€•       Œsphinx.addnodes”Œdocument”“”)”}”(Œ	rawsource”Œ ”Œchildren”]”(Œtranslations”ŒLanguagesNode”“”)”}”(hhh]”(h Œpending_xref”“”)”}”(hhh]”Œdocutils.nodes”ŒText”“”ŒChinese (Simplified)”…””}”Œparent”hsbaŒ
attributes”}”(Œids”]”Œclasses”]”Œnames”]”Œdupnames”]”Œbackrefs”]”Œ	refdomain”Œstd”Œreftype”Œdoc”Œ	reftarget”Œ3/translations/zh_CN/security/keys/trusted-encrypted”Œmodname”NŒ	classname”NŒrefexplicit”ˆuŒtagname”hhhubh)”}”(hhh]”hŒChinese (Traditional)”…””}”hh2sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œ	refdomain”h)Œreftype”h+Œ	reftarget”Œ3/translations/zh_TW/security/keys/trusted-encrypted”Œmodname”NŒ	classname”NŒrefexplicit”ˆuh1hhhubh)”}”(hhh]”hŒItalian”…””}”hhFsbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œ	refdomain”h)Œreftype”h+Œ	reftarget”Œ3/translations/it_IT/security/keys/trusted-encrypted”Œmodname”NŒ	classname”NŒrefexplicit”ˆuh1hhhubh)”}”(hhh]”hŒJapanese”…””}”hhZsbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œ	refdomain”h)Œreftype”h+Œ	reftarget”Œ3/translations/ja_JP/security/keys/trusted-encrypted”Œmodname”NŒ	classname”NŒrefexplicit”ˆuh1hhhubh)”}”(hhh]”hŒKorean”…””}”hhnsbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œ	refdomain”h)Œreftype”h+Œ	reftarget”Œ3/translations/ko_KR/security/keys/trusted-encrypted”Œmodname”NŒ	classname”NŒrefexplicit”ˆuh1hhhubh)”}”(hhh]”hŒSpanish”…””}”hh‚sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œ	refdomain”h)Œreftype”h+Œ	reftarget”Œ3/translations/sp_SP/security/keys/trusted-encrypted”Œmodname”NŒ	classname”NŒrefexplicit”ˆuh1hhhubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œcurrent_language”ŒEnglish”uh1h
hhŒ	_document”hŒsource”NŒline”NubhŒsection”“”)”}”(hhh]”(hŒtitle”“”)”}”(hŒTrusted and Encrypted Keys”h]”hŒTrusted and Encrypted Keys”…””}”(hh¨hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hh£hžhhŸŒM/var/lib/git/docbuild/linux/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst”h KubhŒ	paragraph”“”)”}”(hX÷  Trusted and Encrypted Keys are two new key types added to the existing kernel
key ring service.  Both of these new types are variable length symmetric keys,
and in both cases all keys are created in the kernel, and user space sees,
stores, and loads only encrypted blobs.  Trusted Keys require the availability
of a Trust Source for greater security, while Encrypted Keys can be used on any
system. All user level blobs, are displayed and loaded in hex ASCII for
convenience, and are integrity verified.”h]”hX÷  Trusted and Encrypted Keys are two new key types added to the existing kernel
key ring service.  Both of these new types are variable length symmetric keys,
and in both cases all keys are created in the kernel, and user space sees,
stores, and loads only encrypted blobs.  Trusted Keys require the availability
of a Trust Source for greater security, while Encrypted Keys can be used on any
system. All user level blobs, are displayed and loaded in hex ASCII for
convenience, and are integrity verified.”…””}”(hh¹hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Khh£hžhubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒTrust Source”h]”hŒTrust Source”…””}”(hhÊhžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hhÇhžhhŸh¶h Kubh¸)”}”(hX  A trust source provides the source of security for Trusted Keys.  This
section lists currently supported trust sources, along with their security
considerations.  Whether or not a trust source is sufficiently safe depends
on the strength and correctness of its implementation, as well as the threat
environment for a specific use case.  Since the kernel doesn't know what the
environment is, and there is no metric of trust, it is dependent on the
consumer of the Trusted Keys to determine if the trust source is sufficiently
safe.”h]”hX  A trust source provides the source of security for Trusted Keys.  This
section lists currently supported trust sources, along with their security
considerations.  Whether or not a trust source is sufficiently safe depends
on the strength and correctness of its implementation, as well as the threat
environment for a specific use case.  Since the kernel doesnâ€™t know what the
environment is, and there is no metric of trust, it is dependent on the
consumer of the Trusted Keys to determine if the trust source is sufficiently
safe.”…””}”(hhØhžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h KhhÇhžhubhŒblock_quote”“”)”}”(hX%  *  Root of trust for storage

   (1) TPM (Trusted Platform Module: hardware device)

       Rooted to Storage Root Key (SRK) which never leaves the TPM that
       provides crypto operation to establish root of trust for storage.

   (2) TEE (Trusted Execution Environment: OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone)

       Rooted to Hardware Unique Key (HUK) which is generally burnt in on-chip
       fuses and is accessible to TEE only.

   (3) CAAM (Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module: IP on NXP SoCs)

       When High Assurance Boot (HAB) is enabled and the CAAM is in secure
       mode, trust is rooted to the OTPMK, a never-disclosed 256-bit key
       randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time.
       Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead.

   (4) DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs)

       Rooted to a one-time programmable key (OTP) that is generally burnt
       in the on-chip fuses and is accessible to the DCP encryption engine only.
       DCP provides two keys that can be used as root of trust: the OTP key
       and the UNIQUE key. Default is to use the UNIQUE key, but selecting
       the OTP key can be done via a module parameter (dcp_use_otp_key).

*  Execution isolation

   (1) TPM

       Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment.

   (2) TEE

       Customizable set of operations running in isolated execution
       environment verified via Secure/Trusted boot process.

   (3) CAAM

       Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment.

   (4) DCP

       Fixed set of cryptographic operations running in isolated execution
       environment. Only basic blob key encryption is executed there.
       The actual key sealing/unsealing is done on main processor/kernel space.

* Optional binding to platform integrity state

   (1) TPM

       Keys can be optionally sealed to specified PCR (integrity measurement)
       values, and only unsealed by the TPM, if PCRs and blob integrity
       verifications match. A loaded Trusted Key can be updated with new
       (future) PCR values, so keys are easily migrated to new PCR values,
       such as when the kernel and initramfs are updated. The same key can
       have many saved blobs under different PCR values, so multiple boots are
       easily supported.

   (2) TEE

       Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process for platform integrity. It can
       be extended with TEE based measured boot process.

   (3) CAAM

       Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs
       for platform integrity.

   (4) DCP

       Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for
       platform integrity.

*  Interfaces and APIs

   (1) TPM

       TPMs have well-documented, standardized interfaces and APIs.

   (2) TEE

       TEEs have well-documented, standardized client interface and APIs. For
       more details refer to ``Documentation/driver-api/tee.rst``.

   (3) CAAM

       Interface is specific to silicon vendor.

   (4) DCP

       Vendor-specific API that is implemented as part of the DCP crypto driver in
       ``drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c``.

*  Threat model

   The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source for a given
   purpose must be assessed when using them to protect security-relevant data.

”h]”hŒbullet_list”“”)”}”(hhh]”(hŒ	list_item”“”)”}”(hX¥  Root of trust for storage

(1) TPM (Trusted Platform Module: hardware device)

    Rooted to Storage Root Key (SRK) which never leaves the TPM that
    provides crypto operation to establish root of trust for storage.

(2) TEE (Trusted Execution Environment: OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone)

    Rooted to Hardware Unique Key (HUK) which is generally burnt in on-chip
    fuses and is accessible to TEE only.

(3) CAAM (Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module: IP on NXP SoCs)

    When High Assurance Boot (HAB) is enabled and the CAAM is in secure
    mode, trust is rooted to the OTPMK, a never-disclosed 256-bit key
    randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time.
    Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead.

(4) DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs)

    Rooted to a one-time programmable key (OTP) that is generally burnt
    in the on-chip fuses and is accessible to the DCP encryption engine only.
    DCP provides two keys that can be used as root of trust: the OTP key
    and the UNIQUE key. Default is to use the UNIQUE key, but selecting
    the OTP key can be done via a module parameter (dcp_use_otp_key).
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒRoot of trust for storage”h]”hŒRoot of trust for storage”…””}”(hh÷hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h KhhóubhŒenumerated_list”“”)”}”(hhh]”(hò)”}”(hŒ³TPM (Trusted Platform Module: hardware device)

Rooted to Storage Root Key (SRK) which never leaves the TPM that
provides crypto operation to establish root of trust for storage.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒ.TPM (Trusted Platform Module: hardware device)”h]”hŒ.TPM (Trusted Platform Module: hardware device)”…””}”(hj  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Khj
  ubh¸)”}”(hŒ‚Rooted to Storage Root Key (SRK) which never leaves the TPM that
provides crypto operation to establish root of trust for storage.”h]”hŒ‚Rooted to Storage Root Key (SRK) which never leaves the TPM that
provides crypto operation to establish root of trust for storage.”…””}”(hj  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Khj
  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhj  ubhò)”}”(hŒ±TEE (Trusted Execution Environment: OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone)

Rooted to Hardware Unique Key (HUK) which is generally burnt in on-chip
fuses and is accessible to TEE only.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒBTEE (Trusted Execution Environment: OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone)”h]”hŒBTEE (Trusted Execution Environment: OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone)”…””}”(hj4  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K!hj0  ubh¸)”}”(hŒlRooted to Hardware Unique Key (HUK) which is generally burnt in on-chip
fuses and is accessible to TEE only.”h]”hŒlRooted to Hardware Unique Key (HUK) which is generally burnt in on-chip
fuses and is accessible to TEE only.”…””}”(hjB  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K#hj0  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhj  ubhò)”}”(hXD  CAAM (Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module: IP on NXP SoCs)

When High Assurance Boot (HAB) is enabled and the CAAM is in secure
mode, trust is rooted to the OTPMK, a never-disclosed 256-bit key
randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time.
Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒFCAAM (Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module: IP on NXP SoCs)”h]”hŒFCAAM (Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module: IP on NXP SoCs)”…””}”(hjZ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K&hjV  ubh¸)”}”(hŒûWhen High Assurance Boot (HAB) is enabled and the CAAM is in secure
mode, trust is rooted to the OTPMK, a never-disclosed 256-bit key
randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time.
Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead.”h]”hŒûWhen High Assurance Boot (HAB) is enabled and the CAAM is in secure
mode, trust is rooted to the OTPMK, a never-disclosed 256-bit key
randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time.
Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead.”…””}”(hjh  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K(hjV  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhj  ubhò)”}”(hX›  DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs)

Rooted to a one-time programmable key (OTP) that is generally burnt
in the on-chip fuses and is accessible to the DCP encryption engine only.
DCP provides two keys that can be used as root of trust: the OTP key
and the UNIQUE key. Default is to use the UNIQUE key, but selecting
the OTP key can be done via a module parameter (dcp_use_otp_key).
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒ@DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs)”h]”hŒ@DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs)”…””}”(hj€  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K-hj|  ubh¸)”}”(hXX  Rooted to a one-time programmable key (OTP) that is generally burnt
in the on-chip fuses and is accessible to the DCP encryption engine only.
DCP provides two keys that can be used as root of trust: the OTP key
and the UNIQUE key. Default is to use the UNIQUE key, but selecting
the OTP key can be done via a module parameter (dcp_use_otp_key).”h]”hXX  Rooted to a one-time programmable key (OTP) that is generally burnt
in the on-chip fuses and is accessible to the DCP encryption engine only.
DCP provides two keys that can be used as root of trust: the OTP key
and the UNIQUE key. Default is to use the UNIQUE key, but selecting
the OTP key can be done via a module parameter (dcp_use_otp_key).”…””}”(hjŽ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K/hj|  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhj  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œenumtype”Œarabic”Œprefix”Œ(”Œsuffix”Œ)”uh1j  hhóubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhhîubhò)”}”(hX  Execution isolation

(1) TPM

    Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment.

(2) TEE

    Customizable set of operations running in isolated execution
    environment verified via Secure/Trusted boot process.

(3) CAAM

    Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment.

(4) DCP

    Fixed set of cryptographic operations running in isolated execution
    environment. Only basic blob key encryption is executed there.
    The actual key sealing/unsealing is done on main processor/kernel space.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒExecution isolation”h]”hŒExecution isolation”…””}”(hj¸  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K5hj´  ubj  )”}”(hhh]”(hò)”}”(hŒHTPM

Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒTPM”h]”hŒTPM”…””}”(hjÍ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K7hjÉ  ubh¸)”}”(hŒBFixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment.”h]”hŒBFixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment.”…””}”(hjÛ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K9hjÉ  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhjÆ  ubhò)”}”(hŒxTEE

Customizable set of operations running in isolated execution
environment verified via Secure/Trusted boot process.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒTEE”h]”hŒTEE”…””}”(hjó  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K;hjï  ubh¸)”}”(hŒrCustomizable set of operations running in isolated execution
environment verified via Secure/Trusted boot process.”h]”hŒrCustomizable set of operations running in isolated execution
environment verified via Secure/Trusted boot process.”…””}”(hj  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K=hjï  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhjÆ  ubhò)”}”(hŒICAAM

Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒCAAM”h]”hŒCAAM”…””}”(hj  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K@hj  ubh¸)”}”(hŒBFixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment.”h]”hŒBFixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment.”…””}”(hj'  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h KBhj  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhjÆ  ubhò)”}”(hŒÑDCP

Fixed set of cryptographic operations running in isolated execution
environment. Only basic blob key encryption is executed there.
The actual key sealing/unsealing is done on main processor/kernel space.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒDCP”h]”hŒDCP”…””}”(hj?  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h KDhj;  ubh¸)”}”(hŒËFixed set of cryptographic operations running in isolated execution
environment. Only basic blob key encryption is executed there.
The actual key sealing/unsealing is done on main processor/kernel space.”h]”hŒËFixed set of cryptographic operations running in isolated execution
environment. Only basic blob key encryption is executed there.
The actual key sealing/unsealing is done on main processor/kernel space.”…””}”(hjM  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h KFhj;  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhjÆ  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”j¨  j©  jª  j«  j¬  j­  uh1j  hj´  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhhîubhò)”}”(hXi  Optional binding to platform integrity state

 (1) TPM

     Keys can be optionally sealed to specified PCR (integrity measurement)
     values, and only unsealed by the TPM, if PCRs and blob integrity
     verifications match. A loaded Trusted Key can be updated with new
     (future) PCR values, so keys are easily migrated to new PCR values,
     such as when the kernel and initramfs are updated. The same key can
     have many saved blobs under different PCR values, so multiple boots are
     easily supported.

 (2) TEE

     Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process for platform integrity. It can
     be extended with TEE based measured boot process.

 (3) CAAM

     Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs
     for platform integrity.

 (4) DCP

     Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for
     platform integrity.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒ,Optional binding to platform integrity state”h]”hŒ,Optional binding to platform integrity state”…””}”(hjq  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h KJhjm  ubhç)”}”(hX*  (1) TPM

    Keys can be optionally sealed to specified PCR (integrity measurement)
    values, and only unsealed by the TPM, if PCRs and blob integrity
    verifications match. A loaded Trusted Key can be updated with new
    (future) PCR values, so keys are easily migrated to new PCR values,
    such as when the kernel and initramfs are updated. The same key can
    have many saved blobs under different PCR values, so multiple boots are
    easily supported.

(2) TEE

    Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process for platform integrity. It can
    be extended with TEE based measured boot process.

(3) CAAM

    Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs
    for platform integrity.

(4) DCP

    Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for
    platform integrity.
”h]”j  )”}”(hhh]”(hò)”}”(hX±  TPM

Keys can be optionally sealed to specified PCR (integrity measurement)
values, and only unsealed by the TPM, if PCRs and blob integrity
verifications match. A loaded Trusted Key can be updated with new
(future) PCR values, so keys are easily migrated to new PCR values,
such as when the kernel and initramfs are updated. The same key can
have many saved blobs under different PCR values, so multiple boots are
easily supported.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒTPM”h]”hŒTPM”…””}”(hjŠ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h KLhj†  ubh¸)”}”(hX«  Keys can be optionally sealed to specified PCR (integrity measurement)
values, and only unsealed by the TPM, if PCRs and blob integrity
verifications match. A loaded Trusted Key can be updated with new
(future) PCR values, so keys are easily migrated to new PCR values,
such as when the kernel and initramfs are updated. The same key can
have many saved blobs under different PCR values, so multiple boots are
easily supported.”h]”hX«  Keys can be optionally sealed to specified PCR (integrity measurement)
values, and only unsealed by the TPM, if PCRs and blob integrity
verifications match. A loaded Trusted Key can be updated with new
(future) PCR values, so keys are easily migrated to new PCR values,
such as when the kernel and initramfs are updated. The same key can
have many saved blobs under different PCR values, so multiple boots are
easily supported.”…””}”(hj˜  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h KNhj†  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhjƒ  ubhò)”}”(hŒ|TEE

Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process for platform integrity. It can
be extended with TEE based measured boot process.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒTEE”h]”hŒTEE”…””}”(hj°  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h KVhj¬  ubh¸)”}”(hŒvRelies on Secure/Trusted boot process for platform integrity. It can
be extended with TEE based measured boot process.”h]”hŒvRelies on Secure/Trusted boot process for platform integrity. It can
be extended with TEE based measured boot process.”…””}”(hj¾  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h KXhj¬  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhjƒ  ubhò)”}”(hŒ\CAAM

Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs
for platform integrity.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒCAAM”h]”hŒCAAM”…””}”(hjÖ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K[hjÒ  ubh¸)”}”(hŒURelies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs
for platform integrity.”h]”hŒURelies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs
for platform integrity.”…””}”(hjä  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K]hjÒ  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhjƒ  ubhò)”}”(hŒZDCP

Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for
platform integrity.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒDCP”h]”hŒDCP”…””}”(hjü  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K`hjø  ubh¸)”}”(hŒTRelies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for
platform integrity.”h]”hŒTRelies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for
platform integrity.”…””}”(hj
  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Kbhjø  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhjƒ  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”j¨  j©  jª  j«  j¬  j­  uh1j  hj  ubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hæhŸh¶h KLhjm  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhhîubhò)”}”(hX¨  Interfaces and APIs

(1) TPM

    TPMs have well-documented, standardized interfaces and APIs.

(2) TEE

    TEEs have well-documented, standardized client interface and APIs. For
    more details refer to ``Documentation/driver-api/tee.rst``.

(3) CAAM

    Interface is specific to silicon vendor.

(4) DCP

    Vendor-specific API that is implemented as part of the DCP crypto driver in
    ``drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c``.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒInterfaces and APIs”h]”hŒInterfaces and APIs”…””}”(hj4  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Kehj0  ubj  )”}”(hhh]”(hò)”}”(hŒBTPM

TPMs have well-documented, standardized interfaces and APIs.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒTPM”h]”hŒTPM”…””}”(hjI  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h KghjE  ubh¸)”}”(hŒ<TPMs have well-documented, standardized interfaces and APIs.”h]”hŒ<TPMs have well-documented, standardized interfaces and APIs.”…””}”(hjW  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h KihjE  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhjB  ubhò)”}”(hŒˆTEE

TEEs have well-documented, standardized client interface and APIs. For
more details refer to ``Documentation/driver-api/tee.rst``.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒTEE”h]”hŒTEE”…””}”(hjo  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Kkhjk  ubh¸)”}”(hŒ‚TEEs have well-documented, standardized client interface and APIs. For
more details refer to ``Documentation/driver-api/tee.rst``.”h]”(hŒ]TEEs have well-documented, standardized client interface and APIs. For
more details refer to ”…””}”(hj}  hžhhŸNh NubhŒliteral”“”)”}”(hŒ$``Documentation/driver-api/tee.rst``”h]”hŒ Documentation/driver-api/tee.rst”…””}”(hj‡  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1j…  hj}  ubhŒ.”…””}”(hj}  hžhhŸNh Nubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Kmhjk  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhjB  ubhò)”}”(hŒ/CAAM

Interface is specific to silicon vendor.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒCAAM”h]”hŒCAAM”…””}”(hj©  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Kphj¥  ubh¸)”}”(hŒ(Interface is specific to silicon vendor.”h]”hŒ(Interface is specific to silicon vendor.”…””}”(hj·  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Krhj¥  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhjB  ubhò)”}”(hŒoDCP

Vendor-specific API that is implemented as part of the DCP crypto driver in
``drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c``.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒDCP”h]”hŒDCP”…””}”(hjÏ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h KthjË  ubh¸)”}”(hŒiVendor-specific API that is implemented as part of the DCP crypto driver in
``drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c``.”h]”(hŒLVendor-specific API that is implemented as part of the DCP crypto driver in
”…””}”(hjÝ  hžhhŸNh Nubj†  )”}”(hŒ``drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c``”h]”hŒdrivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c”…””}”(hjå  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1j…  hjÝ  ubhŒ.”…””}”(hjÝ  hžhhŸNh Nubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h KvhjË  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhjB  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”j¨  j©  jª  j«  j¬  j­  uh1j  hj0  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhhîubhò)”}”(hŒ¥Threat model

The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source for a given
purpose must be assessed when using them to protect security-relevant data.

”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒThreat model”h]”hŒThreat model”…””}”(hj  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Kyhj  ubh¸)”}”(hŒ•The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source for a given
purpose must be assessed when using them to protect security-relevant data.”h]”hŒ•The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source for a given
purpose must be assessed when using them to protect security-relevant data.”…””}”(hj!  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K{hj  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhhîubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œbullet”Œ*”uh1hìhŸh¶h Khhèubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hæhŸh¶h KhhÇhžhubeh}”(h]”Œtrust-source”ah ]”h"]”Œtrust source”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hh£hžhhŸh¶h Kubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒKey Generation”h]”hŒKey Generation”…””}”(hjN  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hjK  hžhhŸh¶h K€ubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒTrusted Keys”h]”hŒTrusted Keys”…””}”(hj_  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hj\  hžhhŸh¶h Kƒubh¸)”}”(hXA  New keys are created from random numbers. They are encrypted/decrypted using
a child key in the storage key hierarchy. Encryption and decryption of the
child key must be protected by a strong access control policy within the
trust source. The random number generator in use differs according to the
selected trust source:”h]”hXA  New keys are created from random numbers. They are encrypted/decrypted using
a child key in the storage key hierarchy. Encryption and decryption of the
child key must be protected by a strong access control policy within the
trust source. The random number generator in use differs according to the
selected trust source:”…””}”(hjm  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K…hj\  hžhubhç)”}”(hX˜  *  TPM: hardware device based RNG

   Keys are generated within the TPM. Strength of random numbers may vary
   from one device manufacturer to another.

*  TEE: OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone based RNG

   RNG is customizable as per platform needs. It can either be direct output
   from platform specific hardware RNG or a software based Fortuna CSPRNG
   which can be seeded via multiple entropy sources.

*  CAAM: Kernel RNG

   The normal kernel random number generator is used. To seed it from the
   CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure the device
   is probed.

*  DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs)

   The DCP hardware device itself does not provide a dedicated RNG interface,
   so the kernel default RNG is used. SoCs with DCP like the i.MX6ULL do have
   a dedicated hardware RNG that is independent from DCP which can be enabled
   to back the kernel RNG.
”h]”hí)”}”(hhh]”(hò)”}”(hŒTPM: hardware device based RNG

Keys are generated within the TPM. Strength of random numbers may vary
from one device manufacturer to another.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒTPM: hardware device based RNG”h]”hŒTPM: hardware device based RNG”…””}”(hj†  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K‹hj‚  ubh¸)”}”(hŒoKeys are generated within the TPM. Strength of random numbers may vary
from one device manufacturer to another.”h]”hŒoKeys are generated within the TPM. Strength of random numbers may vary
from one device manufacturer to another.”…””}”(hj”  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Khj‚  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhj  ubhò)”}”(hŒñTEE: OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone based RNG

RNG is customizable as per platform needs. It can either be direct output
from platform specific hardware RNG or a software based Fortuna CSPRNG
which can be seeded via multiple entropy sources.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒ,TEE: OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone based RNG”h]”hŒ,TEE: OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone based RNG”…””}”(hj¬  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Khj¨  ubh¸)”}”(hŒÂRNG is customizable as per platform needs. It can either be direct output
from platform specific hardware RNG or a software based Fortuna CSPRNG
which can be seeded via multiple entropy sources.”h]”hŒÂRNG is customizable as per platform needs. It can either be direct output
from platform specific hardware RNG or a software based Fortuna CSPRNG
which can be seeded via multiple entropy sources.”…””}”(hjº  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K’hj¨  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhj  ubhò)”}”(hŒ©CAAM: Kernel RNG

The normal kernel random number generator is used. To seed it from the
CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure the device
is probed.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒCAAM: Kernel RNG”h]”hŒCAAM: Kernel RNG”…””}”(hjÒ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K–hjÎ  ubh¸)”}”(hŒ–The normal kernel random number generator is used. To seed it from the
CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure the device
is probed.”h]”hŒ–The normal kernel random number generator is used. To seed it from the
CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure the device
is probed.”…””}”(hjà  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K˜hjÎ  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhj  ubhò)”}”(hX;  DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs)

