include <linux/static_key.h>
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kfence_allocation_key);
+#else
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+extern atomic_t kfence_allocation_gate;
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * is_kfence_address() - check if an address belongs to KFENCE pool
+ * @addr: address to check
+ *
+ * Return: true or false depending on whether the address is within the KFENCE
+ * object range.
+ *
+ * KFENCE objects live in a separate page range and are not to be intermixed
+ * with regular heap objects (e.g. KFENCE objects must never be added to the
+ * allocator freelists). Failing to do so may and will result in heap
+ * corruptions, therefore is_kfence_address() must be used to check whether
+ * an object requires specific handling.
+ *
+ * Note: This function may be used in fast-paths, and is performance critical.
+ * Future changes should take this into account; for instance, we want to avoid
+ * introducing another load and therefore need to keep KFENCE_POOL_SIZE a
+ * constant (until immediate patching support is added to the kernel).
+ */
+static __always_inline bool is_kfence_address(const void *addr)
+{
+ /*
+ * The non-NULL check is required in case the __kfence_pool pointer was
+ * never initialized; keep it in the slow-path after the range-check.
+ */
+ return unlikely((unsigned long)((char *)addr - __kfence_pool) < KFENCE_POOL_SIZE && addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * kfence_alloc_pool() - allocate the KFENCE pool via memblock
+ */
+void __init kfence_alloc_pool(void);
+
+/**
+ * kfence_init() - perform KFENCE initialization at boot time
+ *
+ * Requires that kfence_alloc_pool() was called before. This sets up the
+ * allocation gate timer, and requires that workqueues are available.
+ */
+void __init kfence_init(void);
+
+/**
+ * kfence_shutdown_cache() - handle shutdown_cache() for KFENCE objects
+ * @s: cache being shut down
+ *
+ * Before shutting down a cache, one must ensure there are no remaining objects
+ * allocated from it. Because KFENCE objects are not referenced from the cache
+ * directly, we need to check them here.
+ *
+ * Note that shutdown_cache() is internal to SL*B, and kmem_cache_destroy() does
+ * not return if allocated objects still exist: it prints an error message and
+ * simply aborts destruction of a cache, leaking memory.
+ *
+ * If the only such objects are KFENCE objects, we will not leak the entire
+ * cache, but instead try to provide more useful debug info by making allocated
+ * objects "zombie allocations". Objects may then still be used or freed (which
+ * is handled gracefully), but usage will result in showing KFENCE error reports
+ * which include stack traces to the user of the object, the original allocation
+ * site, and caller to shutdown_cache().
+ */
+void kfence_shutdown_cache(struct kmem_cache *s);
+
+/*
+ * Allocate a KFENCE object. Allocators must not call this function directly,
+ * use kfence_alloc() instead.
+ */
+void *__kfence_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, gfp_t flags);
+
+/**
+ * kfence_alloc() - allocate a KFENCE object with a low probability
+ * @s: struct kmem_cache with object requirements
+ * @size: exact size of the object to allocate (can be less than @s->size
+ * e.g. for kmalloc caches)
+ * @flags: GFP flags
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * NULL - must proceed with allocating as usual,
+ * * non-NULL - pointer to a KFENCE object.
+ *
+ * kfence_alloc() should be inserted into the heap allocation fast path,
+ * allowing it to transparently return KFENCE-allocated objects with a low
+ * probability using a static branch (the probability is controlled by the
+ * kfence.sample_interval boot parameter).
+ */
+static __always_inline void *kfence_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&kfence_allocation_key))
+#else
+ if (unlikely(!atomic_read(&kfence_allocation_gate)))
+#endif
+ return __kfence_alloc(s, size, flags);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * kfence_ksize() - get actual amount of memory allocated for a KFENCE object
+ * @addr: pointer to a heap object
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * 0 - not a KFENCE object, must call __ksize() instead,
+ * * non-0 - this many bytes can be accessed without causing a memory error.
+ *
+ * kfence_ksize() returns the number of bytes requested for a KFENCE object at
+ * allocation time. This number may be less than the object size of the
+ * corresponding struct kmem_cache.
+ */
+size_t kfence_ksize(const void *addr);
+
+/**
+ * kfence_object_start() - find the beginning of a KFENCE object
+ * @addr: address within a KFENCE-allocated object
+ *
+ * Return: address of the beginning of the object.
+ *
+ * SL[AU]B-allocated objects are laid out within a page one by one, so it is
+ * easy to calculate the beginning of an object given a pointer inside it and
+ * the object size. The same is not true for KFENCE, which places a single
+ * object at either end of the page. This helper function is used to find the
+ * beginning of a KFENCE-allocated object.
+ */
+void *kfence_object_start(const void *addr);
+
+/**
+ * __kfence_free() - release a KFENCE heap object to KFENCE pool
+ * @addr: object to be freed
+ *
+ * Requires: is_kfence_address(addr)
+ *
+ * Release a KFENCE object and mark it as freed.
+ */
+void __kfence_free(void *addr);
+
+/**
+ * kfence_free() - try to release an arbitrary heap object to KFENCE pool
+ * @addr: object to be freed
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * false - object doesn't belong to KFENCE pool and was ignored,
+ * * true - object was released to KFENCE pool.
+ *
+ * Release a KFENCE object and mark it as freed. May be called on any object,
+ * even non-KFENCE objects, to simplify integration of the hooks into the
+ * allocator's free codepath. The allocator must check the return value to
+ * determine if it was a KFENCE object or not.
+ */
+static __always_inline __must_check bool kfence_free(void *addr)
+{
+ if (!is_kfence_address(addr))
+ return false;
+ __kfence_free(addr);
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * kfence_handle_page_fault() - perform page fault handling for KFENCE pages
+ * @addr: faulting address
+ * @is_write: is access a write
+ * @regs: current struct pt_regs (can be NULL, but shows full stack trace)
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * false - address outside KFENCE pool,
+ * * true - page fault handled by KFENCE, no additional handling required.
+ *
+ * A page fault inside KFENCE pool indicates a memory error, such as an
+ * out-of-bounds access, a use-after-free or an invalid memory access. In these
+ * cases KFENCE prints an error message and marks the offending page as
+ * present, so that the kernel can proceed.
+ */
+bool __must_check kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *regs);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KFENCE */
+
+static inline bool is_kfence_address(const void *addr) { return false; }
+static inline void kfence_alloc_pool(void) { }
+static inline void kfence_init(void) { }
+static inline void kfence_shutdown_cache(struct kmem_cache *s) { }
+static inline void *kfence_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, gfp_t flags) { return NULL; }
+static inline size_t kfence_ksize(const void *addr) { return 0; }
+static inline void *kfence_object_start(const void *addr) { return NULL; }
+static inline void __kfence_free(void *addr) { }
+static inline bool __must_check kfence_free(void *addr) { return false; }
+static inline bool __must_check kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr, bool is_write,
+ struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_KFENCE_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/kgdb.h b/include/linux/kgdb.h
index 0444b44bd156de..392a3670944c6e 100644
--- a/include/linux/kgdb.h
+++ b/include/linux/kgdb.h
@@ -359,9 +359,11 @@ extern atomic_t kgdb_active;
extern bool dbg_is_early;
extern void __init dbg_late_init(void);
extern void kgdb_panic(const char *msg);
+extern void kgdb_free_init_mem(void);
#else /* ! CONFIG_KGDB */
#define in_dbg_master() (0)
#define dbg_late_init()
static inline void kgdb_panic(const char *msg) {}
+static inline void kgdb_free_init_mem(void) { }
#endif /* ! CONFIG_KGDB */
#endif /* _KGDB_H_ */
diff --git a/include/linux/khugepaged.h b/include/linux/khugepaged.h
index c941b73773216f..2fcc01891b474f 100644
--- a/include/linux/khugepaged.h
+++ b/include/linux/khugepaged.h
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#define _LINUX_KHUGEPAGED_H
#include <linux/sched/coredump.h> /* MMF_VM_HUGEPAGE */
+#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@ static inline int khugepaged_enter(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
{
if (!test_bit(MMF_VM_HUGEPAGE, &vma->vm_mm->flags))
if ((khugepaged_always() ||
+ (shmem_file(vma->vm_file) && shmem_huge_enabled(vma)) ||
(khugepaged_req_madv() && (vm_flags & VM_HUGEPAGE))) &&
!(vm_flags & VM_NOHUGEPAGE) &&
!test_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &vma->vm_mm->flags))
diff --git a/include/linux/ks0108.h b/include/linux/ks0108.h
index 0738389b42b601..1a37a664f91574 100644
--- a/include/linux/ks0108.h
+++ b/include/linux/ks0108.h
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* Version: 0.1.0
* Description: ks0108 LCD Controller driver header
*
- * Author: Copyright (C) Miguel Ojeda Sandonis
+ * Author: Copyright (C) Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
* Date: 2006-10-31
*/
diff --git a/include/linux/mdev.h b/include/linux/mdev.h
index 9004375c462eba..27eb383cb95de0 100644
--- a/include/linux/mdev.h
+++ b/include/linux/mdev.h
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ struct device *mdev_get_iommu_device(struct device *dev);
* @mdev: mdev_device structure on of mediated device
* that is being created
* Returns integer: success (0) or error (< 0)
- * @remove: Called to free resources in parent device's driver for a
+ * @remove: Called to free resources in parent device's driver for
* a mediated device. It is mandatory to provide 'remove'
* ops.
* @mdev: mdev_device device structure which is being
diff --git a/include/linux/memory.h b/include/linux/memory.h
index 439a89e758d87b..4da95e684e20f1 100644
--- a/include/linux/memory.h
+++ b/include/linux/memory.h
@@ -27,9 +27,8 @@ struct memory_block {
unsigned long start_section_nr;
unsigned long state; /* serialized by the dev->lock */
int online_type; /* for passing data to online routine */
- int phys_device; /* to which fru does this belong? */
- struct device dev;
int nid; /* NID for this memory block */
+ struct device dev;
};
int arch_get_memory_phys_device(unsigned long start_pfn);
diff --git a/include/linux/memory_hotplug.h b/include/linux/memory_hotplug.h
index 15acce5ab10647..7288aa5ef73b49 100644
--- a/include/linux/memory_hotplug.h
+++ b/include/linux/memory_hotplug.h
@@ -16,22 +16,7 @@ struct resource;
struct vmem_altmap;
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
-/*
- * Return page for the valid pfn only if the page is online. All pfn
- * walkers which rely on the fully initialized page->flags and others
- * should use this rather than pfn_valid && pfn_to_page
- */
-#define pfn_to_online_page(pfn) \
-({ \
- struct page *___page = NULL; \
- unsigned long ___pfn = pfn; \
- unsigned long ___nr = pfn_to_section_nr(___pfn); \
- \
- if (___nr < NR_MEM_SECTIONS && online_section_nr(___nr) && \
- pfn_valid_within(___pfn)) \
- ___page = pfn_to_page(___pfn); \
- ___page; \
-})
+struct page *pfn_to_online_page(unsigned long pfn);
/*
* Types for free bootmem stored in page->lru.next. These have to be in
@@ -68,7 +53,7 @@ typedef int __bitwise mhp_t;
* with this flag set, the resource pointer must no longer be used as it
* might be stale, or the resource might have changed.
*/
-#define MEMHP_MERGE_RESOURCE ((__force mhp_t)BIT(0))
+#define MHP_MERGE_RESOURCE ((__force mhp_t)BIT(0))
/*
* Extended parameters for memory hotplug:
@@ -81,6 +66,9 @@ struct mhp_params {
pgprot_t pgprot;
};
+bool mhp_range_allowed(u64 start, u64 size, bool need_mapping);
+struct range mhp_get_pluggable_range(bool need_mapping);
+
/*
* Zone resizing functions
*
@@ -131,10 +119,10 @@ extern int arch_add_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size,
struct mhp_params *params);
extern u64 max_mem_size;
-extern int memhp_online_type_from_str(const char *str);
+extern int mhp_online_type_from_str(const char *str);
/* Default online_type (MMOP_*) when new memory blocks are added. */
-extern int memhp_default_online_type;
+extern int mhp_default_online_type;
/* If movable_node boot option specified */
extern bool movable_node_enabled;
static inline bool movable_node_is_enabled(void)
@@ -281,6 +269,13 @@ static inline bool movable_node_is_enabled(void)
}
#endif /* ! CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG */
+/*
+ * Keep this declaration outside CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG as some
+ * platforms might override and use arch_get_mappable_range()
+ * for internal non memory hotplug purposes.
+ */
+struct range arch_get_mappable_range(void);
+
#if defined(CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG) || defined(CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT)
/*
* pgdat resizing functions
diff --git a/include/linux/memremap.h b/include/linux/memremap.h
index 79c49e7f5c304f..f5b464daeeca50 100644
--- a/include/linux/memremap.h
+++ b/include/linux/memremap.h
@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ void *devm_memremap_pages(struct device *dev, struct dev_pagemap *pgmap);
void devm_memunmap_pages(struct device *dev, struct dev_pagemap *pgmap);
struct dev_pagemap *get_dev_pagemap(unsigned long pfn,
struct dev_pagemap *pgmap);
+bool pgmap_pfn_valid(struct dev_pagemap *pgmap, unsigned long pfn);
unsigned long vmem_altmap_offset(struct vmem_altmap *altmap);
void vmem_altmap_free(struct vmem_altmap *altmap, unsigned long nr_pfns);
@@ -165,6 +166,11 @@ static inline struct dev_pagemap *get_dev_pagemap(unsigned long pfn,
return NULL;
}
+static inline bool pgmap_pfn_valid(struct dev_pagemap *pgmap, unsigned long pfn)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
static inline unsigned long vmem_altmap_offset(struct vmem_altmap *altmap)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/mmzone.h b/include/linux/mmzone.h
index 9198b7ade85ff7..47946cec758489 100644
--- a/include/linux/mmzone.h
+++ b/include/linux/mmzone.h
@@ -503,6 +503,9 @@ struct zone {
* bootmem allocator):
* managed_pages = present_pages - reserved_pages;
*
+ * cma pages is present pages that are assigned for CMA use
+ * (MIGRATE_CMA).
+ *
* So present_pages may be used by memory hotplug or memory power
* management logic to figure out unmanaged pages by checking
* (present_pages - managed_pages). And managed_pages should be used
@@ -527,6 +530,9 @@ struct zone {
atomic_long_t managed_pages;
unsigned long spanned_pages;
unsigned long present_pages;
+#ifdef CONFIG_CMA
+ unsigned long cma_pages;
+#endif
const char *name;
@@ -624,6 +630,15 @@ static inline unsigned long zone_managed_pages(struct zone *zone)
return (unsigned long)atomic_long_read(&zone->managed_pages);
}
+static inline unsigned long zone_cma_pages(struct zone *zone)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_CMA
+ return zone->cma_pages;
+#else
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
static inline unsigned long zone_end_pfn(const struct zone *zone)
{
return zone->zone_start_pfn + zone->spanned_pages;
@@ -903,6 +918,18 @@ static inline int local_memory_node(int node_id) { return node_id; };
*/
#define zone_idx(zone) ((zone) - (zone)->zone_pgdat->node_zones)
+#ifdef CONFIG_ZONE_DEVICE
+static inline bool zone_is_zone_device(struct zone *zone)
+{
+ return zone_idx(zone) == ZONE_DEVICE;
+}
+#else
+static inline bool zone_is_zone_device(struct zone *zone)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif
+
/*
* Returns true if a zone has pages managed by the buddy allocator.
* All the reclaim decisions have to use this function rather than
@@ -1291,13 +1318,14 @@ extern size_t mem_section_usage_size(void);
* which results in PFN_SECTION_SHIFT equal 6.
* To sum it up, at least 6 bits are available.
*/
-#define SECTION_MARKED_PRESENT (1UL<<0)
-#define SECTION_HAS_MEM_MAP (1UL<<1)
-#define SECTION_IS_ONLINE (1UL<<2)
-#define SECTION_IS_EARLY (1UL<<3)
-#define SECTION_MAP_LAST_BIT (1UL<<4)
-#define SECTION_MAP_MASK (~(SECTION_MAP_LAST_BIT-1))
-#define SECTION_NID_SHIFT 3
+#define SECTION_MARKED_PRESENT (1UL<<0)
+#define SECTION_HAS_MEM_MAP (1UL<<1)
+#define SECTION_IS_ONLINE (1UL<<2)
+#define SECTION_IS_EARLY (1UL<<3)
+#define SECTION_TAINT_ZONE_DEVICE (1UL<<4)
+#define SECTION_MAP_LAST_BIT (1UL<<5)
+#define SECTION_MAP_MASK (~(SECTION_MAP_LAST_BIT-1))
+#define SECTION_NID_SHIFT 3
static inline struct page *__section_mem_map_addr(struct mem_section *section)
{
@@ -1336,6 +1364,13 @@ static inline int online_section(struct mem_section *section)
return (section && (section->section_mem_map & SECTION_IS_ONLINE));
}
+static inline int online_device_section(struct mem_section *section)
+{
+ unsigned long flags = SECTION_IS_ONLINE | SECTION_TAINT_ZONE_DEVICE;
+
+ return section && ((section->section_mem_map & flags) == flags);
+}
+
static inline int online_section_nr(unsigned long nr)
{
return online_section(__nr_to_section(nr));
diff --git a/include/linux/page-flags.h b/include/linux/page-flags.h
index db914477057b25..04a34c08e0a654 100644
--- a/include/linux/page-flags.h
+++ b/include/linux/page-flags.h
@@ -810,7 +810,7 @@ static inline void ClearPageSlabPfmemalloc(struct page *page)
/*
* Flags checked when a page is freed. Pages being freed should not have
- * these flags set. It they are, there is a problem.
+ * these flags set. If they are, there is a problem.
*/
#define PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE \
(1UL << PG_lru | 1UL << PG_locked | \
@@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ static inline void ClearPageSlabPfmemalloc(struct page *page)
/*
* Flags checked when a page is prepped for return by the page allocator.
- * Pages being prepped should not have these flags set. It they are set,
+ * Pages being prepped should not have these flags set. If they are set,
* there has been a kernel bug or struct page corruption.
*
* __PG_HWPOISON is exceptional because it needs to be kept beyond page's
diff --git a/include/linux/pagemap.h b/include/linux/pagemap.h
index bd629d676a2733..20225b067583ab 100644
--- a/include/linux/pagemap.h
+++ b/include/linux/pagemap.h
@@ -315,6 +315,7 @@ pgoff_t page_cache_prev_miss(struct address_space *mapping,
#define FGP_NOWAIT 0x00000020
#define FGP_FOR_MMAP 0x00000040
#define FGP_HEAD 0x00000080
+#define FGP_ENTRY 0x00000100
struct page *pagecache_get_page(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t offset,
int fgp_flags, gfp_t cache_gfp_mask);
@@ -450,8 +451,7 @@ static inline struct page *find_subpage(struct page *head, pgoff_t index)
}
unsigned find_get_entries(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t start,
- unsigned int nr_entries, struct page **entries,
- pgoff_t *indices);
+ pgoff_t end, struct pagevec *pvec, pgoff_t *indices);
unsigned find_get_pages_range(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t *start,
pgoff_t end, unsigned int nr_pages,
struct page **pages);
@@ -759,6 +759,8 @@ extern void __delete_from_page_cache(struct page *page, void *shadow);
void replace_page_cache_page(struct page *old, struct page *new);
void delete_from_page_cache_batch(struct address_space *mapping,
struct pagevec *pvec);
+loff_t mapping_seek_hole_data(struct address_space *, loff_t start, loff_t end,
+ int whence);
/*
* Like add_to_page_cache_locked, but used to add newly allocated pages:
diff --git a/include/linux/pagevec.h b/include/linux/pagevec.h
index ad4ddc17d40393..7f3f19065a9f6d 100644
--- a/include/linux/pagevec.h
+++ b/include/linux/pagevec.h
@@ -25,10 +25,6 @@ struct pagevec {
void __pagevec_release(struct pagevec *pvec);
void __pagevec_lru_add(struct pagevec *pvec);
-unsigned pagevec_lookup_entries(struct pagevec *pvec,
- struct address_space *mapping,
- pgoff_t start, unsigned nr_entries,
- pgoff_t *indices);
void pagevec_remove_exceptionals(struct pagevec *pvec);
unsigned pagevec_lookup_range(struct pagevec *pvec,
struct address_space *mapping,
diff --git a/include/linux/pgtable.h b/include/linux/pgtable.h
index 36eb748f3c977d..cdfc4e9f253e4e 100644
--- a/include/linux/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/linux/pgtable.h
@@ -432,14 +432,6 @@ static inline void ptep_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addres
* To be differentiate with macro pte_mkyoung, this macro is used on platforms
* where software maintains page access bit.
*/
-#ifndef pte_sw_mkyoung
-static inline pte_t pte_sw_mkyoung(pte_t pte)
-{
- return pte;
-}
-#define pte_sw_mkyoung pte_sw_mkyoung
-#endif
-
#ifndef pte_savedwrite
#define pte_savedwrite pte_write
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h
index 2a9df80ea8876a..b5ebf6c012924d 100644
--- a/include/linux/ptrace.h
+++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static inline void ptrace_event(int event, unsigned long message)
*
* Check whether @event is enabled and, if so, report @event and @pid
* to the ptrace parent. @pid is reported as the pid_t seen from the
- * the ptrace parent's pid namespace.
+ * ptrace parent's pid namespace.
*
* Called without locks.
*/
diff --git a/include/linux/rmap.h b/include/linux/rmap.h
index 70085ca1a3fc9d..def5c62c93b3be 100644
--- a/include/linux/rmap.h
+++ b/include/linux/rmap.h
@@ -213,7 +213,8 @@ struct page_vma_mapped_walk {
static inline void page_vma_mapped_walk_done(struct page_vma_mapped_walk *pvmw)
{
- if (pvmw->pte)
+ /* HugeTLB pte is set to the relevant page table entry without pte_mapped. */
+ if (pvmw->pte && !PageHuge(pvmw->page))
pte_unmap(pvmw->pte);
if (pvmw->ptl)
spin_unlock(pvmw->ptl);
diff --git a/include/linux/slab_def.h b/include/linux/slab_def.h
index 9eb430c163c2b8..3aa5e1e73ab66f 100644
--- a/include/linux/slab_def.h
+++ b/include/linux/slab_def.h
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
#ifndef _LINUX_SLAB_DEF_H
#define _LINUX_SLAB_DEF_H
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
#include <linux/reciprocal_div.h>
/*
@@ -114,6 +115,8 @@ static inline unsigned int obj_to_index(const struct kmem_cache *cache,
static inline int objs_per_slab_page(const struct kmem_cache *cache,
const struct page *page)
{
+ if (is_kfence_address(page_address(page)))
+ return 1;
return cache->num;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/slub_def.h b/include/linux/slub_def.h
index 1be0ed5befa1cb..dcde82a4434cae 100644
--- a/include/linux/slub_def.h
+++ b/include/linux/slub_def.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
*
* (C) 2007 SGI, Christoph Lameter
*/
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
#include <linux/kobject.h>
#include <linux/reciprocal_div.h>
@@ -185,6 +186,8 @@ static inline unsigned int __obj_to_index(const struct kmem_cache *cache,
static inline unsigned int obj_to_index(const struct kmem_cache *cache,
const struct page *page, void *obj)
{
+ if (is_kfence_address(obj))
+ return 0;
return __obj_to_index(cache, page_address(page), obj);
}
diff --git a/include/linux/stackdepot.h b/include/linux/stackdepot.h
index 24d49c732341ab..6bb4bc1a5f5459 100644
--- a/include/linux/stackdepot.h
+++ b/include/linux/stackdepot.h
@@ -21,4 +21,13 @@ unsigned int stack_depot_fetch(depot_stack_handle_t handle,
unsigned int filter_irq_stacks(unsigned long *entries, unsigned int nr_entries);
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKDEPOT
+int stack_depot_init(void);
+#else
+static inline int stack_depot_init(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_STACKDEPOT */
+
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/string.h b/include/linux/string.h
index 4fcfb56abcf5fc..9521d8cab18e86 100644
--- a/include/linux/string.h
+++ b/include/linux/string.h
@@ -266,287 +266,7 @@ void __read_overflow3(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of ob
void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object passed as 1st parameter");
#if !defined(__NO_FORTIFY) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
-extern void *__underlying_memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memchr);
-extern int __underlying_memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcmp);
-extern void *__underlying_memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcpy);
-extern void *__underlying_memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memmove);
-extern void *__underlying_memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memset);
-extern char *__underlying_strcat(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcat);
-extern char *__underlying_strcpy(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcpy);
-extern __kernel_size_t __underlying_strlen(const char *p) __RENAME(strlen);
-extern char *__underlying_strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count) __RENAME(strncat);
-extern char *__underlying_strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(strncpy);
-#else
-#define __underlying_memchr __builtin_memchr
-#define __underlying_memcmp __builtin_memcmp
-#define __underlying_memcpy __builtin_memcpy
-#define __underlying_memmove __builtin_memmove
-#define __underlying_memset __builtin_memset
-#define __underlying_strcat __builtin_strcat
-#define __underlying_strcpy __builtin_strcpy
-#define __underlying_strlen __builtin_strlen
-#define __underlying_strncat __builtin_strncat
-#define __underlying_strncpy __builtin_strncpy
-#endif
-
-__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
-{
- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
- if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
- __write_overflow();
- if (p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(__func__);
- return __underlying_strncpy(p, q, size);
-}
-
-__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q)
-{
- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
- if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
- return __underlying_strcat(p, q);
- if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size)
- fortify_panic(__func__);
- return p;
-}
-
-__FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p)
-{
- __kernel_size_t ret;
- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
-
- /* Work around gcc excess stack consumption issue */
- if (p_size == (size_t)-1 ||
- (__builtin_constant_p(p[p_size - 1]) && p[p_size - 1] == '\0'))
- return __underlying_strlen(p);
- ret = strnlen(p, p_size);
- if (p_size <= ret)
- fortify_panic(__func__);
- return ret;
-}
-
-extern __kernel_size_t __real_strnlen(const char *, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(strnlen);
-__FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char *p, __kernel_size_t maxlen)
-{
- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
- __kernel_size_t ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size);
- if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret)
- fortify_panic(__func__);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* defined after fortified strlen to reuse it */
-extern size_t __real_strlcpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strlcpy);
-__FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size)
-{
- size_t ret;
- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
- size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1);
- if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
- return __real_strlcpy(p, q, size);
- ret = strlen(q);
- if (size) {
- size_t len = (ret >= size) ? size - 1 : ret;
- if (__builtin_constant_p(len) && len >= p_size)
- __write_overflow();
- if (len >= p_size)
- fortify_panic(__func__);
- __underlying_memcpy(p, q, len);
- p[len] = '\0';
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* defined after fortified strnlen to reuse it */
-extern ssize_t __real_strscpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strscpy);
-__FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t strscpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size)
-{
- size_t len;
- /* Use string size rather than possible enclosing struct size. */
- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
- size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1);
-
- /* If we cannot get size of p and q default to call strscpy. */
- if (p_size == (size_t) -1 && q_size == (size_t) -1)
- return __real_strscpy(p, q, size);
-
- /*
- * If size can be known at compile time and is greater than
- * p_size, generate a compile time write overflow error.
- */
- if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && size > p_size)
- __write_overflow();
-
- /*
- * This call protects from read overflow, because len will default to q
- * length if it smaller than size.
- */
- len = strnlen(q, size);
- /*
- * If len equals size, we will copy only size bytes which leads to
- * -E2BIG being returned.
- * Otherwise we will copy len + 1 because of the final '\O'.
- */
- len = len == size ? size : len + 1;
-
- /*
- * Generate a runtime write overflow error if len is greater than
- * p_size.
- */
- if (len > p_size)
- fortify_panic(__func__);
-
- /*
- * We can now safely call vanilla strscpy because we are protected from:
- * 1. Read overflow thanks to call to strnlen().
- * 2. Write overflow thanks to above ifs.
- */
- return __real_strscpy(p, q, len);
-}
-
-/* defined after fortified strlen and strnlen to reuse them */
-__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count)
-{
- size_t p_len, copy_len;
- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
- size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1);
- if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
- return __underlying_strncat(p, q, count);
- p_len = strlen(p);
- copy_len = strnlen(q, count);
- if (p_size < p_len + copy_len + 1)
- fortify_panic(__func__);
- __underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
- p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0';
- return p;
-}
-
-__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
-{
- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
- if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
- __write_overflow();
- if (p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(__func__);
- return __underlying_memset(p, c, size);
-}
-
-__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
-{
- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
- size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
- if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
- if (p_size < size)
- __write_overflow();
- if (q_size < size)
- __read_overflow2();
- }
- if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
- fortify_panic(__func__);
- return __underlying_memcpy(p, q, size);
-}
-
-__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
-{
- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
- size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
- if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
- if (p_size < size)
- __write_overflow();
- if (q_size < size)
- __read_overflow2();
- }
- if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
- fortify_panic(__func__);
- return __underlying_memmove(p, q, size);
-}
-
-extern void *__real_memscan(void *, int, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(memscan);
-__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memscan(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
-{
- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
- if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
- __read_overflow();
- if (p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(__func__);
- return __real_memscan(p, c, size);
-}
-
-__FORTIFY_INLINE int memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
-{
- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
- size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
- if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
- if (p_size < size)
- __read_overflow();
- if (q_size < size)
- __read_overflow2();
- }
- if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
- fortify_panic(__func__);
- return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size);
-}
-
-__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
-{
- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
- if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
- __read_overflow();
- if (p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(__func__);
- return __underlying_memchr(p, c, size);
-}
-
-void *__real_memchr_inv(const void *s, int c, size_t n) __RENAME(memchr_inv);
-__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr_inv(const void *p, int c, size_t size)
-{
- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
- if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
- __read_overflow();
- if (p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(__func__);
- return __real_memchr_inv(p, c, size);
-}
-
-extern void *__real_kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp) __RENAME(kmemdup);
-__FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void *p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp)
-{
- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
- if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
- __read_overflow();
- if (p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(__func__);
- return __real_kmemdup(p, size, gfp);
-}
-
-/* defined after fortified strlen and memcpy to reuse them */
-__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcpy(char *p, const char *q)
-{
- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
- size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1);
- size_t size;
- if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
- return __underlying_strcpy(p, q);
- size = strlen(q) + 1;
- /* test here to use the more stringent object size */
- if (p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(__func__);
- memcpy(p, q, size);
- return p;
-}
-
-/* Don't use these outside the FORITFY_SOURCE implementation */
-#undef __underlying_memchr
-#undef __underlying_memcmp
-#undef __underlying_memcpy
-#undef __underlying_memmove
-#undef __underlying_memset
-#undef __underlying_strcat
-#undef __underlying_strcpy
-#undef __underlying_strlen
-#undef __underlying_strncat
-#undef __underlying_strncpy
+#include <linux/fortify-string.h>
#endif
/**
diff --git a/include/linux/vmstat.h b/include/linux/vmstat.h
index 773135fc6e19c7..506d625163a11c 100644
--- a/include/linux/vmstat.h
+++ b/include/linux/vmstat.h
@@ -313,6 +313,12 @@ static inline void __mod_node_page_state(struct pglist_data *pgdat,
enum node_stat_item item, int delta)
{
if (vmstat_item_in_bytes(item)) {
+ /*
+ * Only cgroups use subpage accounting right now; at
+ * the global level, these items still change in
+ * multiples of whole pages. Store them as pages
+ * internally to keep the per-cpu counters compact.
