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authorDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>2017-11-06 17:24:50 -0800
committerDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>2017-11-06 17:24:50 -0800
commit7877a69779084f04c21c19a68b53b00ea49d4cec (patch)
tree12a4c4a0c3aa5520113f20031b5349a67fc8cc46
parent3e098e97b638c1fae9bc76d812a0b2987ca7aa16 (diff)
downloadx86-kaiser-kaiser-dynamic-414rc7-20171106.tar.gz
x86, kaiser, xen: Dynamically disable KAISER when running under Xen PVkaiser-dynamic-414rc7-20171106
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> If you paravirtualize the MMU, you can not use KAISER. This boils down to the fact that KAISER needs to do CR3 writes in places that it is not feasible to do real hypercalls. If we detect that Xen PV is in use, do not do the KAISER CR3 switches. I don't think this too bug of a deal for Xen. I was under the impression that the Xen guest kernel and Xen guest userspace didn't share an address space *anyway* so Xen PV is not normally even exposed to the kinds of things that KAISER protects against. This allows KAISER=y kernels to deployed in environments that also require PARAVIRT=y. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Moritz Lipp <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c24
-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig2
2 files changed, 23 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c b/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
index bce23c592d2771..977ebb1dbc657e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
@@ -31,8 +31,20 @@
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
+/*
+ * We need a two-stage enable/disable. One (kaiser_enabled) to stop
+ * the ongoing work that keeps KAISER from being disabled (like PGD
+ * poisoning) and another (kaiser_asm_do_switch) that we set when it
+ * is completely safe to run without doing KAISER switches.
+ */
+int kaiser_enabled;
+
+/*
+ * Sized and aligned so that we can easily map it out to userspace
+ * for use before we have done the assembly CR3 switching.
+ */
__aligned(PAGE_SIZE)
-unsigned long kaiser_asm_do_switch[PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(unsigned long)] = { 1 };
+unsigned long kaiser_asm_do_switch[PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(unsigned long)];
/*
* At runtime, the only things we map are some things for CPU
@@ -389,6 +401,15 @@ void __init kaiser_init(void)
kaiser_add_user_map_ptrs_early(__irqentry_text_start,
__irqentry_text_end,
__PAGE_KERNEL_RX | _PAGE_GLOBAL);
+
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
+ pr_info("x86/kaiser: Xen PV detected, disabling "
+ "KAISER protection\n");
+ } else {
+ pr_info("x86/kaiser: Unmapping kernel while in userspace\n");
+ kaiser_asm_do_switch[0] = 1;
+ kaiser_enabled = 1;
+ }
}
int kaiser_add_mapping(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size,
@@ -439,7 +460,6 @@ void kaiser_remove_mapping(unsigned long start, unsigned long size)
__native_flush_tlb_global();
}
-int kaiser_enabled = 1;
static ssize_t kaiser_enabled_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 99b530d0dd9e25..5365dc0a8ec168 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK
config KAISER
bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
- depends on X86_64 && SMP && !PARAVIRT
+ depends on X86_64 && SMP
help
This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by
ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped