From: NeilBrown From: "J. Bruce Fields" Note that the user (or exportfs, on the user's behalf) allows a gss pseudoflavor to be used to access an export by exporting to a special client named "gss/pseudoflavor-name", e.g., "gss/krb5" or "gss/lipkey-i". --- 25-akpm/include/linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h | 2 25-akpm/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h | 3 25-akpm/include/linux/sunrpc/svc.h | 1 25-akpm/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h | 5 25-akpm/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth_gss.h | 35 + 25-akpm/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile | 2 25-akpm/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c | 10 25-akpm/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c | 4 25-akpm/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c | 17 25-akpm/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/sunrpcgss_syms.c | 2 25-akpm/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 885 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 25-akpm/net/sunrpc/sunrpc_syms.c | 2 25-akpm/net/sunrpc/svc.c | 4 13 files changed, 969 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff -puN include/linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support include/linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h --- 25/include/linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 +++ 25-akpm/include/linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 @@ -62,8 +62,6 @@ struct rpc_gss_init_res { struct xdr_netobj gr_token; /* token */ }; -#define GSS_SEQ_WIN 5 - /* The gss_cl_ctx struct holds all the information the rpcsec_gss client * code needs to know about a single security context. In particular, * gc_gss_ctx is the context handle that is used to do gss-api calls, while diff -puN include/linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support include/linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h --- 25/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 +++ 25-akpm/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 @@ -120,6 +120,9 @@ int gss_mech_unregister_all(void); * reference count. */ struct gss_api_mech * gss_mech_get_by_OID(struct xdr_netobj *); +/* Similar, but get by name like "krb5", "spkm", etc., instead of OID. */ +struct gss_api_mech *gss_mech_get_by_name(char *); + /* Just increments the mechanism's reference count and returns its input: */ struct gss_api_mech * gss_mech_get(struct gss_api_mech *); diff -puN /dev/null include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth_gss.h --- /dev/null Thu Apr 11 07:25:15 2002 +++ 25-akpm/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth_gss.h Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* + * linux/include/linux/svcauth_gss.h + * + * Bruce Fields + * Copyright (c) 2002 The Regents of the Unviersity of Michigan + * + * $Id$ + * + */ + +#ifndef _LINUX_SUNRPC_SVCAUTH_GSS_H +#define _LINUX_SUNRPC_SVCAUTH_GSS_H + +#ifdef __KERNEL__ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int gss_svc_init(void); +int svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor(u32 pseudoflavor, char * name); + + +struct gss_svc_data { + /* decoded gss client cred: */ + struct rpc_gss_wire_cred clcred; + /* pointer to the beginning of the procedure-specific results, which + * may be encrypted/checksummed in svcauth_gss_release: */ + u32 *body_start; +}; + +#endif /* __KERNEL__ */ +#endif /* _LINUX_SUNRPC_SVCAUTH_GSS_H */ diff -puN include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h --- 25/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 +++ 25-akpm/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 @@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ struct auth_domain { * GARBAGE - rpc garbage_args error * SYSERR - rpc system_err error * DENIED - authp holds reason for denial. + * COMPLETE - the reply is encoded already and ready to be sent; no + * further processing is necessary. (This is used for processing + * null