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authorJean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>2022-10-20 18:34:53 +0100
committerWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>2022-11-08 15:31:22 +0000
commit78771e779a3aca3f6d7ce7aff60ae0f835fbc14f (patch)
tree56152fde803276a10ee0b2dbcb6bd363cca0b755
parent717a3ab0a195626360f40e9d3b4d6d8e072e83ba (diff)
downloadkvmtool-78771e779a3aca3f6d7ce7aff60ae0f835fbc14f.tar.gz
pci: Disable writes to Status register
Although the PCI Status register only contains read-only and write-1-to-clear bits, we currently keep anything written there, which can confuse a guest. The problem was highlighted by recent Linux commit 6cd514e58f12 ("PCI: Clear PCI_STATUS when setting up device"), which unconditionally writes 0xffff to the Status register in order to clear pending errors. Then the EDAC driver sees the parity status bits set and attempts to clear them by writing 0xc100, which in turn clears the Capabilities List bit. Later on, when the virtio-pci driver starts probing, it assumes due to missing capabilities that the device is using the legacy transport, and fails to setup the device because of mismatched protocol. Filter writes to the config space, keeping only those to writable fields. Tighten the access size check while we're at it, to prevent overflow. This is only a small step in the right direction, not a foolproof solution, because a guest could still write both Command and Status registers using a single 32-bit write. More work is needed for: * Supporting arbitrary sized writes. * Sanitizing accesses to capabilities, which are device-specific. Also remove the old hack that filtered accesses. It was most likely guarding against ROM BAR writes, which is now handled by the pci_config_writable bitmap. Reported-by: Pierre Gondois <pierre.gondois@arm.com> Tested-by: Pierre Gondois <pierre.gondois@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221020173452.203043-1-jean-philippe@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
-rw-r--r--pci.c54
1 files changed, 40 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/pci.c b/pci.c
index a769ae27..b170885c 100644
--- a/pci.c
+++ b/pci.c
@@ -117,9 +117,6 @@ static void pci_config_data_mmio(struct kvm_cpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u8 *data,
{
union pci_config_address pci_config_address;
- if (len > 4)
- len = 4;
-
pci_config_address.w = ioport__read32(&pci_config_address_bits);
/*
* If someone accesses PCI configuration space offsets that are not
@@ -127,6 +124,9 @@ static void pci_config_data_mmio(struct kvm_cpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u8 *data,
*/
pci_config_address.reg_offset = addr - PCI_CONFIG_DATA;
+ /* Ensure the access does not cross a 4-byte boundary */
+ len = min(len, 4U - pci_config_address.reg_offset);
+
if (is_write)
pci__config_wr(vcpu->kvm, pci_config_address, data, len);
else
@@ -350,6 +350,24 @@ static void pci_config_bar_wr(struct kvm *kvm,
pci_activate_bar_regions(kvm, old_addr, bar_size);
}
+/*
+ * Bits that are writable in the config space header.
+ * Write-1-to-clear Status bits are missing since we never set them.
+ */
+static const u8 pci_config_writable[PCI_STD_HEADER_SIZEOF] = {
+ [PCI_COMMAND] =
+ PCI_COMMAND_IO |
+ PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY |
+ PCI_COMMAND_MASTER |
+ PCI_COMMAND_PARITY,
+ [PCI_COMMAND + 1] =
+ (PCI_COMMAND_SERR |
+ PCI_COMMAND_INTX_DISABLE) >> 8,
+ [PCI_INTERRUPT_LINE] = 0xff,
+ [PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_0 ... PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_5 + 3] = 0xff,
+ [PCI_CACHE_LINE_SIZE] = 0xff,
+};
+
void pci__config_wr(struct kvm *kvm, union pci_config_address addr, void *data, int size)
{
void *base;
@@ -357,7 +375,7 @@ void pci__config_wr(struct kvm *kvm, union pci_config_address addr, void *data,
u16 offset;
struct pci_device_header *pci_hdr;
u8 dev_num = addr.device_number;
- u32 value = 0;
+ u32 value = 0, mask = 0;
if (!pci_device_exists(addr.bus_number, dev_num, 0))
return;
@@ -365,19 +383,19 @@ void pci__config_wr(struct kvm *kvm, union pci_config_address addr, void *data,
offset = addr.w & PCI_DEV_CFG_MASK;
base = pci_hdr = device__find_dev(DEVICE_BUS_PCI, dev_num)->data;
+ /* We don't sanity-check capabilities for the moment */
+ if (offset < PCI_STD_HEADER_SIZEOF) {
+ memcpy(&mask, pci_config_writable + offset, size);
+ if (!mask)
+ return;
+ }
+
if (pci_hdr->cfg_ops.write)
pci_hdr->cfg_ops.write(kvm, pci_hdr, offset, data, size);
- /*
- * legacy hack: ignore writes to uninitialized regions (e.g. ROM BAR).
- * Not very nice but has been working so far.
- */
- if (*(u32 *)(base + offset) == 0)
- return;
-
if (offset == PCI_COMMAND) {
memcpy(&value, data, size);
- pci_config_command_wr(kvm, pci_hdr, (u16)value);
+ pci_config_command_wr(kvm, pci_hdr, (u16)value & mask);
return;
}
@@ -419,8 +437,16 @@ static void pci_config_mmio_access(struct kvm_cpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u8 *data,
cfg_addr.w = (u32)addr;
cfg_addr.enable_bit = 1;
- if (len > 4)
- len = 4;
+ /*
+ * To prevent some overflows, reject accesses that cross a 4-byte
+ * boundary. The PCIe specification says:
+ *
+ * "Root Complex implementations are not required to support the
+ * generation of Configuration Requests from accesses that cross DW
+ * [4 bytes] boundaries."
+ */
+ if ((addr & 3) + len > 4)
+ return;
if (is_write)
pci__config_wr(kvm, cfg_addr, data, len);