The DCP hardware device itself does not provide a dedicated RNG interface,
so the kernel default RNG is used. SoCs with DCP like the i.MX6ULL do have
a dedicated hardware RNG that is independent from DCP which can be enabled
to back the kernel RNG.
”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒ@DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs)”h]”hŒ@DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs)”…””}”(hjø  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Kœhjô  ubh¸)”}”(hŒøThe DCP hardware device itself does not provide a dedicated RNG interface,
so the kernel default RNG is used. SoCs with DCP like the i.MX6ULL do have
a dedicated hardware RNG that is independent from DCP which can be enabled
to back the kernel RNG.”h]”hŒøThe DCP hardware device itself does not provide a dedicated RNG interface,
so the kernel default RNG is used. SoCs with DCP like the i.MX6ULL do have
a dedicated hardware RNG that is independent from DCP which can be enabled
to back the kernel RNG.”…””}”(hj  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Kžhjô  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hñhj  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”j;  j<  uh1hìhŸh¶h K‹hj{  ubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hæhŸh¶h K‹hj\  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒ–Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the kernel
command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number pool.”h]”(hŒ&Users may override this by specifying ”…””}”(hj&  hžhhŸNh Nubj†  )”}”(hŒ``trusted.rng=kernel``”h]”hŒtrusted.rng=kernel”…””}”(hj.  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1j…  hj&  ubhŒ\ on the kernel
command-line to override the used RNG with the kernelâ€™s random number pool.”…””}”(hj&  hžhhŸNh Nubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K£hj\  hžhubeh}”(h]”Œtrusted-keys”ah ]”h"]”Œtrusted keys”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hjK  hžhhŸh¶h Kƒubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒEncrypted Keys”h]”hŒEncrypted Keys”…””}”(hjQ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hjN  hžhhŸh¶h K§ubh¸)”}”(hXJ  Encrypted keys do not depend on a trust source, and are faster, as they use AES
for encryption/decryption. New keys are created either from kernel-generated
random numbers or user-provided decrypted data, and are encrypted/decrypted
using a specified â€˜masterâ€™ key. The â€˜masterâ€™ key can either be a trusted-key or
user-key type. The main disadvantage of encrypted keys is that if they are not
rooted in a trusted key, they are only as secure as the user key encrypting
them. The master user key should therefore be loaded in as secure a way as
possible, preferably early in boot.”h]”hXJ  Encrypted keys do not depend on a trust source, and are faster, as they use AES
for encryption/decryption. New keys are created either from kernel-generated
random numbers or user-provided decrypted data, and are encrypted/decrypted
using a specified â€˜masterâ€™ key. The â€˜masterâ€™ key can either be a trusted-key or
user-key type. The main disadvantage of encrypted keys is that if they are not
rooted in a trusted key, they are only as secure as the user key encrypting
them. The master user key should therefore be loaded in as secure a way as
possible, preferably early in boot.”…””}”(hj_  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K©hjN  hžhubeh}”(h]”Œencrypted-keys”ah ]”h"]”Œencrypted keys”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hjK  hžhhŸh¶h K§ubeh}”(h]”Œkey-generation”ah ]”h"]”Œkey generation”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hh£hžhhŸh¶h K€ubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒUsage”h]”hŒUsage”…””}”(hj€  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hj}  hžhhŸh¶h K´ubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒTrusted Keys usage: TPM”h]”hŒTrusted Keys usage: TPM”…””}”(hj‘  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hjŽ  hžhhŸh¶h K·ubh¸)”}”(hŒÔTPM 1.2: By default, trusted keys are sealed under the SRK, which has the
default authorization value (20 bytes of 0s).  This can be set at takeownership
time with the TrouSerS utility: "tpm_takeownership -u -z".”h]”hŒØTPM 1.2: By default, trusted keys are sealed under the SRK, which has the
default authorization value (20 bytes of 0s).  This can be set at takeownership
time with the TrouSerS utility: â€œtpm_takeownership -u -zâ€.”…””}”(hjŸ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K¹hjŽ  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒžTPM 2.0: The user must first create a storage key and make it persistent, so the
key is available after reboot. This can be done using the following commands.”h]”hŒžTPM 2.0: The user must first create a storage key and make it persistent, so the
key is available after reboot. This can be done using the following commands.”…””}”(hj­  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h K½hjŽ  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒWith the IBM TSS 2 stack::”h]”hŒWith the IBM TSS 2 stack:”…””}”(hj»  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h KÀhjŽ  hžhubhŒliteral_block”“”)”}”(hŒ`#> tsscreateprimary -hi o -st
Handle 80000000
#> tssevictcontrol -hi o -ho 80000000 -hp 81000001”h]”hŒ`#> tsscreateprimary -hi o -st
Handle 80000000
#> tssevictcontrol -hi o -ho 80000000 -hp 81000001”…””}”hjË  sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œ	xml:space”Œpreserve”uh1jÉ  hŸh¶h KÂhjŽ  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒOr with the Intel TSS 2 stack::”h]”hŒOr with the Intel TSS 2 stack:”…””}”(hjÛ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h KÆhjŽ  hžhubjÊ  )”}”(hŒ‰#> tpm2_createprimary --hierarchy o -G rsa2048 -c key.ctxt
[...]
#> tpm2_evictcontrol -c key.ctxt 0x81000001
persistentHandle: 0x81000001”h]”hŒ‰#> tpm2_createprimary --hierarchy o -G rsa2048 -c key.ctxt
[...]
#> tpm2_evictcontrol -c key.ctxt 0x81000001
persistentHandle: 0x81000001”…””}”hjé  sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”jÙ  jÚ  uh1jÉ  hŸh¶h KÈhjŽ  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒUsage::”h]”hŒUsage:”…””}”(hj÷  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h KÍhjŽ  hžhubjÊ  )”}”(hXF  keyctl add trusted name "new keylen [options]" ring
keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob [pcrlock=pcrnum]" ring
keyctl update key "update [options]"
keyctl print keyid

options:
   keyhandle=    ascii hex value of sealing key
                   TPM 1.2: default 0x40000000 (SRK)
                   TPM 2.0: no default; must be passed every time
   keyauth=      ascii hex auth for sealing key default 0x00...i
                 (40 ascii zeros)
   blobauth=     ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00...
                 (40 ascii zeros)
   pcrinfo=      ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default)
   pcrlock=      pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob
   migratable=   0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values,
                 default 1 (resealing allowed)
   hash=         hash algorithm name as a string. For TPM 1.x the only
                 allowed value is sha1. For TPM 2.x the allowed values
                 are sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512 and sm3-256.
   policydigest= digest for the authorization policy. must be calculated
                 with the same hash algorithm as specified by the 'hash='
                 option.
   policyhandle= handle to an authorization policy session that defines the
                 same policy and with the same hash algorithm as was used to
                 seal the key.”h]”hXF  keyctl add trusted name "new keylen [options]" ring
keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob [pcrlock=pcrnum]" ring
keyctl update key "update [options]"
keyctl print keyid

