bpf: store both map ptr and state in bpf_insn_aux_data

Currently, bpf_insn_aux_data->map_ptr_state is used to store either
map_ptr or its poison state (i.e., BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON). Thus
BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON must be checked before reading map_ptr. In certain
cases, we may need valid map_ptr even in case of poison state.
This will be explained in next patch with bpf_for_each_map_elem()
helper.

This patch changes map_ptr_state into a new struct including both map
pointer and its state (poison/unpriv). It's in the same union with
struct bpf_loop_inline_state, so there is no extra memory overhead.
Besides, macros BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV/BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON/BPF_MAP_PTR are no
longer needed.

This patch does not change any existing functionality.

Signed-off-by: Philo Lu <lulie@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240405025536.18113-2-lulie@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

2 files changed, 24 insertions, 21 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 7cb1b75eee3819..36d19cd32eb59b 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -502,6 +502,13 @@ struct bpf_loop_inline_state {
 	u32 callback_subprogno; /* valid when fit_for_inline is true */
 };
 
+/* pointer and state for maps */
+struct bpf_map_ptr_state {
+	struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
+	bool poison;
+	bool unpriv;
+};
+
 /* Possible states for alu_state member. */
 #define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC		(1U << 0)
 #define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST		(1U << 1)
@@ -514,7 +521,7 @@ struct bpf_loop_inline_state {
 struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
 	union {
 		enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type;	/* pointer type for load/store insns */
-		unsigned long map_ptr_state;	/* pointer/poison value for maps */
+		struct bpf_map_ptr_state map_ptr_state;
 		s32 call_imm;			/* saved imm field of call insn */
 		u32 alu_limit;			/* limit for add/sub register with pointer */
 		struct {
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 4353cb09c35beb..62fedb1f331273 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -190,11 +190,6 @@ struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {
 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON	(1ULL << 63)
 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN	(1ULL << 62)
 
-#define BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV	1UL
-#define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON	((void *)((0xeB9FUL << 1) +	\
-					  POISON_POINTER_DELTA))
-#define BPF_MAP_PTR(X)		((struct bpf_map *)((X) & ~BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV))
-
 #define BPF_GLOBAL_PERCPU_MA_MAX_SIZE  512
 
 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx);
@@ -209,21 +204,22 @@ static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
 
 static bool bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
 {
-	return BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON;
+	return aux->map_ptr_state.poison;
 }
 
 static bool bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
 {
-	return aux->map_ptr_state & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV;
+	return aux->map_ptr_state.unpriv;
 }
 
 static void bpf_map_ptr_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux,
-			      const struct bpf_map *map, bool unpriv)
+			      struct bpf_map *map,
+			      bool unpriv, bool poison)
 {
-	BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV);
 	unpriv |= bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux);
-	aux->map_ptr_state = (unsigned long)map |
-			     (unpriv ? BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV : 0UL);
+	aux->map_ptr_state.unpriv = unpriv;
+	aux->map_ptr_state.poison = poison;
+	aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr = map;
 }
 
 static bool bpf_map_key_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
@@ -9660,7 +9656,7 @@ static int set_map_elem_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	map = BPF_MAP_PTR(insn_aux->map_ptr_state);
+	map = insn_aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr;
 	if (!map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args ||
 	    !map->ops->map_for_each_callback) {
 		verbose(env, "callback function not allowed for map\n");
@@ -10019,12 +10015,12 @@ record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
-	if (!BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state))
+	if (!aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr)
+		bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr,
+				  !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1, false);
+	else if (aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr != meta->map_ptr)
 		bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr,
-				  !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1);
-	else if (BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) != meta->map_ptr)
-		bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON,
-				  !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1);
+				  !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1, true);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -19840,7 +19836,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 			    !bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) {
 				struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor desc = {
 					.reason = BPF_POKE_REASON_TAIL_CALL,
-					.tail_call.map = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state),
+					.tail_call.map = aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr,
 					.tail_call.key = bpf_map_key_immediate(aux),
 					.insn_idx = i + delta,
 				};
@@ -19869,7 +19865,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 
-			map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state);
+			map_ptr = aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr;
 			insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3,
 						  map_ptr->max_entries, 2);
 			insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3,
@@ -19977,7 +19973,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 			if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux))
 				goto patch_call_imm;
 
-			map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state);
+			map_ptr = aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr;
 			ops = map_ptr->ops;
 			if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
 			    ops->map_gen_lookup) {