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author | Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> | 2023-12-06 12:36:59 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> | 2023-12-06 12:43:55 +0100 |
commit | 3142dbf084cb66080b111673148192906a4c037c (patch) | |
tree | a6e57c26d2932ea1ac186211eb02f92c34751d89 | |
parent | 6b07b5225d87f1ff212be9f95d527a3bb6b99adb (diff) | |
parent | 9396c4ee93f9ac03cd0cea0bb345fbc657772943 (diff) | |
download | staging-3142dbf084cb66080b111673148192906a4c037c.tar.gz |
Merge branch 'tcp-ao-fixes'
Dmitry Safonov says:
====================
TCP-AO fixes
Changes from v4:
- Dropped 2 patches on which there's no consensus. They will require
more work TBD if they may made acceptable. Those are:
o "net/tcp: Allow removing current/rnext TCP-AO keys on TCP_LISTEN sockets"
o "net/tcp: Store SNEs + SEQs on ao_info"
Changes from v3:
- Don't restrict adding any keys on TCP-AO connection in VRF, but only
the ones that don't match l3index (David)
Changes from v2:
- rwlocks are problematic in net code (Paolo)
Changed the SNE code to avoid spin/rw locks on RX/TX fastpath by
double-accounting SEQ numbers for TCP-AO enabled connections.
Changes from v1:
- Use tcp_can_repair_sock() helper to limit TCP_AO_REPAIR (Eric)
- Instead of hook to listen() syscall, allow removing current/rnext keys
on TCP_LISTEN (addressing Eric's objection)
- Add sne_lock to protect snd_sne/rcv_sne
- Don't move used_tcp_ao in struct tcp_request_sock (Eric)
I've been working on TCP-AO key-rotation selftests and as a result
exercised some corner-cases that are not usually met in production.
Here are a bunch of semi-related fixes:
- Documentation typo (reported by Markus Elfring)
- Proper alignment for TCP-AO option in TCP header that has MAC length
of non 4 bytes (now a selftest with randomized maclen/algorithm/etc
passes)
- 3 uAPI restricting patches that disallow more things to userspace in
order to prevent it shooting itself in any parts of the body
- SNEs READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() that went missing by my human factor
- Avoid storing MAC length from SYN header as SYN-ACK will use
rnext_key.maclen (drops an extra check that fails on new selftests)
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/networking/tcp_ao.rst | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/tcp.h | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/net/tcp_ao.h | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c | 17 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 15 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 2 |
10 files changed, 41 insertions, 26 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tcp_ao.rst b/Documentation/networking/tcp_ao.rst index cfa5bf1cc5423..8a58321acce72 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/tcp_ao.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/tcp_ao.rst @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ also [6.1]:: when it is no longer considered permitted. Linux TCP-AO will try its best to prevent you from removing a key that's -being used, considering it a key management failure. But sine keeping +being used, considering it a key management failure. But since keeping an outdated key may become a security issue and as a peer may unintentionally prevent the removal of an old key by always setting it as RNextKeyID - a forced key removal mechanism is provided, where diff --git a/include/linux/tcp.h b/include/linux/tcp.h index 68f3d315d2e18..b646b574b060d 100644 --- a/include/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/linux/tcp.h @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ struct tcp_request_sock { #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AO u8 ao_keyid; u8 ao_rcv_next; - u8 maclen; + bool used_tcp_ao; #endif }; @@ -180,14 +180,10 @@ static inline struct tcp_request_sock *tcp_rsk(const struct request_sock *req) static inline bool tcp_rsk_used_ao(const struct request_sock *req) { - /* The real length of MAC is saved in the request socket, - * signing anything with zero-length makes no sense, so here is - * a little hack.. - */ #ifndef CONFIG_TCP_AO return false; #else - return tcp_rsk(req)->maclen != 0; + return tcp_rsk(req)->used_tcp_ao; #endif } diff --git a/include/net/tcp_ao.h b/include/net/tcp_ao.h index b56be10838f09..6477810806137 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_ao.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_ao.h @@ -62,11 +62,17 @@ static inline int tcp_ao_maclen(const struct tcp_ao_key *key) return key->maclen; } +/* Use tcp_ao_len_aligned() for TCP header calculations */ static inline int tcp_ao_len(const struct tcp_ao_key *key) { return tcp_ao_maclen(key) + sizeof(struct tcp_ao_hdr); } +static inline int tcp_ao_len_aligned(const struct tcp_ao_key *key) +{ + return round_up(tcp_ao_len(key), 4); +} + static inline unsigned int tcp_ao_digest_size(struct tcp_ao_key *key) { return key->digest_size; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index c9f078224569e..ff6838ca2e580 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -3610,6 +3610,10 @@ int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, break; case TCP_AO_REPAIR: + if (!tcp_can_repair_sock(sk)) { + err = -EPERM; + break; + } err = tcp_ao_set_repair(sk, optval, optlen); break; #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AO @@ -4309,6 +4313,8 @@ zerocopy_rcv_out: } #endif case TCP_AO_REPAIR: + if (!tcp_can_repair_sock(sk)) + return -EPERM; return tcp_ao_get_repair(sk, optval, optlen); case TCP_AO_GET_KEYS: case TCP_AO_INFO: { diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c index 7696417d06401..f8308d3f565e9 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c @@ -851,7 +851,7 @@ void tcp_ao_syncookie(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tcp_ao_hdr *aoh; struct tcp_ao_key *key; - treq->maclen = 0; + treq->used_tcp_ao = false; if (tcp_parse_auth_options(th, NULL, &aoh) || !aoh) return; @@ -863,7 +863,7 @@ void tcp_ao_syncookie(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, treq->ao_rcv_next = aoh->keyid; treq->ao_keyid = aoh->rnext_keyid; - treq->maclen = tcp_ao_maclen(key); + treq->used_tcp_ao = true; } static enum skb_drop_reason @@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@ void tcp_ao_connect_init(struct sock *sk) ao_info->current_key = key; if (!ao_info->rnext_key) ao_info->rnext_key = key; - tp->tcp_header_len += tcp_ao_len(key); + tp->tcp_header_len += tcp_ao_len_aligned(key); ao_info->lisn = htonl(tp->write_seq); ao_info->snd_sne = 0; @@ -1346,7 +1346,7 @@ static int tcp_ao_parse_crypto(struct tcp_ao_add *cmd, struct tcp_ao_key *key) syn_tcp_option_space -= TCPOLEN_MSS_ALIGNED; syn_tcp_option_space -= TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED; syn_tcp_option_space -= TCPOLEN_WSCALE_ALIGNED; - if (tcp_ao_len(key) > syn_tcp_option_space) { + if (tcp_ao_len_aligned(key) > syn_tcp_option_space) { err = -EMSGSIZE; goto err_kfree; } @@ -1608,6 +1608,15 @@ static int tcp_ao_add_cmd(struct sock *sk, unsigned short int family, if (!dev || !l3index) return -EINVAL; + if (!bound_dev_if || bound_dev_if != cmd.ifindex) { + /* tcp_ao_established_key() doesn't expect having + * non peer-matching key on an established TCP-AO + * connection. + */ + if (!((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_LISTEN | TCPF_CLOSE))) + return -EINVAL; + } + /* It's still possible to bind after adding keys or even * re-bind to a different dev (with CAP_NET_RAW). * So, no reason to return error here, rather try to be diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index bcb55d98004c5..337c8bb07ccc5 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -7182,11 +7182,12 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, if (tcp_parse_auth_options(tcp_hdr(skb), NULL, &aoh)) goto drop_and_release; /* Invalid TCP options */ if (aoh) { - tcp_rsk(req)->maclen = aoh->length - sizeof(struct tcp_ao_hdr); + tcp_rsk(req)->used_tcp_ao = true; tcp_rsk(req)->ao_rcv_next = aoh->keyid; tcp_rsk(req)->ao_keyid = aoh->rnext_keyid; + } else { - tcp_rsk(req)->maclen = 0; + tcp_rsk(req)->used_tcp_ao = false; } #endif tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn = isn; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index 5f693bbd578d2..0c50c5a32b84a 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ static bool tcp_v4_ao_sign_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, reply_options[0] = htonl((TCPOPT_AO << 24) | (tcp_ao_len(key) << 16) | (aoh->rnext_keyid << 8) | keyid); - arg->iov[0].iov_len += round_up(tcp_ao_len(key), 4); + arg->iov[0].iov_len += tcp_ao_len_aligned(key); reply->doff = arg->iov[0].iov_len / 4; if (tcp_ao_hash_hdr(AF_INET, (char *)&reply_options[1], @@ -978,7 +978,7 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_ack(const struct sock *sk, (tcp_ao_len(key->ao_key) << 16) | (key->ao_key->sndid << 8) | key->rcv_next); - arg.iov[0].iov_len += round_up(tcp_ao_len(key->ao_key), 4); + arg.iov[0].iov_len += tcp_ao_len_aligned(key->ao_key); rep.th.doff = arg.iov[0].iov_len / 4; tcp_ao_hash_hdr(AF_INET, (char *)&rep.opt[offset], diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c index a9807eeb311ca..9e85f2a0bddd4 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c @@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ struct sock *tcp_create_openreq_child(const struct sock *sk, ao_key = treq->af_specific->ao_lookup(sk, req, tcp_rsk(req)->ao_keyid, -1); if (ao_key) - newtp->tcp_header_len += tcp_ao_len(ao_key); + newtp->tcp_header_len += tcp_ao_len_aligned(ao_key); #endif if (skb->len >= TCP_MSS_DEFAULT + newtp->tcp_header_len) newicsk->icsk_ack.last_seg_size = skb->len - newtp->tcp_header_len; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index eb13a55d660c2..f5ef15e1d9ac3 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -825,7 +825,7 @@ static unsigned int tcp_syn_options(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, timestamps = READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps); if (tcp_key_is_ao(key)) { opts->options |= OPTION_AO; - remaining -= tcp_ao_len(key->ao_key); + remaining -= tcp_ao_len_aligned(key->ao_key); } } @@ -915,7 +915,7 @@ static unsigned int tcp_synack_options(const struct sock *sk, ireq->tstamp_ok &= !ireq->sack_ok; } else if (tcp_key_is_ao(key)) { opts->options |= OPTION_AO; - remaining -= tcp_ao_len(key->ao_key); + remaining -= tcp_ao_len_aligned(key->ao_key); ireq->tstamp_ok &= !ireq->sack_ok; } @@ -982,7 +982,7 @@ static unsigned int tcp_established_options(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb size += TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED; } else if (tcp_key_is_ao(key)) { opts->options |= OPTION_AO; - size += tcp_ao_len(key->ao_key); + size += tcp_ao_len_aligned(key->ao_key); } if (likely(tp->rx_opt.tstamp_ok)) { @@ -3720,7 +3720,6 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst, if (tcp_rsk_used_ao(req)) { #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AO struct tcp_ao_key *ao_key = NULL; - u8 maclen = tcp_rsk(req)->maclen; u8 keyid = tcp_rsk(req)->ao_keyid; ao_key = tcp_sk(sk)->af_specific->ao_lookup(sk, req_to_sk(req), @@ -3730,13 +3729,11 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst, * for another peer-matching key, but the peer has requested * ao_keyid (RFC5925 RNextKeyID), so let's keep it simple here. */ - if (unlikely(!ao_key || tcp_ao_maclen(ao_key) != maclen)) { - u8 key_maclen = ao_key ? tcp_ao_maclen(ao_key) : 0; - + if (unlikely(!ao_key)) { rcu_read_unlock(); kfree_skb(skb); - net_warn_ratelimited("TCP-AO: the keyid %u with maclen %u|%u from SYN packet is not present - not sending SYNACK\n", - keyid, maclen, key_maclen); + net_warn_ratelimited("TCP-AO: the keyid %u from SYN packet is not present - not sending SYNACK\n", + keyid); return NULL; } key.ao_key = ao_key; diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c index 937a02c2e5345..8c6623496dd7e 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c @@ -881,7 +881,7 @@ static void tcp_v6_send_response(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 if (tcp_key_is_md5(key)) tot_len += TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED; if (tcp_key_is_ao(key)) - tot_len += tcp_ao_len(key->ao_key); + tot_len += tcp_ao_len_aligned(key->ao_key); #ifdef CONFIG_MPTCP if (rst && !tcp_key_is_md5(key)) { |