diff options
| author | Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> | 2018-01-05 15:27:34 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> | 2018-01-05 15:34:43 +0100 |
| commit | de791821c295cc61419a06fe5562288417d1bc58 (patch) | |
| tree | 7c17f469a4686675175478713805a307344d73a0 | |
| parent | b9e705ef7cfaf22db0daab91ad3cd33b0fa32eb9 (diff) | |
| download | linux-de791821c295cc61419a06fe5562288417d1bc58.tar.gz | |
x86/pti: Rename BUG_CPU_INSECURE to BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN
Use the name associated with the particular attack which needs page table
isolation for mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Jiri Koshina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801051525300.1724@nanos
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 6 |
3 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 07cdd17157050e..21ac898df2d8e4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -341,6 +341,6 @@ #define X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE X86_BUG(11) /* SWAPGS without input dep on GS */ #define X86_BUG_MONITOR X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */ #define X86_BUG_AMD_E400 X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */ -#define X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is insecure and needs kernel page table isolation */ +#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index b1be494ab4e8ba..2d3bd2215e5b47 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS); if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE); + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN); fpu__init_system(c); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c index 2da28ba9750824..43d4a4a29037ed 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c @@ -56,13 +56,13 @@ static void __init pti_print_if_insecure(const char *reason) { - if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE)) + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN)) pr_info("%s\n", reason); } static void __init pti_print_if_secure(const char *reason) { - if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE)) + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN)) pr_info("%s\n", reason); } @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(void) } autosel: - if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE)) + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN)) return; enable: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PTI); |