+ */
VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(delta & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
delta >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/zpool.h b/include/linux/zpool.h
index 51bf43076165d7..e8997010612a26 100644
--- a/include/linux/zpool.h
+++ b/include/linux/zpool.h
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ u64 zpool_get_total_size(struct zpool *pool);
* @malloc: allocate mem from a pool.
* @free: free mem from a pool.
* @shrink: shrink the pool.
+ * @sleep_mapped: whether zpool driver can sleep during map.
* @map: map a handle.
* @unmap: unmap a handle.
* @total_size: get total size of a pool.
@@ -100,6 +101,7 @@ struct zpool_driver {
int (*shrink)(void *pool, unsigned int pages,
unsigned int *reclaimed);
+ bool sleep_mapped;
void *(*map)(void *pool, unsigned long handle,
enum zpool_mapmode mm);
void (*unmap)(void *pool, unsigned long handle);
@@ -112,5 +114,6 @@ void zpool_register_driver(struct zpool_driver *driver);
int zpool_unregister_driver(struct zpool_driver *driver);
bool zpool_evictable(struct zpool *pool);
+bool zpool_can_sleep_mapped(struct zpool *pool);
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/zsmalloc.h b/include/linux/zsmalloc.h
index 4807ca4d52e039..2a430e713ce513 100644
--- a/include/linux/zsmalloc.h
+++ b/include/linux/zsmalloc.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ enum zs_mapmode {
struct zs_pool_stats {
/* How many pages were migrated (freed) */
- unsigned long pages_compacted;
+ atomic_long_t pages_compacted;
};
struct zs_pool;
diff --git a/include/trace/events/error_report.h b/include/trace/events/error_report.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..96f64bf218b256
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/trace/events/error_report.h
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Declarations for error reporting tracepoints.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021, Google LLC.
+ */
+#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
+#define TRACE_SYSTEM error_report
+
+#if !defined(_TRACE_ERROR_REPORT_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
+#define _TRACE_ERROR_REPORT_H
+
+#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
+
+#ifndef __ERROR_REPORT_DECLARE_TRACE_ENUMS_ONCE_ONLY
+#define __ERROR_REPORT_DECLARE_TRACE_ENUMS_ONCE_ONLY
+
+enum error_detector {
+ ERROR_DETECTOR_KFENCE,
+ ERROR_DETECTOR_KASAN
+};
+
+#endif /* __ERROR_REPORT_DECLARE_TRACE_ENUMS_ONCE_ONLY */
+
+#define error_detector_list \
+ EM(ERROR_DETECTOR_KFENCE, "kfence") \
+ EMe(ERROR_DETECTOR_KASAN, "kasan")
+/* Always end the list with an EMe. */
+
+#undef EM
+#undef EMe
+
+#define EM(a, b) TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(a);
+#define EMe(a, b) TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(a);
+
+error_detector_list
+
+#undef EM
+#undef EMe
+
+#define EM(a, b) { a, b },
+#define EMe(a, b) { a, b }
+
+#define show_error_detector_list(val) \
+ __print_symbolic(val, error_detector_list)
+
+DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(error_report_template,
+ TP_PROTO(enum error_detector error_detector, unsigned long id),
+ TP_ARGS(error_detector, id),
+ TP_STRUCT__entry(__field(enum error_detector, error_detector)
+ __field(unsigned long, id)),
+ TP_fast_assign(__entry->error_detector = error_detector;
+ __entry->id = id;),
+ TP_printk("[%s] %lx",
+ show_error_detector_list(__entry->error_detector),
+ __entry->id));
+
+/**
+ * error_report_end - called after printing the error report
+ * @error_detector: short string describing the error detection tool
+ * @id: pseudo-unique descriptor identifying the report
+ * (e.g. the memory access address)
+ *
+ * This event occurs right after a debugging tool finishes printing the error
+ * report.
+ */
+DEFINE_EVENT(error_report_template, error_report_end,
+ TP_PROTO(enum error_detector error_detector, unsigned long id),
+ TP_ARGS(error_detector, id));
+
+#endif /* _TRACE_ERROR_REPORT_H */
+
+/* This part must be outside protection */
+#include <trace/define_trace.h>
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/firewire-cdev.h b/include/uapi/linux/firewire-cdev.h
index 7e5b5c10a49c9c..5effa9832802c8 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/firewire-cdev.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/firewire-cdev.h
@@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ struct fw_cdev_queue_iso {
* struct fw_cdev_start_iso - Start an isochronous transmission or reception
* @cycle: Cycle in which to start I/O. If @cycle is greater than or
* equal to 0, the I/O will start on that cycle.
- * @sync: Determines the value to wait for for receive packets that have
+ * @sync: Determines the value to wait for receive packets that have
* the %FW_CDEV_ISO_SYNC bit set
* @tags: Tag filter bit mask. Only valid for isochronous reception.
* Determines the tag values for which packets will be accepted.
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/input.h b/include/uapi/linux/input.h
index 9a61c28ed3ae48..ee3127461ee009 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/input.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/input.h
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ struct input_id {
* in units per radian.
* When INPUT_PROP_ACCELEROMETER is set the resolution changes.
* The main axes (ABS_X, ABS_Y, ABS_Z) are then reported in
- * in units per g (units/g) and in units per degree per second
+ * units per g (units/g) and in units per degree per second
* (units/deg/s) for rotational axes (ABS_RX, ABS_RY, ABS_RZ).
*/
struct input_absinfo {
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 719871f8727cf2..efdc35abccb614 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ config CC_VERSION_TEXT
CC_VERSION_TEXT so it is recorded in include/config/auto.conf.cmd.
When the compiler is updated, Kconfig will be invoked.
- - Ensure full rebuild when the compier is updated
+ - Ensure full rebuild when the compiler is updated
include/linux/kconfig.h contains this option in the comment line so
fixdep adds include/config/cc/version/text.h into the auto-generated
dependency. When the compiler is updated, syncconfig will touch it
diff --git a/init/initramfs.c b/init/initramfs.c
index 55b74d7e526075..5fa84711127a85 100644
--- a/init/initramfs.c
+++ b/init/initramfs.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/utime.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/init_syscalls.h>
@@ -45,6 +46,16 @@ static void __init error(char *x)
message = x;
}
+static void panic_show_mem(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ show_mem(0, NULL);
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ panic(fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
/* link hash */
#define N_ALIGN(len) ((((len) + 1) & ~3) + 2)
@@ -80,7 +91,7 @@ static char __init *find_link(int major, int minor, int ino,
}
q = kmalloc(sizeof(struct hash), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!q)
- panic("can't allocate link hash entry");
+ panic_show_mem("can't allocate link hash entry");
q->major = major;
q->minor = minor;
q->ino = ino;
@@ -125,7 +136,7 @@ static void __init dir_add(const char *name, time64_t mtime)
{
struct dir_entry *de = kmalloc(sizeof(struct dir_entry), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!de)
- panic("can't allocate dir_entry buffer");
+ panic_show_mem("can't allocate dir_entry buffer");
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&de->list);
de->name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
de->mtime = mtime;
@@ -460,7 +471,7 @@ static char * __init unpack_to_rootfs(char *buf, unsigned long len)
name_buf = kmalloc(N_ALIGN(PATH_MAX), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!header_buf || !symlink_buf || !name_buf)
- panic("can't allocate buffers");
+ panic_show_mem("can't allocate buffers");
state = Start;
this_header = 0;
@@ -607,7 +618,7 @@ static int __init populate_rootfs(void)
/* Load the built in initramfs */
char *err = unpack_to_rootfs(__initramfs_start, __initramfs_size);
if (err)
- panic("%s", err); /* Failed to decompress INTERNAL initramfs */
+ panic_show_mem("%s", err); /* Failed to decompress INTERNAL initramfs */
if (!initrd_start || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INITRAMFS_FORCE))
goto done;
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index e9933cbf60d417..53b278845b886e 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/profile.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
@@ -96,6 +97,7 @@
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <linux/kcsan.h>
#include <linux/init_syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/stackdepot.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
@@ -824,7 +826,9 @@ static void __init mm_init(void)
*/
page_ext_init_flatmem();
init_mem_debugging_and_hardening();
+ kfence_alloc_pool();
report_meminit();
+ stack_depot_init();
mem_init();
/* page_owner must be initialized after buddy is ready */
page_ext_init_flatmem_late();
@@ -955,6 +959,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address start_kernel(void)
hrtimers_init();
softirq_init();
timekeeping_init();
+ kfence_init();
/*
* For best initial stack canary entropy, prepare it after:
@@ -1421,6 +1426,7 @@ static int __ref kernel_init(void *unused)
async_synchronize_full();
kprobe_free_init_mem();
ftrace_free_init_mem();
+ kgdb_free_init_mem();
free_initmem();
mark_readonly();
diff --git a/init/version.c b/init/version.c
index 80d2b7566b397d..92afc782b04342 100644
--- a/init/version.c
+++ b/init/version.c
@@ -16,14 +16,6 @@
#include <linux/version.h>
#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
-#ifndef CONFIG_KALLSYMS
-#define version(a) Version_ ## a
-#define version_string(a) version(a)
-
-extern int version_string(LINUX_VERSION_CODE);
-int version_string(LINUX_VERSION_CODE);
-#endif
-
struct uts_namespace init_uts_ns = {
.ns.count = REFCOUNT_INIT(2),
.name = {
diff --git a/kernel/debug/debug_core.c b/kernel/debug/debug_core.c
index b636d517c02c46..4708aec492df9e 100644
--- a/kernel/debug/debug_core.c
+++ b/kernel/debug/debug_core.c
@@ -455,6 +455,17 @@ setundefined:
return 0;
}
+void kgdb_free_init_mem(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* Clear init memory breakpoints. */
+ for (i = 0; i < KGDB_MAX_BREAKPOINTS; i++) {
+ if (init_section_contains((void *)kgdb_break[i].bpt_addr, 0))
+ kgdb_break[i].state = BP_UNDEFINED;
+ }
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_KGDB_KDB
void kdb_dump_stack_on_cpu(int cpu)
{
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 129dee540a8be3..0aeca5f3c0acce 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ static void event_function_call(struct perf_event *event, event_f func, void *da
if (!event->parent) {
/*
* If this is a !child event, we must hold ctx::mutex to
- * stabilize the the event->ctx relation. See
+ * stabilize the event->ctx relation. See
* perf_event_ctx_lock().
*/
lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->mutex);
@@ -1303,7 +1303,7 @@ static void put_ctx(struct perf_event_context *ctx)
* life-time rules separate them. That is an exiting task cannot fork, and a
* spawning task cannot (yet) exit.
*
- * But remember that that these are parent<->child context relations, and
+ * But remember that these are parent<->child context relations, and
* migration does not affect children, therefore these two orderings should not
* interact.
*
@@ -1442,7 +1442,7 @@ static u64 primary_event_id(struct perf_event *event)
/*
* Get the perf_event_context for a task and lock it.
*
- * This has to cope with with the fact that until it is locked,
+ * This has to cope with the fact that until it is locked,
* the context could get moved to another task.
*/
static struct perf_event_context *
@@ -2486,7 +2486,7 @@ static void perf_set_shadow_time(struct perf_event *event,
* But this is a bit hairy.
*
* So instead, we have an explicit cgroup call to remain
- * within the time time source all along. We believe it
+ * within the time source all along. We believe it
* is cleaner and simpler to understand.
*/
if (is_cgroup_event(event))
diff --git a/kernel/events/uprobes.c b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
index 3ea7f8f92f1db5..6addc97803198d 100644
--- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c
+++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
@@ -1733,7 +1733,7 @@ void uprobe_free_utask(struct task_struct *t)
}
/*
- * Allocate a uprobe_task object for the task if if necessary.
+ * Allocate a uprobe_task object for the task if necessary.
* Called when the thread hits a breakpoint.
*
* Returns:
diff --git a/kernel/groups.c b/kernel/groups.c
index fe7e6385530e67..787b381c7c0026 100644
--- a/kernel/groups.c
+++ b/kernel/groups.c
@@ -15,12 +15,7 @@
struct group_info *groups_alloc(int gidsetsize)
{
struct group_info *gi;
- unsigned int len;
-
- len = sizeof(struct group_info) + sizeof(kgid_t) * gidsetsize;
- gi = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY);
- if (!gi)
- gi = __vmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ gi = kvmalloc(struct_size(gi, gid, gidsetsize), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!gi)
return NULL;
diff --git a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
index 03b21135313cbe..48fff64379014b 100644
--- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
@@ -1420,7 +1420,7 @@ rt_mutex_fasttrylock(struct rt_mutex *lock,
}
/*
- * Performs the wakeup of the the top-waiter and re-enables preemption.
+ * Performs the wakeup of the top-waiter and re-enables preemption.
*/
void rt_mutex_postunlock(struct wake_q_head *wake_q)
{
@@ -1819,7 +1819,7 @@ struct task_struct *rt_mutex_next_owner(struct rt_mutex *lock)
* been started.
* @waiter: the pre-initialized rt_mutex_waiter
*
- * Wait for the the lock acquisition started on our behalf by
+ * Wait for the lock acquisition started on our behalf by
* rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(). Upon failure, the caller must call
* rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock().
*
diff --git a/kernel/locking/rwsem.c b/kernel/locking/rwsem.c
index ba67600c7b2c05..abba5df5000600 100644
--- a/kernel/locking/rwsem.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/rwsem.c
@@ -1048,7 +1048,7 @@ rwsem_down_write_slowpath(struct rw_semaphore *sem, int state)
/*
* If there were already threads queued before us and:
- * 1) there are no no active locks, wake the front
+ * 1) there are no active locks, wake the front
* queued process(es) as the handoff bit might be set.
* 2) there are no active writers and some readers, the lock
* must be read owned; so we try to wake any read lock
diff --git a/kernel/locking/semaphore.c b/kernel/locking/semaphore.c
index d9dd94defc0a92..9aa855a96c4ae2 100644
--- a/kernel/locking/semaphore.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/semaphore.c
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(down_killable);
* @sem: the semaphore to be acquired
*
* Try to acquire the semaphore atomically. Returns 0 if the semaphore has
- * been acquired successfully or 1 if it it cannot be acquired.
+ * been acquired successfully or 1 if it cannot be acquired.
*
* NOTE: This return value is inverted from both spin_trylock and
* mutex_trylock! Be careful about this when converting code.
diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c
index 8a8bd7b13634d6..794c2cb945f8b4 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/fair.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c
@@ -5126,7 +5126,7 @@ static void do_sched_cfs_slack_timer(struct cfs_bandwidth *cfs_b)
/*
* When a group wakes up we want to make sure that its quota is not already
* expired/exceeded, otherwise it may be allowed to steal additional ticks of
- * runtime as update_curr() throttling can not not trigger until it's on-rq.
+ * runtime as update_curr() throttling can not trigger until it's on-rq.
*/
static void check_enqueue_throttle(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq)
{
diff --git a/kernel/sched/membarrier.c b/kernel/sched/membarrier.c
index 08ae45ad9261df..acdae625c6364b 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/membarrier.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/membarrier.c
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ static int sync_runqueues_membarrier_state(struct mm_struct *mm)
/*
* For each cpu runqueue, if the task's mm match @mm, ensure that all
- * @mm's membarrier state set bits are also set in in the runqueue's
+ * @mm's membarrier state set bits are also set in the runqueue's
* membarrier state. This ensures that a runqueue scheduling
* between threads which are users of @mm has its membarrier state
* updated.
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index c9fbdd848138c8..62fbd09b5dc1c0 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -2962,7 +2962,7 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = {
.data = &block_dump,
.maxlen = sizeof(block_dump),
.mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
},
{
@@ -2970,7 +2970,7 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = {
.data = &sysctl_vfs_cache_pressure,
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_vfs_cache_pressure),
.mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
},
#if defined(HAVE_ARCH_PICK_MMAP_LAYOUT) || \
@@ -2980,7 +2980,7 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = {
.data = &sysctl_legacy_va_layout,
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_legacy_va_layout),
.mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
},
#endif
@@ -2990,7 +2990,7 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = {
.data = &node_reclaim_mode,
.maxlen = sizeof(node_reclaim_mode),
.mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
},
{
diff --git a/kernel/trace/Makefile b/kernel/trace/Makefile
index 7e44cea89fdc98..b28d3e5013cd95 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/trace/Makefile
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SYNTH_EVENTS) += trace_events_synth.o
obj-$(CONFIG_HIST_TRIGGERS) += trace_events_hist.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_EVENTS) += bpf_trace.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KPROBE_EVENTS) += trace_kprobe.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS) += error_report-traces.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS) += power-traces.o
ifeq ($(CONFIG_PM),y)
obj-$(CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS) += rpm-traces.o
diff --git a/kernel/trace/error_report-traces.c b/kernel/trace/error_report-traces.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..f89792c25b114d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/trace/error_report-traces.c
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Error reporting trace points.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021, Google LLC.
+ */
+
+#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+#include <trace/events/error_report.h>
+
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(error_report_end);
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig
index 46806332a8cc2c..a38cc61256f1a4 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/Kconfig
@@ -651,6 +651,15 @@ config STACKDEPOT
bool
select STACKTRACE
+config STACK_HASH_ORDER
+ int "stack depot hash size (12 => 4KB, 20 => 1024KB)"
+ range 12 20
+ default 20
+ depends on STACKDEPOT
+ help
+ Select the hash size as a power of 2 for the stackdepot hash table.
+ Choose a lower value to reduce the memory impact.
+
config SBITMAP
bool
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index f9febffffc21ac..2779c29d9981f1 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -938,6 +938,7 @@ config DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW
If in doubt, say "N".
source "lib/Kconfig.kasan"
+source "lib/Kconfig.kfence"
endmenu # "Memory Debugging"
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kfence b/lib/Kconfig.kfence
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..78f50ccb3b45ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.kfence
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE
+ bool
+
+menuconfig KFENCE
+ bool "KFENCE: low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector"
+ depends on HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE && (SLAB || SLUB)
+ select STACKTRACE
+ help
+ KFENCE is a low-overhead sampling-based detector of heap out-of-bounds
+ access, use-after-free, and invalid-free errors. KFENCE is designed
+ to have negligible cost to permit enabling it in production
+ environments.
+
+ See <file:Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst> for more details.
+
+ Note that, KFENCE is not a substitute for explicit testing with tools
+ such as KASAN. KFENCE can detect a subset of bugs that KASAN can
+ detect, albeit at very different performance profiles. If you can
+ afford to use KASAN, continue using KASAN, for example in test
+ environments. If your kernel targets production use, and cannot
+ enable KASAN due to its cost, consider using KFENCE.
+
+if KFENCE
+
+config KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS
+ bool "Use static keys to set up allocations"
+ default y
+ depends on JUMP_LABEL # To ensure performance, require jump labels
+ help
+ Use static keys (static branches) to set up KFENCE allocations. Using
+ static keys is normally recommended, because it avoids a dynamic
+ branch in the allocator's fast path. However, with very low sample
+ intervals, or on systems that do not support jump labels, a dynamic
+ branch may still be an acceptable performance trade-off.
+
+config KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL
+ int "Default sample interval in milliseconds"
+ default 100
+ help
+ The KFENCE sample interval determines the frequency with which heap
+ allocations will be guarded by KFENCE. May be overridden via boot
+ parameter "kfence.sample_interval".
+
+ Set this to 0 to disable KFENCE by default, in which case only
+ setting "kfence.sample_interval" to a non-zero value enables KFENCE.
+
+config KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS
+ int "Number of guarded objects available"
+ range 1 65535
+ default 255
+ help
+ The number of guarded objects available. For each KFENCE object, 2
+ pages are required; with one containing the object and two adjacent
+ ones used as guard pages.
+
+config KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS
+ int "Stress testing of fault handling and error reporting" if EXPERT
+ default 0
+ help
+ The inverse probability with which to randomly protect KFENCE object
+ pages, resulting in spurious use-after-frees. The main purpose of
+ this option is to stress test KFENCE with concurrent error reports
+ and allocations/frees. A value of 0 disables stress testing logic.
+
+ Only for KFENCE testing; set to 0 if you are not a KFENCE developer.
+
+config KFENCE_KUNIT_TEST
+ tristate "KFENCE integration test suite" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+ default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+ depends on TRACEPOINTS && KUNIT
+ help
+ Test suite for KFENCE, testing various error detection scenarios with
+ various allocation types, and checking that reports are correctly
+ output to console.
+
+ Say Y here if you want the test to be built into the kernel and run
+ during boot; say M if you want the test to build as a module; say N
+ if you are unsure.
+
+endif # KFENCE
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
index 3a0b1c930733af..e5372a13511df1 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
@@ -112,23 +112,6 @@ config UBSAN_UNREACHABLE
This option enables -fsanitize=unreachable which checks for control
flow reaching an expected-to-be-unreachable position.
-config UBSAN_SIGNED_OVERFLOW
- bool "Perform checking for signed arithmetic overflow"
- default UBSAN
- depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow)
- help
- This option enables -fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow which checks
- for overflow of any arithmetic operations with signed integers.
-
-config UBSAN_UNSIGNED_OVERFLOW
- bool "Perform checking for unsigned arithmetic overflow"
- depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow)
- depends on !X86_32 # avoid excessive stack usage on x86-32/clang
- help
- This option enables -fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow which checks
- for overflow of any arithmetic operations with unsigned integers. This
- currently causes x86 to fail to boot.
-
config UBSAN_OBJECT_SIZE
bool "Perform checking for accesses beyond the end of objects"
default UBSAN
diff --git a/lib/cmdline.c b/lib/cmdline.c
index dfd4c4423f9a27..5d474c626e245c 100644
--- a/lib/cmdline.c
+++ b/lib/cmdline.c
@@ -228,7 +228,6 @@ char *next_arg(char *args, char **param, char **val)
{
unsigned int i, equals = 0;
int in_quote = 0, quoted = 0;
- char *next;
if (*args == '"') {
args++;
@@ -266,10 +265,10 @@ char *next_arg(char *args, char **param, char **val)
if (args[i]) {
args[i] = '\0';
- next = args + i + 1;
+ args += i + 1;
} else
- next = args + i;
+ args += i;
/* Chew up trailing spaces. */
- return skip_spaces(next);
+ return skip_spaces(args);
}
diff --git a/lib/genalloc.c b/lib/genalloc.c
index dab97bb69df63e..5dcf9cdcbc46da 100644
--- a/lib/genalloc.c
+++ b/lib/genalloc.c
@@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ static int clear_bits_ll(unsigned long *addr, unsigned long mask_to_clear)
* users set the same bit, one user will return remain bits, otherwise
* return 0.
*/
-static int bitmap_set_ll(unsigned long *map, unsigned long start, unsigned long nr)
+static unsigned long
+bitmap_set_ll(unsigned long *map, unsigned long start, unsigned long nr)
{
unsigned long *p = map + BIT_WORD(start);
const unsigned long size = start + nr;
diff --git a/lib/stackdepot.c b/lib/stackdepot.c
index 890dcc2e984e36..49f67a0c6e5d2a 100644
--- a/lib/stackdepot.c
+++ b/lib/stackdepot.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <linux/stackdepot.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
#define DEPOT_STACK_BITS (sizeof(depot_stack_handle_t) * 8)
@@ -141,14 +142,38 @@ static struct stack_record *depot_alloc_stack(unsigned long *entries, int size,
return stack;
}
-#define STACK_HASH_ORDER 20
-#define STACK_HASH_SIZE (1L << STACK_HASH_ORDER)
+#define STACK_HASH_SIZE (1L << CONFIG_STACK_HASH_ORDER)
#define STACK_HASH_MASK (STACK_HASH_SIZE - 1)
#define STACK_HASH_SEED 0x9747b28c
-static struct stack_record *stack_table[STACK_HASH_SIZE] = {
- [0 ... STACK_HASH_SIZE - 1] = NULL
-};
+static bool stack_depot_disable;
+static struct stack_record **stack_table;
+
+static int __init is_stack_depot_disabled(char *str)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = kstrtobool(str, &stack_depot_disable);
+ if (!ret && stack_depot_disable) {
+ pr_info("Stack Depot is disabled\n");
+ stack_table = NULL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("stack_depot_disable", is_stack_depot_disabled);
+
+int __init stack_depot_init(void)
+{
+ if (!stack_depot_disable) {
+ size_t size = (STACK_HASH_SIZE * sizeof(struct stack_record *));
+ int i;
+
+ stack_table = memblock_alloc(size, size);
+ for (i = 0; i < STACK_HASH_SIZE; i++)
+ stack_table[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
/* Calculate hash for a stack */
static inline u32 hash_stack(unsigned long *entries, unsigned int size)
@@ -242,7 +267,7 @@ depot_stack_handle_t stack_depot_save(unsigned long *entries,
unsigned long flags;
u32 hash;
- if (unlikely(nr_entries == 0))
+ if (unlikely(nr_entries == 0) || stack_depot_disable)
goto fast_exit;
hash = hash_stack(entries, nr_entries);
diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
index 25576303897bd1..e5647d147b3505 100644
--- a/lib/test_kasan.c
+++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
@@ -252,11 +252,14 @@ static void kmalloc_large_oob_right(struct kunit *test)
kfree(ptr);
}
-static void kmalloc_oob_krealloc_more(struct kunit *test)
+static void krealloc_more_oob_helper(struct kunit *test,
+ size_t size1, size_t size2)
{
char *ptr1, *ptr2;
- size_t size1 = 17;
- size_t size2 = 19;
+ size_t middle;
+
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_LT(test, size1, size2);
+ middle = size1 + (size2 - size1) / 2;
ptr1 = kmalloc(size1, GFP_KERNEL);
KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr1);
@@ -264,15 +267,31 @@ static void kmalloc_oob_krealloc_more(struct kunit *test)
ptr2 = krealloc(ptr1, size2, GFP_KERNEL);
KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr2);
- KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr2[size2 + OOB_TAG_OFF] = 'x');
+ /* All offsets up to size2 must be accessible. */
+ ptr2[size1 - 1] = 'x';
+ ptr2[size1] = 'x';
+ ptr2[middle] = 'x';
+ ptr2[size2 - 1] = 'x';
+
+ /* Generic mode is precise, so unaligned size2 must be inaccessible. */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr2[size2] = 'x');
+
+ /* For all modes first aligned offset after size2 must be inaccessible. */
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test,
+ ptr2[round_up(size2, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)] = 'x');
+
kfree(ptr2);
}
-static void kmalloc_oob_krealloc_less(struct kunit *test)
+static void krealloc_less_oob_helper(struct kunit *test,
+ size_t size1, size_t size2)
{
char *ptr1, *ptr2;
- size_t size1 = 17;
- size_t size2 = 15;
+ size_t middle;
+
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_LT(test, size2, size1);
+ middle = size2 + (size1 - size2) / 2;
ptr1 = kmalloc(size1, GFP_KERNEL);
KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr1);
@@ -280,10 +299,79 @@ static void kmalloc_oob_krealloc_less(struct kunit *test)
ptr2 = krealloc(ptr1, size2, GFP_KERNEL);
KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr2);
- KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr2[size2 + OOB_TAG_OFF] = 'x');
+ /* Must be accessible for all modes. */
+ ptr2[size2 - 1] = 'x';
+
+ /* Generic mode is precise, so unaligned size2 must be inaccessible. */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr2[size2] = 'x');
+
+ /* For all modes first aligned offset after size2 must be inaccessible. */
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test,
+ ptr2[round_up(size2, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)] = 'x');
+
+ /*
+ * For all modes all size2, middle, and size1 should land in separate
+ * granules and thus the latter two offsets should be inaccessible.
+ */
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_LE(test, round_up(size2, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
+ round_down(middle, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE));
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_LE(test, round_up(middle, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
+ round_down(size1, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE));
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr2[middle] = 'x');
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr2[size1 - 1] = 'x');
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr2[size1] = 'x');
+
kfree(ptr2);
}
+static void krealloc_more_oob(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ krealloc_more_oob_helper(test, 201, 235);
+}
+
+static void krealloc_less_oob(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ krealloc_less_oob_helper(test, 235, 201);
+}
+
+static void krealloc_pagealloc_more_oob(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ /* page_alloc fallback in only implemented for SLUB. */
+ KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_SLUB);
+
+ krealloc_more_oob_helper(test, KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE + 201,
+ KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE + 235);
+}
+
+static void krealloc_pagealloc_less_oob(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ /* page_alloc fallback in only implemented for SLUB. */
+ KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_SLUB);
+
+ krealloc_less_oob_helper(test, KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE + 235,
+ KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE + 201);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that krealloc() detects a use-after-free, returns NULL,
+ * and doesn't unpoison the freed object.