options:
   keyhandle=    ascii hex value of sealing key
                   TPM 1.2: default 0x40000000 (SRK)
                   TPM 2.0: no default; must be passed every time
   keyauth=      ascii hex auth for sealing key default 0x00...i
                 (40 ascii zeros)
   blobauth=     ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00...
                 (40 ascii zeros)
   pcrinfo=      ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default)
   pcrlock=      pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob
   migratable=   0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values,
                 default 1 (resealing allowed)
   hash=         hash algorithm name as a string. For TPM 1.x the only
                 allowed value is sha1. For TPM 2.x the allowed values
                 are sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512 and sm3-256.
   policydigest= digest for the authorization policy. must be calculated
                 with the same hash algorithm as specified by the 'hash='
                 option.
   policyhandle= handle to an authorization policy session that defines the
                 same policy and with the same hash algorithm as was used to
                 seal the key.”…””}”hj  sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”jÙ  jÚ  uh1jÉ  hŸh¶h KÏhjŽ  hžhubh¸)”}”(hX9  "keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard
TPM_STORED_DATA format.  The key length for new keys are always in bytes.
Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits), the upper limit is to fit
within the 2048 bit SRK (RSA) keylength, with all necessary structure/padding.”h]”hX=  â€œkeyctl printâ€ returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard
TPM_STORED_DATA format.  The key length for new keys are always in bytes.
Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits), the upper limit is to fit
within the 2048 bit SRK (RSA) keylength, with all necessary structure/padding.”…””}”(hj  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h KêhjŽ  hžhubeh}”(h]”Œtrusted-keys-usage-tpm”ah ]”h"]”Œtrusted keys usage: tpm”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hj}  hžhhŸh¶h K·ubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒTrusted Keys usage: TEE”h]”hŒTrusted Keys usage: TEE”…””}”(hj,  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hj)  hžhhŸh¶h Kðubh¸)”}”(hŒUsage::”h]”hŒUsage:”…””}”(hj:  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Kòhj)  hžhubjÊ  )”}”(hŒikeyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring
keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring
keyctl print keyid”h]”hŒikeyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring
keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring
keyctl print keyid”…””}”hjH  sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”jÙ  jÚ  uh1jÉ  hŸh¶h Kôhj)  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒÜ"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format
specific to TEE device implementation.  The key length for new keys is always
in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).”h]”hŒàâ€œkeyctl printâ€ returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format
specific to TEE device implementation.  The key length for new keys is always
in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).”…””}”(hjV  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Køhj)  hžhubeh}”(h]”Œtrusted-keys-usage-tee”ah ]”h"]”Œtrusted keys usage: tee”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hj}  hžhhŸh¶h Kðubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒTrusted Keys usage: CAAM”h]”hŒTrusted Keys usage: CAAM”…””}”(hjo  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hjl  hžhhŸh¶h Kýubh¸)”}”(hŒUsage::”h]”hŒUsage:”…””}”(hj}  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Kÿhjl  hžhubjÊ  )”}”(hŒikeyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring
keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring
keyctl print keyid”h]”hŒikeyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring
keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring
keyctl print keyid”…””}”hj‹  sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”jÙ  jÚ  uh1jÉ  hŸh¶h Mhjl  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒÆ"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in a
CAAM-specific format.  The key length for new keys is always in bytes.
Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).”h]”hŒÊâ€œkeyctl printâ€ returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in a
CAAM-specific format.  The key length for new keys is always in bytes.
Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).”…””}”(hj™  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Mhjl  hžhubeh}”(h]”Œtrusted-keys-usage-caam”ah ]”h"]”Œtrusted keys usage: caam”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hj}  hžhhŸh¶h Kýubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒTrusted Keys usage: DCP”h]”hŒTrusted Keys usage: DCP”…””}”(hj²  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hj¯  hžhhŸh¶h M
ubh¸)”}”(hŒUsage::”h]”hŒUsage:”…””}”(hjÀ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Mhj¯  hžhubjÊ  )”}”(hŒikeyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring
keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring
keyctl print keyid”h]”hŒikeyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring
keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring
keyctl print keyid”…””}”hjÎ  sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”jÙ  jÚ  uh1jÉ  hŸh¶h Mhj¯  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒã"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format
specific to this DCP key-blob implementation.  The key length for new keys is
always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).”h]”hŒçâ€œkeyctl printâ€ returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format
specific to this DCP key-blob implementation.  The key length for new keys is
always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).”…””}”(hjÜ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Mhj¯  hžhubeh}”(h]”Œtrusted-keys-usage-dcp”ah ]”h"]”Œtrusted keys usage: dcp”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hj}  hžhhŸh¶h M
ubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒEncrypted Keys usage”h]”hŒEncrypted Keys usage”…””}”(hjõ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hjò  hžhhŸh¶h Mubh¸)”}”(hŒÑThe decrypted portion of encrypted keys can contain either a simple symmetric
key or a more complex structure. The format of the more complex structure is
application specific, which is identified by 'format'.”h]”hŒÕThe decrypted portion of encrypted keys can contain either a simple symmetric
key or a more complex structure. The format of the more complex structure is
application specific, which is identified by â€˜formatâ€™.”…””}”(hj  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Mhjò  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒUsage::”h]”hŒUsage:”…””}”(hj  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h Mhjò  hžhubjÊ  )”}”(hX  keyctl add encrypted name "new [format] key-type:master-key-name keylen"
    ring
keyctl add encrypted name "new [format] key-type:master-key-name keylen
    decrypted-data" ring
keyctl add encrypted name "load hex_blob" ring
keyctl update keyid "update key-type:master-key-name"”h]”hX  keyctl add encrypted name "new [format] key-type:master-key-name keylen"
    ring
keyctl add encrypted name "new [format] key-type:master-key-name keylen
    decrypted-data" ring
keyctl add encrypted name "load hex_blob" ring
keyctl update keyid "update key-type:master-key-name"”…””}”hj  sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”jÙ  jÚ  uh1jÉ  hŸh¶h Mhjò  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒWhere::”h]”hŒWhere:”…””}”(hj-  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h M&hjò  hžhubjÊ  )”}”(hŒCformat:= 'default | ecryptfs | enc32'
key-type:= 'trusted' | 'user'”h]”hŒCformat:= 'default | ecryptfs | enc32'
key-type:= 'trusted' | 'user'”…””}”hj;  sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”jÙ  jÚ  uh1jÉ  hŸh¶h M(hjò  hžhubeh}”(h]”Œencrypted-keys-usage”ah ]”h"]”Œencrypted keys usage”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hj}  hžhhŸh¶h Mubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒ+Examples of trusted and encrypted key usage”h]”hŒ+Examples of trusted and encrypted key usage”…””}”(hjT  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hjQ  hžhhŸh¶h M,ubh¸)”}”(hŒ=Create and save a trusted key named "kmk" of length 32 bytes.”h]”hŒACreate and save a trusted key named â€œkmkâ€ of length 32 bytes.”…””}”(hjb  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h M.hjQ  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒ«Note: When using a TPM 2.0 with a persistent key with handle 0x81000001,
append 'keyhandle=0x81000001' to statements between quotes, such as
"new 32 keyhandle=0x81000001".”h]”hŒ³Note: When using a TPM 2.0 with a persistent key with handle 0x81000001,
append â€˜keyhandle=0x81000001â€™ to statements between quotes, such as
â€œnew 32 keyhandle=0x81000001â€.”…””}”(hjp  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h M0hjQ  hžhubjÊ  )”}”(hXG  $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32" @u
440502848

