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* maint-2.42: (39 commits)
Git 2.42.2
Git 2.41.1
Git 2.40.2
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
has_dir_name(): do not get confused by characters < '/'
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In the wake of fixing a vulnerability where `git clone` mistakenly
followed a symbolic link that it had just written while checking out
files, writing into a gitdir, let's add some defense-in-depth by
teaching `git fsck` to report symbolic links stored in its trees that
point inside `.git/`.
Even though the Git project never made any promises about the exact
shape of the `.git/` directory's contents, there are likely repositories
out there containing symbolic links that point inside the gitdir. For
that reason, let's only report these as warnings, not as errors.
Security-conscious users are encouraged to configure
`fsck.symlinkPointsToGitDir = error`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Diff best viewed with --color-diff.
Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Diff best viewed with --color-diff.
Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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In general, Git tries not to arbitrarily limit what it will store, and
there are currently no limits at all on the size of the path we find in
a tree. In theory you could have one that is gigabytes long.
But in practice this freedom is not really helping anybody, and is
potentially harmful:
1. Most operating systems have much lower limits for the size of a
single pathname component (e.g., on Linux you'll generally get
ENAMETOOLONG for anything over 255 bytes). And while you _can_ use
Git in a way that never touches the filesystem (manipulating the
index and trees directly), it's still probably not a good idea to
have gigantic tree names. Many operations load and traverse them,
so any clever Git-as-a-database scheme is likely to perform poorly
in that case.
2. We still have a lot of code which assumes strings are reasonably
sized, and I won't be at all surprised if you can trigger some
interesting integer overflows with gigantic pathnames. Stopping
malicious trees from entering the repository provides an extra line
of defense, protecting downstream code.
This patch implements an fsck check so that such trees can be rejected
by transfer.fsckObjects. I've picked a reasonably high maximum depth
here (4096) that hopefully should not bother anybody in practice. I've
also made it configurable, as an escape hatch.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The documentation lacks mention of specific <msg-id> that are supported.
While git-help --config will display a list of these options, often
developers' first instinct is to consult the git docs to find valid
config values.
Add a list of fsck error messages, and link to it from the git-fsck
documentation.
Signed-off-by: John Cai <johncai86@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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