+ */
+static void krealloc_uaf(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ char *ptr1, *ptr2;
+ int size1 = 201;
+ int size2 = 235;
+
+ ptr1 = kmalloc(size1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr1);
+ kfree(ptr1);
+
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr2 = krealloc(ptr1, size2, GFP_KERNEL));
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_PTR_EQ(test, (void *)ptr2, NULL);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *(volatile char *)ptr1);
+}
+
static void kmalloc_oob_16(struct kunit *test)
{
struct {
@@ -977,8 +1065,11 @@ static struct kunit_case kasan_kunit_test_cases[] = {
KUNIT_CASE(pagealloc_oob_right),
KUNIT_CASE(pagealloc_uaf),
KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_large_oob_right),
- KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_oob_krealloc_more),
- KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_oob_krealloc_less),
+ KUNIT_CASE(krealloc_more_oob),
+ KUNIT_CASE(krealloc_less_oob),
+ KUNIT_CASE(krealloc_pagealloc_more_oob),
+ KUNIT_CASE(krealloc_pagealloc_less_oob),
+ KUNIT_CASE(krealloc_uaf),
KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_oob_16),
KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_uaf_16),
KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_oob_in_memset),
diff --git a/lib/test_ubsan.c b/lib/test_ubsan.c
index 5e5d9355ef499d..7e7bbd0f3fd27d 100644
--- a/lib/test_ubsan.c
+++ b/lib/test_ubsan.c
@@ -11,51 +11,6 @@ typedef void(*test_ubsan_fp)(void);
#config, IS_ENABLED(config) ? "y" : "n"); \
} while (0)
-static void test_ubsan_add_overflow(void)
-{
- volatile int val = INT_MAX;
- volatile unsigned int uval = UINT_MAX;
-
- UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_OVERFLOW);
- val += 2;
-
- UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_UNSIGNED_OVERFLOW);
- uval += 2;
-}
-
-static void test_ubsan_sub_overflow(void)
-{
- volatile int val = INT_MIN;
- volatile unsigned int uval = 0;
- volatile int val2 = 2;
-
- UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_OVERFLOW);
- val -= val2;
-
- UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_UNSIGNED_OVERFLOW);
- uval -= val2;
-}
-
-static void test_ubsan_mul_overflow(void)
-{
- volatile int val = INT_MAX / 2;
- volatile unsigned int uval = UINT_MAX / 2;
-
- UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_OVERFLOW);
- val *= 3;
-
- UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_UNSIGNED_OVERFLOW);
- uval *= 3;
-}
-
-static void test_ubsan_negate_overflow(void)
-{
- volatile int val = INT_MIN;
-
- UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_OVERFLOW);
- val = -val;
-}
-
static void test_ubsan_divrem_overflow(void)
{
volatile int val = 16;
@@ -155,10 +110,6 @@ static void test_ubsan_object_size_mismatch(void)
}
static const test_ubsan_fp test_ubsan_array[] = {
- test_ubsan_add_overflow,
- test_ubsan_sub_overflow,
- test_ubsan_mul_overflow,
- test_ubsan_negate_overflow,
test_ubsan_shift_out_of_bounds,
test_ubsan_out_of_bounds,
test_ubsan_load_invalid_value,
diff --git a/lib/ubsan.c b/lib/ubsan.c
index bec38c64d6a624..26229973049d36 100644
--- a/lib/ubsan.c
+++ b/lib/ubsan.c
@@ -163,74 +163,6 @@ static void ubsan_epilogue(void)
}
}
-static void handle_overflow(struct overflow_data *data, void *lhs,
- void *rhs, char op)
-{
-
- struct type_descriptor *type = data->type;
- char lhs_val_str[VALUE_LENGTH];
- char rhs_val_str[VALUE_LENGTH];
-
- if (suppress_report(&data->location))
- return;
-
- ubsan_prologue(&data->location, type_is_signed(type) ?
- "signed-integer-overflow" :
- "unsigned-integer-overflow");
-
- val_to_string(lhs_val_str, sizeof(lhs_val_str), type, lhs);
- val_to_string(rhs_val_str, sizeof(rhs_val_str), type, rhs);
- pr_err("%s %c %s cannot be represented in type %s\n",
- lhs_val_str,
- op,
- rhs_val_str,
- type->type_name);
-
- ubsan_epilogue();
-}
-
-void __ubsan_handle_add_overflow(void *data,
- void *lhs, void *rhs)
-{
-
- handle_overflow(data, lhs, rhs, '+');
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_add_overflow);
-
-void __ubsan_handle_sub_overflow(void *data,
- void *lhs, void *rhs)
-{
- handle_overflow(data, lhs, rhs, '-');
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_sub_overflow);
-
-void __ubsan_handle_mul_overflow(void *data,
- void *lhs, void *rhs)
-{
- handle_overflow(data, lhs, rhs, '*');
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_mul_overflow);
-
-void __ubsan_handle_negate_overflow(void *_data, void *old_val)
-{
- struct overflow_data *data = _data;
- char old_val_str[VALUE_LENGTH];
-
- if (suppress_report(&data->location))
- return;
-
- ubsan_prologue(&data->location, "negation-overflow");
-
- val_to_string(old_val_str, sizeof(old_val_str), data->type, old_val);
-
- pr_err("negation of %s cannot be represented in type %s:\n",
- old_val_str, data->type->type_name);
-
- ubsan_epilogue();
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_negate_overflow);
-
-
void __ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow(void *_data, void *lhs, void *rhs)
{
struct overflow_data *data = _data;
diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile
index 135bbb65511ae8..72227b24a61688 100644
--- a/mm/Makefile
+++ b/mm/Makefile
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING) += page_poison.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SLAB) += slab.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SLUB) += slub.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN) += kasan/
+obj-$(CONFIG_KFENCE) += kfence/
obj-$(CONFIG_FAILSLAB) += failslab.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG) += memory_hotplug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MEMTEST) += memtest.o
diff --git a/mm/backing-dev.c b/mm/backing-dev.c
index eca555f658d949..576220acd686a6 100644
--- a/mm/backing-dev.c
+++ b/mm/backing-dev.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/writeback.h>
@@ -578,7 +579,7 @@ struct bdi_writeback *wb_get_create(struct backing_dev_info *bdi,
{
struct bdi_writeback *wb;
- might_sleep_if(gfpflags_allow_blocking(gfp));
+ might_alloc(gfp);
if (!memcg_css->parent)
return &bdi->wb;
diff --git a/mm/cma.c b/mm/cma.c
index 20c4f6f40037d8..54eee211982202 100644
--- a/mm/cma.c
+++ b/mm/cma.c
@@ -94,34 +94,29 @@ static void cma_clear_bitmap(struct cma *cma, unsigned long pfn,
static void __init cma_activate_area(struct cma *cma)
{
- unsigned long base_pfn = cma->base_pfn, pfn = base_pfn;
- unsigned i = cma->count >> pageblock_order;
+ unsigned long base_pfn = cma->base_pfn, pfn;
struct zone *zone;
cma->bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(cma_bitmap_maxno(cma), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cma->bitmap)
goto out_error;
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!pfn_valid(pfn));
- zone = page_zone(pfn_to_page(pfn));
-
- do {
- unsigned j;
-
- base_pfn = pfn;
- for (j = pageblock_nr_pages; j; --j, pfn++) {
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!pfn_valid(pfn));
- /*
- * alloc_contig_range requires the pfn range
- * specified to be in the same zone. Make this
- * simple by forcing the entire CMA resv range
- * to be in the same zone.
- */
- if (page_zone(pfn_to_page(pfn)) != zone)
- goto not_in_zone;
- }
- init_cma_reserved_pageblock(pfn_to_page(base_pfn));
- } while (--i);
+ /*
+ * alloc_contig_range() requires the pfn range specified to be in the
+ * same zone. Simplify by forcing the entire CMA resv range to be in the
+ * same zone.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!pfn_valid(base_pfn));
+ zone = page_zone(pfn_to_page(base_pfn));
+ for (pfn = base_pfn + 1; pfn < base_pfn + cma->count; pfn++) {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!pfn_valid(pfn));
+ if (page_zone(pfn_to_page(pfn)) != zone)
+ goto not_in_zone;
+ }
+
+ for (pfn = base_pfn; pfn < base_pfn + cma->count;
+ pfn += pageblock_nr_pages)
+ init_cma_reserved_pageblock(pfn_to_page(pfn));
mutex_init(&cma->lock);
@@ -135,6 +130,10 @@ static void __init cma_activate_area(struct cma *cma)
not_in_zone:
bitmap_free(cma->bitmap);
out_error:
+ /* Expose all pages to the buddy, they are useless for CMA. */
+ for (pfn = base_pfn; pfn < base_pfn + cma->count; pfn++)
+ free_reserved_page(pfn_to_page(pfn));
+ totalcma_pages -= cma->count;
cma->count = 0;
pr_err("CMA area %s could not be activated\n", cma->name);
return;
@@ -336,6 +335,23 @@ int __init cma_declare_contiguous_nid(phys_addr_t base,
limit = highmem_start;
}
+ /*
+ * If there is enough memory, try a bottom-up allocation first.
+ * It will place the new cma area close to the start of the node
+ * and guarantee that the compaction is moving pages out of the
+ * cma area and not into it.
+ * Avoid using first 4GB to not interfere with constrained zones
+ * like DMA/DMA32.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT
+ if (!memblock_bottom_up() && memblock_end >= SZ_4G + size) {
+ memblock_set_bottom_up(true);
+ addr = memblock_alloc_range_nid(size, alignment, SZ_4G,
+ limit, nid, true);
+ memblock_set_bottom_up(false);
+ }
+#endif
+
if (!addr) {
addr = memblock_alloc_range_nid(size, alignment, base,
limit, nid, true);
@@ -484,8 +500,8 @@ struct page *cma_alloc(struct cma *cma, size_t count, unsigned int align,
}
if (ret && !no_warn) {
- pr_err("%s: alloc failed, req-size: %zu pages, ret: %d\n",
- __func__, count, ret);
+ pr_err("%s: %s: alloc failed, req-size: %zu pages, ret: %d\n",
+ __func__, cma->name, count, ret);
cma_debug_show_areas(cma);
}
diff --git a/mm/dmapool.c b/mm/dmapool.c
index a97c97232337d5..f3791532fef22a 100644
--- a/mm/dmapool.c
+++ b/mm/dmapool.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/poison.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/stat.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
@@ -319,7 +320,7 @@ void *dma_pool_alloc(struct dma_pool *pool, gfp_t mem_flags,
size_t offset;
void *retval;
- might_sleep_if(gfpflags_allow_blocking(mem_flags));
+ might_alloc(mem_flags);
spin_lock_irqsave(&pool->lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(page, &pool->page_list, page_list) {
diff --git a/mm/early_ioremap.c b/mm/early_ioremap.c
index a0018ad1a1f6af..164607c7cdf1c4 100644
--- a/mm/early_ioremap.c
+++ b/mm/early_ioremap.c
@@ -181,17 +181,17 @@ void __init early_iounmap(void __iomem *addr, unsigned long size)
}
}
- if (WARN(slot < 0, "early_iounmap(%p, %08lx) not found slot\n",
- addr, size))
+ if (WARN(slot < 0, "%s(%p, %08lx) not found slot\n",
+ __func__, addr, size))
return;
if (WARN(prev_size[slot] != size,
- "early_iounmap(%p, %08lx) [%d] size not consistent %08lx\n",
- addr, size, slot, prev_size[slot]))
+ "%s(%p, %08lx) [%d] size not consistent %08lx\n",
+ __func__, addr, size, slot, prev_size[slot]))
return;
- WARN(early_ioremap_debug, "early_iounmap(%p, %08lx) [%d]\n",
- addr, size, slot);
+ WARN(early_ioremap_debug, "%s(%p, %08lx) [%d]\n",
+ __func__, addr, size, slot);
virt_addr = (unsigned long)addr;
if (WARN_ON(virt_addr < fix_to_virt(FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN)))
diff --git a/mm/filemap.c b/mm/filemap.c
index 46a8b9e824347a..43700480d897d4 100644
--- a/mm/filemap.c
+++ b/mm/filemap.c
@@ -1658,8 +1658,8 @@ pgoff_t page_cache_prev_miss(struct address_space *mapping,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(page_cache_prev_miss);
-/**
- * find_get_entry - find and get a page cache entry
+/*
+ * mapping_get_entry - Get a page cache entry.
* @mapping: the address_space to search
* @index: The page cache index.
*
@@ -1671,7 +1671,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(page_cache_prev_miss);
*
* Return: The head page or shadow entry, %NULL if nothing is found.
*/
-struct page *find_get_entry(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t index)
+static struct page *mapping_get_entry(struct address_space *mapping,
+ pgoff_t index)
{
XA_STATE(xas, &mapping->i_pages, index);
struct page *page;
@@ -1708,39 +1709,6 @@ out:
}
/**
- * find_lock_entry - Locate and lock a page cache entry.
- * @mapping: The address_space to search.
- * @index: The page cache index.
- *
- * Looks up the page at @mapping & @index. If there is a page in the
- * cache, the head page is returned locked and with an increased refcount.
- *
- * If the slot holds a shadow entry of a previously evicted page, or a
- * swap entry from shmem/tmpfs, it is returned.
- *
- * Context: May sleep.
- * Return: The head page or shadow entry, %NULL if nothing is found.
- */
-struct page *find_lock_entry(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t index)
-{
- struct page *page;
-
-repeat:
- page = find_get_entry(mapping, index);
- if (page && !xa_is_value(page)) {
- lock_page(page);
- /* Has the page been truncated? */
- if (unlikely(page->mapping != mapping)) {
- unlock_page(page);
- put_page(page);
- goto repeat;
- }
- VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!thp_contains(page, index), page);
- }
- return page;
-}
-
-/**
* pagecache_get_page - Find and get a reference to a page.
* @mapping: The address_space to search.
* @index: The page index.
@@ -1755,6 +1723,8 @@ repeat:
* * %FGP_LOCK - The page is returned locked.
* * %FGP_HEAD - If the page is present and a THP, return the head page
* rather than the exact page specified by the index.
+ * * %FGP_ENTRY - If there is a shadow / swap / DAX entry, return it
+ * instead of allocating a new page to replace it.
* * %FGP_CREAT - If no page is present then a new page is allocated using
* @gfp_mask and added to the page cache and the VM's LRU list.
* The page is returned locked and with an increased refcount.
@@ -1778,9 +1748,12 @@ struct page *pagecache_get_page(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t index,
struct page *page;
repeat:
- page = find_get_entry(mapping, index);
- if (xa_is_value(page))
+ page = mapping_get_entry(mapping, index);
+ if (xa_is_value(page)) {
+ if (fgp_flags & FGP_ENTRY)
+ return page;
page = NULL;
+ }
if (!page)
goto no_page;
@@ -1852,18 +1825,53 @@ no_page:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(pagecache_get_page);
+static inline struct page *find_get_entry(struct xa_state *xas, pgoff_t max,
+ xa_mark_t mark)
+{
+ struct page *page;
+
+retry:
+ if (mark == XA_PRESENT)
+ page = xas_find(xas, max);
+ else
+ page = xas_find_marked(xas, max, mark);
+
+ if (xas_retry(xas, page))
+ goto retry;
+ /*
+ * A shadow entry of a recently evicted page, a swap
+ * entry from shmem/tmpfs or a DAX entry. Return it
+ * without attempting to raise page count.
+ */
+ if (!page || xa_is_value(page))
+ return page;
+
+ if (!page_cache_get_speculative(page))
+ goto reset;
+
+ /* Has the page moved or been split? */
+ if (unlikely(page != xas_reload(xas))) {
+ put_page(page);
+ goto reset;
+ }
+
+ return page;
+reset:
+ xas_reset(xas);
+ goto retry;
+}
+
/**
* find_get_entries - gang pagecache lookup
* @mapping: The address_space to search
* @start: The starting page cache index
- * @nr_entries: The maximum number of entries
- * @entries: Where the resulting entries are placed
+ * @end: The final page index (inclusive).
+ * @pvec: Where the resulting entries are placed.
* @indices: The cache indices corresponding to the entries in @entries
*
- * find_get_entries() will search for and return a group of up to
- * @nr_entries entries in the mapping. The entries are placed at
- * @entries. find_get_entries() takes a reference against any actual
- * pages it returns.
+ * find_get_entries() will search for and return a batch of entries in
+ * the mapping. The entries are placed in @pvec. find_get_entries()
+ * takes a reference on any actual pages it returns.
*
* The search returns a group of mapping-contiguous page cache entries
* with ascending indexes. There may be holes in the indices due to
@@ -1879,60 +1887,97 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(pagecache_get_page);
*
* Return: the number of pages and shadow entries which were found.
*/
-unsigned find_get_entries(struct address_space *mapping,
- pgoff_t start, unsigned int nr_entries,
- struct page **entries, pgoff_t *indices)
+unsigned find_get_entries(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t start,
+ pgoff_t end, struct pagevec *pvec, pgoff_t *indices)
{
XA_STATE(xas, &mapping->i_pages, start);
struct page *page;
unsigned int ret = 0;
-
- if (!nr_entries)
- return 0;
+ unsigned nr_entries = PAGEVEC_SIZE;
rcu_read_lock();
- xas_for_each(&xas, page, ULONG_MAX) {
- if (xas_retry(&xas, page))
- continue;
- /*
- * A shadow entry of a recently evicted page, a swap
- * entry from shmem/tmpfs or a DAX entry. Return it
- * without attempting to raise page count.
- */
- if (xa_is_value(page))
- goto export;
-
- if (!page_cache_get_speculative(page))
- goto retry;
-
- /* Has the page moved or been split? */
- if (unlikely(page != xas_reload(&xas)))
- goto put_page;
-
+ while ((page = find_get_entry(&xas, end, XA_PRESENT))) {
/*
* Terminate early on finding a THP, to allow the caller to
* handle it all at once; but continue if this is hugetlbfs.
*/
- if (PageTransHuge(page) && !PageHuge(page)) {
+ if (!xa_is_value(page) && PageTransHuge(page) &&
+ !PageHuge(page)) {
page = find_subpage(page, xas.xa_index);
nr_entries = ret + 1;
}
-export:
+
indices[ret] = xas.xa_index;
- entries[ret] = page;
+ pvec->pages[ret] = page;
if (++ret == nr_entries)
break;
- continue;
-put_page:
- put_page(page);
-retry:
- xas_reset(&xas);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ pvec->nr = ret;
return ret;
}
/**
+ * find_lock_entries - Find a batch of pagecache entries.
+ * @mapping: The address_space to search.
+ * @start: The starting page cache index.
+ * @end: The final page index (inclusive).
+ * @pvec: Where the resulting entries are placed.
+ * @indices: The cache indices of the entries in @pvec.
+ *
+ * find_lock_entries() will return a batch of entries from @mapping.
+ * Swap, shadow and DAX entries are included. Pages are returned
+ * locked and with an incremented refcount. Pages which are locked by
+ * somebody else or under writeback are skipped. Only the head page of
+ * a THP is returned. Pages which are partially outside the range are
+ * not returned.
+ *
+ * The entries have ascending indexes. The indices may not be consecutive
+ * due to not-present entries, THP pages, pages which could not be locked
+ * or pages under writeback.
+ *
+ * Return: The number of entries which were found.
+ */
+unsigned find_lock_entries(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t start,
+ pgoff_t end, struct pagevec *pvec, pgoff_t *indices)
+{
+ XA_STATE(xas, &mapping->i_pages, start);
+ struct page *page;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ while ((page = find_get_entry(&xas, end, XA_PRESENT))) {
+ if (!xa_is_value(page)) {
+ if (page->index < start)
+ goto put;
+ VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page->index != xas.xa_index, page);
+ if (page->index + thp_nr_pages(page) - 1 > end)
+ goto put;
+ if (!trylock_page(page))
+ goto put;
+ if (page->mapping != mapping || PageWriteback(page))
+ goto unlock;
+ VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!thp_contains(page, xas.xa_index),
+ page);
+ }
+ indices[pvec->nr] = xas.xa_index;
+ if (!pagevec_add(pvec, page))
+ break;
+ goto next;
+unlock:
+ unlock_page(page);
+put:
+ put_page(page);
+next:
+ if (!xa_is_value(page) && PageTransHuge(page))
+ xas_set(&xas, page->index + thp_nr_pages(page));
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return pagevec_count(pvec);
+}
+
+/**
* find_get_pages_range - gang pagecache lookup
* @mapping: The address_space to search
* @start: The starting page index
@@ -1965,30 +2010,16 @@ unsigned find_get_pages_range(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t *start,
return 0;
rcu_read_lock();
- xas_for_each(&xas, page, end) {
- if (xas_retry(&xas, page))
- continue;
+ while ((page = find_get_entry(&xas, end, XA_PRESENT))) {
/* Skip over shadow, swap and DAX entries */
if (xa_is_value(page))
continue;
- if (!page_cache_get_speculative(page))
- goto retry;
-
- /* Has the page moved or been split? */
- if (unlikely(page != xas_reload(&xas)))
- goto put_page;
-
pages[ret] = find_subpage(page, xas.xa_index);
if (++ret == nr_pages) {
*start = xas.xa_index + 1;
goto out;
}
- continue;
-put_page:
- put_page(page);
-retry:
- xas_reset(&xas);
}
/*
@@ -2062,7 +2093,7 @@ retry:
EXPORT_SYMBOL(find_get_pages_contig);
/**
- * find_get_pages_range_tag - find and return pages in given range matching @tag
+ * find_get_pages_range_tag - Find and return head pages matching @tag.
* @mapping: the address_space to search
* @index: the starting page index
* @end: The final page index (inclusive)
@@ -2070,8 +2101,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(find_get_pages_contig);
* @nr_pages: the maximum number of pages
* @pages: where the resulting pages are placed
*
- * Like find_get_pages, except we only return pages which are tagged with
- * @tag. We update @index to index the next page for the traversal.
+ * Like find_get_pages(), except we only return head pages which are tagged
+ * with @tag. @index is updated to the index immediately after the last
+ * page we return, ready for the next iteration.
*
* Return: the number of pages which were found.
*/
@@ -2087,9 +2119,7 @@ unsigned find_get_pages_range_tag(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t *index,
return 0;
rcu_read_lock();
- xas_for_each_marked(&xas, page, end, tag) {
- if (xas_retry(&xas, page))
- continue;
+ while ((page = find_get_entry(&xas, end, tag))) {
/*
* Shadow entries should never be tagged, but this iteration
* is lockless so there is a window for page reclaim to evict
@@ -2098,23 +2128,11 @@ unsigned find_get_pages_range_tag(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t *index,
if (xa_is_value(page))
continue;
- if (!page_cache_get_speculative(page))
- goto retry;
-
- /* Has the page moved or been split? */
- if (unlikely(page != xas_reload(&xas)))
- goto put_page;
-
- pages[ret] = find_subpage(page, xas.xa_index);
+ pages[ret] = page;
if (++ret == nr_pages) {
- *index = xas.xa_index + 1;
+ *index = page->index + thp_nr_pages(page);
goto out;
}
- continue;
-put_page:
- put_page(page);
-retry:
- xas_reset(&xas);
}
/*
@@ -2592,6 +2610,109 @@ generic_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_file_read_iter);
+static inline loff_t page_seek_hole_data(struct xa_state *xas,
+ struct address_space *mapping, struct page *page,
+ loff_t start, loff_t end, bool seek_data)
+{
+ const struct address_space_operations *ops = mapping->a_ops;
+ size_t offset, bsz = i_blocksize(mapping->host);
+
+ if (xa_is_value(page) || PageUptodate(page))
+ return seek_data ? start : end;
+ if (!ops->is_partially_uptodate)
+ return seek_data ? end : start;
+
+ xas_pause(xas);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ lock_page(page);
+ if (unlikely(page->mapping != mapping))
+ goto unlock;
+
+ offset = offset_in_thp(page, start) & ~(bsz - 1);
+
+ do {
+ if (ops->is_partially_uptodate(page, offset, bsz) == seek_data)
+ break;
+ start = (start + bsz) & ~(bsz - 1);
+ offset += bsz;
+ } while (offset < thp_size(page));
+unlock:
+ unlock_page(page);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ return start;
+}
+
+static inline
+unsigned int seek_page_size(struct xa_state *xas, struct page *page)
+{
+ if (xa_is_value(page))
+ return PAGE_SIZE << xa_get_order(xas->xa, xas->xa_index);
+ return thp_size(page);
+}
+
+/**
+ * mapping_seek_hole_data - Seek for SEEK_DATA / SEEK_HOLE in the page cache.
+ * @mapping: Address space to search.
+ * @start: First byte to consider.
+ * @end: Limit of search (exclusive).
+ * @whence: Either SEEK_HOLE or SEEK_DATA.
+ *
+ * If the page cache knows which blocks contain holes and which blocks
+ * contain data, your filesystem can use this function to implement
+ * SEEK_HOLE and SEEK_DATA. This is useful for filesystems which are
+ * entirely memory-based such as tmpfs, and filesystems which support
+ * unwritten extents.
+ *
+ * Return: The requested offset on successs, or -ENXIO if @whence specifies
+ * SEEK_DATA and there is no data after @start. There is an implicit hole
+ * after @end - 1, so SEEK_HOLE returns @end if all the bytes between @start
+ * and @end contain data.
+ */
+loff_t mapping_seek_hole_data(struct address_space *mapping, loff_t start,
+ loff_t end, int whence)
+{
+ XA_STATE(xas, &mapping->i_pages, start >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ pgoff_t max = (end - 1) / PAGE_SIZE;
+ bool seek_data = (whence == SEEK_DATA);
+ struct page *page;
+
+ if (end <= start)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ while ((page = find_get_entry(&xas, max, XA_PRESENT))) {
+ loff_t pos = xas.xa_index * PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ if (start < pos) {
+ if (!seek_data)
+ goto unlock;
+ start = pos;
+ }
+
+ pos += seek_page_size(&xas, page);
+ start = page_seek_hole_data(&xas, mapping, page, start, pos,
+ seek_data);
+ if (start < pos)
+ goto unlock;
+ if (!xa_is_value(page))
+ put_page(page);
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (seek_data)
+ return -ENXIO;
+ goto out;
+
+unlock:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (!xa_is_value(page))
+ put_page(page);
+out:
+ if (start > end)
+ return end;
+ return start;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
#define MMAP_LOTSAMISS (100)
/*
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index d77605c30f2e06..395c75111d335e 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -668,9 +668,9 @@ release:
* available
* never: never stall for any thp allocation
*/
-static inline gfp_t alloc_hugepage_direct_gfpmask(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+gfp_t vma_thp_gfp_mask(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
- const bool vma_madvised = !!(vma->vm_flags & VM_HUGEPAGE);
+ const bool vma_madvised = vma && (vma->vm_flags & VM_HUGEPAGE);
/* Always do synchronous compaction */
if (test_bit(TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_DEFRAG_DIRECT_FLAG, &transparent_hugepage_flags))
@@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page(struct vm_fault *vmf)
}
return ret;
}
- gfp = alloc_hugepage_direct_gfpmask(vma);
+ gfp = vma_thp_gfp_mask(vma);
page = alloc_hugepage_vma(gfp, vma, haddr, HPAGE_PMD_ORDER);
if (unlikely(!page)) {
count_vm_event(THP_FAULT_FALLBACK);
diff --git a/mm/internal.h b/mm/internal.h
index 25d2b2439f19f2..9902648f2206f0 100644
--- a/mm/internal.h
+++ b/mm/internal.h
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ static inline void force_page_cache_readahead(struct address_space *mapping,
force_page_cache_ra(&ractl, &file->f_ra, nr_to_read);
}
-struct page *find_get_entry(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t index);
-struct page *find_lock_entry(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t index);
+unsigned find_lock_entries(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t start,
+ pgoff_t end, struct pagevec *pvec, pgoff_t *indices);
/**
* page_evictable - test whether a page is evictable
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index b18189ef3a9274..b5e08d4cefecc0 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -210,6 +210,11 @@ void __kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
*size = optimal_size;
}
+void __kasan_cache_create_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache)
+{
+ cache->kasan_info.is_kmalloc = true;
+}
+
size_t __kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)
{
if (!kasan_stack_collection_enabled())
@@ -256,7 +261,8 @@ void __kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
void __kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
{
- kasan_poison(object, cache->object_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
+ kasan_poison(object, round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
+ KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
}
/*
@@ -273,22 +279,13 @@ void __kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
* based on objects indexes, so that objects that are next to each other
* get different tags.
*/
-static u8 assign_tag(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
- bool init, bool keep_tag)
+static inline u8 assign_tag(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+ const void *object, bool init)
{
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
return 0xff;
/*
- * 1. When an object is kmalloc()'ed, two hooks are called:
- * kasan_slab_alloc() and kasan_kmalloc(). We assign the
- * tag only in the first one.
- * 2. We reuse the same tag for krealloc'ed objects.
- */
- if (keep_tag)
- return get_tag(object);
-
- /*
* If the cache neither has a constructor nor has SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU
* set, assign a tag when the object is being allocated (init == false).
*/
@@ -320,13 +317,13 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
}
/* Tag is ignored in set_tag() without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS */
- object = set_tag(object, assign_tag(cache, object, true, false));
+ object = set_tag(object, assign_tag(cache, object, true));
return (void *)object;
}
-static bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
- unsigned long ip, bool quarantine)
+static inline bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+ void *object, unsigned long ip, bool quarantine)
{
u8 tag;
void *tagged_object;
@@ -335,6 +332,9 @@ static bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
tagged_object = object;
object = kasan_reset_tag(object);
+ if (is_kfence_address(object))
+ return false;
+
if (unlikely(nearest_obj(cache, virt_to_head_page(object), object) !=
object)) {
kasan_report_invalid_free(tagged_object, ip);
@@ -350,15 +350,14 @@ static bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
return true;
}
- kasan_poison(object, cache->object_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
-
- if (!kasan_stack_collection_enabled())
- return false;
+ kasan_poison(object, round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
+ KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine))
return false;
- kasan_set_free_info(cache, object, tag);
+ if (kasan_stack_collection_enabled())
+ kasan_set_free_info(cache, object, tag);
return kasan_quarantine_put(cache, object);
}
@@ -368,6 +367,31 @@ bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
return ____kasan_slab_free(cache, object, ip, true);
}
+static inline bool ____kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+{
+ if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr))) {
+ kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if (!kasan_byte_accessible(ptr)) {
+ kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The object will be poisoned by kasan_free_pages() or
+ * kasan_slab_free_mempool().
