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-rw-r--r--fs/proc/base.c97
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/internal.h2
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/namespaces.c1
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/root.c7
-rw-r--r--net/sysctl_net.c3
5 files changed, 109 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 5eb02069e1b81..e77d972066d4e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDWALL
#include <asm/hardwall.h>
#endif
@@ -628,6 +629,7 @@ int proc_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
}
static const struct inode_operations proc_def_inode_operations = {
+ .permission = proc_base_permission,
.setattr = proc_setattr,
};
@@ -1666,6 +1668,7 @@ out:
}
static const struct inode_operations proc_pid_link_inode_operations = {
+ .permission = proc_base_permission,
.readlink = proc_pid_readlink,
.follow_link = proc_pid_follow_link,
.setattr = proc_setattr,
@@ -2188,6 +2191,7 @@ static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
* proc directories can do almost nothing..
*/
static const struct inode_operations proc_fd_inode_operations = {
+ .permission = proc_base_permission,
.lookup = proc_lookupfd,
.permission = proc_fd_permission,
.setattr = proc_setattr,
@@ -2241,6 +2245,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_fdinfo_operations = {
* proc directories can do almost nothing..
*/
static const struct inode_operations proc_fdinfo_inode_operations = {
+ .permission = proc_base_permission,
.lookup = proc_lookupfdinfo,
.setattr = proc_setattr,
};
@@ -2477,6 +2482,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_attr_dir_lookup(struct inode *dir,
}
static const struct inode_operations proc_attr_dir_inode_operations = {
+ .permission = proc_base_permission,
.lookup = proc_attr_dir_lookup,
.getattr = pid_getattr,
.setattr = proc_setattr,
@@ -2885,6 +2891,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_tgid_base_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *de
}
static const struct inode_operations proc_tgid_base_inode_operations = {
+ .permission = proc_base_permission,
.lookup = proc_tgid_base_lookup,
.getattr = pid_getattr,
.setattr = proc_setattr,
@@ -3227,6 +3234,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_tid_base_operations = {
};
static const struct inode_operations proc_tid_base_inode_operations = {
+ .permission = proc_base_permission,
.lookup = proc_tid_base_lookup,
.getattr = pid_getattr,
.setattr = proc_setattr,
@@ -3452,6 +3460,7 @@ static int proc_task_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct
}
static const struct inode_operations proc_task_inode_operations = {
+ .permission = proc_base_permission,
.lookup = proc_task_lookup,
.getattr = proc_task_getattr,
.setattr = proc_setattr,
@@ -3462,3 +3471,91 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_task_operations = {
.readdir = proc_task_readdir,
.llseek = default_llseek,
};
+
+static int proc_dac_permission_check(struct inode *inode, int mask,
+ struct user_namespace *inode_user_ns)
+{
+ unsigned int mode = inode->i_mode;
+
+ mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
+
+ if (current_user_ns() != inode_user_ns)
+ goto other_perms;
+
+ if (likely(current_fsuid() == inode->i_uid))
+ mode >>= 6;
+ else {
+ if (in_group_p(inode->i_gid))
+ mode >>= 3;
+ }
+
+other_perms:
+ /*
+ * If the DACs are ok we don't need any capability check.
+ */
+ if ((mask & ~mode & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC)) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ return -EACCES;
+}
+
+
+static int proc_userns_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
+ struct user_namespace *inode_user_ns)
+{
+ int ret;
+ /*
+ * Do the basic DAC permission checks.
+ */
+ ret = proc_dac_permission_check(inode, mask, inode_user_ns);
+ if (ret != -EACCES)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = 0;
+ if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
+ /* DACs are overridable for directories */
+ if (ns_capable(inode_user_ns, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+ return 0;
+ if (!(mask & MAY_WRITE))
+ if (ns_capable(inode_user_ns, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+ return 0;
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Read/write DACs are always overridable.
+ * Executable DACs are overridable when there is
+ * at least one exec bit set.
+ */
+ if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO))
+ if (ns_capable(inode_user_ns, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Searching includes executable on directories, else just read.
+ */
+ mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
+ if (mask == MAY_READ)
+ if (ns_capable(inode_user_ns, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+ return 0;
+
+ return -EACCES;
+}
+
+int proc_base_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+ struct user_namespace *inode_user_ns;
+ struct task_struct *task;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = -EACCES;
+ task = get_proc_task(inode);
+ if (!task)
+ return -ESRCH;
+
+ inode_user_ns = get_user_ns(task_cred_xxx(task, user_ns));
+
+ ret = proc_userns_permission(inode, mask, inode_user_ns);
+
+ put_user_ns(inode_user_ns);
+ put_task_struct(task);
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
index 7838e5cfec145..d6930a7cfb656 100644
--- a/fs/proc/internal.h
+++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
@@ -145,3 +145,5 @@ int proc_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
extern const struct inode_operations proc_ns_dir_inode_operations;
extern const struct file_operations proc_ns_dir_operations;
+extern int proc_base_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask);
+
diff --git a/fs/proc/namespaces.c b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
index acc6eafaa2d2d..10a88a54626ba 100644
--- a/fs/proc/namespaces.c
+++ b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ out_no_task:
}
const struct inode_operations proc_ns_dir_inode_operations = {
+ .permission = proc_base_permission,
.lookup = proc_ns_dir_lookup,
.getattr = pid_getattr,
.setattr = proc_setattr,
diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
index 9a8a2b77b8747..19128e0260f32 100644
--- a/fs/proc/root.c
+++ b/fs/proc/root.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -62,6 +63,11 @@ static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
}
sb->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
+ /* Guarantee that we are always in the init_user_ns
+ * Individually files are treated as exceptions.
+ */
+ put_user_ns(sb->s_user_ns);
+ sb->s_user_ns = get_user_ns(&init_user_ns);
}
ei = PROC_I(sb->s_root->d_inode);
@@ -84,6 +90,7 @@ static void proc_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
}
static struct file_system_type proc_fs_type = {
+ .fs_flags = FS_SAFE,
.name = "proc",
.mount = proc_mount,
.kill_sb = proc_kill_sb,
diff --git a/net/sysctl_net.c b/net/sysctl_net.c
index ca84212cfbfed..077d68c34dda8 100644
--- a/net/sysctl_net.c
+++ b/net/sysctl_net.c
@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ static int net_ctl_permissions(struct ctl_table_root *root,
struct nsproxy *nsproxy,
struct ctl_table *table)
{
+ /* FIXME make this code fully userns aware */
/* Allow network administrator to have same access as root. */
- if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ if (ns_capable(nsproxy->net_ns->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
int mode = (table->mode >> 6) & 7;
return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode;
}