procedure calls which are used to set up encryption + * contexts.) * * accept is passed the proc number so that it can accept NULL rpc requests * even if it cannot authenticate the client (as is sometimes appropriate). @@ -98,6 +102,7 @@ extern struct auth_ops *authtab[RPC_AUTH #define SVC_DROP 6 #define SVC_DENIED 7 #define SVC_PENDING 8 +#define SVC_COMPLETE 9 extern int svc_authenticate(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, u32 *authp); diff -puN include/linux/sunrpc/svc.h~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support include/linux/sunrpc/svc.h --- 25/include/linux/sunrpc/svc.h~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 +++ 25-akpm/include/linux/sunrpc/svc.h Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 @@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ struct svc_rqst { void * rq_argp; /* decoded arguments */ void * rq_resp; /* xdr'd results */ + void * rq_auth_data; /* flavor-specific data */ int rq_reserved; /* space on socket outq * reserved for this request diff -puN net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c --- 25/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 +++ 25-akpm/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -972,6 +973,15 @@ static int __init init_rpcsec_gss(void) int err = 0; err = rpcauth_register(&authgss_ops); + if (err) + goto out; + err = gss_svc_init(); + if (err) + goto out_unregister; + return 0; +out_unregister: + rpcauth_unregister(&authgss_ops); +out: return err; } diff -puN net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c --- 25/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 +++ 25-akpm/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 @@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include #include #include @@ -232,6 +234,8 @@ static int __init init_kerberos_module(v gm = gss_mech_get_by_OID(&gss_mech_krb5_oid); gss_register_triple(RPC_AUTH_GSS_KRB5 , gm, 0, RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE); gss_register_triple(RPC_AUTH_GSS_KRB5I, gm, 0, RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY); + if (svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor(RPC_AUTH_GSS_KRB5, "krb5")) + printk("Failed to register %s with server!\n", "krb5"); gss_mech_put(gm); return 0; } diff -puN net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c --- 25/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 +++ 25-akpm/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 @@ -162,6 +162,23 @@ gss_mech_get_by_OID(struct xdr_netobj *m return gm; } +struct gss_api_mech * +gss_mech_get_by_name(char *name) +{ + struct gss_api_mech *pos, *gm = NULL; + + spin_lock(®istered_mechs_lock); + list_for_each_entry(pos, ®istered_mechs, gm_list) { + if (0 == strcmp(name, pos->gm_ops->name)) { + gm = gss_mech_get(pos); + break; + } + } + spin_unlock(®istered_mechs_lock); + return gm; + +} + int gss_mech_put(struct gss_api_mech * gm) { diff -puN net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile --- 25/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 +++ 25-akpm/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SUNRPC_GSS) += auth_rpcgss.o auth_rpcgss-objs := auth_gss.o gss_pseudoflavors.o gss_generic_token.o \ - sunrpcgss_syms.o gss_mech_switch.o + sunrpcgss_syms.o gss_mech_switch.o svcauth_gss.o obj-$(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5) += rpcsec_gss_krb5.o diff -puN net/sunrpc/auth_gss/sunrpcgss_syms.c~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support net/sunrpc/auth_gss/sunrpcgss_syms.c --- 25/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/sunrpcgss_syms.c~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 +++ 25-akpm/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/sunrpcgss_syms.c Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include /* sec_triples: */ @@ -17,6 +18,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(gss_cmp_triples); EXPORT_SYMBOL(gss_pseudoflavor_to_mechOID); EXPORT_SYMBOL(gss_pseudoflavor_supported); EXPORT_SYMBOL(gss_pseudoflavor_to_service); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor); /* registering