+ */
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+{
+ ____kasan_kfree_large(ptr, ip);
+}
+
void __kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
{
struct page *page;
@@ -381,31 +405,68 @@ void __kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
* KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, and kmalloc falls back onto page_alloc.
*/
if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
- if (ptr != page_address(page)) {
- kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
+ if (____kasan_kfree_large(ptr, ip))
return;
- }
kasan_poison(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
} else {
____kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
}
}
-static void set_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)
+static void set_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
+ gfp_t flags, bool is_kmalloc)
{
struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
+ /* Don't save alloc info for kmalloc caches in kasan_slab_alloc(). */
+ if (cache->kasan_info.is_kmalloc && !is_kmalloc)
+ return;
+
alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
if (alloc_meta)
kasan_set_track(&alloc_meta->alloc_track, flags);
}
-static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
- size_t size, gfp_t flags, bool keep_tag)
+void * __must_check __kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+ void *object, gfp_t flags)
+{
+ u8 tag;
+ void *tagged_object;
+
+ if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
+ kasan_quarantine_reduce();
+
+ if (unlikely(object == NULL))
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (is_kfence_address(object))
+ return (void *)object;
+
+ /*
+ * Generate and assign random tag for tag-based modes.
+ * Tag is ignored in set_tag() for the generic mode.
+ */
+ tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false);
+ tagged_object = set_tag(object, tag);
+
+ /*
+ * Unpoison the whole object.
+ * For kmalloc() allocations, kasan_kmalloc() will do precise poisoning.
+ */
+ kasan_unpoison(tagged_object, cache->object_size);
+
+ /* Save alloc info (if possible) for non-kmalloc() allocations. */
+ if (kasan_stack_collection_enabled())
+ set_alloc_info(cache, (void *)object, flags, false);
+
+ return tagged_object;
+}
+
+static inline void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+ const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
{
unsigned long redzone_start;
unsigned long redzone_end;
- u8 tag;
if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
kasan_quarantine_reduce();
@@ -413,40 +474,51 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
if (unlikely(object == NULL))
return NULL;
+ if (is_kfence_address(kasan_reset_tag(object)))
+ return (void *)object;
+
+ /*
+ * The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_slab_alloc() for
+ * kmalloc() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc().
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * The redzone has byte-level precision for the generic mode.
+ * Partially poison the last object granule to cover the unaligned
+ * part of the redzone.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+ kasan_poison_last_granule((void *)object, size);
+
+ /* Poison the aligned part of the redzone. */
redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(object + size),
KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
- redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)object + cache->object_size,
+ redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)(object + cache->object_size),
KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
- tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag);
-
- /* Tag is ignored in set_tag without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS */
- kasan_unpoison(set_tag(object, tag), size);
kasan_poison((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
+ /*
+ * Save alloc info (if possible) for kmalloc() allocations.
+ * This also rewrites the alloc info when called from kasan_krealloc().
+ */
if (kasan_stack_collection_enabled())
- set_alloc_info(cache, (void *)object, flags);
+ set_alloc_info(cache, (void *)object, flags, true);
- return set_tag(object, tag);
-}
-
-void * __must_check __kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache,
- void *object, gfp_t flags)
-{
- return ____kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, cache->object_size, flags, false);
+ /* Keep the tag that was set by kasan_slab_alloc(). */
+ return (void *)object;
}
void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
size_t size, gfp_t flags)
{
- return ____kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, size, flags, true);
+ return ____kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, size, flags);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_kmalloc);
void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
gfp_t flags)
{
- struct page *page;
unsigned long redzone_start;
unsigned long redzone_end;
@@ -456,12 +528,23 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
if (unlikely(ptr == NULL))
return NULL;
- page = virt_to_page(ptr);
+ /*
+ * The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_alloc_pages() for
+ * alloc_pages() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc().
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * The redzone has byte-level precision for the generic mode.
+ * Partially poison the last object granule to cover the unaligned
+ * part of the redzone.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+ kasan_poison_last_granule(ptr, size);
+
+ /* Poison the aligned part of the redzone. */
redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
- redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(page);
-
- kasan_unpoison(ptr, size);
+ redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(virt_to_page(ptr));
kasan_poison((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE);
@@ -475,20 +558,20 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag
if (unlikely(object == ZERO_SIZE_PTR))
return (void *)object;
+ /*
+ * Unpoison the object's data.
+ * Part of it might already have been unpoisoned, but it's unknown
+ * how big that part is.
+ */
+ kasan_unpoison(object, size);
+
page = virt_to_head_page(object);
+ /* Piggy-back on kmalloc() instrumentation to poison the redzone. */
if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page)))
return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
else
- return ____kasan_kmalloc(page->slab_cache, object, size,
- flags, true);
-}
-
-void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
-{
- if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr)))
- kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
- /* The object will be poisoned by kasan_free_pages(). */
+ return ____kasan_kmalloc(page->slab_cache, object, size, flags);
}
bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *address, unsigned long ip)
diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
index 3f17a12180559b..2e55e0f82f39c3 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kasan.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
@@ -331,7 +332,7 @@ void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *addr)
struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
void *object;
- if (!(page && PageSlab(page)))
+ if (is_kfence_address(addr) || !(page && PageSlab(page)))
return;
cache = page->slab_cache;
diff --git a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c b/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c
index b31aeef505dd5e..2aad21fda156e4 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_flag_enabled);
/* Whether to collect alloc/free stack traces. */
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kasan_flag_stacktrace);
-/* Whether panic or disable tag checking on fault. */
+/* Whether to panic or print a report and disable tag checking on fault. */
bool kasan_flag_panic __ro_after_init;
/* kasan=off/on */
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index cc14b6e6c14c5d..8c55634d6edd92 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#define __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H
#include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
#include <linux/stackdepot.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
@@ -329,16 +330,37 @@ static inline u8 kasan_random_tag(void) { return 0; }
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
-static inline void kasan_poison(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
+static inline void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value)
{
- hw_set_mem_tag_range(kasan_reset_tag(address),
- round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), value);
+ addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr);
+
+ /* Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. */
+ if (is_kfence_address(addr))
+ return;
+
+ if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK))
+ return;
+ if (WARN_ON(size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK))
+ return;
+
+ hw_set_mem_tag_range((void *)addr, size, value);
}
-static inline void kasan_unpoison(const void *address, size_t size)
+static inline void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size)
{
- hw_set_mem_tag_range(kasan_reset_tag(address),
- round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address));
+ u8 tag = get_tag(addr);
+
+ addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr);
+
+ /* Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. */
+ if (is_kfence_address(addr))
+ return;
+
+ if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK))
+ return;
+ size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+
+ hw_set_mem_tag_range((void *)addr, size, tag);
}
static inline bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr)
@@ -352,12 +374,51 @@ static inline bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr)
#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
-void kasan_poison(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
-void kasan_unpoison(const void *address, size_t size);
+/**
+ * kasan_poison - mark the memory range as unaccessible
+ * @addr - range start address, must be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE
+ * @size - range size, must be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE
+ * @value - value that's written to metadata for the range
+ *
+ * The size gets aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE before marking the range.
+ */
+void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value);
+
+/**
+ * kasan_unpoison - mark the memory range as accessible
+ * @addr - range start address, must be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE
+ * @size - range size, can be unaligned
+ *
+ * For the tag-based modes, the @size gets aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE before
+ * marking the range.
+ * For the generic mode, the last granule of the memory range gets partially
+ * unpoisoned based on the @size.
+ */
+void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size);
+
bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr);
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
+
+/**
+ * kasan_poison_last_granule - mark the last granule of the memory range as
+ * unaccessible
+ * @addr - range start address, must be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE
+ * @size - range size
+ *
+ * This function is only available for the generic mode, as it's the only mode
+ * that has partially poisoned memory granules.
+ */
+void kasan_poison_last_granule(const void *address, size_t size);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC */
+
+static inline void kasan_poison_last_granule(const void *address, size_t size) { }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC */
+
/*
* Exported functions for interfaces called from assembly or from generated
* code. Declarations here to avoid warning about missing declarations.
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
index 234f35a84f19e0..87b271206163b8 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <trace/events/error_report.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
@@ -84,8 +85,9 @@ static void start_report(unsigned long *flags)
pr_err("==================================================================\n");
}
-static void end_report(unsigned long *flags)
+static void end_report(unsigned long *flags, unsigned long addr)
{
+ trace_error_report_end(ERROR_DETECTOR_KASAN, addr);
pr_err("==================================================================\n");
add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, *flags);
@@ -355,7 +357,7 @@ void kasan_report_invalid_free(void *object, unsigned long ip)
print_address_description(object, tag);
pr_err("\n");
print_memory_metadata(object);
- end_report(&flags);
+ end_report(&flags, (unsigned long)object);
}
static void __kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool is_write,
@@ -401,7 +403,7 @@ static void __kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool is_write,
dump_stack();
}
- end_report(&flags);
+ end_report(&flags, addr);
}
bool kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool is_write,
diff --git a/mm/kasan/shadow.c b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
index 80adc85d03933e..63f43443f5d772 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kasan.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
#include <linux/memory.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
@@ -68,11 +69,7 @@ void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
return __memcpy(dest, src, len);
}
-/*
- * Poisons the shadow memory for 'size' bytes starting from 'addr'.
- * Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE.
- */
-void kasan_poison(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
+void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value)
{
void *shadow_start, *shadow_end;
@@ -81,37 +78,62 @@ void kasan_poison(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
* some of the callers (e.g. kasan_poison_object_data) pass tagged
* addresses to this function.
*/
- address = kasan_reset_tag(address);
- size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+ addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr);
- shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address);
- shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
+ /* Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. */
+ if (is_kfence_address(addr))
+ return;
+
+ if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK))
+ return;
+ if (WARN_ON(size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK))
+ return;
+
+ shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr);
+ shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr + size);
__memset(shadow_start, value, shadow_end - shadow_start);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_poison);
-void kasan_unpoison(const void *address, size_t size)
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
+void kasan_poison_last_granule(const void *addr, size_t size)
{
- u8 tag = get_tag(address);
+ if (size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) {
+ u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr + size);
+ *shadow = size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK;
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size)
+{
+ u8 tag = get_tag(addr);
/*
* Perform shadow offset calculation based on untagged address, as
* some of the callers (e.g. kasan_unpoison_object_data) pass tagged
* addresses to this function.
*/
- address = kasan_reset_tag(address);
+ addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr);
+
+ /*
+ * Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. Also note
+ * that calls to ksize(), where size is not a multiple of machine-word
+ * size, would otherwise poison the invalid portion of the word.
+ */
+ if (is_kfence_address(addr))
+ return;
- kasan_poison(address, size, tag);
+ if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK))
+ return;
- if (size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) {
- u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
+ /* Unpoison all granules that cover the object. */
+ kasan_poison(addr, round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), tag);
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS))
- *shadow = tag;
- else /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC */
- *shadow = size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK;
- }
+ /* Partially poison the last granule for the generic mode. */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+ kasan_poison_last_granule(addr, size);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
diff --git a/mm/kfence/Makefile b/mm/kfence/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..6872cd5e539072
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kfence/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_KFENCE) := core.o report.o
+
+CFLAGS_kfence_test.o := -g -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls
+obj-$(CONFIG_KFENCE_KUNIT_TEST) += kfence_test.o
diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..3b8ec938470a2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kfence/core.c
@@ -0,0 +1,841 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * KFENCE guarded object allocator and fault handling.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, Google LLC.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kfence: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/kcsan-checks.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/lockdep.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+#include <asm/kfence.h>
+
+#include "kfence.h"
+
+/* Disables KFENCE on the first warning assuming an irrecoverable error. */
+#define KFENCE_WARN_ON(cond) \
+ ({ \
+ const bool __cond = WARN_ON(cond); \
+ if (unlikely(__cond)) \
+ WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, false); \
+ __cond; \
+ })
+
+/* === Data ================================================================= */
+
+static bool kfence_enabled __read_mostly;
+
+static unsigned long kfence_sample_interval __read_mostly = CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL;
+
+#ifdef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX
+#undef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX
+#endif
+#define MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX "kfence."
+
+static int param_set_sample_interval(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+ unsigned long num;
+ int ret = kstrtoul(val, 0, &num);
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (!num) /* Using 0 to indicate KFENCE is disabled. */
+ WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, false);
+ else if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled) && system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING)
+ return -EINVAL; /* Cannot (re-)enable KFENCE on-the-fly. */
+
+ *((unsigned long *)kp->arg) = num;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int param_get_sample_interval(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+ if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled))
+ return sprintf(buffer, "0\n");
+
+ return param_get_ulong(buffer, kp);
+}
+
+static const struct kernel_param_ops sample_interval_param_ops = {
+ .set = param_set_sample_interval,
+ .get = param_get_sample_interval,
+};
+module_param_cb(sample_interval, &sample_interval_param_ops, &kfence_sample_interval, 0600);
+
+/* The pool of pages used for guard pages and objects. */
+char *__kfence_pool __ro_after_init;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kfence_pool); /* Export for test modules. */
+
+/*
+ * Per-object metadata, with one-to-one mapping of object metadata to
+ * backing pages (in __kfence_pool).
+ */
+static_assert(CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS > 0);
+struct kfence_metadata kfence_metadata[CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS];
+
+/* Freelist with available objects. */
+static struct list_head kfence_freelist = LIST_HEAD_INIT(kfence_freelist);
+static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(kfence_freelist_lock); /* Lock protecting freelist. */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS
+/* The static key to set up a KFENCE allocation. */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kfence_allocation_key);
+#endif
+
+/* Gates the allocation, ensuring only one succeeds in a given period. */
+atomic_t kfence_allocation_gate = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
+
+/* Statistics counters for debugfs. */
+enum kfence_counter_id {
+ KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED,
+ KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCS,
+ KFENCE_COUNTER_FREES,
+ KFENCE_COUNTER_ZOMBIES,
+ KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS,
+ KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT,
+};
+static atomic_long_t counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT];
+static const char *const counter_names[] = {
+ [KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED] = "currently allocated",
+ [KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCS] = "total allocations",
+ [KFENCE_COUNTER_FREES] = "total frees",
+ [KFENCE_COUNTER_ZOMBIES] = "zombie allocations",
+ [KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS] = "total bugs",
+};
+static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(counter_names) == KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT);
+
+/* === Internals ============================================================ */
+
+static bool kfence_protect(unsigned long addr)
+{
+ return !KFENCE_WARN_ON(!kfence_protect_page(ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PAGE_SIZE), true));
+}
+
+static bool kfence_unprotect(unsigned long addr)
+{
+ return !KFENCE_WARN_ON(!kfence_protect_page(ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PAGE_SIZE), false));
+}
+
+static inline struct kfence_metadata *addr_to_metadata(unsigned long addr)
+{
+ long index;
+
+ /* The checks do not affect performance; only called from slow-paths. */
+
+ if (!is_kfence_address((void *)addr))
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * May be an invalid index if called with an address at the edge of
+ * __kfence_pool, in which case we would report an "invalid access"
+ * error.
+ */
+ index = (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool) / (PAGE_SIZE * 2) - 1;
+ if (index < 0 || index >= CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return &kfence_metadata[index];
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long metadata_to_pageaddr(const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
+{
+ unsigned long offset = (meta - kfence_metadata + 1) * PAGE_SIZE * 2;
+ unsigned long pageaddr = (unsigned long)&__kfence_pool[offset];
+
+ /* The checks do not affect performance; only called from slow-paths. */
+
+ /* Only call with a pointer into kfence_metadata. */
+ if (KFENCE_WARN_ON(meta < kfence_metadata ||
+ meta >= kfence_metadata + CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * This metadata object only ever maps to 1 page; verify that the stored
+ * address is in the expected range.
+ */
+ if (KFENCE_WARN_ON(ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, PAGE_SIZE) != pageaddr))
+ return 0;
+
+ return pageaddr;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update the object's metadata state, including updating the alloc/free stacks
+ * depending on the state transition.
+ */
+static noinline void metadata_update_state(struct kfence_metadata *meta,
+ enum kfence_object_state next)
+{
+ struct kfence_track *track =
+ next == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED ? &meta->free_track : &meta->alloc_track;
+
+ lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock);
+
+ /*
+ * Skip over 1 (this) functions; noinline ensures we do not accidentally
+ * skip over the caller by never inlining.
+ */
+ track->num_stack_entries = stack_trace_save(track->stack_entries, KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH, 1);
+ track->pid = task_pid_nr(current);
+
+ /*
+ * Pairs with READ_ONCE() in
+ * kfence_shutdown_cache(),
+ * kfence_handle_page_fault().
+ */
+ WRITE_ONCE(meta->state, next);
+}
+
+/* Write canary byte to @addr. */
+static inline bool set_canary_byte(u8 *addr)
+{
+ *addr = KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(addr);
+ return true;
+}
+
+/* Check canary byte at @addr. */
+static inline bool check_canary_byte(u8 *addr)
+{
+ if (likely(*addr == KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(addr)))
+ return true;
+
+ atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]);
+ kfence_report_error((unsigned long)addr, false, NULL, addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr),
+ KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION);
+ return false;
+}
+
+/* __always_inline this to ensure we won't do an indirect call to fn. */
+static __always_inline void for_each_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta, bool (*fn)(u8 *))
+{
+ const unsigned long pageaddr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+ unsigned long addr;
+
+ lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock);
+
+ /*
+ * We'll iterate over each canary byte per-side until fn() returns
+ * false. However, we'll still iterate over the canary bytes to the
+ * right of the object even if there was an error in the canary bytes to
+ * the left of the object. Specifically, if check_canary_byte()
+ * generates an error, showing both sides might give more clues as to
+ * what the error is about when displaying which bytes were corrupted.
+ */
+
+ /* Apply to left of object. */
+ for (addr = pageaddr; addr < meta->addr; addr++) {
+ if (!fn((u8 *)addr))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Apply to right of object. */
+ for (addr = meta->addr + meta->size; addr < pageaddr + PAGE_SIZE; addr++) {
+ if (!fn((u8 *)addr))
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ struct kfence_metadata *meta = NULL;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct page *page;
+ void *addr;
+
+ /* Try to obtain a free object. */
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags);
+ if (!list_empty(&kfence_freelist)) {
+ meta = list_entry(kfence_freelist.next, struct kfence_metadata, list);
+ list_del_init(&meta->list);
+ }
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags);
+ if (!meta)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (unlikely(!raw_spin_trylock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags))) {
+ /*
+ * This is extremely unlikely -- we are reporting on a
+ * use-after-free, which locked meta->lock, and the reporting
+ * code via printk calls kmalloc() which ends up in
+ * kfence_alloc() and tries to grab the same object that we're
+ * reporting on. While it has never been observed, lockdep does
+ * report that there is a possibility of deadlock. Fix it by
+ * using trylock and bailing out gracefully.
+ */
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags);
+ /* Put the object back on the freelist. */
+ list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags);
+
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ meta->addr = metadata_to_pageaddr(meta);
+ /* Unprotect if we're reusing this page. */
+ if (meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED)
+ kfence_unprotect(meta->addr);
+
+ /*
+ * Note: for allocations made before RNG initialization, will always
+ * return zero. We still benefit from enabling KFENCE as early as
+ * possible, even when the RNG is not yet available, as this will allow
+ * KFENCE to detect bugs due to earlier allocations. The only downside
+ * is that the out-of-bounds accesses detected are deterministic for
+ * such allocations.
+ */
+ if (prandom_u32_max(2)) {
+ /* Allocate on the "right" side, re-calculate address. */
+ meta->addr += PAGE_SIZE - size;
+ meta->addr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, cache->align);
+ }
+
+ addr = (void *)meta->addr;
+
+ /* Update remaining metadata. */
+ metadata_update_state(meta, KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED);
+ /* Pairs with READ_ONCE() in kfence_shutdown_cache(). */
+ WRITE_ONCE(meta->cache, cache);
+ meta->size = size;
+ for_each_canary(meta, set_canary_byte);
+
+ /* Set required struct page fields. */
+ page = virt_to_page(meta->addr);
+ page->slab_cache = cache;
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLUB))
+ page->objects = 1;
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB))
+ page->s_mem = addr;
+
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
+
+ /* Memory initialization. */
+
+ /*
+ * We check slab_want_init_on_alloc() ourselves, rather than letting
+ * SL*B do the initialization, as otherwise we might overwrite KFENCE's
+ * redzone.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfp, cache)))
+ memzero_explicit(addr, size);
+ if (cache->ctor)
+ cache->ctor(addr);
+
+ if (CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS && !prandom_u32_max(CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS))
+ kfence_protect(meta->addr); /* Random "faults" by protecting the object. */
+
+ atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED]);
+ atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCS]);
+
+ return addr;
+}
+
+static void kfence_guarded_free(void *addr, struct kfence_metadata *meta, bool zombie)
+{
+ struct kcsan_scoped_access assert_page_exclusive;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags);
+
+ if (meta->state != KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED || meta->addr != (unsigned long)addr) {
+ /* Invalid or double-free, bail out. */
+ atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]);
+ kfence_report_error((unsigned long)addr, false, NULL, meta,
+ KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Detect racy use-after-free, or incorrect reallocation of this page by KFENCE. */
+ kcsan_begin_scoped_access((void *)ALIGN_DOWN((unsigned long)addr, PAGE_SIZE), PAGE_SIZE,
+ KCSAN_ACCESS_SCOPED | KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT,
+ &assert_page_exclusive);
+
+ if (CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS)
+ kfence_unprotect((unsigned long)addr); /* To check canary bytes. */
+
+ /* Restore page protection if there was an OOB access. */
+ if (meta->unprotected_page) {
+ kfence_protect(meta->unprotected_page);
+ meta->unprotected_page = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Check canary bytes for memory corruption. */
+ for_each_canary(meta, check_canary_byte);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear memory if init-on-free is set. While we protect the page, the
+ * data is still there, and after a use-after-free is detected, we
+ * unprotect the page, so the data is still accessible.
+ */
+ if (!zombie && unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(meta->cache)))
+ memzero_explicit(addr, meta->size);
+
+ /* Mark the object as freed. */
+ metadata_update_state(meta, KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED);
+
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
+
+ /* Protect to detect use-after-frees. */
+ kfence_protect((unsigned long)addr);
+
+ kcsan_end_scoped_access(&assert_page_exclusive);
+ if (!zombie) {
+ /* Add it to the tail of the freelist for reuse. */
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags);
+ KFENCE_WARN_ON(!list_empty(&meta->list));
+ list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags);
+
+ atomic_long_dec(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED]);
+ atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_FREES]);
+ } else {
+ /* See kfence_shutdown_cache(). */
+ atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ZOMBIES]);
+ }
+}
+
+static void rcu_guarded_free(struct rcu_head *h)
+{
+ struct kfence_metadata *meta = container_of(h, struct kfence_metadata, rcu_head);
+
+ kfence_guarded_free((void *)meta->addr, meta, false);
+}
+
+static bool __init kfence_init_pool(void)
+{
+ unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)__kfence_pool;
+ struct page *pages;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!__kfence_pool)
+ return false;
+
+ if (!arch_kfence_init_pool())
+ goto err;
+
+ pages = virt_to_page(addr);
+
+ /*
+ * Set up object pages: they must have PG_slab set, to avoid freeing
+ * these as real pages.
+ *
+ * We also want to avoid inserting kfence_free() in the kfree()
+ * fast-path in SLUB, and therefore need to ensure kfree() correctly
+ * enters __slab_free() slow-path.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < KFENCE_POOL_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; i++) {
+ if (!i || (i % 2))
+ continue;
+
+ /* Verify we do not have a compound head page. */
+ if (WARN_ON(compound_head(&pages[i]) != &pages[i]))
+ goto err;
+
+ __SetPageSlab(&pages[i]);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Protect the first 2 pages. The first page is mostly unnecessary, and
+ * merely serves as an extended guard page. However, adding one
+ * additional page in the beginning gives us an even number of pages,
+ * which simplifies the mapping of address to metadata index.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+ if (unlikely(!kfence_protect(addr)))
+ goto err;
+
+ addr += PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) {
+ struct kfence_metadata *meta = &kfence_metadata[i];
+
+ /* Initialize metadata. */
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&meta->list);
+ raw_spin_lock_init(&meta->lock);
+ meta->state = KFENCE_OBJECT_UNUSED;
+ meta->addr = addr; /* Initialize for validation in metadata_to_pageaddr(). */
+ list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist);
+
+ /* Protect the right redzone. */
+ if (unlikely(!kfence_protect(addr + PAGE_SIZE)))
+ goto err;
+
+ addr += 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+
+err:
+ /*
+ * Only release unprotected pages, and do not try to go back and change
+ * page attributes due to risk of failing to do so as well. If changing
+ * page attributes for some pages fails, it is very likely that it also
+ * fails for the first page, and therefore expect addr==__kfence_pool in
+ * most failure cases.
+ */
+ memblock_free_late(__pa(addr), KFENCE_POOL_SIZE - (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool));
+ __kfence_pool = NULL;
+ return false;
+}
+
+/* === DebugFS Interface ==================================================== */
+
+static int stats_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ seq_printf(seq, "enabled: %i\n", READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled));
+ for (i = 0; i < KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT; i++)
+ seq_printf(seq, "%s: %ld\n", counter_names[i], atomic_long_read(&counters[i]));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(stats);
+
+/*
+ * debugfs seq_file operations for /sys/kernel/debug/kfence/objects.
+ * start_object() and next_object() return the object index + 1, because NULL is used
+ * to stop iteration.
+ */
+static void *start_object(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ if (*pos < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS)
+ return (void *)((long)*pos + 1);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void stop_object(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+}
+
+static void *next_object(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ ++*pos;
+ if (*pos < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS)
+ return (void *)((long)*pos + 1);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int show_object(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct kfence_metadata *meta = &kfence_metadata[(long)v - 1];
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags);
+ kfence_print_object(seq, meta);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
+ seq_puts(seq, "---------------------------------\n");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations object_seqops = {
+ .start = start_object,
+ .next = next_object,
+ .stop = stop_object,
+ .show = show_object,
+};
+
+static int open_objects(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &object_seqops);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations objects_fops = {
+ .open = open_objects,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+};
+
+static int __init kfence_debugfs_init(void)
+{
+ struct dentry *kfence_dir = debugfs_create_dir("kfence", NULL);
+
+ debugfs_create_file("stats", 0444, kfence_dir, NULL, &stats_fops);
+ debugfs_create_file("objects", 0400, kfence_dir, NULL, &objects_fops);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+late_initcall(kfence_debugfs_init);
+
+/* === Allocation Gate Timer ================================================ */
+
+/*
+ * Set up delayed work, which will enable and disable the static key. We need to
+ * use a work queue (rather than a simple timer), since enabling and disabling a
+ * static key cannot be done from an interrupt.
+ *
+ * Note: Toggling a static branch currently causes IPIs, and here we'll end up
+ * with a total of 2 IPIs to all CPUs. If this ends up a problem in future (with
+ * more aggressive sampling intervals), we could get away with a variant that
+ * avoids IPIs, at the cost of not immediately capturing allocations if the
+ * instructions remain cached.
+ */
+static struct delayed_work kfence_timer;
+static void toggle_allocation_gate(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled))
+ return;
+
+ /* Enable static key, and await allocation to happen. */
+ atomic_set(&kfence_allocation_gate, 0);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS
+ static_branch_enable(&kfence_allocation_key);
+ /*
+ * Await an allocation. Timeout after 1 second, in case the kernel stops
+ * doing allocations, to avoid stalling this worker task for too long.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned long end_wait = jiffies + HZ;
+
+ do {
+ set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
+ if (atomic_read(&kfence_allocation_gate) != 0)
+ break;
+ schedule_timeout(1);
+ } while (time_before(jiffies, end_wait));
+ __set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
+ }
+ /* Disable static key and reset timer. */
+ static_branch_disable(&kfence_allocation_key);
+#endif
+ schedule_delayed_work(&kfence_timer, msecs_to_jiffies(kfence_sample_interval));
+}
+static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(kfence_timer, toggle_allocation_gate);
+
+/* === Public interface ===================================================== */
+
+void __init kfence_alloc_pool(void)
+{
+ if (!kfence_sample_interval)
+ return;
+
+ __kfence_pool = memblock_alloc(KFENCE_POOL_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ if (!__kfence_pool)
+ pr_err("failed to allocate pool\n");
+}
+
+void __init kfence_init(void)
+{
+ /* Setting kfence_sample_interval to 0 on boot disables KFENCE. */
+ if (!kfence_sample_interval)
+ return;
+
+ if (!kfence_init_pool()) {
+ pr_err("%s failed\n", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, true);
+ schedule_delayed_work(&kfence_timer, 0);
+ pr_info("initialized - using %lu bytes for %d objects at 0x%p-0x%p\n", KFENCE_POOL_SIZE,
+ CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS, (void *)__kfence_pool,
+ (void *)(__kfence_pool + KFENCE_POOL_SIZE));
+}
+
+void kfence_shutdown_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct kfence_metadata *meta;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) {
+ bool in_use;
+
+ meta = &kfence_metadata[i];
+
+ /*
+ * If we observe some inconsistent cache and state pair where we
+ * should have returned false here, cache destruction is racing
+ * with either kmem_cache_alloc() or kmem_cache_free(). Taking
+ * the lock will not help, as different critical section
+ * serialization will have the same outcome.
