summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2012-02-15 14:10:51 -0800
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2012-02-15 14:10:51 -0800
commit975d8e876040c84dec85977985ec379a4a9b3caf (patch)
tree9a4714a263a3aa8f2fb76f87a0b09dd33ffd202c
parentfd4703b312ea360a7acafb6b0dc468e958beecbf (diff)
downloadlongterm-queue-2.6.32-975d8e876040c84dec85977985ec379a4a9b3caf.tar.gz
2.6.32-stable patches
added patches: add-mount-option-to-check-uid-of-device-being-mounted-expect-uid-cve-2011-1833.patch ban-ecryptfs-over-ecryptfs.patch ecryptfs-remove-mmap-from-directory-operations.patch
-rw-r--r--queue-2.6.32/add-mount-option-to-check-uid-of-device-being-mounted-expect-uid-cve-2011-1833.patch131
-rw-r--r--queue-2.6.32/ban-ecryptfs-over-ecryptfs.patch61
-rw-r--r--queue-2.6.32/ecryptfs-remove-mmap-from-directory-operations.patch54
-rw-r--r--queue-2.6.32/series3
4 files changed, 249 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/queue-2.6.32/add-mount-option-to-check-uid-of-device-being-mounted-expect-uid-cve-2011-1833.patch b/queue-2.6.32/add-mount-option-to-check-uid-of-device-being-mounted-expect-uid-cve-2011-1833.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c38df49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-2.6.32/add-mount-option-to-check-uid-of-device-being-mounted-expect-uid-cve-2011-1833.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+From tim.gardner@canonical.com Wed Feb 15 14:06:11 2012
+From: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
+Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2012 14:14:06 -0700
+Subject: Add mount option to check uid of device being mounted = expect uid, CVE-2011-1833
+To: stable@vger.kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
+Cc: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>, John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>, <stable@kernel.org>, Tyler Hicks <tyler.hicks@canonical.com>
+Message-ID: <1329340446-126150-1-git-send-email-tim.gardner@canonical.com>
+
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+
+(backported from commit 764355487ea220fdc2faf128d577d7f679b91f97)
+
+Close a TOCTOU race for mounts done via ecryptfs-mount-private. The mount
+source (device) can be raced when the ownership test is done in userspace.
+Provide Ecryptfs a means to force the uid check at mount time.
+
+BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/732628
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyler.hicks@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/ecryptfs/main.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
++++ b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
+@@ -212,7 +212,8 @@ enum { ecryptfs_opt_sig, ecryptfs_opt_ec
+ ecryptfs_opt_passthrough, ecryptfs_opt_xattr_metadata,
+ ecryptfs_opt_encrypted_view, ecryptfs_opt_fnek_sig,
+ ecryptfs_opt_fn_cipher, ecryptfs_opt_fn_cipher_key_bytes,
+- ecryptfs_opt_unlink_sigs, ecryptfs_opt_err };
++ ecryptfs_opt_unlink_sigs, ecryptfs_opt_check_dev_ruid,
++ ecryptfs_opt_err };
+
+ static const match_table_t tokens = {
+ {ecryptfs_opt_sig, "sig=%s"},
+@@ -227,6 +228,7 @@ static const match_table_t tokens = {
+ {ecryptfs_opt_fn_cipher, "ecryptfs_fn_cipher=%s"},
+ {ecryptfs_opt_fn_cipher_key_bytes, "ecryptfs_fn_key_bytes=%u"},
+ {ecryptfs_opt_unlink_sigs, "ecryptfs_unlink_sigs"},
++ {ecryptfs_opt_check_dev_ruid, "ecryptfs_check_dev_ruid"},
+ {ecryptfs_opt_err, NULL}
+ };
+
+@@ -270,6 +272,7 @@ static void ecryptfs_init_mount_crypt_st
+ * ecryptfs_parse_options
+ * @sb: The ecryptfs super block
+ * @options: The options pased to the kernel
++ * @check_ruid: set to 1 if device uid should be checked against the ruid
+ *
+ * Parse mount options:
+ * debug=N - ecryptfs_verbosity level for debug output
+@@ -285,7 +288,8 @@ static void ecryptfs_init_mount_crypt_st
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success; non-zero on error
+ */
+-static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options)
++static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options,
++ uid_t *check_ruid)
+ {
+ char *p;
+ int rc = 0;
+@@ -310,6 +314,8 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct
+ char *cipher_key_bytes_src;
+ char *fn_cipher_key_bytes_src;
+
++ *check_ruid = 0;
++
+ if (!options) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+@@ -410,6 +416,9 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct
+ case ecryptfs_opt_unlink_sigs:
+ mount_crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_UNLINK_SIGS;
+ break;
++ case ecryptfs_opt_check_dev_ruid:
++ *check_ruid = 1;
++ break;
+ case ecryptfs_opt_err:
+ default:
+ printk(KERN_WARNING
+@@ -552,7 +561,8 @@ out:
+ * ecryptfs_interpose to create our initial inode and super block
+ * struct.
+ */
+-static int ecryptfs_read_super(struct super_block *sb, const char *dev_name)
++static int ecryptfs_read_super(struct super_block *sb, const char *dev_name,
++ uid_t check_ruid)
+ {
+ struct path path;
+ int rc;
+@@ -569,6 +579,15 @@ static int ecryptfs_read_super(struct su
+ "known incompatibilities\n");
+ goto out_free;
+ }
++
++ if (check_ruid && path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid != current_uid()) {
++ rc = -EPERM;
++ printk(KERN_ERR "Mount of device (uid: %d) not owned by "
++ "requested user (uid: %d)\n",
++ path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid, current_uid());
++ goto out_free;
++ }
++
+ ecryptfs_set_superblock_lower(sb, path.dentry->d_sb);
+ sb->s_maxbytes = path.dentry->d_sb->s_maxbytes;
+ sb->s_blocksize = path.dentry->d_sb->s_blocksize;
+@@ -607,6 +626,7 @@ static int ecryptfs_get_sb(struct file_s
+ {
+ int rc;
+ struct super_block *sb;
++ uid_t check_ruid;
+
+ rc = get_sb_nodev(fs_type, flags, raw_data, ecryptfs_fill_super, mnt);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+@@ -614,12 +634,12 @@ static int ecryptfs_get_sb(struct file_s
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sb = mnt->mnt_sb;
+- rc = ecryptfs_parse_options(sb, raw_data);
++ rc = ecryptfs_parse_options(sb, raw_data, &check_ruid);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Error parsing options; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
+ goto out_abort;
+ }
+- rc = ecryptfs_read_super(sb, dev_name);
++ rc = ecryptfs_read_super(sb, dev_name, check_ruid);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Reading sb failed; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
+ goto out_abort;
diff --git a/queue-2.6.32/ban-ecryptfs-over-ecryptfs.patch b/queue-2.6.32/ban-ecryptfs-over-ecryptfs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d590bfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-2.6.32/ban-ecryptfs-over-ecryptfs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From tim.gardner@canonical.com Wed Feb 15 14:05:29 2012
+From: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
+Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2012 14:10:52 -0700
+Subject: Ban ecryptfs over ecryptfs
+To: stable@vger.kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
+Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
+Message-ID: <1329340253-126075-1-git-send-email-tim.gardner@canonical.com>
+
+
+From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
+
+(cherry picked from commit 4403158ba295c8e36f6736b1bb12d0f7e1923dac)
+
+This is a seriously simplified patch from Eric Sandeen; copy of
+rationale follows:
+===
+ mounting stacked ecryptfs on ecryptfs has been shown to lead to bugs
+ in testing. For crypto info in xattr, there is no mechanism for handling
+ this at all, and for normal file headers, we run into other trouble:
+
+ BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008
+ IP: [<ffffffffa015b0b3>] ecryptfs_d_revalidate+0x43/0xa0 [ecryptfs]
+ ...
+
+ There doesn't seem to be any good usecase for this, so I'd suggest just
+ disallowing the configuration.
+
+ Based on a patch originally, I believe, from Mike Halcrow.
+===
+
+Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
+Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/ecryptfs/main.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
++++ b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
+@@ -487,6 +487,7 @@ out:
+ }
+
+ struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_sb_info_cache;
++static struct file_system_type ecryptfs_fs_type;
+
+ /**
+ * ecryptfs_fill_super
+@@ -561,6 +562,13 @@ static int ecryptfs_read_super(struct su
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "path_lookup() failed\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
++ if (path.dentry->d_sb->s_type == &ecryptfs_fs_type) {
++ rc = -EINVAL;
++ printk(KERN_ERR "Mount on filesystem of type "
++ "eCryptfs explicitly disallowed due to "
++ "known incompatibilities\n");
++ goto out_free;
++ }
+ ecryptfs_set_superblock_lower(sb, path.dentry->d_sb);
+ sb->s_maxbytes = path.dentry->d_sb->s_maxbytes;
+ sb->s_blocksize = path.dentry->d_sb->s_blocksize;
diff --git a/queue-2.6.32/ecryptfs-remove-mmap-from-directory-operations.patch b/queue-2.6.32/ecryptfs-remove-mmap-from-directory-operations.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a38700
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-2.6.32/ecryptfs-remove-mmap-from-directory-operations.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From tim.gardner@canonical.com Wed Feb 15 14:04:31 2012
+From: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
+Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2012 11:32:31 -0700
+Subject: eCryptfs: Remove mmap from directory operations
+To: stable@vger.kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
+Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>, Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
+Message-ID: <1329330751-118898-1-git-send-email-tim.gardner@canonical.com>
+
+
+From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+
+backported from 38e3eaeedcac75360af8a92e7b66956ec4f334e5
+
+Adrian reported that mkfontscale didn't work inside of eCryptfs mounts.
+Strace revealed the following:
+
+open("./", O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_LARGEFILE|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC) = 3
+fcntl64(3, F_GETFD) = 0x1 (flags FD_CLOEXEC)
+open("./fonts.scale", O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0666) = 4
+getdents(3, /* 80 entries */, 32768) = 2304
+open("./.", O_RDONLY) = 5
+fcntl64(5, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) = 0
+fstat64(5, {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=16384, ...}) = 0
+mmap2(NULL, 16384, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 5, 0) = 0xb7fcf000
+close(5) = 0
+ --- SIGBUS (Bus error) @ 0 (0) ---
+ +++ killed by SIGBUS +++
+
+The mmap2() on a directory was successful, resulting in a SIGBUS
+signal later. This patch removes mmap() from the list of possible
+ecryptfs_dir_fops so that mmap() isn't possible on eCryptfs directory
+files.
+
+http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/400443
+
+Reported-by: Adrian C. <anrxc@sysphere.org>
+Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/ecryptfs/file.c | 1 -
+ 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/fs/ecryptfs/file.c
++++ b/fs/ecryptfs/file.c
+@@ -327,7 +327,6 @@ const struct file_operations ecryptfs_di
+ #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ .compat_ioctl = ecryptfs_compat_ioctl,
+ #endif
+- .mmap = generic_file_mmap,
+ .open = ecryptfs_open,
+ .flush = ecryptfs_flush,
+ .release = ecryptfs_release,
diff --git a/queue-2.6.32/series b/queue-2.6.32/series
index 45c3bf9..b22c78f 100644
--- a/queue-2.6.32/series
+++ b/queue-2.6.32/series
@@ -8,3 +8,6 @@ printk_ratelimited-fix-uninitialized-spinlock.patch
hwmon-f75375s-fix-automatic-pwm-mode-setting-for-f75373-f75375.patch
crypto-sha512-use-binary-and-instead-of-modulus.patch
crypto-sha512-avoid-stack-bloat-on-i386.patch
+ecryptfs-remove-mmap-from-directory-operations.patch
+ban-ecryptfs-over-ecryptfs.patch
+add-mount-option-to-check-uid-of-device-being-mounted-expect-uid-cve-2011-1833.patch