gss mechanisms to the mech switching code: */ EXPORT_SYMBOL(gss_mech_register); diff -puN /dev/null net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c --- /dev/null Thu Apr 11 07:25:15 2002 +++ 25-akpm/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 @@ -0,0 +1,885 @@ +/* + * Neil Brown + * J. Bruce Fields + * Andy Adamson + * Dug Song + * + * RPCSEC_GSS server authentication. + * This implements RPCSEC_GSS as defined in rfc2203 (rpcsec_gss) and rfc2078 + * (gssapi) + * + * The RPCSEC_GSS involves three stages: + * 1/ context creation + * 2/ data exchange + * 3/ context destruction + * + * Context creation is handled largely by upcalls to user-space. + * In particular, GSS_Accept_sec_context is handled by an upcall + * Data exchange is handled entirely within the kernel + * In particular, GSS_GetMIC, GSS_VerifyMIC, GSS_Seal, GSS_Unseal are in-kernel. + * Context destruction is handled in-kernel + * GSS_Delete_sec_context is in-kernel + * + * Context creation is initiated by a RPCSEC_GSS_INIT request arriving. + * The context handle and gss_token are used as a key into the rpcsec_init cache. + * The content of this cache includes some of the outputs of GSS_Accept_sec_context, + * being major_status, minor_status, context_handle, reply_token. + * These are sent back to the client. + * Sequence window management is handled by the kernel. The window size if currently + * a compile time constant. + * + * When user-space is happy that a context is established, it places an entry + * in the rpcsec_context cache. The key for this cache is the context_handle. + * The content includes: + * uid/gidlist - for determining access rights + * mechanism type + * mechanism specific information, such as a key + * + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef RPC_DEBUG +# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH +#endif + +/* The rpcsec_init cache is used for mapping RPCSEC_GSS_{,CONT_}INIT requests + * into replies. + * + * Key is context handle (\x if empty) and gss_token. + * Content is major_status minor_status (integers) context_handle, reply_token. + * + */ + +static int netobj_equal(struct xdr_netobj *a, struct xdr_netobj *b) +{ + return a->len == b->len && 0 == memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->len); +} + +#define RSI_HASHBITS 6 +#define RSI_HASHMAX (1<in_handle.data); + kfree(rsii->in_token.data); + kfree(rsii->out_handle.data); + kfree(rsii->out_token.data); +} + +static void rsi_put(struct cache_head *item, struct cache_detail *cd) +{ + struct rsi *rsii = container_of(item, struct rsi, h); + if (cache_put(item, cd)) { + rsi_free(rsii); + kfree(rsii); + } +} + +static inline int rsi_hash(struct rsi *item) +{ + return hash_mem(item->in_handle.data, item->in_handle.len, RSI_HASHBITS) + ^ hash_mem(item->in_token.data, item->in_token.len, RSI_HASHBITS); +} + +static inline int rsi_match(struct rsi *item, struct rsi *tmp) +{ + return netobj_equal(&item->in_handle, &tmp->in_handle) + && netobj_equal(&item->in_token, &tmp->in_token); +} + +static int dup_to_netobj(struct xdr_netobj *dst, char *src, int len) +{ + dst->len = len; + dst->data = (len ? kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL) : NULL); + if (dst->data) + memcpy(dst->data, src, len); + if (len && !dst->data) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +static inline int dup_netobj(struct xdr_netobj *dst, struct xdr_netobj *src) +{ + return dup_to_netobj(dst, src->data, src->len); +} + +static inline void rsi_init(struct rsi *new, struct rsi *item) +{ + new->out_handle.data = NULL; + new->out_handle.len = 0; + new->out_token.data = NULL; + new->out_token.len = 0; + new->in_handle.len = item->in_handle.len; + item->in_handle.len = 0; + new->in_token.len = item->in_token.len; + item->in_token.len = 0; + new->in_handle.data = item->in_handle.data; + item->in_handle.data = NULL; + new->in_token.data = item->in_token.data; + item->in_token.data = NULL; +} + +static inline void rsi_update(struct rsi *new, struct rsi *item) +{ + BUG_ON(new->out_handle.data || new->out_token.data); + new->out_handle.len = item->out_handle.len; + item->out_handle.len = 0; + new->out_token.len = item->out_token.len; + item->out_token.len = 0; + new->out_handle.data = item->out_handle.data; + item->out_handle.data = NULL; + new->out_token.data = item->out_token.data; + item->out_token.data = NULL; + + new->major_status = item->major_status; + new->minor_status = item->minor_status; +} + +static void rsi_request(struct cache_detail *cd, + struct cache_head *h, + char **bpp, int *blen) +{ + struct rsi *rsii = container_of(h, struct rsi, h); + + qword_addhex(bpp, blen, rsii->in_handle.data, rsii->in_handle.len); + qword_addhex(bpp, blen, rsii->in_token.data, rsii->in_token.len); + (*bpp)[-1] = '\n'; +} + + +static int rsi_parse(struct cache_detail *cd, + char *mesg, int mlen) +{ + /* context token expiry major minor context token */ + char *buf = mesg; + char *ep; + int len; + struct rsi rsii, *rsip = NULL; + time_t expiry; + int status = -EINVAL; + + memset(&rsii, 0, sizeof(rsii)); + /* handle */ + len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen); + if (len < 0) + goto out; + status = -ENOMEM; + if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.in_handle, buf, len)) + goto out; + + /* token */ + len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen); + status = -EINVAL; + if (len < 0) + goto out;; + status = -ENOMEM; + if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.in_token, buf, len)) + goto out; + + rsii.h.flags = 0; + /* expiry */ + expiry = get_expiry(&mesg); + status = -EINVAL; + if (expiry == 0) + goto out; + + /* major/minor */ + len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen); + if (len < 0) + goto out; + if (len == 0) { + goto out; + } else { + rsii.major_status = simple_strtoul(buf, &ep, 10); + if (*ep) + goto out; + len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen); + if (len <= 0) + goto out; + rsii.minor_status = simple_strtoul(buf, &ep, 10); + if (*ep) + goto out; + + /* out_handle */ + len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen); + if (len < 0) + goto out; + status = -ENOMEM; + if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.out_handle, buf, len)) + goto out; + + /* out_token */ + len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen); + status = -EINVAL; + if (len < 0) + goto out; + status = -ENOMEM; + if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.out_token, buf, len)) + goto out; + } + rsii.h.expiry_time = expiry; + rsip = rsi_lookup(&rsii, 1); + status = 0; +out: + rsi_free(&rsii); + if (rsip) + rsi_put(&rsip->h, &rsi_cache); + return status; +} + +static struct cache_detail rsi_cache = { + .hash_size = RSI_HASHMAX, + .hash_table = rsi_table, + .name = "auth.rpcsec.init", + .cache_put = rsi_put, + .cache_request = rsi_request, + .cache_parse = rsi_parse, +}; + +static DefineSimpleCacheLookup(rsi, 0) + +/* + * The rpcsec_context cache is used to store a context that is + * used in data exchange. + * The key is a context handle. The content is: + * uid, gidlist, mechanism, service-set, mech-specific-data + */ + +#define RSC_HASHBITS 10 +#define RSC_HASHMAX (1<handle.data); + if (rsci->mechctx) + gss_delete_sec_context(&rsci->mechctx); +} + +static void rsc_put(struct cache_head *item, struct cache_detail *cd) +{ + struct rsc *rsci = container_of(item, struct rsc, h); + + if (cache_put(item, cd)) { + rsc_free(rsci); + kfree(rsci); + } +} + +static inline int +rsc_hash(struct rsc *rsci) +{ + return hash_mem(rsci->handle.data, rsci->handle.len, RSC_HASHBITS); +} + +static inline int +rsc_match(struct rsc *new, struct rsc *tmp) +{ + return netobj_equal(&new->handle, &tmp->handle); +} + +static inline void +rsc_init(struct rsc *new, struct rsc *tmp) +{ + new->handle.len = tmp->handle.len; + tmp->handle.len = 0; + new->handle.data = tmp->handle.data; + tmp->handle.data = NULL; + new->mechctx = NULL; +} + +static inline void +rsc_update(struct rsc *new, struct rsc *tmp) +{ + new->mechctx = tmp->mechctx; + tmp->mechctx = NULL; + memset(&new->seqdata, 0, sizeof(new->seqdata)); + spin_lock_init(&new->seqdata.sd_lock); + new->cred = tmp->cred; +} + +static int rsc_parse(struct cache_detail *cd, + char *mesg, int mlen) +{ + /* contexthandle expiry [ uid gid N mechname ...mechdata... ] */ + char *buf = mesg; + int len, rv; + struct rsc rsci, *rscp = NULL; + time_t expiry; + int status = -EINVAL; + + memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci)); + /* context handle */ + len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen); + if (len < 0) goto out; + status = -ENOMEM; + if (dup_to_netobj(&rsci.handle, buf, len)) + goto out; + + rsci.h.flags = 0; + /* expiry */ + expiry = get_expiry(&mesg); + status = -EINVAL; + if (expiry == 0) + goto out; + + /* uid, or NEGATIVE */ + rv = get_int(&mesg, &rsci.cred.cr_uid); + if (rv == -EINVAL) + goto out; + if (rv == -ENOENT) + set_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &rsci.h.flags); + else { + int N, i; + struct gss_api_mech *gm; + struct xdr_netobj tmp_buf; + + /* gid */ + if (get_int(&mesg, &rsci.cred.cr_gid)) + goto out; + + /* number of additional gid's */ + if (get_int(&mesg, &N)) + goto out; + if (N > NGROUPS) + goto out; + + /* gid's */ + for (i=0; ih, &rsc_cache); + return status; +} + +static struct cache_detail rsc_cache = { + .hash_size = RSC_HASHMAX, + .hash_table = rsc_table, + .name = "auth.rpcsec.context", + .cache_put = rsc_put, + .cache_parse = rsc_parse, +}; + +static DefineSimpleCacheLookup(rsc, 0); + +struct rsc * +gss_svc_searchbyctx(struct xdr_netobj *handle) +{ + struct rsc rsci; + struct rsc *found; + + rsci.handle = *handle; + found = rsc_lookup(&rsci, 0); + if (!found) + return NULL; + if (cache_check(&rsc_cache, &found->h, NULL)) + return NULL; + return found; +} + +/* Implements sequence number algorithm as specified in RFC 2203. */ +static int +gss_check_seq_num(struct rsc *rsci, int seq_num) +{ + struct gss_svc_seq_data *sd = &rsci->seqdata; + + spin_lock(&sd->sd_lock); + if (seq_num > sd->sd_max) { + if (seq_num >= sd->sd_max + GSS_SEQ_WIN) { + memset(sd->sd_win,0,sizeof(sd->sd_win)); + sd->sd_max = seq_num; + } else while (sd->sd_max < seq_num) { + sd->sd_max++; + __clear_bit(sd->sd_max % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win); + } + __set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win); + goto ok; + } else if (seq_num <= sd->sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN) { + goto drop; + } + /* sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN < seq_num <= sd_max */ + if (__test_and_set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win)) + goto drop; +ok: + spin_unlock(&sd->sd_lock); + return 1; +drop: + spin_unlock(&sd->sd_lock); + return 0; +} + +static inline u32 round_up_to_quad(u32 i) +{ + return (i + 3 ) & ~3; +} + +static inline int +svc_safe_getnetobj(struct iovec *argv, struct xdr_netobj *o) +{ + int l; + + if (argv->iov_len < 4) + return -1; + o->len = ntohl(svc_getu32(argv)); + l = round_up_to_quad(o->len); + if (argv->iov_len < l) + return -1; + o->data = argv->iov_base; + argv->iov_base += l; + argv->iov_len -= l; + return 0; +} + +static inline int +svc_safe_putnetobj(struct iovec *resv, struct xdr_netobj *o) +{ + u32 *p; + + if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE) + return -1; + svc_putu32(resv, htonl(o->len)); + p = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len; + resv->iov_len += round_up_to_quad(o->len); + if (resv->iov_len > PAGE_SIZE) + return -1; + memcpy(p, o->data, o->len); + memset((u8 *)p + o->len, 0, round_up_to_quad(o->len) - o->len); + return 0; +} + +/* Verify the checksum on the header and return SVC_OK on success. + * Otherwise, return SVC_DROP (in the case of a bad sequence number) + * or return SVC_DENIED and indicate error in authp. + */ +static int +gss_verify_header(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsc *rsci, + u32 *rpcstart, struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, u32 *authp) +{ + struct gss_ctx *ctx_id = rsci->mechctx; + struct xdr_netobj rpchdr; + struct xdr_netobj checksum; + u32 flavor = 0; + struct iovec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0]; + + /* data to compute the checksum over: */ + rpchdr.data = (u8 *)rpcstart; + rpchdr.len = (u8 *)argv->iov_base - (u8 *)rpcstart; + + *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf; + if (argv->iov_len < 4) + return SVC_DENIED; + flavor = ntohl(svc_getu32(argv)); + if (flavor != RPC_AUTH_GSS) + return SVC_DENIED; + if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &checksum)) + return SVC_DENIED; + + if (rqstp->rq_deferred) /* skip verification of revisited request */ + return SVC_OK; + if (gss_verify_mic(ctx_id, &rpchdr, &checksum, NULL) + != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + *authp = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem; + return SVC_DENIED; + } + + if (gc->gc_seq > MAXSEQ) { + dprintk("svcauth_gss: discarding request with large" + " sequence number %d\n", gc->gc_seq); + *authp = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem; + return SVC_DENIED; + } + if (!gss_check_seq_num(rsci, gc->gc_seq)) { + dprintk("svcauth_gss: discarding request with old" + " sequence number %d\n", gc->gc_seq); + return SVC_DROP; + } + return SVC_OK; +} + +static int +gss_write_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, u32 seq) +{ + u32 xdr_seq; + u32 maj_stat; + struct xdr_netobj verf_data; + struct xdr_netobj mic; + u32 *p; + + svc_putu32(rqstp->rq_res.head, htonl(RPC_AUTH_GSS)); + xdr_seq = htonl(seq); + + verf_data.data = (u8 *)&xdr_seq; + verf_data.len = sizeof(xdr_seq); + p = rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_base + rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_len; + maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx_id, 0, &verf_data, &mic); + if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) + return -1; + p = xdr_encode_netobj(rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_base + + rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_len, &mic); + kfree(mic.data); + if (!xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, p)) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +struct gss_domain { + struct auth_domain h; + u32 pseudoflavor; +}; + +/* XXX this should be done in gss_pseudoflavors, and shouldn't be hardcoded: */ +static struct auth_domain * +find_gss_auth_domain(struct gss_ctx *ctx, u32 svc) +{ + switch(gss_get_pseudoflavor(ctx, 0, svc)) { + case RPC_AUTH_GSS_KRB5: + return auth_domain_find("gss/krb5"); + case RPC_AUTH_GSS_KRB5I: + return auth_domain_find("gss/krb5i"); + case RPC_AUTH_GSS_KRB5P: + return auth_domain_find("gss/krb5p"); + } + return NULL; +} + +int +svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor(u32 pseudoflavor, char * name) +{ + struct gss_domain *new; + struct auth_domain *test; + static char *prefix = "gss/"; + int stat = -1; + + new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new) + goto out; + cache_init(&new->h.h); + atomic_inc(&new->h.h.refcnt); + new->h.name = kmalloc(strlen(name) + strlen(prefix) + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new->h.name) + goto out_free_dom; + strcpy(new->h.name, prefix); + strcat(new->h.name, name); + new->h.flavour = RPC_AUTH_GSS; + new->pseudoflavor = pseudoflavor; + new->h.h.expiry_time = NEVER; + new->h.h.flags = 0; + + test = auth_domain_lookup(&new->h, 1); + if (test == &new->h) { + BUG_ON(atomic_dec_and_test(&new->h.h.refcnt)); + } else { /* XXX Duplicate registration? */ + auth_domain_put(&new->h); + goto out; + } + return 0; + +out_free_dom: + kfree(new); +out: + return stat; +} + +/* + * Accept an rpcsec packet. + * If context establishment, punt to user space + * If data exchange, verify/decrypt + * If context destruction, handle here + * In the context establishment and destruction case we encode + * response here and return SVC_COMPLETE. + */ +static int +svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, u32 *authp) +{ + struct iovec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0]; + struct iovec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0]; + u32 crlen; + struct xdr_netobj tmpobj; + struct gss_svc_data *svcdata = rqstp->rq_auth_data; + struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc; + struct rsc *rsci = NULL; + struct rsi *rsip, rsikey; + u32 *rpcstart; + u32 *reject_stat = resv->iov_base; + int ret; + + dprintk("RPC: svcauth_gss: argv->iov_len = %d\n",argv->iov_len); + + *authp = rpc_autherr_badcred; + if (!svcdata) + svcdata = kmalloc(sizeof(*svcdata), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!svcdata) + goto auth_err; + rqstp->rq_auth_data = svcdata; + gc = &svcdata->clcred; + + /* start of rpc packet is 7 u32's back from here: + * xid direction rpcversion prog vers proc flavour + */ + rpcstart = argv->iov_base; + rpcstart -= 7; + + /* credential is: + * version(==1), proc(0,1,2,3), seq, service (1,2,3), handle + * at least 5 u32s, and is preceeded by length, so that makes 6. + */ + + if (argv->iov_len < 5 * 4) + goto auth_err; + crlen = ntohl(svc_getu32(argv)); + if (ntohl(svc_getu32(argv)) != RPC_GSS_VERSION) + goto auth_err; + gc->gc_proc = ntohl(svc_getu32(argv)); + gc->gc_seq = ntohl(svc_getu32(argv)); + gc->gc_svc = ntohl(svc_getu32(argv)); + if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &gc->gc_ctx)) + goto auth_err; + if (crlen != round_up_to_quad(gc->gc_ctx.len) + 5 * 4) + goto auth_err; + + if ((gc->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA) && (rqstp->rq_proc != 0)) + goto auth_err; + + /* + * We've successfully parsed the credential. Let's check out the + * verifier. An AUTH_NULL verifier is allowed (and required) for + * INIT and CONTINUE_INIT requests. AUTH_RPCSEC_GSS is required for + * PROC_DATA and PROC_DESTROY. + * + * AUTH_NULL verifier is 0 (AUTH_NULL), 0 (length). + * AUTH_RPCSEC_GSS verifier is: + * 6 (AUTH_RPCSEC_GSS), length, checksum. + * checksum is calculated over rpcheader from xid up to here. + */ + *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf; + switch (gc->gc_proc) { + case RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT: + case RPC_GSS_PROC_CONTINUE_INIT: + if (argv->iov_len < 2 * 4) + goto auth_err; + if (ntohl(svc_getu32(argv)) != RPC_AUTH_NULL) + goto auth_err; + if (ntohl(svc_getu32(argv)) != 0) + goto auth_err; + break; + case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA: + case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY: + /* integrity and privacy unsupported: */ + if (gc->gc_svc != RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE) + goto auth_err; + *authp = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem; + rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(&gc->gc_ctx); + if (!rsci) + goto auth_err; + switch (gss_verify_header(rqstp, rsci, rpcstart, gc, authp)) { + case SVC_OK: + break; + case SVC_DENIED: + goto auth_err; + case SVC_DROP: + goto drop; + } + break; + default: + *authp = rpc_autherr_rejectedcred; + goto auth_err; + } + + /* now act upon the command: */ + switch (gc->gc_proc) { + case RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT: + case RPC_GSS_PROC_CONTINUE_INIT: + *authp = rpc_autherr_badcred; + if (gc->gc_proc == RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT && gc->gc_ctx.len != 0) + goto auth_err; + memset(&rsikey, 0, sizeof(rsikey)); + if (dup_netobj(&rsikey.in_handle, &gc->gc_ctx)) + goto drop; + *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf; + if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &tmpobj)) { + kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data); + goto auth_err; + } + if (dup_netobj(&rsikey.in_token, &tmpobj)) { + kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data); + goto drop; + } + + rsip = rsi_lookup(&rsikey, 0); + rsi_free(&rsikey); + if (!rsip) { + goto drop; + } + switch(cache_check(&rsi_cache, &rsip->h, &rqstp->rq_chandle)) { + case -EAGAIN: + goto drop; + case -ENOENT: + goto drop; + case 0: + rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(&rsip->out_handle); + if (!rsci) { + goto drop; + } + if (gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, GSS_SEQ_WIN)) + goto drop; + if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE) + goto drop; + svc_putu32(resv, rpc_success); + if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, &rsip->out_handle)) + goto drop; + if (resv->iov_len + 3 * 4 > PAGE_SIZE) + goto drop; + svc_putu32(resv, htonl(rsip->major_status)); + svc_putu32(resv, htonl(rsip->minor_status)); + svc_putu32(resv, htonl(GSS_SEQ_WIN)); + if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, &rsip->out_token)) + goto drop; + rqstp->rq_client = NULL; + } + goto complete; + case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY: + set_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &rsci->h.flags); + if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE) + goto drop; + svc_putu32(resv, rpc_success); + goto complete; + case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA: + rqstp->rq_client = + find_gss_auth_domain(rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_svc); + if (rqstp->rq_client == NULL) + goto auth_err; + *authp = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem; + if (gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_seq)) + goto auth_err; + /* For use when wrapping: */ + svcdata->body_start = resv->iov_base + 1; + rqstp->rq_cred = rsci->cred; + ret = SVC_OK; + goto out; + } +auth_err: + /* Restore write pointer to original value: */ + xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, reject_stat); + ret = SVC_DENIED; + goto out; +complete: + ret = SVC_COMPLETE; + goto out; +drop: + ret = SVC_DROP; +out: + if (rsci) + rsc_put(&rsci->h, &rsc_cache); + return ret; +} + +static int +svcauth_gss_release(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) +{ + if (rqstp->rq_client) + auth_domain_put(rqstp->rq_client); + rqstp->rq_client = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +static void +svcauth_gss_domain_release(struct auth_domain *dom) +{ + struct gss_domain *gd = container_of(dom, struct gss_domain, h); + + kfree(dom->name); + kfree(gd); +} + +struct auth_ops svcauthops_gss = { + .name = "rpcsec_gss", + .flavour = RPC_AUTH_GSS, + .accept = svcauth_gss_accept, + .release = svcauth_gss_release, + .domain_release = svcauth_gss_domain_release, +}; + +int +gss_svc_init(void) +{ + cache_register(&rsc_cache); + cache_register(&rsi_cache); + svc_auth_register(RPC_AUTH_GSS, &svcauthops_gss); + return 0; +} diff -puN net/sunrpc/sunrpc_syms.c~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support net/sunrpc/sunrpc_syms.c --- 25/net/sunrpc/sunrpc_syms.c~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 +++ 25-akpm/net/sunrpc/sunrpc_syms.c Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 @@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(svc_recv); EXPORT_SYMBOL(svc_wake_up); EXPORT_SYMBOL(svc_makesock); EXPORT_SYMBOL(svc_reserve); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(svc_auth_register); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(auth_domain_lookup); /* RPC statistics */ #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS diff -puN net/sunrpc/svc.c~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support net/sunrpc/svc.c --- 25/net/sunrpc/svc.c~knfsd-rpcsec_gss-minimal-support Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 +++ 25-akpm/net/sunrpc/svc.c Mon Feb 23 16:33:40 2004 @@ -200,6 +200,8 @@ svc_exit_thread(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) kfree(rqstp->rq_resp); if (rqstp->rq_argp) kfree(rqstp->rq_argp); + if (rqstp->rq_auth_data) + kfree(rqstp->rq_auth_data); kfree(rqstp); /* Release the server */ @@ -322,6 +324,8 @@ svc_process(struct svc_serv *serv, struc goto err_bad_auth; case SVC_DROP: goto dropit; + case SVC_COMPLETE: + goto sendit; } progp = serv->sv_program; _