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| author | Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> | 2024-03-28 10:07:59 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> | 2024-03-28 10:08:00 +0100 |
| commit | 7e6f4b2af5b8cfe028386bc439c9bad1eddff9a6 (patch) | |
| tree | 50e1f79928073c9b2a70881a01f0a2eaf4367281 /kernel/bpf/verifier.c | |
| parent | 56d2f48ed8f857f2765575a6a25b9655765edd41 (diff) | |
| parent | 4dd651076ef0e5f09940f763a1b4e8a209dab7ab (diff) | |
| download | linux-7e6f4b2af5b8cfe028386bc439c9bad1eddff9a6.tar.gz | |
Merge tag 'for-net' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf
Alexei Starovoitov says:
====================
pull-request: bpf 2024-03-27
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.
We've added 4 non-merge commits during the last 1 day(s) which contain
a total of 5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) Fix bloom filter value size validation and protect the verifier
against such mistakes, from Andrei.
2) Fix build due to CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE/CRASH_DUMP split, from Hari.
3) Update bpf_lsm maintainers entry, from Matt.
* tag 'for-net' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf:
bpf: update BPF LSM designated reviewer list
bpf: Protect against int overflow for stack access size
bpf: Check bloom filter map value size
bpf: fix warning for crash_kexec
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240328012938.24249-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 0bfc0050db28d4..353985b2b6a279 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -6701,6 +6701,11 @@ static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(env, min_off, state, type); if (!err && max_off > 0) err = -EINVAL; /* out of stack access into non-negative offsets */ + if (!err && access_size < 0) + /* access_size should not be negative (or overflow an int); others checks + * along the way should have prevented such an access. + */ + err = -EFAULT; /* invalid negative access size; integer overflow? */ if (err) { if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { |