diff options
| author | Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com> | 2023-01-03 10:17:09 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2023-01-03 09:24:41 +0000 |
| commit | c7dd13805f8b8fc1ce3b6d40f6aff47e66b72ad2 (patch) | |
| tree | a262f5859ecf01608d6af5f44328bbe3f2b35a72 | |
| parent | 7dc61838541928895abae6d2355258e02a251bba (diff) | |
| download | pci-c7dd13805f8b8fc1ce3b6d40f6aff47e66b72ad2.tar.gz | |
usb: rndis_host: Secure rndis_query check against int overflow
Variables off and len typed as uint32 in rndis_query function
are controlled by incoming RNDIS response message thus their
value may be manipulated. Setting off to a unexpectetly large
value will cause the sum with len and 8 to overflow and pass
the implemented validation step. Consequently the response
pointer will be referring to a location past the expected
buffer boundaries allowing information leakage e.g. via
RNDIS_OID_802_3_PERMANENT_ADDRESS OID.
Fixes: ddda08624013 ("USB: rndis_host, various cleanups")
Signed-off-by: Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c b/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c index f79333fe17836c..7b3739b29c8f72 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c @@ -255,7 +255,8 @@ static int rndis_query(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf, off = le32_to_cpu(u.get_c->offset); len = le32_to_cpu(u.get_c->len); - if (unlikely((8 + off + len) > CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE)) + if (unlikely((off > CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE - 8) || + (len > CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE - 8 - off))) goto response_error; if (*reply_len != -1 && len != *reply_len) |