diff options
| author | Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> | 2011-07-26 18:58:26 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@aristanetworks.com> | 2011-08-11 10:07:51 -0500 |
| commit | ec3d61047307d8ec0fb66dd2eb575240215bb00b (patch) | |
| tree | d9801c240661a7ef02833dd5cf5ac9d4c43b69dd | |
| parent | f0afb8225756de664a0f8a195669d2f61cdc4f30 (diff) | |
| download | linux-user-ns-devel-ec3d61047307d8ec0fb66dd2eb575240215bb00b.tar.gz | |
keyctl: check capabilities against key's user_ns
ATM, task should only be able to get his own user_ns's keys
anyway, so nsown_capable should also work, but there is no
advantage to doing that, while using key's user_ns is clearer.
changelog: jun 6:
compile fix: keyctl.c (key_user, not key has user_ns)
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/keyctl.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index eca51918c951d3..fa7d420478d4bc 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) ret = -EACCES; down_write(&key->sem); - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + if (!ns_capable(key->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { /* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */ if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && key->uid != uid) goto error_put; @@ -852,7 +852,8 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm) down_write(&key->sem); /* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */ - if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || key->uid == current_fsuid()) { + if (ns_capable(key->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || + key->uid == current_fsuid()) { key->perm = perm; ret = 0; } |