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From f6302f1bcd75a042df69866d98b8d775a668f8f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2012 09:03:58 +0100
Subject: relay: prevent integer overflow in relay_open()
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
commit f6302f1bcd75a042df69866d98b8d775a668f8f1 upstream.
"subbuf_size" and "n_subbufs" come from the user and they need to be
capped to prevent an integer overflow.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/relay.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/relay.c
+++ b/kernel/relay.c
@@ -171,10 +171,14 @@ depopulate:
*/
static struct rchan_buf *relay_create_buf(struct rchan *chan)
{
- struct rchan_buf *buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rchan_buf), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!buf)
+ struct rchan_buf *buf;
+
+ if (chan->n_subbufs > UINT_MAX / sizeof(size_t *))
return NULL;
+ buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rchan_buf), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return NULL;
buf->padding = kmalloc(chan->n_subbufs * sizeof(size_t *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf->padding)
goto free_buf;
@@ -581,6 +585,8 @@ struct rchan *relay_open(const char *bas
if (!(subbuf_size && n_subbufs))
return NULL;
+ if (subbuf_size > UINT_MAX / n_subbufs)
+ return NULL;
chan = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rchan), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!chan)
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