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| author | Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> | 2023-03-02 11:46:50 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> | 2023-04-24 16:15:53 +0300 |
| commit | 567671281a751b80918a4531c4ba84b90a2a42c0 (patch) | |
| tree | 7ba5b47c220649c0025da8afcd44f73247f868c5 /crypto | |
| parent | 30eae2b037af54b24109dcaea21db46f6285c69b (diff) | |
| download | linux-567671281a751b80918a4531c4ba84b90a2a42c0.tar.gz | |
KEYS: X.509: Parse Key Usage
Parse the X.509 Key Usage. The key usage extension defines the purpose of
the key contained in the certificate.
id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 15 }
KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING {
digitalSignature (0),
contentCommitment (1),
keyEncipherment (2),
dataEncipherment (3),
keyAgreement (4),
keyCertSign (5),
cRLSign (6),
encipherOnly (7),
decipherOnly (8) }
If the keyCertSign or digitalSignature is set, store it in the
public_key structure. Having the purpose of the key being stored
during parsing, allows enforcement on the usage field in the future.
This will be used in a follow on patch that requires knowing the
certificate key usage type.
Link: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 28 |
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c index 77547d4bd94dd4..0a7049b470c181 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c @@ -579,6 +579,34 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen, return 0; } + if (ctx->last_oid == OID_keyUsage) { + /* + * Get hold of the keyUsage bit string + * v[1] is the encoding size + * (Expect either 0x02 or 0x03, making it 1 or 2 bytes) + * v[2] is the number of unused bits in the bit string + * (If >= 3 keyCertSign is missing when v[1] = 0x02) + * v[3] and possibly v[4] contain the bit string + * + * From RFC 5280 4.2.1.3: + * 0x04 is where keyCertSign lands in this bit string + * 0x80 is where digitalSignature lands in this bit string + */ + if (v[0] != ASN1_BTS) + return -EBADMSG; + if (vlen < 4) + return -EBADMSG; + if (v[2] >= 8) + return -EBADMSG; + if (v[3] & 0x80) + ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG; + if (v[1] == 0x02 && v[2] <= 2 && (v[3] & 0x04)) + ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN; + else if (vlen > 4 && v[1] == 0x03 && (v[3] & 0x04)) + ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN; + return 0; + } + if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) { /* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */ ctx->raw_akid = v; |