+ */
+ if (READ_ONCE(meta->cache) != s ||
+ READ_ONCE(meta->state) != KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED)
+ continue;
+
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags);
+ in_use = meta->cache == s && meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED;
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
+
+ if (in_use) {
+ /*
+ * This cache still has allocations, and we should not
+ * release them back into the freelist so they can still
+ * safely be used and retain the kernel's default
+ * behaviour of keeping the allocations alive (leak the
+ * cache); however, they effectively become "zombie
+ * allocations" as the KFENCE objects are the only ones
+ * still in use and the owning cache is being destroyed.
+ *
+ * We mark them freed, so that any subsequent use shows
+ * more useful error messages that will include stack
+ * traces of the user of the object, the original
+ * allocation, and caller to shutdown_cache().
+ */
+ kfence_guarded_free((void *)meta->addr, meta, /*zombie=*/true);
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) {
+ meta = &kfence_metadata[i];
+
+ /* See above. */
+ if (READ_ONCE(meta->cache) != s || READ_ONCE(meta->state) != KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED)
+ continue;
+
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags);
+ if (meta->cache == s && meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED)
+ meta->cache = NULL;
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
+ }
+}
+
+void *__kfence_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+ /*
+ * allocation_gate only needs to become non-zero, so it doesn't make
+ * sense to continue writing to it and pay the associated contention
+ * cost, in case we have a large number of concurrent allocations.
+ */
+ if (atomic_read(&kfence_allocation_gate) || atomic_inc_return(&kfence_allocation_gate) > 1)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled))
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return kfence_guarded_alloc(s, size, flags);
+}
+
+size_t kfence_ksize(const void *addr)
+{
+ const struct kfence_metadata *meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr);
+
+ /*
+ * Read locklessly -- if there is a race with __kfence_alloc(), this is
+ * either a use-after-free or invalid access.
+ */
+ return meta ? meta->size : 0;
+}
+
+void *kfence_object_start(const void *addr)
+{
+ const struct kfence_metadata *meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr);
+
+ /*
+ * Read locklessly -- if there is a race with __kfence_alloc(), this is
+ * either a use-after-free or invalid access.
+ */
+ return meta ? (void *)meta->addr : NULL;
+}
+
+void __kfence_free(void *addr)
+{
+ struct kfence_metadata *meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr);
+
+ /*
+ * If the objects of the cache are SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, defer freeing
+ * the object, as the object page may be recycled for other-typed
+ * objects once it has been freed. meta->cache may be NULL if the cache
+ * was destroyed.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(meta->cache && (meta->cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU)))
+ call_rcu(&meta->rcu_head, rcu_guarded_free);
+ else
+ kfence_guarded_free(addr, meta, false);
+}
+
+bool kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ const int page_index = (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool) / PAGE_SIZE;
+ struct kfence_metadata *to_report = NULL;
+ enum kfence_error_type error_type;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ if (!is_kfence_address((void *)addr))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) /* If disabled at runtime ... */
+ return kfence_unprotect(addr); /* ... unprotect and proceed. */
+
+ atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]);
+
+ if (page_index % 2) {
+ /* This is a redzone, report a buffer overflow. */
+ struct kfence_metadata *meta;
+ int distance = 0;
+
+ meta = addr_to_metadata(addr - PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (meta && READ_ONCE(meta->state) == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED) {
+ to_report = meta;
+ /* Data race ok; distance calculation approximate. */
+ distance = addr - data_race(meta->addr + meta->size);
+ }
+
+ meta = addr_to_metadata(addr + PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (meta && READ_ONCE(meta->state) == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED) {
+ /* Data race ok; distance calculation approximate. */
+ if (!to_report || distance > data_race(meta->addr) - addr)
+ to_report = meta;
+ }
+
+ if (!to_report)
+ goto out;
+
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags);
+ to_report->unprotected_page = addr;
+ error_type = KFENCE_ERROR_OOB;
+
+ /*
+ * If the object was freed before we took the look we can still
+ * report this as an OOB -- the report will simply show the
+ * stacktrace of the free as well.
+ */
+ } else {
+ to_report = addr_to_metadata(addr);
+ if (!to_report)
+ goto out;
+
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags);
+ error_type = KFENCE_ERROR_UAF;
+ /*
+ * We may race with __kfence_alloc(), and it is possible that a
+ * freed object may be reallocated. We simply report this as a
+ * use-after-free, with the stack trace showing the place where
+ * the object was re-allocated.
+ */
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (to_report) {
+ kfence_report_error(addr, is_write, regs, to_report, error_type);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&to_report->lock, flags);
+ } else {
+ /* This may be a UAF or OOB access, but we can't be sure. */
+ kfence_report_error(addr, is_write, regs, NULL, KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID);
+ }
+
+ return kfence_unprotect(addr); /* Unprotect and let access proceed. */
+}
diff --git a/mm/kfence/kfence.h b/mm/kfence/kfence.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..24065321ff8a7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kfence/kfence.h
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE). For more info please see
+ * Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, Google LLC.
+ */
+
+#ifndef MM_KFENCE_KFENCE_H
+#define MM_KFENCE_KFENCE_H
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#include "../slab.h" /* for struct kmem_cache */
+
+/*
+ * Get the canary byte pattern for @addr. Use a pattern that varies based on the
+ * lower 3 bits of the address, to detect memory corruptions with higher
+ * probability, where similar constants are used.
+ */
+#define KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(addr) ((u8)0xaa ^ (u8)((unsigned long)(addr) & 0x7))
+
+/* Maximum stack depth for reports. */
+#define KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH 64
+
+/* KFENCE object states. */
+enum kfence_object_state {
+ KFENCE_OBJECT_UNUSED, /* Object is unused. */
+ KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED, /* Object is currently allocated. */
+ KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED, /* Object was allocated, and then freed. */
+};
+
+/* Alloc/free tracking information. */
+struct kfence_track {
+ pid_t pid;
+ int num_stack_entries;
+ unsigned long stack_entries[KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH];
+};
+
+/* KFENCE metadata per guarded allocation. */
+struct kfence_metadata {
+ struct list_head list; /* Freelist node; access under kfence_freelist_lock. */
+ struct rcu_head rcu_head; /* For delayed freeing. */
+
+ /*
+ * Lock protecting below data; to ensure consistency of the below data,
+ * since the following may execute concurrently: __kfence_alloc(),
+ * __kfence_free(), kfence_handle_page_fault(). However, note that we
+ * cannot grab the same metadata off the freelist twice, and multiple
+ * __kfence_alloc() cannot run concurrently on the same metadata.
+ */
+ raw_spinlock_t lock;
+
+ /* The current state of the object; see above. */
+ enum kfence_object_state state;
+
+ /*
+ * Allocated object address; cannot be calculated from size, because of
+ * alignment requirements.
+ *
+ * Invariant: ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PAGE_SIZE) is constant.
+ */
+ unsigned long addr;
+
+ /*
+ * The size of the original allocation.
+ */
+ size_t size;
+
+ /*
+ * The kmem_cache cache of the last allocation; NULL if never allocated
+ * or the cache has already been destroyed.
+ */
+ struct kmem_cache *cache;
+
+ /*
+ * In case of an invalid access, the page that was unprotected; we
+ * optimistically only store one address.
+ */
+ unsigned long unprotected_page;
+
+ /* Allocation and free stack information. */
+ struct kfence_track alloc_track;
+ struct kfence_track free_track;
+};
+
+extern struct kfence_metadata kfence_metadata[CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS];
+
+/* KFENCE error types for report generation. */
+enum kfence_error_type {
+ KFENCE_ERROR_OOB, /* Detected a out-of-bounds access. */
+ KFENCE_ERROR_UAF, /* Detected a use-after-free access. */
+ KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION, /* Detected a memory corruption on free. */
+ KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID, /* Invalid access of unknown type. */
+ KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE, /* Invalid free. */
+};
+
+void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *regs,
+ const struct kfence_metadata *meta, enum kfence_error_type type);
+
+void kfence_print_object(struct seq_file *seq, const struct kfence_metadata *meta);
+
+#endif /* MM_KFENCE_KFENCE_H */
diff --git a/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c b/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..4acf4251ee0439
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,858 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Test cases for KFENCE memory safety error detector. Since the interface with
+ * which KFENCE's reports are obtained is via the console, this is the output we
+ * should verify. For each test case checks the presence (or absence) of
+ * generated reports. Relies on 'console' tracepoint to capture reports as they
+ * appear in the kernel log.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, Google LLC.
+ * Author: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
+ * Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
+ */
+
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+#include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
+#include <trace/events/printk.h>
+
+#include "kfence.h"
+
+/* Report as observed from console. */
+static struct {
+ spinlock_t lock;
+ int nlines;
+ char lines[2][256];
+} observed = {
+ .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(observed.lock),
+};
+
+/* Probe for console output: obtains observed lines of interest. */
+static void probe_console(void *ignore, const char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int nlines;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&observed.lock, flags);
+ nlines = observed.nlines;
+
+ if (strnstr(buf, "BUG: KFENCE: ", len) && strnstr(buf, "test_", len)) {
+ /*
+ * KFENCE report and related to the test.
+ *
+ * The provided @buf is not NUL-terminated; copy no more than
+ * @len bytes and let strscpy() add the missing NUL-terminator.
+ */
+ strscpy(observed.lines[0], buf, min(len + 1, sizeof(observed.lines[0])));
+ nlines = 1;
+ } else if (nlines == 1 && (strnstr(buf, "at 0x", len) || strnstr(buf, "of 0x", len))) {
+ strscpy(observed.lines[nlines++], buf, min(len + 1, sizeof(observed.lines[0])));
+ }
+
+ WRITE_ONCE(observed.nlines, nlines); /* Publish new nlines. */
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&observed.lock, flags);
+}
+
+/* Check if a report related to the test exists. */
+static bool report_available(void)
+{
+ return READ_ONCE(observed.nlines) == ARRAY_SIZE(observed.lines);
+}
+
+/* Information we expect in a report. */
+struct expect_report {
+ enum kfence_error_type type; /* The type or error. */
+ void *fn; /* Function pointer to expected function where access occurred. */
+ char *addr; /* Address at which the bad access occurred. */
+ bool is_write; /* Is access a write. */
+};
+
+static const char *get_access_type(const struct expect_report *r)
+{
+ return r->is_write ? "write" : "read";
+}
+
+/* Check observed report matches information in @r. */
+static bool report_matches(const struct expect_report *r)
+{
+ bool ret = false;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ typeof(observed.lines) expect;
+ const char *end;
+ char *cur;
+
+ /* Doubled-checked locking. */
+ if (!report_available())
+ return false;
+
+ /* Generate expected report contents. */
+
+ /* Title */
+ cur = expect[0];
+ end = &expect[0][sizeof(expect[0]) - 1];
+ switch (r->type) {
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_OOB:
+ cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds %s",
+ get_access_type(r));
+ break;
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_UAF:
+ cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free %s",
+ get_access_type(r));
+ break;
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION:
+ cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "BUG: KFENCE: memory corruption");
+ break;
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID:
+ cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "BUG: KFENCE: invalid %s",
+ get_access_type(r));
+ break;
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE:
+ cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "BUG: KFENCE: invalid free");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ scnprintf(cur, end - cur, " in %pS", r->fn);
+ /* The exact offset won't match, remove it; also strip module name. */
+ cur = strchr(expect[0], '+');
+ if (cur)
+ *cur = '\0';
+
+ /* Access information */
+ cur = expect[1];
+ end = &expect[1][sizeof(expect[1]) - 1];
+
+ switch (r->type) {
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_OOB:
+ cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "Out-of-bounds %s at", get_access_type(r));
+ break;
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_UAF:
+ cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "Use-after-free %s at", get_access_type(r));
+ break;
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION:
+ cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "Corrupted memory at");
+ break;
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID:
+ cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "Invalid %s at", get_access_type(r));
+ break;
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE:
+ cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "Invalid free of");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, " 0x%p", (void *)r->addr);
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&observed.lock, flags);
+ if (!report_available())
+ goto out; /* A new report is being captured. */
+
+ /* Finally match expected output to what we actually observed. */
+ ret = strstr(observed.lines[0], expect[0]) && strstr(observed.lines[1], expect[1]);
+out:
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&observed.lock, flags);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ===== Test cases ===== */
+
+#define TEST_PRIV_WANT_MEMCACHE ((void *)1)
+
+/* Cache used by tests; if NULL, allocate from kmalloc instead. */
+static struct kmem_cache *test_cache;
+
+static size_t setup_test_cache(struct kunit *test, size_t size, slab_flags_t flags,
+ void (*ctor)(void *))
+{
+ if (test->priv != TEST_PRIV_WANT_MEMCACHE)
+ return size;
+
+ kunit_info(test, "%s: size=%zu, ctor=%ps\n", __func__, size, ctor);
+
+ /*
+ * Use SLAB_NOLEAKTRACE to prevent merging with existing caches. Any
+ * other flag in SLAB_NEVER_MERGE also works. Use SLAB_ACCOUNT to
+ * allocate via memcg, if enabled.
+ */
+ flags |= SLAB_NOLEAKTRACE | SLAB_ACCOUNT;
+ test_cache = kmem_cache_create("test", size, 1, flags, ctor);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_TRUE_MSG(test, test_cache, "could not create cache");
+
+ return size;
+}
+
+static void test_cache_destroy(void)
+{
+ if (!test_cache)
+ return;
+
+ kmem_cache_destroy(test_cache);
+ test_cache = NULL;
+}
+
+static inline size_t kmalloc_cache_alignment(size_t size)
+{
+ return kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL)][kmalloc_index(size)]->align;
+}
+
+/* Must always inline to match stack trace against caller. */
+static __always_inline void test_free(void *ptr)
+{
+ if (test_cache)
+ kmem_cache_free(test_cache, ptr);
+ else
+ kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * If this should be a KFENCE allocation, and on which side the allocation and
+ * the closest guard page should be.
+ */
+enum allocation_policy {
+ ALLOCATE_ANY, /* KFENCE, any side. */
+ ALLOCATE_LEFT, /* KFENCE, left side of page. */
+ ALLOCATE_RIGHT, /* KFENCE, right side of page. */
+ ALLOCATE_NONE, /* No KFENCE allocation. */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Try to get a guarded allocation from KFENCE. Uses either kmalloc() or the
+ * current test_cache if set up.
+ */
+static void *test_alloc(struct kunit *test, size_t size, gfp_t gfp, enum allocation_policy policy)
+{
+ void *alloc;
+ unsigned long timeout, resched_after;
+ const char *policy_name;
+
+ switch (policy) {
+ case ALLOCATE_ANY:
+ policy_name = "any";
+ break;
+ case ALLOCATE_LEFT:
+ policy_name = "left";
+ break;
+ case ALLOCATE_RIGHT:
+ policy_name = "right";
+ break;
+ case ALLOCATE_NONE:
+ policy_name = "none";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ kunit_info(test, "%s: size=%zu, gfp=%x, policy=%s, cache=%i\n", __func__, size, gfp,
+ policy_name, !!test_cache);
+
+ /*
+ * 100x the sample interval should be more than enough to ensure we get
+ * a KFENCE allocation eventually.
+ */
+ timeout = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(100 * CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL);
+ /*
+ * Especially for non-preemption kernels, ensure the allocation-gate
+ * timer can catch up: after @resched_after, every failed allocation
+ * attempt yields, to ensure the allocation-gate timer is scheduled.
+ */
+ resched_after = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL);
+ do {
+ if (test_cache)
+ alloc = kmem_cache_alloc(test_cache, gfp);
+ else
+ alloc = kmalloc(size, gfp);
+
+ if (is_kfence_address(alloc)) {
+ struct page *page = virt_to_head_page(alloc);
+ struct kmem_cache *s = test_cache ?: kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL)][kmalloc_index(size)];
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that various helpers return the right values
+ * even for KFENCE objects; these are required so that
+ * memcg accounting works correctly.
+ */
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, obj_to_index(s, page, alloc), 0U);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, objs_per_slab_page(s, page), 1);
+
+ if (policy == ALLOCATE_ANY)
+ return alloc;
+ if (policy == ALLOCATE_LEFT && IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)alloc, PAGE_SIZE))
+ return alloc;
+ if (policy == ALLOCATE_RIGHT &&
+ !IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)alloc, PAGE_SIZE))
+ return alloc;
+ } else if (policy == ALLOCATE_NONE)
+ return alloc;
+
+ test_free(alloc);
+
+ if (time_after(jiffies, resched_after))
+ cond_resched();
+ } while (time_before(jiffies, timeout));
+
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_TRUE_MSG(test, false, "failed to allocate from KFENCE");
+ return NULL; /* Unreachable. */
+}
+
+static void test_out_of_bounds_read(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ size_t size = 32;
+ struct expect_report expect = {
+ .type = KFENCE_ERROR_OOB,
+ .fn = test_out_of_bounds_read,
+ .is_write = false,
+ };
+ char *buf;
+
+ setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have our own cache, adjust based on alignment, so that we
+ * actually access guard pages on either side.
+ */
+ if (!test_cache)
+ size = kmalloc_cache_alignment(size);
+
+ /* Test both sides. */
+
+ buf = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_LEFT);
+ expect.addr = buf - 1;
+ READ_ONCE(*expect.addr);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+ test_free(buf);
+
+ buf = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_RIGHT);
+ expect.addr = buf + size;
+ READ_ONCE(*expect.addr);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+ test_free(buf);
+}
+
+static void test_out_of_bounds_write(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ size_t size = 32;
+ struct expect_report expect = {
+ .type = KFENCE_ERROR_OOB,
+ .fn = test_out_of_bounds_write,
+ .is_write = true,
+ };
+ char *buf;
+
+ setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, NULL);
+ buf = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_LEFT);
+ expect.addr = buf - 1;
+ WRITE_ONCE(*expect.addr, 42);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+ test_free(buf);
+}
+
+static void test_use_after_free_read(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ const size_t size = 32;
+ struct expect_report expect = {
+ .type = KFENCE_ERROR_UAF,
+ .fn = test_use_after_free_read,
+ .is_write = false,
+ };
+
+ setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, NULL);
+ expect.addr = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_ANY);
+ test_free(expect.addr);
+ READ_ONCE(*expect.addr);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+}
+
+static void test_double_free(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ const size_t size = 32;
+ struct expect_report expect = {
+ .type = KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE,
+ .fn = test_double_free,
+ };
+
+ setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, NULL);
+ expect.addr = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_ANY);
+ test_free(expect.addr);
+ test_free(expect.addr); /* Double-free. */
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+}
+
+static void test_invalid_addr_free(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ const size_t size = 32;
+ struct expect_report expect = {
+ .type = KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE,
+ .fn = test_invalid_addr_free,
+ };
+ char *buf;
+
+ setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, NULL);
+ buf = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_ANY);
+ expect.addr = buf + 1; /* Free on invalid address. */
+ test_free(expect.addr); /* Invalid address free. */
+ test_free(buf); /* No error. */
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+}
+
+static void test_corruption(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ size_t size = 32;
+ struct expect_report expect = {
+ .type = KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION,
+ .fn = test_corruption,
+ };
+ char *buf;
+
+ setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, NULL);
+
+ /* Test both sides. */
+
+ buf = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_LEFT);
+ expect.addr = buf + size;
+ WRITE_ONCE(*expect.addr, 42);
+ test_free(buf);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+
+ buf = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_RIGHT);
+ expect.addr = buf - 1;
+ WRITE_ONCE(*expect.addr, 42);
+ test_free(buf);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+}
+
+/*
+ * KFENCE is unable to detect an OOB if the allocation's alignment requirements
+ * leave a gap between the object and the guard page. Specifically, an
+ * allocation of e.g. 73 bytes is aligned on 8 and 128 bytes for SLUB or SLAB
+ * respectively. Therefore it is impossible for the allocated object to
+ * contiguously line up with the right guard page.
+ *
+ * However, we test that an access to memory beyond the gap results in KFENCE
+ * detecting an OOB access.
+ */
+static void test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_read(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ const size_t size = 73;
+ const size_t align = kmalloc_cache_alignment(size);
+ struct expect_report expect = {
+ .type = KFENCE_ERROR_OOB,
+ .fn = test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_read,
+ .is_write = false,
+ };
+ char *buf;
+
+ buf = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_RIGHT);
+
+ /*
+ * The object is offset to the right, so there won't be an OOB to the
+ * left of it.
+ */
+ READ_ONCE(*(buf - 1));
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, report_available());
+
+ /*
+ * @buf must be aligned on @align, therefore buf + size belongs to the
+ * same page -> no OOB.
+ */
+ READ_ONCE(*(buf + size));
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, report_available());
+
+ /* Overflowing by @align bytes will result in an OOB. */
+ expect.addr = buf + size + align;
+ READ_ONCE(*expect.addr);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+
+ test_free(buf);
+}
+
+static void test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_write(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ const size_t size = 73;
+ struct expect_report expect = {
+ .type = KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION,
+ .fn = test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_write,
+ };
+ char *buf;
+
+ buf = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_RIGHT);
+ /*
+ * The object is offset to the right, so we won't get a page
+ * fault immediately after it.
+ */
+ expect.addr = buf + size;
+ WRITE_ONCE(*expect.addr, READ_ONCE(*expect.addr) + 1);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, report_available());
+ test_free(buf);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+}
+
+/* Test cache shrinking and destroying with KFENCE. */
+static void test_shrink_memcache(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ const size_t size = 32;
+ void *buf;
+
+ setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, NULL);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, test_cache);
+ buf = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_ANY);
+ kmem_cache_shrink(test_cache);
+ test_free(buf);
+
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, report_available());
+}
+
+static void ctor_set_x(void *obj)
+{
+ /* Every object has at least 8 bytes. */
+ memset(obj, 'x', 8);
+}
+
+/* Ensure that SL*B does not modify KFENCE objects on bulk free. */
+static void test_free_bulk(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ int iter;
+
+ for (iter = 0; iter < 5; iter++) {
+ const size_t size = setup_test_cache(test, 8 + prandom_u32_max(300), 0,
+ (iter & 1) ? ctor_set_x : NULL);
+ void *objects[] = {
+ test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_RIGHT),
+ test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_NONE),
+ test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_LEFT),
+ test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_NONE),
+ test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_NONE),
+ };
+
+ kmem_cache_free_bulk(test_cache, ARRAY_SIZE(objects), objects);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_FALSE(test, report_available());
+ test_cache_destroy();
+ }
+}
+
+/* Test init-on-free works. */
+static void test_init_on_free(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ const size_t size = 32;
+ struct expect_report expect = {
+ .type = KFENCE_ERROR_UAF,
+ .fn = test_init_on_free,
+ .is_write = false,
+ };
+ int i;
+
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON))
+ return;
+ /* Assume it hasn't been disabled on command line. */
+
+ setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, NULL);
+ expect.addr = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_ANY);
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+ expect.addr[i] = i + 1;
+ test_free(expect.addr);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+ /*
+ * This may fail if the page was recycled by KFENCE and then
+ * written to again -- this however, is near impossible with a
+ * default config.
+ */
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, expect.addr[i], (char)0);
+
+ if (!i) /* Only check first access to not fail test if page is ever re-protected. */
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+ }
+}
+
+/* Ensure that constructors work properly. */
+static void test_memcache_ctor(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ const size_t size = 32;
+ char *buf;
+ int i;
+
+ setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, ctor_set_x);
+ buf = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_ANY);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, buf[i], (char)'x');
+
+ test_free(buf);
+
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, report_available());
+}
+
+/* Test that memory is zeroed if requested. */
+static void test_gfpzero(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ const size_t size = PAGE_SIZE; /* PAGE_SIZE so we can use ALLOCATE_ANY. */
+ char *buf1, *buf2;
+ int i;
+
+ if (CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL > 100) {
+ kunit_warn(test, "skipping ... would take too long\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, NULL);
+ buf1 = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_ANY);
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+ buf1[i] = i + 1;
+ test_free(buf1);
+
+ /* Try to get same address again -- this can take a while. */
+ for (i = 0;; i++) {
+ buf2 = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO, ALLOCATE_ANY);
+ if (buf1 == buf2)
+ break;
+ test_free(buf2);
+
+ if (i == CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS) {
+ kunit_warn(test, "giving up ... cannot get same object back\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, buf2[i], (char)0);
+
+ test_free(buf2);
+
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, report_available());
+}
+
+static void test_invalid_access(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ const struct expect_report expect = {
+ .type = KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID,
+ .fn = test_invalid_access,
+ .addr = &__kfence_pool[10],
+ .is_write = false,
+ };
+
+ READ_ONCE(__kfence_pool[10]);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+}
+
+/* Test SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU works. */
+static void test_memcache_typesafe_by_rcu(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ const size_t size = 32;
+ struct expect_report expect = {
+ .type = KFENCE_ERROR_UAF,
+ .fn = test_memcache_typesafe_by_rcu,
+ .is_write = false,
+ };
+
+ setup_test_cache(test, size, SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, NULL);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, test_cache); /* Want memcache. */
+
+ expect.addr = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_ANY);
+ *expect.addr = 42;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ test_free(expect.addr);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, *expect.addr, (char)42);
+ /*
+ * Up to this point, memory should not have been freed yet, and
+ * therefore there should be no KFENCE report from the above access.
+ */
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ /* Above access to @expect.addr should not have generated a report! */
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, report_available());
+
+ /* Only after rcu_barrier() is the memory guaranteed to be freed. */
+ rcu_barrier();
+
+ /* Expect use-after-free. */
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, *expect.addr, (char)42);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+}
+
+/* Test krealloc(). */
+static void test_krealloc(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ const size_t size = 32;
+ const struct expect_report expect = {
+ .type = KFENCE_ERROR_UAF,
+ .fn = test_krealloc,
+ .addr = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_ANY),
+ .is_write = false,
+ };
+ char *buf = expect.addr;
+ int i;
+
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, test_cache);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, ksize(buf), size); /* Precise size match after KFENCE alloc. */
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+ buf[i] = i + 1;
+
+ /* Check that we successfully change the size. */
+ buf = krealloc(buf, size * 3, GFP_KERNEL); /* Grow. */
+ /* Note: Might no longer be a KFENCE alloc. */
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_GE(test, ksize(buf), size * 3);
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, buf[i], (char)(i + 1));
+ for (; i < size * 3; i++) /* Fill to extra bytes. */
+ buf[i] = i + 1;
+
+ buf = krealloc(buf, size * 2, GFP_KERNEL); /* Shrink. */
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_GE(test, ksize(buf), size * 2);
+ for (i = 0; i < size * 2; i++)
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, buf[i], (char)(i + 1));
+
+ buf = krealloc(buf, 0, GFP_KERNEL); /* Free. */
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, (unsigned long)buf, (unsigned long)ZERO_SIZE_PTR);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_FALSE(test, report_available()); /* No reports yet! */
+
+ READ_ONCE(*expect.addr); /* Ensure krealloc() actually freed earlier KFENCE object. */
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+}
+
+/* Test that some objects from a bulk allocation belong to KFENCE pool. */
+static void test_memcache_alloc_bulk(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ const size_t size = 32;
+ bool pass = false;
+ unsigned long timeout;
+
+ setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, NULL);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, test_cache); /* Want memcache. */
+ /*
+ * 100x the sample interval should be more than enough to ensure we get
+ * a KFENCE allocation eventually.
+ */
+ timeout = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(100 * CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL);
+ do {
+ void *objects[100];
+ int i, num = kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(test_cache, GFP_ATOMIC, ARRAY_SIZE(objects),
+ objects);
+ if (!num)
+ continue;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(objects); i++) {
+ if (is_kfence_address(objects[i])) {
+ pass = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ kmem_cache_free_bulk(test_cache, num, objects);
+ /*
+ * kmem_cache_alloc_bulk() disables interrupts, and calling it
+ * in a tight loop may not give KFENCE a chance to switch the
+ * static branch. Call cond_resched() to let KFENCE chime in.
+ */
+ cond_resched();
+ } while (!pass && time_before(jiffies, timeout));
+
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, pass);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, report_available());
+}
+
+/*
+ * KUnit does not provide a way to provide arguments to tests, and we encode
+ * additional info in the name. Set up 2 tests per test case, one using the
+ * default allocator, and another using a custom memcache (suffix '-memcache').
+ */
+#define KFENCE_KUNIT_CASE(test_name) \
+ { .run_case = test_name, .name = #test_name }, \
+ { .run_case = test_name, .name = #test_name "-memcache" }
+
+static struct kunit_case kfence_test_cases[] = {
+ KFENCE_KUNIT_CASE(test_out_of_bounds_read),
+ KFENCE_KUNIT_CASE(test_out_of_bounds_write),
+ KFENCE_KUNIT_CASE(test_use_after_free_read),
+ KFENCE_KUNIT_CASE(test_double_free),
+ KFENCE_KUNIT_CASE(test_invalid_addr_free),
+ KFENCE_KUNIT_CASE(test_corruption),
+ KFENCE_KUNIT_CASE(test_free_bulk),
+ KFENCE_KUNIT_CASE(test_init_on_free),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_read),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_write),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_shrink_memcache),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_memcache_ctor),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_invalid_access),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_gfpzero),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_memcache_typesafe_by_rcu),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_krealloc),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_memcache_alloc_bulk),
+ {},
+};
+
+/* ===== End test cases ===== */
+
+static int test_init(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int i;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&observed.lock, flags);
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(observed.lines); i++)
+ observed.lines[i][0] = '\0';
+ observed.nlines = 0;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&observed.lock, flags);
+
+ /* Any test with 'memcache' in its name will want a memcache. */
+ if (strstr(test->name, "memcache"))
+ test->priv = TEST_PRIV_WANT_MEMCACHE;
+ else
+ test->priv = NULL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void test_exit(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ test_cache_destroy();
+}
+
+static struct kunit_suite kfence_test_suite = {
+ .name = "kfence",
+ .test_cases = kfence_test_cases,
+ .init = test_init,
+ .exit = test_exit,
+};
+static struct kunit_suite *kfence_test_suites[] = { &kfence_test_suite, NULL };
+
+static void register_tracepoints(struct tracepoint *tp, void *ignore)
+{
+ check_trace_callback_type_console(probe_console);
+ if (!strcmp(tp->name, "console"))
+ WARN_ON(tracepoint_probe_register(tp, probe_console, NULL));
+}
+
+static void unregister_tracepoints(struct tracepoint *tp, void *ignore)
+{
+ if (!strcmp(tp->name, "console"))
+ tracepoint_probe_unregister(tp, probe_console, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * We only want to do tracepoints setup and teardown once, therefore we have to
+ * customize the init and exit functions and cannot rely on kunit_test_suite().
+ */
+static int __init kfence_test_init(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Because we want to be able to build the test as a module, we need to
+ * iterate through all known tracepoints, since the static registration
+ * won't work here.
+ */
+ for_each_kernel_tracepoint(register_tracepoints, NULL);
+ return __kunit_test_suites_init(kfence_test_suites);
+}
+
+static void kfence_test_exit(void)
+{
+ __kunit_test_suites_exit(kfence_test_suites);
+ for_each_kernel_tracepoint(unregister_tracepoints, NULL);
+ tracepoint_synchronize_unregister();
+}
+
+late_initcall(kfence_test_init);
+module_exit(kfence_test_exit);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>, Marco Elver <elver@google.com>");
diff --git a/mm/kfence/report.c b/mm/kfence/report.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..ab83d5a59bb124
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kfence/report.c
@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * KFENCE reporting.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, Google LLC.
+ */
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/lockdep.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <trace/events/error_report.h>
+
+#include <asm/kfence.h>
+
+#include "kfence.h"
+
+extern bool no_hash_pointers;
+
+/* Helper function to either print to a seq_file or to console. */
+__printf(2, 3)
+static void seq_con_printf(struct seq_file *seq, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ if (seq)
+ seq_vprintf(seq, fmt, args);
+ else
+ vprintk(fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the number of stack entries to skip to get out of MM internals. @type is
+ * optional, and if set to NULL, assumes an allocation or free stack.
+ */
+static int get_stack_skipnr(const unsigned long stack_entries[], int num_entries,
+ const enum kfence_error_type *type)
+{
+ char buf[64];
+ int skipnr, fallback = 0;
+
+ if (type) {
+ /* Depending on error type, find different stack entries. */
+ switch (*type) {
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_UAF:
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_OOB:
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID:
+ /*
+ * kfence_handle_page_fault() may be called with pt_regs
+ * set to NULL; in that case we'll simply show the full
+ * stack trace.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION:
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (skipnr = 0; skipnr < num_entries; skipnr++) {
+ int len = scnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%ps", (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]);
+
+ if (str_has_prefix(buf, "kfence_") || str_has_prefix(buf, "__kfence_") ||
+ !strncmp(buf, "__slab_free", len)) {
+ /*
+ * In case of tail calls from any of the below
+ * to any of the above.
+ */
+ fallback = skipnr + 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Also the *_bulk() variants by only checking prefixes. */
+ if (str_has_prefix(buf, "kfree") ||
+ str_has_prefix(buf, "kmem_cache_free") ||
+ str_has_prefix(buf, "__kmalloc") ||
+ str_has_prefix(buf, "kmem_cache_alloc"))
+ goto found;
+ }
+ if (fallback < num_entries)
+ return fallback;
+found:
+ skipnr++;
+ return skipnr < num_entries ? skipnr : 0;
+}
+
+static void kfence_print_stack(struct seq_file *seq, const struct kfence_metadata *meta,
+ bool show_alloc)
+{
+ const struct kfence_track *track = show_alloc ? &meta->alloc_track : &meta->free_track;
+
+ if (track->num_stack_entries) {
+ /* Skip allocation/free internals stack. */
+ int i = get_stack_skipnr(track->stack_entries, track->num_stack_entries, NULL);
+
+ /* stack_trace_seq_print() does not exist; open code our own. */
+ for (; i < track->num_stack_entries; i++)
+ seq_con_printf(seq, " %pS\n", (void *)track->stack_entries[i]);
+ } else {
+ seq_con_printf(seq, " no %s stack\n", show_alloc ? "allocation" : "deallocation");
+ }
+}
+
+void kfence_print_object(struct seq_file *seq, const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
+{
+ const int size = abs(meta->size);
+ const unsigned long start = meta->addr;
+ const struct kmem_cache *const cache = meta->cache;
+
+ lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock);
+
+ if (meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_UNUSED) {
+ seq_con_printf(seq, "kfence-#%zd unused\n", meta - kfence_metadata);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ seq_con_printf(seq,
+ "kfence-#%zd [0x%p-0x%p"
+ ", size=%d, cache=%s] allocated by task %d:\n",
+ meta - kfence_metadata, (void *)start, (void *)(start + size - 1), size,
+ (cache && cache->name) ? cache->name : "<destroyed>", meta->alloc_track.pid);
+ kfence_print_stack(seq, meta, true);
+
+ if (meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED) {
+ seq_con_printf(seq, "\nfreed by task %d:\n", meta->free_track.pid);
+ kfence_print_stack(seq, meta, false);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Show bytes at @addr that are different from the expected canary values, up to
+ * @max_bytes.
+ */
+static void print_diff_canary(unsigned long address, size_t bytes_to_show,
+ const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
+{
+ const unsigned long show_until_addr = address + bytes_to_show;
+ const u8 *cur, *end;
+
+ /* Do not show contents of object nor read into following guard page. */
+ end = (const u8 *)(address < meta->addr ? min(show_until_addr, meta->addr)
+ : min(show_until_addr, PAGE_ALIGN(address)));
+
+ pr_cont("[");
+ for (cur = (const u8 *)address; cur < end; cur++) {
+ if (*cur == KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(cur))
+ pr_cont(" .");
+ else if (no_hash_pointers)
+ pr_cont(" 0x%02x", *cur);
+ else /* Do not leak kernel memory in non-debug builds. */
+ pr_cont(" !");
+ }
+ pr_cont(" ]");
+}
+
+static const char *get_access_type(bool is_write)
+{
+ return is_write ? "write" : "read";
+}
+
+void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *regs,
+ const struct kfence_metadata *meta, enum kfence_error_type type)
+{
+ unsigned long stack_entries[KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH] = { 0 };
+ const ptrdiff_t object_index = meta ? meta - kfence_metadata : -1;
+ int num_stack_entries;
+ int skipnr = 0;
+
+ if (regs) {
+ num_stack_entries = stack_trace_save_regs(regs, stack_entries, KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH, 0);
+ } else {
+ num_stack_entries = stack_trace_save(stack_entries, KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH, 1);
+ skipnr = get_stack_skipnr(stack_entries, num_stack_entries, &type);
+ }
+
+ /* Require non-NULL meta, except if KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID. */
+ if (WARN_ON(type != KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID && !meta))
+ return;
+
+ if (meta)
+ lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock);
+ /*
+ * Because we may generate reports in printk-unfriendly parts of the
+ * kernel, such as scheduler code, the use of printk() could deadlock.
+ * Until such time that all printing code here is safe in all parts of
+ * the kernel, accept the risk, and just get our message out (given the
+ * system might already behave unpredictably due to the memory error).
+ * As such, also disable lockdep to hide warnings, and avoid disabling
+ * lockdep for the rest of the kernel.
+ */
+ lockdep_off();
+
+ pr_err("==================================================================\n");
+ /* Print report header. */
+ switch (type) {
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_OOB: {
+ const bool left_of_object = address < meta->addr;
+
+ pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds %s in %pS\n\n", get_access_type(is_write),
+ (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]);
+ pr_err("Out-of-bounds %s at 0x%p (%luB %s of kfence-#%zd):\n",
+ get_access_type(is_write), (void *)address,
+ left_of_object ? meta->addr - address : address - meta->addr,
+ left_of_object ? "left" : "right", object_index);
+ break;
+ }
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_UAF:
+ pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free %s in %pS\n\n", get_access_type(is_write),
+ (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]);
+ pr_err("Use-after-free %s at 0x%p (in kfence-#%zd):\n",
+ get_access_type(is_write), (void *)address, object_index);
+ break;
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION:
+ pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: memory corruption in %pS\n\n", (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]);
+ pr_err("Corrupted memory at 0x%p ", (void *)address);
+ print_diff_canary(address, 16, meta);
+ pr_cont(" (in kfence-#%zd):\n", object_index);
+ break;
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID:
+ pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: invalid %s in %pS\n\n", get_access_type(is_write),
+ (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]);
+ pr_err("Invalid %s at 0x%p:\n", get_access_type(is_write),
+ (void *)address);
+ break;
+ case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE:
+ pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: invalid free in %pS\n\n", (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]);
+ pr_err("Invalid free of 0x%p (in kfence-#%zd):\n", (void *)address,
+ object_index);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Print stack trace and object info. */
+ stack_trace_print(stack_entries + skipnr, num_stack_entries - skipnr, 0);
+
+ if (meta) {
+ pr_err("\n");
+ kfence_print_object(NULL, meta);
+ }
+
+ /* Print report footer. */
+ pr_err("\n");
+ if (no_hash_pointers && regs)
+ show_regs(regs);
+ else
+ dump_stack_print_info(KERN_ERR);
+ trace_error_report_end(ERROR_DETECTOR_KFENCE, address);
+ pr_err("==================================================================\n");
+
+ lockdep_on();
+
+ if (panic_on_warn)
+ panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+
+ /* We encountered a memory unsafety error, taint the kernel! */
+ add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+}
diff --git a/mm/khugepaged.c b/mm/khugepaged.c
index 75e246f680f4f0..a7d6cb912b051b 100644
--- a/mm/khugepaged.c
+++ b/mm/khugepaged.c
@@ -442,18 +442,28 @@ static inline int khugepaged_test_exit(struct mm_struct *mm)
static bool hugepage_vma_check(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long vm_flags)
{
- if ((!(vm_flags & VM_HUGEPAGE) && !khugepaged_always()) ||
- (vm_flags & VM_NOHUGEPAGE) ||
+ /* Explicitly disabled through madvise. */
+ if ((vm_flags & VM_NOHUGEPAGE) ||
test_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &vma->vm_mm->flags))
return false;
- if (shmem_file(vma->vm_file) ||
- (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS) &&
- vma->vm_file &&
- (vm_flags & VM_DENYWRITE))) {
+ /* Enabled via shmem mount options or sysfs settings. */
+ if (shmem_file(vma->vm_file) && shmem_huge_enabled(vma)) {
return IS_ALIGNED((vma->vm_start >> PAGE_SHIFT) - vma->vm_pgoff,
HPAGE_PMD_NR);
}
+
+ /* THP settings require madvise. */
+ if (!(vm_flags & VM_HUGEPAGE) && !khugepaged_always())
+ return false;
+
+ /* Read-only file mappings need to be aligned for THP to work. */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS) && vma->vm_file &&
+ (vm_flags & VM_DENYWRITE)) {
+ return IS_ALIGNED((vma->vm_start >> PAGE_SHIFT) - vma->vm_pgoff,
+ HPAGE_PMD_NR);
+ }
+
if (!vma->anon_vma || vma->vm_ops)
return false;
if (vma_is_temporary_stack(vma))
diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c
index 55c671904aacf8..24210c9bd84348 100644
--- a/mm/memory-failure.c
+++ b/mm/memory-failure.c
@@ -1312,6 +1312,12 @@ static int memory_failure_dev_pagemap(unsigned long pfn, int flags,
*/
put_page(page);
+ /* device metadata space is not recoverable */
+ if (!pgmap_pfn_valid(pgmap, pfn)) {
+ rc = -ENXIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/*
* Prevent the inode from being freed while we are interrogating
* the address_space, typically this would be handled by
diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
index 784249f3307bd1..c8e35762731861 100644
--- a/mm/memory.c
+++ b/mm/memory.c
@@ -2902,7 +2902,6 @@ static vm_fault_t wp_page_copy(struct vm_fault *vmf)
}
flush_cache_page(vma, vmf->address, pte_pfn(vmf->orig_pte));
entry = mk_pte(new_page, vma->vm_page_prot);
- entry = pte_sw_mkyoung(entry);
entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
/*
@@ -3560,7 +3559,6 @@ static vm_fault_t do_anonymous_page(struct vm_fault *vmf)
__SetPageUptodate(page);
entry = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot);
- entry = pte_sw_mkyoung(entry);
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
entry = pte_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry));
@@ -3745,8 +3743,6 @@ void do_set_pte(struct vm_fault *vmf, struct page *page, unsigned long addr)
if (prefault && arch_wants_old_prefaulted_pte())
entry = pte_mkold(entry);
- else
- entry = pte_sw_mkyoung(entry);
if (write)
entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
diff --git a/mm/memory_hotplug.c b/mm/memory_hotplug.c
index abe43c1ae92042..5ba51a8bdaeb20 100644
--- a/mm/memory_hotplug.c
+++ b/mm/memory_hotplug.c
@@ -67,17 +67,17 @@ void put_online_mems(void)
bool movable_node_enabled = false;
#ifndef CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG_DEFAULT_ONLINE
-int memhp_default_online_type = MMOP_OFFLINE;
+int mhp_default_online_type = MMOP_OFFLINE;
#else
-int memhp_default_online_type = MMOP_ONLINE;
+int mhp_default_online_type = MMOP_ONLINE;
#endif
static int __init setup_memhp_default_state(char *str)
{
- const int online_type = memhp_online_type_from_str(str);
+ const int online_type = mhp_online_type_from_str(str);
if (online_type >= 0)
- memhp_default_online_type = online_type;
+ mhp_default_online_type = online_type;
return 1;
}
@@ -107,6 +107,9 @@ static struct resource *register_memory_resource(u64 start, u64 size,
if (strcmp(resource_name, "System RAM"))
flags |= IORESOURCE_SYSRAM_DRIVER_MANAGED;
+ if (!mhp_range_allowed(start, size, true))
+ return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
+
/*
* Make sure value parsed from 'mem=' only restricts memory adding
* while booting, so that memory hotplug won't be impacted. Please
@@ -284,21 +287,53 @@ static int check_pfn_span(unsigned long pfn, unsigned long nr_pages,
return 0;
}
-static int check_hotplug_memory_addressable(unsigned long pfn,
- unsigned long nr_pages)
+/*
+ * Return page for the valid pfn only if the page is online. All pfn
+ * walkers which rely on the fully initialized page->flags and others
+ * should use this rather than pfn_valid && pfn_to_page
+ */
+struct page *pfn_to_online_page(unsigned long pfn)
{
- const u64 max_addr = PFN_PHYS(pfn + nr_pages) - 1;
+ unsigned long nr = pfn_to_section_nr(pfn);
+ struct dev_pagemap *pgmap;
+ struct mem_section *ms;
- if (max_addr >> MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS) {
- const u64 max_allowed = (1ull << (MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS + 1)) - 1;
- WARN(1,
- "Hotplugged memory exceeds maximum addressable address, range=%#llx-%#llx, maximum=%#llx\n",
- (u64)PFN_PHYS(pfn), max_addr, max_allowed);
- return -E2BIG;
- }
+ if (nr >= NR_MEM_SECTIONS)
+ return NULL;
- return 0;
+ ms = __nr_to_section(nr);
+ if (!online_section(ms))
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Save some code text when online_section() +
+ * pfn_section_valid() are sufficient.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID) && !pfn_valid(pfn))
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!pfn_section_valid(ms, pfn))
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!online_device_section(ms))
+ return pfn_to_page(pfn);
+
+ /*
+ * Slowpath: when ZONE_DEVICE collides with
+ * ZONE_{NORMAL,MOVABLE} within the same section some pfns in
+ * the section may be 'offline' but 'valid'. Only
+ * get_dev_pagemap() can determine sub-section online status.
+ */
+ pgmap = get_dev_pagemap(pfn, NULL);
+ put_dev_pagemap(pgmap);
+
+ /* The presence of a pgmap indicates ZONE_DEVICE offline pfn */
+ if (pgmap)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return pfn_to_page(pfn);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pfn_to_online_page);
/*
* Reasonably generic function for adding memory. It is
@@ -317,9 +352,7 @@ int __ref __add_pages(int nid, unsigned long pfn, unsigned long nr_pages,
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!params->pgprot.pgprot))
return -EINVAL;
- err = check_hotplug_memory_addressable(pfn, nr_pages);
- if (err)
- return err;
+ VM_BUG_ON(!mhp_range_allowed(PFN_PHYS(pfn), nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE, false));
if (altmap) {
/*
@@ -445,20 +478,19 @@ static void update_pgdat_span(struct pglist_data *pgdat)
for (zone = pgdat->node_zones;
zone < pgdat->node_zones + MAX_NR_ZONES; zone++) {
- unsigned long zone_end_pfn = zone->zone_start_pfn +
- zone->spanned_pages;
+ unsigned long end_pfn = zone_end_pfn(zone);
/* No need to lock the zones, they can't change. */
if (!zone->spanned_pages)
continue;
if (!node_end_pfn) {
node_start_pfn = zone->zone_start_pfn;
- node_end_pfn = zone_end_pfn;
+ node_end_pfn = end_pfn;
continue;
}
- if (zone_end_pfn > node_end_pfn)
- node_end_pfn = zone_end_pfn;
+ if (end_pfn > node_end_pfn)
+ node_end_pfn = end_pfn;
if (zone->zone_start_pfn < node_start_pfn)
node_start_pfn = zone->zone_start_pfn;
}
@@ -678,6 +710,14 @@ static void __meminit resize_pgdat_range(struct pglist_data *pgdat, unsigned lon
pgdat->node_spanned_pages = max(start_pfn + nr_pages, old_end_pfn) - pgdat->node_start_pfn;
}
+
+static void section_taint_zone_device(unsigned long pfn)
+{
+ struct mem_section *ms = __pfn_to_section(pfn);
+
+ ms->section_mem_map |= SECTION_TAINT_ZONE_DEVICE;
+}
+
/*
* Associate the pfn range with the given zone, initializing the memmaps
* and resizing the pgdat/zone data to span the added pages. After this
@@ -708,6 +748,19 @@ void __ref move_pfn_range_to_zone(struct zone *zone, unsigned long start_pfn,
pgdat_resize_unlock(pgdat, &flags);
/*
+ * Subsection population requires care in pfn_to_online_page().
+ * Set the taint to enable the slow path detection of
+ * ZONE_DEVICE pages in an otherwise ZONE_{NORMAL,MOVABLE}
+ * section.
+ */
+ if (zone_is_zone_device(zone)) {
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(start_pfn, PAGES_PER_SECTION))
+ section_taint_zone_device(start_pfn);
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(start_pfn + nr_pages, PAGES_PER_SECTION))
+ section_taint_zone_device(start_pfn + nr_pages);
+ }
+
+ /*
* TODO now we have a visible range of pages which are not associated
* with their zone properly. Not nice but set_pfnblock_flags_mask
* expects the zone spans the pfn range. All the pages in the range
@@ -1007,7 +1060,7 @@ static int check_hotplug_memory_range(u64 start, u64 size)
static int online_memory_block(struct memory_block *mem, void *arg)
{
- mem->online_type = memhp_default_online_type;
+ mem->online_type = mhp_default_online_type;
return device_online(&mem->dev);
}
@@ -1084,11 +1137,11 @@ int __ref add_memory_resource(int nid, struct resource *res, mhp_t mhp_flags)
* In case we're allowed to merge the resource, flag it and trigger
* merging now that adding succeeded.
*/
- if (mhp_flags & MEMHP_MERGE_RESOURCE)
+ if (mhp_flags & MHP_MERGE_RESOURCE)
merge_system_ram_resource(res);
/* online pages if requested */
- if (memhp_default_online_type != MMOP_OFFLINE)
+ if (mhp_default_online_type != MMOP_OFFLINE)
walk_memory_blocks(start, size, NULL, online_memory_block);
return ret;
@@ -1180,6 +1233,61 @@ out_unlock:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_memory_driver_managed);
+/*
+ * Platforms should define arch_get_mappable_range() that provides
+ * maximum possible addressable physical memory range for which the
+ * linear mapping could be created. The platform returned address
+ * range must adhere to these following semantics.
+ *
+ * - range.start <= range.end
+ * - Range includes both end points [range.start..range.end]
+ *
+ * There is also a fallback definition provided here, allowing the
+ * entire possible physical address range in case any platform does
+ * not define arch_get_mappable_range().
+ */
+struct range __weak arch_get_mappable_range(void)
+{
+ struct range mhp_range = {
+ .start = 0UL,
+ .end = -1ULL,
+ };
+ return mhp_range;
+}
+
+struct range mhp_get_pluggable_range(bool need_mapping)
+{
+ const u64 max_phys = (1ULL << MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS) - 1;
+ struct range mhp_range;
+
+ if (need_mapping) {
+ mhp_range = arch_get_mappable_range();
+ if (mhp_range.start > max_phys) {
+ mhp_range.start = 0;
+ mhp_range.end = 0;
+ }
+ mhp_range.end = min_t(u64, mhp_range.end, max_phys);
+ } else {
+ mhp_range.start = 0;
+ mhp_range.end = max_phys;
+ }
+ return mhp_range;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mhp_get_pluggable_range);
+
+bool mhp_range_allowed(u64 start, u64 size, bool need_mapping)
+{
+ struct range mhp_range = mhp_get_pluggable_range(need_mapping);
+ u64 end = start + size;
+
+ if (start < end && start >= mhp_range.start && (end - 1) <= mhp_range.end)
+ return true;
+
+ pr_warn("Hotplug memory [%#llx-%#llx] exceeds maximum addressable range [%#llx-%#llx]\n",
+ start, end, mhp_range.start, mhp_range.end);
+ return false;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE
/*
* Confirm all pages in a range [start, end) belong to the same zone (skipping
diff --git a/mm/memremap.c b/mm/memremap.c
index 16b2fb482da112..7aa7d6e80ee508 100644
--- a/mm/memremap.c
+++ b/mm/memremap.c
@@ -80,6 +80,21 @@ static unsigned long pfn_first(struct dev_pagemap *pgmap, int range_id)
return pfn + vmem_altmap_offset(pgmap_altmap(pgmap));
}
+bool pgmap_pfn_valid(struct dev_pagemap *pgmap, unsigned long pfn)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < pgmap->nr_range; i++) {
+ struct range *range = &pgmap->ranges[i];
+
+ if (pfn >= PHYS_PFN(range->start) &&
+ pfn <= PHYS_PFN(range->end))
+ return pfn >= pfn_first(pgmap, i);
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
static unsigned long pfn_end(struct dev_pagemap *pgmap, int range_id)
{
const struct range *range = &pgmap->ranges[range_id];
@@ -185,6 +200,7 @@ static void dev_pagemap_percpu_release(struct percpu_ref *ref)
static int pagemap_range(struct dev_pagemap *pgmap, struct mhp_params *params,
int range_id, int nid)
{
+ const bool is_private = pgmap->type == MEMORY_DEVICE_PRIVATE;
struct range *range = &pgmap->ranges[range_id];
struct dev_pagemap *conflict_pgmap;
int error, is_ram;
@@ -230,6 +246,11 @@ static int pagemap_range(struct dev_pagemap *pgmap, struct mhp_params *params,
if (error)
goto err_pfn_remap;
+ if (!mhp_range_allowed(range->start, range_len(range), !is_private)) {
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ goto err_pfn_remap;
+ }
+
mem_hotplug_begin();
/*
@@ -243,7 +264,7 @@ static int pagemap_range(struct dev_pagemap *pgmap, struct mhp_params *params,
* the CPU, we do want the linear mapping and thus use
* arch_add_memory().
*/
- if (pgmap->type == MEMORY_DEVICE_PRIVATE) {
+ if (is_private) {
error = add_pages(nid, PHYS_PFN(range->start),
PHYS_PFN(range_len(range)), params);
} else {
diff --git a/mm/mlock.c b/mm/mlock.c
index 73960bb3464d00..f8f8cc32d03d0b 100644
--- a/mm/mlock.c
+++ b/mm/mlock.c
@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ static unsigned long count_mm_mlocked_page_nr(struct mm_struct *mm,
vma = find_vma(mm, start);
if (vma == NULL)
- vma = mm->mmap;
+ return 0;
for (; vma ; vma = vma->vm_next) {
if (start >= vma->vm_end)
diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c
index ddccc59f2f72a3..3e4b29ee2b1e4a 100644
--- a/mm/page_alloc.c
+++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
@@ -2168,6 +2168,7 @@ void __init init_cma_reserved_pageblock(struct page *page)
}
adjust_managed_page_count(page, pageblock_nr_pages);
+ page_zone(page)->cma_pages += pageblock_nr_pages;
}
#endif
diff --git a/mm/rmap.c b/mm/rmap.c
index e26ae119a131b5..b0fc27e77d6d79 100644
--- a/mm/rmap.c
+++ b/mm/rmap.c
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static void anon_vma_chain_link(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
*
* Anon-vma allocations are very subtle, because we may have
* optimistically looked up an anon_vma in page_lock_anon_vma_read()
- * and that may actually touch the spinlock even in the newly
+ * and that may actually touch the rwsem even in the newly
* allocated vma (it depends on RCU to make sure that the
* anon_vma isn't actually destroyed).
*
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ int anon_vma_fork(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct *pvma)
goto out_error_free_anon_vma;
/*
- * The root anon_vma's spinlock is the lock actually used when we
+ * The root anon_vma's rwsem is the lock actually used when we
* lock any of the anon_vmas in this anon_vma tree.
*/
anon_vma->root = pvma->anon_vma->root;
@@ -462,8 +462,8 @@ void __init anon_vma_init(void)
* Getting a lock on a stable anon_vma from a page off the LRU is tricky!
*
* Since there is no serialization what so ever against page_remove_rmap()
- * the best this function can do is return a locked anon_vma that might
- * have been relevant to this page.
+ * the best this function can do is return a refcount increased anon_vma
+ * that might have been relevant to this page.
*
* The page might have been remapped to a different anon_vma or the anon_vma
* returned may already be freed (and even reused).
@@ -1086,8 +1086,7 @@ static void __page_check_anon_rmap(struct page *page,
* be set up correctly at this point.
*
* We have exclusion against page_add_anon_rmap because the caller
- * always holds the page locked, except if called from page_dup_rmap,
- * in which case the page is already known to be setup.
+ * always holds the page locked.
*
* We have exclusion against page_add_new_anon_rmap because those pages
* are initially only visible via the pagetables, and the pte is locked
@@ -1737,9 +1736,9 @@ static bool invalid_migration_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, void *arg)
return vma_is_temporary_stack(vma);
}
-static int page_mapcount_is_zero(struct page *page)
+static int page_not_mapped(struct page *page)
{
- return !total_mapcount(page);
+ return !page_mapped(page);
}
/**
@@ -1757,7 +1756,7 @@ bool try_to_unmap(struct page *page, enum ttu_flags flags)
struct rmap_walk_control rwc = {
.rmap_one = try_to_unmap_one,
.arg = (void *)flags,
- .done = page_mapcount_is_zero,
+ .done = page_not_mapped,
.anon_lock = page_lock_anon_vma_read,
};
@@ -1781,11 +1780,6 @@ bool try_to_unmap(struct page *page, enum ttu_flags flags)
return !page_mapcount(page) ? true : false;
}
-static int page_not_mapped(struct page *page)
-{
- return !page_mapped(page);
-};
-
/**
* try_to_munlock - try to munlock a page
* @page: the page to be munlocked
diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
index ff741d22970168..b2db4ed0fbc7c9 100644
--- a/mm/shmem.c
+++ b/mm/shmem.c
@@ -842,7 +842,6 @@ unsigned long shmem_swap_usage(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
void shmem_unlock_mapping(struct address_space *mapping)
{
struct pagevec pvec;
- pgoff_t indices[PAGEVEC_SIZE];
pgoff_t index = 0;
pagevec_init(&pvec);
@@ -850,16 +849,8 @@ void shmem_unlock_mapping(struct address_space *mapping)
* Minor point, but we might as well stop if someone else SHM_LOCKs it.
*/
while (!mapping_unevictable(mapping)) {
- /*
- * Avoid pagevec_lookup(): find_get_pages() returns 0 as if it
- * has finished, if it hits a row of PAGEVEC_SIZE swap entries.
- */
- pvec.nr = find_get_entries(mapping, index,
- PAGEVEC_SIZE, pvec.pages, indices);
- if (!pvec.nr)
+ if (!pagevec_lookup(&pvec, mapping, &index))
break;
- index = indices[pvec.nr - 1] + 1;
- pagevec_remove_exceptionals(&pvec);
check_move_unevictable_pages(&pvec);
pagevec_release(&pvec);
cond_resched();
@@ -916,18 +907,12 @@ static void shmem_undo_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t lstart, loff_t lend,
pagevec_init(&pvec);
index = start;
- while (index < end) {
- pvec.nr = find_get_entries(mapping, index,
- min(end - index, (pgoff_t)PAGEVEC_SIZE),
- pvec.pages, indices);
- if (!pvec.nr)
- break;
+ while (index < end && find_lock_entries(mapping, index, end - 1,
+ &pvec, indices)) {
for (i = 0; i < pagevec_count(&pvec); i++) {
struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
index = indices[i];
- if (index >= end)
- break;
if (xa_is_value(page)) {
if (unfalloc)
@@ -936,18 +921,10 @@ static void shmem_undo_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t lstart, loff_t lend,
index, page);
continue;
}
+ index += thp_nr_pages(page) - 1;
- VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_to_pgoff(page) != index, page);
-
- if (!trylock_page(page))
- continue;
-
- if ((!unfalloc || !PageUptodate(page)) &&
- page_mapping(page) == mapping) {
- VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageWriteback(page), page);
- if (shmem_punch_compound(page, start, end))
- truncate_inode_page(mapping, page);
- }
+ if (!unfalloc || !PageUptodate(page))
+ truncate_inode_page(mapping, page);
unlock_page(page);
}
pagevec_remove_exceptionals(&pvec);
@@ -988,10 +965,8 @@ static void shmem_undo_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t lstart, loff_t lend,
while (index < end) {
cond_resched();
- pvec.nr = find_get_entries(mapping, index,
- min(end - index, (pgoff_t)PAGEVEC_SIZE),
- pvec.pages, indices);
- if (!pvec.nr) {
+ if (!find_get_entries(mapping, index, end - 1, &pvec,
+ indices)) {
/* If all gone or hole-punch or unfalloc, we're done */
if (index == start || end != -1)
break;
@@ -1003,9 +978,6 @@ static void shmem_undo_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t lstart, loff_t lend,
struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
index = indices[i];
- if (index >= end)
- break;
-
if (xa_is_value(page)) {
if (unfalloc)
continue;
@@ -1533,6 +1505,30 @@ static struct page *shmem_swapin(swp_entry_t swap, gfp_t gfp,
return page;
}
+/*
+ * Make sure huge_gfp is always more limited than limit_gfp.
+ * Some of the flags set permissions, while others set limitations.
+ */
+static gfp_t limit_gfp_mask(gfp_t huge_gfp, gfp_t limit_gfp)
+{
+ gfp_t allowflags = __GFP_IO | __GFP_FS | __GFP_RECLAIM;
+ gfp_t denyflags = __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY;
+ gfp_t zoneflags = limit_gfp & GFP_ZONEMASK;
+ gfp_t result = huge_gfp & ~(allowflags | GFP_ZONEMASK);
+
+ /* Allow allocations only from the originally specified zones. */
+ result |= zoneflags;
+
+ /*
+ * Minimize the result gfp by taking the union with the deny flags,
+ * and the intersection of the allow flags.
+ */
+ result |= (limit_gfp & denyflags);
+ result |= (huge_gfp & limit_gfp) & allowflags;
+
+ return result;
+}
+
static struct page *shmem_alloc_hugepage(gfp_t gfp,
struct shmem_inode_info *info, pgoff_t index)
{
@@ -1547,8 +1543,8 @@ static struct page *shmem_alloc_hugepage(gfp_t gfp,
return NULL;
shmem_pseudo_vma_init(&pvma, info, hindex);
- page = alloc_pages_vma(gfp | __GFP_COMP | __GFP_NORETRY | __GFP_NOWARN,
- HPAGE_PMD_ORDER, &pvma, 0, numa_node_id(), true);
+ page = alloc_pages_vma(gfp, HPAGE_PMD_ORDER, &pvma, 0, numa_node_id(),
+ true);
shmem_pseudo_vma_destroy(&pvma);
if (page)
prep_transhuge_page(page);
@@ -1804,6 +1800,7 @@ static int shmem_getpage_gfp(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index,
struct page *page;
enum sgp_type sgp_huge = sgp;
pgoff_t hindex = index;
+ gfp_t huge_gfp;
int error;
int once = 0;
int alloced = 0;
@@ -1821,7 +1818,8 @@ repeat:
sbinfo = SHMEM_SB(inode->i_sb);
charge_mm = vma ? vma->vm_mm : current->mm;
- page = find_lock_entry(mapping, index);
+ page = pagecache_get_page(mapping, index,
+ FGP_ENTRY | FGP_HEAD | FGP_LOCK, 0);
if (xa_is_value(page)) {
error = shmem_swapin_page(inode, index, &page,
sgp, gfp, vma, fault_type);
@@ -1889,7 +1887,9 @@ repeat:
}
alloc_huge:
- page = shmem_alloc_and_acct_page(gfp, inode, index, true);
+ huge_gfp = vma_thp_gfp_mask(vma);
+ huge_gfp = limit_gfp_mask(huge_gfp, gfp);
+ page = shmem_alloc_and_acct_page(huge_gfp, inode, index, true);
if (IS_ERR(page)) {
alloc_nohuge:
page = shmem_alloc_and_acct_page(gfp, inode,
@@ -2676,86 +2676,20 @@ static ssize_t shmem_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to)
return retval ? retval : error;
}
-/*
- * llseek SEEK_DATA or SEEK_HOLE through the page cache.
- */
-static pgoff_t shmem_seek_hole_data(struct address_space *mapping,
- pgoff_t index, pgoff_t end, int whence)
-{
- struct page *page;
- struct pagevec pvec;
- pgoff_t indices[PAGEVEC_SIZE];
- bool done = false;
- int i;
-
- pagevec_init(&pvec);
- pvec.nr = 1; /* start small: we may be there already */
- while (!done) {
- pvec.nr = find_get_entries(mapping, index,
- pvec.nr, pvec.pages, indices);
- if (!pvec.nr) {
- if (whence == SEEK_DATA)
- index = end;
- break;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < pvec.nr; i++, index++) {
- if (index < indices[i]) {
- if (whence == SEEK_HOLE) {
- done = true;
- break;
- }
- index = indices[i];
- }
- page = pvec.pages[i];
- if (page && !xa_is_value(page)) {
- if (!PageUptodate(page))
- page = NULL;
- }
- if (index >= end ||
- (page && whence == SEEK_DATA) ||
- (!page && whence == SEEK_HOLE)) {
- done = true;
- break;
- }
- }
- pagevec_remove_exceptionals(&pvec);
- pagevec_release(&pvec);
- pvec.nr = PAGEVEC_SIZE;
- cond_resched();
- }
- return index;
-}
-
static loff_t shmem_file_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
{
struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
- pgoff_t start, end;
- loff_t new_offset;
if (whence != SEEK_DATA && whence != SEEK_HOLE)
return generic_file_llseek_size(file, offset, whence,
MAX_LFS_FILESIZE, i_size_read(inode));
+ if (offset < 0)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
inode_lock(inode);
/* We're holding i_mutex so we can access i_size directly */
-
- if (offset < 0 || offset >= inode->i_size)
- offset = -ENXIO;
- else {
- start = offset >> PAGE_SHIFT;
- end = (inode->i_size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
- new_offset = shmem_seek_hole_data(mapping, start, end, whence);
- new_offset <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (new_offset > offset) {
- if (new_offset < inode->i_size)
- offset = new_offset;
- else if (whence == SEEK_DATA)
- offset = -ENXIO;
- else
- offset = inode->i_size;
- }
- }
-
+ offset = mapping_seek_hole_data(mapping, offset, inode->i_size, whence);
if (offset >= 0)
offset = vfs_setpos(file, offset, MAX_LFS_FILESIZE);
inode_unlock(inode);
diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c
index 35c68d99d460fd..51fd424e0d6d03 100644
--- a/mm/slab.c
+++ b/mm/slab.c
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/notifier.h>
#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -3208,7 +3209,7 @@ must_grow:
}
static __always_inline void *
-slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid,
+slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid, size_t orig_size,
unsigned long caller)
{
unsigned long save_flags;
@@ -3221,6 +3222,10 @@ slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid,
if (unlikely(!cachep))
return NULL;
+ ptr = kfence_alloc(cachep, orig_size, flags);
+ if (unlikely(ptr))
+ goto out_hooks;
+
cache_alloc_debugcheck_before(cachep, flags);
local_irq_save(save_flags);
@@ -3253,6 +3258,7 @@ slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid,
if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, cachep)) && ptr)
memset(ptr, 0, cachep->object_size);
+out_hooks:
slab_post_alloc_hook(cachep, objcg, flags, 1, &ptr);
return ptr;
}
@@ -3290,7 +3296,7 @@ __do_cache_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags)
#endif /* CONFIG_NUMA */
static __always_inline void *
-slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller)
+slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, size_t orig_size, unsigned long caller)
{
unsigned long save_flags;
void *objp;
@@ -3301,6 +3307,10 @@ slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller)
if (unlikely(!cachep))
return NULL;
+ objp = kfence_alloc(cachep, orig_size, flags);
+ if (unlikely(objp))
+ goto out;
+
cache_alloc_debugcheck_before(cachep, flags);
local_irq_save(save_flags);
objp = __do_cache_alloc(cachep, flags);
@@ -3311,6 +3321,7 @@ slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller)
if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, cachep)) && objp)
memset(objp, 0, cachep->object_size);
+out:
slab_post_alloc_hook(cachep, objcg, flags, 1, &objp);
return objp;
}
@@ -3416,6 +3427,12 @@ free_done:
static __always_inline void __cache_free(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp,
unsigned long caller)
{
+ if (is_kfence_address(objp)) {
+ kmemleak_free_recursive(objp, cachep->flags);
+ __kfence_free(objp);
+ return;
+ }
+
if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(cachep)))
memset(objp, 0, cachep->object_size);
@@ -3482,7 +3499,7 @@ void ___cache_free(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp,
*/
void *kmem_cache_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags)
{
- void *ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, _RET_IP_);
+ void *ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, cachep->object_size, _RET_IP_);
trace_kmem_cache_alloc(_RET_IP_, ret,
cachep->object_size, cachep->size, flags);
@@ -3515,7 +3532,7 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
local_irq_disable();
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
- void *objp = __do_cache_alloc(s, flags);
+ void *objp = kfence_alloc(s, s->object_size, flags) ?: __do_cache_alloc(s, flags);
if (unlikely(!objp))
goto error;
@@ -3548,7 +3565,7 @@ kmem_cache_alloc_trace(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, size_t size)
{
void *ret;
- ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, _RET_IP_);
+ ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, size, _RET_IP_);
ret = kasan_kmalloc(cachep, ret, size, flags);
trace_kmalloc(_RET_IP_, ret,
@@ -3574,7 +3591,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_trace);
*/
void *kmem_cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid)
{
- void *ret = slab_alloc_node(cachep, flags, nodeid, _RET_IP_);
+ void *ret = slab_alloc_node(cachep, flags, nodeid, cachep->object_size, _RET_IP_);
trace_kmem_cache_alloc_node(_RET_IP_, ret,
cachep->object_size, cachep->size,
@@ -3592,7 +3609,7 @@ void *kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
{
void *ret;
- ret = slab_alloc_node(cachep, flags, nodeid, _RET_IP_);
+ ret = slab_alloc_node(cachep, flags, nodeid, size, _RET_IP_);
ret = kasan_kmalloc(cachep, ret, size, flags);
trace_kmalloc_node(_RET_IP_, ret,
@@ -3673,7 +3690,7 @@ static __always_inline void *__do_kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags,
cachep = kmalloc_slab(size, flags);
if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(cachep)))
return cachep;
- ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, caller);
+ ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, size, caller);
ret = kasan_kmalloc(cachep, ret, size, flags);
trace_kmalloc(caller, ret,
@@ -4172,7 +4189,10 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page,
BUG_ON(objnr >= cachep->num);
/* Find offset within object. */
- offset = ptr - index_to_obj(cachep, page, objnr) - obj_offset(cachep);
+ if (is_kfence_address(ptr))
+ offset = ptr - kfence_object_start(ptr);
+ else
+ offset = ptr - index_to_obj(cachep, page, objnr) - obj_offset(cachep);
/* Allow address range falling entirely within usercopy region. */
if (offset >= cachep->useroffset &&
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 7c8298c17145f1..88e833986332e0 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/memory.h>
#include <linux/cache.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -430,6 +431,7 @@ static void slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
rcu_barrier();
list_for_each_entry_safe(s, s2, &to_destroy, list) {
+ kfence_shutdown_cache(s);
#ifdef SLAB_SUPPORTS_SYSFS
sysfs_slab_release(s);
#else
@@ -455,6 +457,7 @@ static int shutdown_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
list_add_tail(&s->list, &slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy);
schedule_work(&slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_work);
} else {
+ kfence_shutdown_cache(s);
#ifdef SLAB_SUPPORTS_SYSFS
sysfs_slab_unlink(s);
sysfs_slab_release(s);
@@ -640,6 +643,7 @@ struct kmem_cache *__init create_kmalloc_cache(const char *name,
panic("Out of memory when creating slab %s\n", name);
create_boot_cache(s, name, size, flags, useroffset, usersize);
+ kasan_cache_create_kmalloc(s);
list_add(&s->list, &slab_caches);
s->refcount = 1;
return s;
@@ -1132,16 +1136,27 @@ static __always_inline void *__do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size,
void *ret;
size_t ks;
- ks = ksize(p);
+ /* Don't use instrumented ksize to allow precise KASAN poisoning. */
+ if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(p))) {
+ if (!kasan_check_byte(p))
+ return NULL;
+ ks = kfence_ksize(p) ?: __ksize(p);
+ } else
+ ks = 0;
+ /* If the object still fits, repoison it precisely. */
if (ks >= new_size) {
p = kasan_krealloc((void *)p, new_size, flags);
return (void *)p;
}
ret = kmalloc_track_caller(new_size, flags);
- if (ret && p)
- memcpy(ret, p, ks);
+ if (ret && p) {
+ /* Disable KASAN checks as the object's redzone is accessed. */
+ kasan_disable_current();
+ memcpy(ret, kasan_reset_tag(p), ks);
+ kasan_enable_current();
+ }
return ret;
}
@@ -1235,7 +1250,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || !kasan_check_byte(objp))
return 0;
- size = __ksize(objp);
+ size = kfence_ksize(objp) ?: __ksize(objp);
/*
* We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area,
* so we need to unpoison this area.
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index b2833ce85c9260..e26c274b4657f2 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/debugobjects.h>
#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
#include <linux/memory.h>
#include <linux/math64.h>
#include <linux/fault-inject.h>
@@ -1570,6 +1571,11 @@ static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
void *old_tail = *tail ? *tail : *head;
int rsize;
+ if (is_kfence_address(next)) {
+ slab_free_hook(s, next);
+ return true;
+ }
+
/* Head and tail of the reconstructed freelist */
*head = NULL;
*tail = NULL;
@@ -2809,7 +2815,7 @@ static __always_inline void maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(struct kmem_cache *s,
* Otherwise we can simply pick the next object from the lockless free list.
*/
static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
- gfp_t gfpflags, int node, unsigned long addr)
+ gfp_t gfpflags, int node, unsigned long addr, size_t orig_size)
{
void *object;
struct kmem_cache_cpu *c;
@@ -2820,6 +2826,11 @@ static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
s = slab_pre_alloc_hook(s, &objcg, 1, gfpflags);
if (!s)
return NULL;
+
+ object = kfence_alloc(s, orig_size, gfpflags);
+ if (unlikely(object))
+ goto out;
+
redo:
/*
* Must read kmem_cache cpu data via this cpu ptr. Preemption is
@@ -2892,20 +2903,21 @@ redo:
if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfpflags, s)) && object)
memset(kasan_reset_tag(object), 0, s->object_size);
+out:
slab_post_alloc_hook(s, objcg, gfpflags, 1, &object);
return object;
}
static __always_inline void *slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s,
- gfp_t gfpflags, unsigned long addr)
+ gfp_t gfpflags, unsigned long addr, size_t orig_size)
{
- return slab_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, NUMA_NO_NODE, addr);
+ return slab_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, NUMA_NO_NODE, addr, orig_size);
}
void *kmem_cache_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t gfpflags)
{
- void *ret = slab_alloc(s, gfpflags, _RET_IP_);
+ void *ret = slab_alloc(s, gfpflags, _RET_IP_, s->object_size);
trace_kmem_cache_alloc(_RET_IP_, ret, s->object_size,
s->size, gfpflags);
@@ -2917,7 +2929,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc);
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
void *kmem_cache_alloc_trace(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t gfpflags, size_t size)
{
- void *ret = slab_alloc(s, gfpflags, _RET_IP_);
+ void *ret = slab_alloc(s, gfpflags, _RET_IP_, size);
trace_kmalloc(_RET_IP_, ret, size, s->size, gfpflags);
ret = kasan_kmalloc(s, ret, size, gfpflags);
return ret;
@@ -2928,7 +2940,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_trace);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
void *kmem_cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t gfpflags, int node)
{
- void *ret = slab_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, node, _RET_IP_);
+ void *ret = slab_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, node, _RET_IP_, s->object_size);
trace_kmem_cache_alloc_node(_RET_IP_, ret,
s->object_size, s->size, gfpflags, node);
@@ -2942,7 +2954,7 @@ void *kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace(struct kmem_cache *s,
gfp_t gfpflags,
int node, size_t size)
{
- void *ret = slab_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, node, _RET_IP_);
+ void *ret = slab_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, node, _RET_IP_, size);
trace_kmalloc_node(_RET_IP_, ret,
size, s->size, gfpflags, node);
@@ -2976,6 +2988,9 @@ static void __slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
stat(s, FREE_SLOWPATH);
+ if (kfence_free(head))
+ return;
+
if (kmem_cache_debug(s) &&
!free_debug_processing(s, page, head, tail, cnt, addr))
return;
@@ -3220,6 +3235,13 @@ int build_detached_freelist(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size,
df->s = cache_from_obj(s, object); /* Support for memcg */
}
+ if (is_kfence_address(object)) {
+ slab_free_hook(df->s, object);
+ __kfence_free(object);
+ p[size] = NULL; /* mark object processed */
+ return size;
+ }
+
/* Start new detached freelist */
df->page = page;
set_freepointer(df->s, object, NULL);
@@ -3295,8 +3317,14 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
c = this_cpu_ptr(s->cpu_slab);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
- void *object = c->freelist;
+ void *object = kfence_alloc(s, s->object_size, flags);
+ if (unlikely(object)) {
+ p[i] = object;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ object = c->freelist;
if (unlikely(!object)) {
/*
* We may have removed an object from c->freelist using
@@ -3551,8 +3579,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node)
init_object(kmem_cache_node, n, SLUB_RED_ACTIVE);
init_tracking(kmem_cache_node, n);
#endif
- n = kasan_kmalloc(kmem_cache_node, n, sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node),
- GFP_KERNEL);
+ n = kasan_slab_alloc(kmem_cache_node, n, GFP_KERNEL);
page->freelist = get_freepointer(kmem_cache_node, n);
page->inuse = 1;
page->frozen = 0;
@@ -4021,7 +4048,7 @@ void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(s)))
return s;
- ret = slab_alloc(s, flags, _RET_IP_);
+ ret = slab_alloc(s, flags, _RET_IP_, size);
trace_kmalloc(_RET_IP_, ret, size, s->size, flags);
@@ -4069,7 +4096,7 @@ void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(s)))
return s;
- ret = slab_alloc_node(s, flags, node, _RET_IP_);
+ ret = slab_alloc_node(s, flags, node, _RET_IP_, size);
trace_kmalloc_node(_RET_IP_, ret, size, s->size, flags, node);
@@ -4095,6 +4122,7 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page,
struct kmem_cache *s;
unsigned int offset;
size_t object_size;
+ bool is_kfence = is_kfence_address(ptr);
ptr = kasan_reset_tag(ptr);
@@ -4107,10 +4135,13 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page,
to_user, 0, n);
/* Find offset within object. */
- offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size;
+ if (is_kfence)
+ offset = ptr - kfence_object_start(ptr);
+ else
+ offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size;
/* Adjust for redzone and reject if within the redzone. */
- if (kmem_cache_debug_flags(s, SLAB_RED_ZONE)) {
+ if (!is_kfence && kmem_cache_debug_flags(s, SLAB_RED_ZONE)) {
if (offset < s->red_left_pad)
usercopy_abort("SLUB object in left red zone",
s->name, to_user, offset, n);
@@ -4527,7 +4558,7 @@ void *__kmalloc_track_caller(size_t size, gfp_t gfpflags, unsigned long caller)
if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(s)))
return s;
- ret = slab_alloc(s, gfpflags, caller);
+ ret = slab_alloc(s, gfpflags, caller, size);
/* Honor the call site pointer we received. */
trace_kmalloc(caller, ret, size, s->size, gfpflags);
@@ -4558,7 +4589,7 @@ void *__kmalloc_node_track_caller(size_t size, gfp_t gfpflags,
if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(s)))
return s;
- ret = slab_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, node, caller);
+ ret = slab_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, node, caller, size);
/* Honor the call site pointer we received. */
trace_kmalloc_node(caller, ret, size, s->size, gfpflags, node);
diff --git a/mm/swap.c b/mm/swap.c
index ab3258afcbeb85..31b844d4ed94ee 100644
--- a/mm/swap.c
+++ b/mm/swap.c
@@ -1018,45 +1018,11 @@ void __pagevec_lru_add(struct pagevec *pvec)
}
/**
- * pagevec_lookup_entries - gang pagecache lookup
- * @pvec: Where the resulting entries are placed
- * @mapping: The address_space to search
- * @start: The starting entry index
- * @nr_entries: The maximum number of pages
- * @indices: The cache indices corresponding to the entries in @pvec
- *
- * pagevec_lookup_entries() will search for and return a group of up
- * to @nr_pages pages and shadow entries in the mapping. All
- * entries are placed in @pvec. pagevec_lookup_entries() takes a
- * reference against actual pages in @pvec.
- *
- * The search returns a group of mapping-contiguous entries with
- * ascending indexes. There may be holes in the indices due to
- * not-present entries.
- *
- * Only one subpage of a Transparent Huge Page is returned in one call:
- * allowing truncate_inode_pages_range() to evict the whole THP without
- * cycling through a pagevec of extra references.
- *
- * pagevec_lookup_entries() returns the number of entries which were
- * found.
- */
-unsigned pagevec_lookup_entries(struct pagevec *pvec,
- struct address_space *mapping,
- pgoff_t start, unsigned nr_entries,
- pgoff_t *indices)
-{
- pvec->nr = find_get_entries(mapping, start, nr_entries,
- pvec->pages, indices);
- return pagevec_count(pvec);
-}
-
-/**
* pagevec_remove_exceptionals - pagevec exceptionals pruning
* @pvec: The pagevec to prune
*
- * pagevec_lookup_entries() fills both pages and exceptional radix
- * tree entries into the pagevec. This function prunes all
+ * find_get_entries() fills both pages and XArray value entries (aka
+ * exceptional entries) into the pagevec. This function prunes all
* exceptionals from @pvec without leaving holes, so that it can be
* passed on to page-only pagevec operations.
*/
diff --git a/mm/swap_state.c b/mm/swap_state.c
index c1a648d9092bd3..3cdee7b11da9b6 100644
--- a/mm/swap_state.c
+++ b/mm/swap_state.c
@@ -87,11 +87,9 @@ void *get_shadow_from_swap_cache(swp_entry_t entry)
pgoff_t idx = swp_offset(entry);
struct page *page;
- page = find_get_entry(address_space, idx);
+ page = xa_load(&address_space->i_pages, idx);
if (xa_is_value(page))
return page;
- if (page)
- put_page(page);
return NULL;
}
@@ -405,7 +403,8 @@ struct page *find_get_incore_page(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t index)
{
swp_entry_t swp;
struct swap_info_struct *si;
- struct page *page = find_get_entry(mapping, index);
+ struct page *page = pagecache_get_page(mapping, index,
+ FGP_ENTRY | FGP_HEAD, 0);
if (!page)
return page;
diff --git a/mm/truncate.c b/mm/truncate.c
index 8aa4907e06e01f..455944264663ef 100644
--- a/mm/truncate.c
+++ b/mm/truncate.c
@@ -57,11 +57,10 @@ static void clear_shadow_entry(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t index,
* exceptional entries similar to what pagevec_remove_exceptionals does.
*/
static void truncate_exceptional_pvec_entries(struct address_space *mapping,
- struct pagevec *pvec, pgoff_t *indices,
- pgoff_t end)
+ struct pagevec *pvec, pgoff_t *indices)
{
int i, j;
- bool dax, lock;
+ bool dax;
/* Handled by shmem itself */
if (shmem_mapping(mapping))
@@ -75,8 +74,7 @@ static void truncate_exceptional_pvec_entries(struct address_space *mapping,
return;
dax = dax_mapping(mapping);
- lock = !dax && indices[j] < end;
- if (lock)
+ if (!dax)
xa_lock_irq(&mapping->i_pages);
for (i = j; i < pagevec_count(pvec); i++) {
@@ -88,9 +86,6 @@ static void truncate_exceptional_pvec_entries(struct address_space *mapping,
continue;
}
- if (index >= end)
- continue;
-
if (unlikely(dax)) {
dax_delete_mapping_entry(mapping, index);
continue;
@@ -99,7 +94,7 @@ static void truncate_exceptional_pvec_entries(struct address_space *mapping,
__clear_shadow_entry(mapping, index, page);
}
- if (lock)
+ if (!dax)
xa_unlock_irq(&mapping->i_pages);
pvec->nr = j;
}
@@ -326,51 +321,19 @@ void truncate_inode_pages_range(struct address_space *mapping,
pagevec_init(&pvec);
index = start;
- while (index < end && pagevec_lookup_entries(&pvec, mapping, index,
- min(end - index, (pgoff_t)PAGEVEC_SIZE),
- indices)) {
- /*
- * Pagevec array has exceptional entries and we may also fail
- * to lock some pages. So we store pages that can be deleted
- * in a new pagevec.
- */
- struct pagevec locked_pvec;
-
- pagevec_init(&locked_pvec);
- for (i = 0; i < pagevec_count(&pvec); i++) {
- struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
-
- /* We rely upon deletion not changing page->index */
- index = indices[i];
- if (index >= end)
- break;
-
- if (xa_is_value(page))
- continue;
-
- if (!trylock_page(page))
- continue;
- WARN_ON(page_to_index(page) != index);
- if (PageWriteback(page)) {
- unlock_page(page);
- continue;
- }
- if (page->mapping != mapping) {
- unlock_page(page);
- continue;
- }
- pagevec_add(&locked_pvec, page);
- }
- for (i = 0; i < pagevec_count(&locked_pvec); i++)
- truncate_cleanup_page(mapping, locked_pvec.pages[i]);
- delete_from_page_cache_batch(mapping, &locked_pvec);
- for (i = 0; i < pagevec_count(&locked_pvec); i++)
- unlock_page(locked_pvec.pages[i]);
- truncate_exceptional_pvec_entries(mapping, &pvec, indices, end);
+ while (index < end && find_lock_entries(mapping, index, end - 1,
+ &pvec, indices)) {
+ index = indices[pagevec_count(&pvec) - 1] + 1;
+ truncate_exceptional_pvec_entries(mapping, &pvec, indices);
+ for (i = 0; i < pagevec_count(&pvec); i++)
+ truncate_cleanup_page(mapping, pvec.pages[i]);
+ delete_from_page_cache_batch(mapping, &pvec);
+ for (i = 0; i < pagevec_count(&pvec); i++)
+ unlock_page(pvec.pages[i]);
pagevec_release(&pvec);
cond_resched();
- index++;
}
+
if (partial_start) {
struct page *page = find_lock_page(mapping, start - 1);
if (page) {
@@ -413,8 +376,8 @@ void truncate_inode_pages_range(struct address_space *mapping,
index = start;
for ( ; ; ) {
cond_resched();
- if (!pagevec_lookup_entries(&pvec, mapping, index,
- min(end - index, (pgoff_t)PAGEVEC_SIZE), indices)) {
+ if (!find_get_entries(mapping, index, end - 1, &pvec,
+ indices)) {
/* If all gone from start onwards, we're done */
if (index == start)
break;
@@ -422,23 +385,12 @@ void truncate_inode_pages_range(struct address_space *mapping,
index = start;
continue;
}
- if (index == start && indices[0] >= end) {
- /* All gone out of hole to be punched, we're done */
- pagevec_remove_exceptionals(&pvec);
- pagevec_release(&pvec);
- break;
- }
for (i = 0; i < pagevec_count(&pvec); i++) {
struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
/* We rely upon deletion not changing page->index */
index = indices[i];
- if (index >= end) {
- /* Restart punch to make sure all gone */
- index = start - 1;
- break;
- }
if (xa_is_value(page))
continue;
@@ -449,7 +401,7 @@ void truncate_inode_pages_range(struct address_space *mapping,
truncate_inode_page(mapping, page);
unlock_page(page);
}
- truncate_exceptional_pvec_entries(mapping, &pvec, indices, end);
+ truncate_exceptional_pvec_entries(mapping, &pvec, indices);
pagevec_release(&pvec);
index++;
}
@@ -539,55 +491,19 @@ static unsigned long __invalidate_mapping_pages(struct address_space *mapping,
int i;
pagevec_init(&pvec);
- while (index <= end && pagevec_lookup_entries(&pvec, mapping, index,
- min(end - index, (pgoff_t)PAGEVEC_SIZE - 1) + 1,
- indices)) {
+ while (find_lock_entries(mapping, index, end, &pvec, indices)) {
for (i = 0; i < pagevec_count(&pvec); i++) {
struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
/* We rely upon deletion not changing page->index */
index = indices[i];
- if (index > end)
- break;
if (xa_is_value(page)) {
invalidate_exceptional_entry(mapping, index,
page);
continue;
}
-
- if (!trylock_page(page))
- continue;
-
- WARN_ON(page_to_index(page) != index);
-
- /* Middle of THP: skip */
- if (PageTransTail(page)) {
- unlock_page(page);
- continue;
- } else if (PageTransHuge(page)) {
- index += HPAGE_PMD_NR - 1;
- i += HPAGE_PMD_NR - 1;
- /*
- * 'end' is in the middle of THP. Don't
- * invalidate the page as the part outside of
- * 'end' could be still useful.
- */
- if (index > end) {
- unlock_page(page);
- continue;
- }
-
- /* Take a pin outside pagevec */
- get_page(page);
-
- /*
- * Drop extra pins before trying to invalidate
- * the huge page.
- */
- pagevec_remove_exceptionals(&pvec);
- pagevec_release(&pvec);
- }
+ index += thp_nr_pages(page) - 1;
ret = invalidate_inode_page(page);
unlock_page(page);
@@ -601,9 +517,6 @@ static unsigned long __invalidate_mapping_pages(struct address_space *mapping,
if (nr_pagevec)
(*nr_pagevec)++;
}
-
- if (PageTransHuge(page))
- put_page(page);
count += ret;
}
pagevec_remove_exceptionals(&pvec);
@@ -725,16 +638,12 @@ int invalidate_inode_pages2_range(struct address_space *mapping,
pagevec_init(&pvec);
index = start;
- while (index <= end && pagevec_lookup_entries(&pvec, mapping, index,
- min(end - index, (pgoff_t)PAGEVEC_SIZE - 1) + 1,
- indices)) {
+ while (find_get_entries(mapping, index, end, &pvec, indices)) {
for (i = 0; i < pagevec_count(&pvec); i++) {
struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
/* We rely upon deletion not changing page->index */
index = indices[i];
- if (index > end)
- break;
if (xa_is_value(page)) {
if (!invalidate_exceptional_entry2(mapping,
diff --git a/mm/vmstat.c b/mm/vmstat.c
index a0e94954220446..74b2c374b86c8a 100644
--- a/mm/vmstat.c
+++ b/mm/vmstat.c
@@ -342,6 +342,12 @@ void __mod_node_page_state(struct pglist_data *pgdat, enum node_stat_item item,
long t;
if (vmstat_item_in_bytes(item)) {
+ /*
+ * Only cgroups use subpage accounting right now; at
+ * the global level, these items still change in
+ * multiples of whole pages. Store them as pages
+ * internally to keep the per-cpu counters compact.
+ */
VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(delta & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
delta >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
@@ -551,6 +557,12 @@ static inline void mod_node_state(struct pglist_data *pgdat,
long o, n, t, z;
if (vmstat_item_in_bytes(item)) {
+ /*
+ * Only cgroups use subpage accounting right now; at
+ * the global level, these items still change in
+ * multiples of whole pages. Store them as pages
+ * internally to keep the per-cpu counters compact.
+ */
VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(delta & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
delta >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
@@ -1637,14 +1649,16 @@ static void zoneinfo_show_print(struct seq_file *m, pg_data_t *pgdat,
"\n high %lu"
"\n spanned %lu"
"\n present %lu"
- "\n managed %lu",
+ "\n managed %lu"
+ "\n cma %lu",
zone_page_state(zone, NR_FREE_PAGES),
min_wmark_pages(zone),
low_wmark_pages(zone),
high_wmark_pages(zone),
zone->spanned_pages,
zone->present_pages,
- zone_managed_pages(zone));
+ zone_managed_pages(zone),
+ zone_cma_pages(zone));
seq_printf(m,
"\n protection: (%ld",
@@ -1892,16 +1906,12 @@ static void vmstat_update(struct work_struct *w)
*/
static bool need_update(int cpu)
{
+ pg_data_t *last_pgdat = NULL;
struct zone *zone;
for_each_populated_zone(zone) {
struct per_cpu_pageset *p = per_cpu_ptr(zone->pageset, cpu);
-
- BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p->vm_stat_diff[0]) != 1);
-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
- BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p->vm_numa_stat_diff[0]) != 2);
-#endif
-
+ struct per_cpu_nodestat *n;
/*
* The fast way of checking if there are any vmstat diffs.
*/
@@ -1913,6 +1923,13 @@ static bool need_update(int cpu)
sizeof(p->vm_numa_stat_diff[0])))
return true;
#endif
+ if (last_pgdat == zone->zone_pgdat)
+ continue;
+ last_pgdat = zone->zone_pgdat;
+ n = per_cpu_ptr(zone->zone_pgdat->per_cpu_nodestats, cpu);
+ if (memchr_inv(n->vm_node_stat_diff, 0, NR_VM_NODE_STAT_ITEMS *
+ sizeof(n->vm_node_stat_diff[0])))
+ return true;
}
return false;
}
@@ -1963,6 +1980,8 @@ static void vmstat_shepherd(struct work_struct *w)
if (!delayed_work_pending(dw) && need_update(cpu))
queue_delayed_work_on(cpu, mm_percpu_wq, dw, 0);
+
+ cond_resched();
}
put_online_cpus();
diff --git a/mm/z3fold.c b/mm/z3fold.c
index c1ccf6bb0ffb79..b5dafa7e44e429 100644
--- a/mm/z3fold.c
+++ b/mm/z3fold.c
@@ -1771,6 +1771,7 @@ static u64 z3fold_zpool_total_size(void *pool)
static struct zpool_driver z3fold_zpool_driver = {
.type = "z3fold",
+ .sleep_mapped = true,
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.create = z3fold_zpool_create,
.destroy = z3fold_zpool_destroy,
diff --git a/mm/zbud.c b/mm/zbud.c
index c49966ece674b1..7ec5f27a68b08d 100644
--- a/mm/zbud.c
+++ b/mm/zbud.c
@@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ static u64 zbud_zpool_total_size(void *pool)
static struct zpool_driver zbud_zpool_driver = {
.type = "zbud",
+ .sleep_mapped = true,
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.create = zbud_zpool_create,
.destroy = zbud_zpool_destroy,
diff --git a/mm/zpool.c b/mm/zpool.c
index 3744a2d1a62466..5ed71207ced733 100644
--- a/mm/zpool.c
+++ b/mm/zpool.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ struct zpool {
void *pool;
const struct zpool_ops *ops;
bool evictable;
+ bool can_sleep_mapped;
struct list_head list;
};
@@ -183,6 +184,7 @@ struct zpool *zpool_create_pool(const char *type, const char *name, gfp_t gfp,
zpool->pool = driver->create(name, gfp, ops, zpool);
zpool->ops = ops;
zpool->evictable = driver->shrink && ops && ops->evict;
+ zpool->can_sleep_mapped = driver->sleep_mapped;
if (!zpool->pool) {
pr_err("couldn't create %s pool\n", type);
@@ -393,6 +395,17 @@ bool zpool_evictable(struct zpool *zpool)
return zpool->evictable;
}
+/**
+ * zpool_can_sleep_mapped - Test if zpool can sleep when do mapped.
+ * @zpool: The zpool to test
+ *
+ * Returns: true if zpool can sleep; false otherwise.
+ */
+bool zpool_can_sleep_mapped(struct zpool *zpool)
+{
+ return zpool->can_sleep_mapped;
+}
+
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org>");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Common API for compressed memory storage");
diff --git a/mm/zsmalloc.c b/mm/zsmalloc.c
index 7289f502ffacab..30c358b7202510 100644
--- a/mm/zsmalloc.c
+++ b/mm/zsmalloc.c
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ static void cache_free_handle(struct zs_pool *pool, unsigned long handle)
static struct zspage *cache_alloc_zspage(struct zs_pool *pool, gfp_t flags)
{
- return kmem_cache_alloc(pool->zspage_cachep,
+ return kmem_cache_zalloc(pool->zspage_cachep,
flags & ~(__GFP_HIGHMEM|__GFP_MOVABLE));
}
@@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ static int get_pages_per_zspage(int class_size)
static struct zspage *get_zspage(struct page *page)
{
- struct zspage *zspage = (struct zspage *)page->private;
+ struct zspage *zspage = (struct zspage *)page_private(page);
BUG_ON(zspage->magic != ZSPAGE_MAGIC);
return zspage;
@@ -1064,7 +1064,6 @@ static struct zspage *alloc_zspage(struct zs_pool *pool,
if (!zspage)
return NULL;
- memset(zspage, 0, sizeof(struct zspage));
zspage->magic = ZSPAGE_MAGIC;
migrate_lock_init(zspage);
@@ -2213,11 +2212,13 @@ static unsigned long zs_can_compact(struct size_class *class)
return obj_wasted * class->pages_per_zspage;
}
-static void __zs_compact(struct zs_pool *pool, struct size_class *class)
+static unsigned long __zs_compact(struct zs_pool *pool,
+ struct size_class *class)
{
struct zs_compact_control cc;
struct zspage *src_zspage;
struct zspage *dst_zspage = NULL;
+ unsigned long pages_freed = 0;
spin_lock(&class->lock);
while ((src_zspage = isolate_zspage(class, true))) {
@@ -2247,7 +2248,7 @@ static void __zs_compact(struct zs_pool *pool, struct size_class *class)
putback_zspage(class, dst_zspage);
if (putback_zspage(class, src_zspage) == ZS_EMPTY) {
free_zspage(pool, class, src_zspage);
- pool->stats.pages_compacted += class->pages_per_zspage;
+ pages_freed += class->pages_per_zspage;
}
spin_unlock(&class->lock);
cond_resched();
@@ -2258,12 +2259,15 @@ static void __zs_compact(struct zs_pool *pool, struct size_class *class)
putback_zspage(class, src_zspage);
spin_unlock(&class->lock);
+
+ return pages_freed;
}
unsigned long zs_compact(struct zs_pool *pool)
{
int i;
struct size_class *class;
+ unsigned long pages_freed = 0;
for (i = ZS_SIZE_CLASSES - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
class = pool->size_class[i];
@@ -2271,10 +2275,11 @@ unsigned long zs_compact(struct zs_pool *pool)
continue;
if (class->index != i)
continue;
- __zs_compact(pool, class);
+ pages_freed += __zs_compact(pool, class);
}
+ atomic_long_add(pages_freed, &pool->stats.pages_compacted);
- return pool->stats.pages_compacted;
+ return pages_freed;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(zs_compact);
@@ -2291,13 +2296,12 @@ static unsigned long zs_shrinker_scan(struct shrinker *shrinker,
struct zs_pool *pool = container_of(shrinker, struct zs_pool,
shrinker);
- pages_freed = pool->stats.pages_compacted;
/*
* Compact classes and calculate compaction delta.
* Can run concurrently with a manually triggered
* (by user) compaction.
*/
- pages_freed = zs_compact(pool) - pages_freed;
+ pages_freed = zs_compact(pool);
return pages_freed ? pages_freed : SHRINK_STOP;
}
diff --git a/mm/zswap.c b/mm/zswap.c
index 182f6ad5aa69fc..578d9f25692003 100644
--- a/mm/zswap.c
+++ b/mm/zswap.c
@@ -935,13 +935,19 @@ static int zswap_writeback_entry(struct zpool *pool, unsigned long handle)
struct scatterlist input, output;
struct crypto_acomp_ctx *acomp_ctx;
- u8 *src;
+ u8 *src, *tmp = NULL;
unsigned int dlen;
int ret;
struct writeback_control wbc = {
.sync_mode = WB_SYNC_NONE,
};
+ if (!zpool_can_sleep_mapped(pool)) {
+ tmp = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!tmp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
/* extract swpentry from data */
zhdr = zpool_map_handle(pool, handle, ZPOOL_MM_RO);
swpentry = zhdr->swpentry; /* here */
@@ -955,6 +961,7 @@ static int zswap_writeback_entry(struct zpool *pool, unsigned long handle)
/* entry was invalidated */
spin_unlock(&tree->lock);
zpool_unmap_handle(pool, handle);
+ kfree(tmp);
return 0;
}
spin_unlock(&tree->lock);
@@ -979,6 +986,14 @@ static int zswap_writeback_entry(struct zpool *pool, unsigned long handle)
dlen = PAGE_SIZE;
src = (u8 *)zhdr + sizeof(struct zswap_header);
+ if (!zpool_can_sleep_mapped(pool)) {
+
+ memcpy(tmp, src, entry->length);
+ src = tmp;
+
+ zpool_unmap_handle(pool, handle);
+ }
+
mutex_lock(acomp_ctx->mutex);
sg_init_one(&input, src, entry->length);
sg_init_table(&output, 1);
@@ -1022,10 +1037,10 @@ static int zswap_writeback_entry(struct zpool *pool, unsigned long handle)
/*
* if we get here due to ZSWAP_SWAPCACHE_EXIST
- * a load may happening concurrently
- * it is safe and okay to not free the entry
+ * a load may be happening concurrently.
+ * it is safe and okay to not free the entry.
* if we free the entry in the following put
- * it it either okay to return !0
+ * it is also okay to return !0
*/
fail:
spin_lock(&tree->lock);
@@ -1033,7 +1048,11 @@ fail:
spin_unlock(&tree->lock);
end:
- zpool_unmap_handle(pool, handle);
+ if (zpool_can_sleep_mapped(pool))
+ zpool_unmap_handle(pool, handle);
+ else
+ kfree(tmp);
+
return ret;
}
@@ -1235,7 +1254,7 @@ static int zswap_frontswap_load(unsigned type, pgoff_t offset,
struct zswap_entry *entry;
struct scatterlist input, output;
struct crypto_acomp_ctx *acomp_ctx;
- u8 *src, *dst;
+ u8 *src, *dst, *tmp;
unsigned int dlen;
int ret;
@@ -1253,15 +1272,33 @@ static int zswap_frontswap_load(unsigned type, pgoff_t offset,
dst = kmap_atomic(page);
zswap_fill_page(dst, entry->value);
kunmap_atomic(dst);
+ ret = 0;
goto freeentry;
}
+ if (!zpool_can_sleep_mapped(entry->pool->zpool)) {
+
+ tmp = kmalloc(entry->length, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!tmp) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto freeentry;
+ }
+ }
+
/* decompress */
dlen = PAGE_SIZE;
src = zpool_map_handle(entry->pool->zpool, entry->handle, ZPOOL_MM_RO);
if (zpool_evictable(entry->pool->zpool))
src += sizeof(struct zswap_header);
+ if (!zpool_can_sleep_mapped(entry->pool->zpool)) {
+
+ memcpy(tmp, src, entry->length);
+ src = tmp;
+
+ zpool_unmap_handle(entry->pool->zpool, entry->handle);
+ }
+
acomp_ctx = raw_cpu_ptr(entry->pool->acomp_ctx);
mutex_lock(acomp_ctx->mutex);
sg_init_one(&input, src, entry->length);
@@ -1271,7 +1308,11 @@ static int zswap_frontswap_load(unsigned type, pgoff_t offset,
ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_acomp_decompress(acomp_ctx->req), &acomp_ctx->wait);
mutex_unlock(acomp_ctx->mutex);
- zpool_unmap_handle(entry->pool->zpool, entry->handle);
+ if (zpool_can_sleep_mapped(entry->pool->zpool))
+ zpool_unmap_handle(entry->pool->zpool, entry->handle);
+ else
+ kfree(tmp);
+
BUG_ON(ret);
freeentry:
@@ -1279,7 +1320,7 @@ freeentry:
zswap_entry_put(tree, entry);
spin_unlock(&tree->lock);
- return 0;
+ return ret;
}
/* frees an entry in zswap */
diff --git a/samples/auxdisplay/cfag12864b-example.c b/samples/auxdisplay/cfag12864b-example.c
index bfeab44f81d077..2e3bb7375c9934 100644
--- a/samples/auxdisplay/cfag12864b-example.c
+++ b/samples/auxdisplay/cfag12864b-example.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* Version: 0.1.0
* Description: cfag12864b LCD userspace example program
*
- * Author: Copyright (C) Miguel Ojeda Sandonis
+ * Author: Copyright (C) Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
* Date: 2006-10-31
*/
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.ubsan b/scripts/Makefile.ubsan
index 0e53a93e8f151c..9e2092fd5206c7 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.ubsan
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.ubsan
@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@ ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_LOCAL_BOUNDS) += -fsanitize=local-bounds
ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT) += -fsanitize=shift
ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_DIV_ZERO) += -fsanitize=integer-divide-by-zero
ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_UNREACHABLE) += -fsanitize=unreachable
-ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_OVERFLOW) += -fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow
-ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_UNSIGNED_OVERFLOW) += -fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow
ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_OBJECT_SIZE) += -fsanitize=object-size
ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_BOOL) += -fsanitize=bool
ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_ENUM) += -fsanitize=enum
diff --git a/scripts/checkpatch.pl b/scripts/checkpatch.pl
index ca4201753d5ef0..df8b23dc1eb0af 100755
--- a/scripts/checkpatch.pl
+++ b/scripts/checkpatch.pl
@@ -382,6 +382,7 @@ our $InitAttribute = qr{$InitAttributeData|$InitAttributeConst|$InitAttributeIni
# We need \b after 'init' otherwise 'initconst' will cause a false positive in a check
our $Attribute = qr{
const|
+ volatile|
__percpu|
__nocast|
__safe|
@@ -486,7 +487,7 @@ our $logFunctions = qr{(?x:
our $allocFunctions = qr{(?x:
(?:(?:devm_)?
- (?:kv|k|v)[czm]alloc(?:_node|_array)? |
+ (?:kv|k|v)[czm]alloc(?:_array)?(?:_node)? |
kstrdup(?:_const)? |
kmemdup(?:_nul)?) |
(?:\w+)?alloc_skb(?:_ip_align)? |
@@ -506,6 +507,30 @@ our $signature_tags = qr{(?xi:
Cc:
)};
+our $tracing_logging_tags = qr{(?xi:
+ [=-]*> |
+ <[=-]* |
+ \[ |
+ \] |
+ start |
+ called |
+ entered |
+ entry |
+ enter |
+ in |
+ inside |
+ here |
+ begin |
+ exit |
+ end |
+ done |
+ leave |
+ completed |
+ out |
+ return |
+ [\.\!:\s]*
+)};
+
sub edit_distance_min {
my (@arr) = @_;
my $len = scalar @arr;
@@ -2428,6 +2453,15 @@ sub get_raw_comment {
return $comment;
}
+sub exclude_global_initialisers {
+ my ($realfile) = @_;
+
+ # Do not check for BPF programs (tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/*.c, samples/bpf/*_kern.c, *.bpf.c).
+ return $realfile =~ m@^tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/.*\.c$@ ||
+ $realfile =~ m@^samples/bpf/.*_kern\.c$@ ||
+ $realfile =~ m@/bpf/.*\.bpf\.c$@;
+}
+
sub process {
my $filename = shift;
@@ -2973,7 +3007,7 @@ sub process {
}
if (!defined $lines[$linenr]) {
WARN("BAD_SIGN_OFF",
- "Co-developed-by: must be immediately followed by Signed-off-by:\n" . "$here\n" . $rawline);
+ "Co-developed-by: must be immediately followed by Signed-off-by:\n" . "$here\n" . $rawline);
} elsif ($rawlines[$linenr] !~ /^\s*signed-off-by:\s*(.*)/i) {
WARN("BAD_SIGN_OFF",
"Co-developed-by: must be immediately followed by Signed-off-by:\n" . "$here\n" . $rawline . "\n" .$rawlines[$linenr]);
@@ -2996,8 +3030,8 @@ sub process {
if (ERROR("GERRIT_CHANGE_ID",
"Remove Gerrit Change-Id's before submitting upstream\n" . $herecurr) &&
$fix) {
- fix_delete_line($fixlinenr, $rawline);
- }
+ fix_delete_line($fixlinenr, $rawline);
+ }
}
# Check if the commit log is in a possible stack dump
@@ -3239,10 +3273,10 @@ sub process {
next if ($start_char =~ /^\S$/);
next if (index(" \t.,;?!", $end_char) == -1);
- # avoid repeating hex occurrences like 'ff ff fe 09 ...'
- if ($first =~ /\b[0-9a-f]{2,}\b/i) {
- next if (!exists($allow_repeated_words{lc($first)}));
- }
+ # avoid repeating hex occurrences like 'ff ff fe 09 ...'
+ if ($first =~ /\b[0-9a-f]{2,}\b/i) {
+ next if (!exists($allow_repeated_words{lc($first)}));
+ }
if (WARN("REPEATED_WORD",
"Possible repeated word: '$first'\n" . $herecurr) &&
@@ -3574,6 +3608,13 @@ sub process {
}
}
+# check for .L prefix local symbols in .S files
+ if ($realfile =~ /\.S$/ &&
+ $line =~ /^\+\s*(?:[A-Z]+_)?SYM_[A-Z]+_(?:START|END)(?:_[A-Z_]+)?\s*\(\s*\.L/) {
+ WARN("AVOID_L_PREFIX",
+ "Avoid using '.L' prefixed local symbol names for denoting a range of code via 'SYM_*_START/END' annotations; see Documentation/asm-annotations.rst\n" . $herecurr);
+ }
+
# check we are in a valid source file C or perl if not then ignore this hunk
next if ($realfile !~ /\.(h|c|pl|dtsi|dts)$/);
@@ -3776,43 +3817,48 @@ sub process {
}
# check for missing blank lines after declarations
- if ($sline =~ /^\+\s+\S/ && #Not at char 1
- # actual declarations
- ($prevline =~ /^\+\s+$Declare\s*$Ident\s*[=,;:\[]/ ||
+# (declarations must have the same indentation and not be at the start of line)
+ if (($prevline =~ /\+(\s+)\S/) && $sline =~ /^\+$1\S/) {
+ # use temporaries
+ my $sl = $sline;
+ my $pl = $prevline;
+ # remove $Attribute/$Sparse uses to simplify comparisons
+ $sl =~ s/\b(?:$Attribute|$Sparse)\b//g;
+ $pl =~ s/\b(?:$Attribute|$Sparse)\b//g;
+ if (($pl =~ /^\+\s+$Declare\s*$Ident\s*[=,;:\[]/ ||
# function pointer declarations
- $prevline =~ /^\+\s+$Declare\s*\(\s*\*\s*$Ident\s*\)\s*[=,;:\[\(]/ ||
+ $pl =~ /^\+\s+$Declare\s*\(\s*\*\s*$Ident\s*\)\s*[=,;:\[\(]/ ||
# foo bar; where foo is some local typedef or #define
- $prevline =~ /^\+\s+$Ident(?:\s+|\s*\*\s*)$Ident\s*[=,;\[]/ ||
+ $pl =~ /^\+\s+$Ident(?:\s+|\s*\*\s*)$Ident\s*[=,;\[]/ ||
# known declaration macros
- $prevline =~ /^\+\s+$declaration_macros/) &&
+ $pl =~ /^\+\s+$declaration_macros/) &&
# for "else if" which can look like "$Ident $Ident"
- !($prevline =~ /^\+\s+$c90_Keywords\b/ ||
+ !($pl =~ /^\+\s+$c90_Keywords\b/ ||
# other possible extensions of declaration lines
- $prevline =~ /(?:$Compare|$Assignment|$Operators)\s*$/ ||
+ $pl =~ /(?:$Compare|$Assignment|$Operators)\s*$/ ||
# not starting a section or a macro "\" extended line
- $prevline =~ /(?:\{\s*|\\)$/) &&
+ $pl =~ /(?:\{\s*|\\)$/) &&
# looks like a declaration
- !($sline =~ /^\+\s+$Declare\s*$Ident\s*[=,;:\[]/ ||
+ !($sl =~ /^\+\s+$Declare\s*$Ident\s*[=,;:\[]/ ||
# function pointer declarations
- $sline =~ /^\+\s+$Declare\s*\(\s*\*\s*$Ident\s*\)\s*[=,;:\[\(]/ ||
+ $sl =~ /^\+\s+$Declare\s*\(\s*\*\s*$Ident\s*\)\s*[=,;:\[\(]/ ||
# foo bar; where foo is some local typedef or #define
- $sline =~ /^\+\s+$Ident(?:\s+|\s*\*\s*)$Ident\s*[=,;\[]/ ||
+ $sl =~ /^\+\s+$Ident(?:\s+|\s*\*\s*)$Ident\s*[=,;\[]/ ||
# known declaration macros
- $sline =~ /^\+\s+$declaration_macros/ ||
+ $sl =~ /^\+\s+$declaration_macros/ ||
# start of struct or union or enum
- $sline =~ /^\+\s+(?:static\s+)?(?:const\s+)?(?:union|struct|enum|typedef)\b/ ||
+ $sl =~ /^\+\s+(?:static\s+)?(?:const\s+)?(?:union|struct|enum|typedef)\b/ ||
# start or end of block or continuation of declaration
- $sline =~ /^\+\s+(?:$|[\{\}\.\#\"\?\:\(\[])/ ||
+ $sl =~ /^\+\s+(?:$|[\{\}\.\#\"\?\:\(\[])/ ||
# bitfield continuation
- $sline =~ /^\+\s+$Ident\s*:\s*\d+\s*[,;]/ ||
+ $sl =~ /^\+\s+$Ident\s*:\s*\d+\s*[,;]/ ||
# other possible extensions of declaration lines
- $sline =~ /^\+\s+\(?\s*(?:$Compare|$Assignment|$Operators)/) &&
- # indentation of previous and current line are the same
- (($prevline =~ /\+(\s+)\S/) && $sline =~ /^\+$1\S/)) {
- if (WARN("LINE_SPACING",
- "Missing a blank line after declarations\n" . $hereprev) &&
- $fix) {
- fix_insert_line($fixlinenr, "\+");
+ $sl =~ /^\+\s+\(?\s*(?:$Compare|$Assignment|$Operators)/)) {
+ if (WARN("LINE_SPACING",
+ "Missing a blank line after declarations\n" . $hereprev) &&
+ $fix) {
+ fix_insert_line($fixlinenr, "\+");
+ }
}
}
@@ -4321,7 +4367,8 @@ sub process {
}
# check for global initialisers.
- if ($line =~ /^\+$Type\s*$Ident(?:\s+$Modifier)*\s*=\s*($zero_initializer)\s*;/) {
+ if ($line =~ /^\+$Type\s*$Ident(?:\s+$Modifier)*\s*=\s*($zero_initializer)\s*;/ &&
+ !exclude_global_initialisers($realfile)) {
if (ERROR("GLOBAL_INITIALISERS",
"do not initialise globals to $1\n" . $herecurr) &&
$fix) {
@@ -4417,7 +4464,7 @@ sub process {
WARN("STATIC_CONST_CHAR_ARRAY",
"char * array declaration might be better as static const\n" .
$herecurr);
- }
+ }
# check for sizeof(foo)/sizeof(foo[0]) that could be ARRAY_SIZE(foo)
if ($line =~ m@\bsizeof\s*\(\s*($Lval)\s*\)@) {
@@ -5007,7 +5054,7 @@ sub process {
# A colon needs no spaces before when it is
# terminating a case value or a label.
} elsif ($opv eq ':C' || $opv eq ':L') {
- if ($ctx =~ /Wx./) {
+ if ($ctx =~ /Wx./ and $realfile !~ m@.*\.lds\.h$@) {
if (ERROR("SPACING",
"space prohibited before that '$op' $at\n" . $hereptr)) {
$good = rtrim($fix_elements[$n]) . trim($fix_elements[$n + 1]);
@@ -5270,7 +5317,7 @@ sub process {
$lines[$linenr - 3] !~ /^[ +]\s*$Ident\s*:/) {
WARN("RETURN_VOID",
"void function return statements are not generally useful\n" . $hereprev);
- }
+ }
# if statements using unnecessary parentheses - ie: if ((foo == bar))
if ($perl_version_ok &&
@@ -5966,6 +6013,17 @@ sub process {
"Prefer using '\"%s...\", __func__' to using '$context_function', this function's name, in a string\n" . $herecurr);
}
+# check for unnecessary function tracing like uses
+# This does not use $logFunctions because there are many instances like
+# 'dprintk(FOO, "%s()\n", __func__);' which do not match $logFunctions
+ if ($rawline =~ /^\+.*\([^"]*"$tracing_logging_tags{0,3}%s(?:\s*\(\s*\)\s*)?$tracing_logging_tags{0,3}(?:\\n)?"\s*,\s*__func__\s*\)\s*;/) {
+ if (WARN("TRACING_LOGGING",
+ "Unnecessary ftrace-like logging - prefer using ftrace\n" . $herecurr) &&
+ $fix) {
+ fix_delete_line($fixlinenr, $rawline);
+ }
+ }
+
# check for spaces before a quoted newline
if ($rawline =~ /^.*\".*\s\\n/) {
if (WARN("QUOTED_WHITESPACE_BEFORE_NEWLINE",
@@ -6477,18 +6535,18 @@ sub process {
if ($line =~ /(\(\s*$C90_int_types\s*\)\s*)($Constant)\b/) {
my $cast = $1;
my $const = $2;
+ my $suffix = "";
+ my $newconst = $const;
+ $newconst =~ s/${Int_type}$//;
+ $suffix .= 'U' if ($cast =~ /\bunsigned\b/);
+ if ($cast =~ /\blong\s+long\b/) {
+ $suffix .= 'LL';
+ } elsif ($cast =~ /\blong\b/) {
+ $suffix .= 'L';
+ }
if (WARN("TYPECAST_INT_CONSTANT",
- "Unnecessary typecast of c90 int constant\n" . $herecurr) &&
+ "Unnecessary typecast of c90 int constant - '$cast$const' could be '$const$suffix'\n" . $herecurr) &&
$fix) {
- my $suffix = "";
- my $newconst = $const;
- $newconst =~ s/${Int_type}$//;
- $suffix .= 'U' if ($cast =~ /\bunsigned\b/);
- if ($cast =~ /\blong\s+long\b/) {
- $suffix .= 'LL';
- } elsif ($cast =~ /\blong\b/) {
- $suffix .= 'L';
- }
$fixed[$fixlinenr] =~ s/\Q$cast\E$const\b/$newconst$suffix/;
}
}
@@ -7019,12 +7077,14 @@ sub process {
# use of NR_CPUS is usually wrong
# ignore definitions of NR_CPUS and usage to define arrays as likely right
+# ignore designated initializers using NR_CPUS
if ($line =~ /\bNR_CPUS\b/ &&
$line !~ /^.\s*\s*#\s*if\b.*\bNR_CPUS\b/ &&
$line !~ /^.\s*\s*#\s*define\b.*\bNR_CPUS\b/ &&
$line !~ /^.\s*$Declare\s.*\[[^\]]*NR_CPUS[^\]]*\]/ &&
$line !~ /\[[^\]]*\.\.\.[^\]]*NR_CPUS[^\]]*\]/ &&
- $line !~ /\[[^\]]*NR_CPUS[^\]]*\.\.\.[^\]]*\]/)
+ $line !~ /\[[^\]]*NR_CPUS[^\]]*\.\.\.[^\]]*\]/ &&
+ $line !~ /^.\s*\.\w+\s*=\s*.*\bNR_CPUS\b/)
{
WARN("NR_CPUS",
"usage of NR_CPUS is often wrong - consider using cpu_possible(), num_possible_cpus(), for_each_possible_cpu(), etc\n" . $herecurr);
diff --git a/scripts/gdb/linux/lists.py b/scripts/gdb/linux/lists.py
index c487ddf09d380f..bae4d70b7eaefd 100644
--- a/scripts/gdb/linux/lists.py
+++ b/scripts/gdb/linux/lists.py
@@ -27,6 +27,11 @@ def list_for_each(head):
raise TypeError("Must be struct list_head not {}"
.format(head.type))
+ if head['next'] == 0:
+ gdb.write("list_for_each: Uninitialized list '{}' treated as empty\n"
+ .format(head.address))
+ return
+
node = head['next'].dereference()
while node.address != head.address:
yield node.address