$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
       -3 --alswrv    500   500  keyring: _ses
 97833714 --alswrv    500    -1   \_ keyring: _uid.500
440502848 --alswrv    500   500       \_ trusted: kmk

$ keyctl print 440502848
0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915
3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b
27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722
a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec
d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d
dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0
f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b
e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba

$ keyctl pipe 440502848 > kmk.blob”h]”hXG  $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32" @u
440502848

$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
       -3 --alswrv    500   500  keyring: _ses
 97833714 --alswrv    500    -1   \_ keyring: _uid.500
440502848 --alswrv    500   500       \_ trusted: kmk

$ keyctl print 440502848
0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915
3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b
27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722
a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec
d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d
dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0
f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b
e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba

$ keyctl pipe 440502848 > kmk.blob”…””}”hj~  sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”jÙ  jÚ  uh1jÉ  hŸh¶h M6hjQ  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒ(Load a trusted key from the saved blob::”h]”hŒ'Load a trusted key from the saved blob:”…””}”(hjŒ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h MKhjQ  hžhubjÊ  )”}”(hXu  $ keyctl add trusted kmk "load `cat kmk.blob`" @u
268728824

$ keyctl print 268728824
0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915
3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b
27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722
a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec
d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d
dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0
f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b
e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba”h]”hXu  $ keyctl add trusted kmk "load `cat kmk.blob`" @u
268728824

$ keyctl print 268728824
0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915
3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b
27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722
a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec
d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d
dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0
f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b
e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba”…””}”hjš  sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”jÙ  jÚ  uh1jÉ  hŸh¶h MMhjQ  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒ:Reseal (TPM specific) a trusted key under new PCR values::”h]”hŒ9Reseal (TPM specific) a trusted key under new PCR values:”…””}”(hj¨  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h MZhjQ  hžhubjÊ  )”}”(hXË  $ keyctl update 268728824 "update pcrinfo=`cat pcr.blob`"
$ keyctl print 268728824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”h]”hXË  $ keyctl update 268728824 "update pcrinfo=`cat pcr.blob`"
$ keyctl print 268728824
010100000000002c0002800093c35a09b70fff26e7a98ae786c641e678ec6ffb6b46d805
77c8a6377aed9d3219c6dfec4b23ffe3000001005d37d472ac8a44023fbb3d18583a4f73
d3a076c0858f6f1dcaa39ea0f119911ff03f5406df4f7f27f41da8d7194f45c9f4e00f2e
df449f266253aa3f52e55c53de147773e00f0f9aca86c64d94c95382265968c354c5eab4
9638c5ae99c89de1e0997242edfb0b501744e11ff9762dfd951cffd93227cc513384e7e6
e782c29435c7ec2edafaa2f4c1fe6e7a781b59549ff5296371b42133777dcc5b8b971610
94bc67ede19e43ddb9dc2baacad374a36feaf0314d700af0a65c164b7082401740e489c9
7ef6a24defe4846104209bf0c3eced7fa1a672ed5b125fc9d8cd88b476a658a4434644ef
df8ae9a178e9f83ba9f08d10fa47e4226b98b0702f06b3b8”…””}”hj¶  sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”jÙ  jÚ  uh1jÉ  hŸh¶h M\hjQ  hžhubh¸)”}”(hX£  The initial consumer of trusted keys is EVM, which at boot time needs a high
quality symmetric key for HMAC protection of file metadata. The use of a
trusted key provides strong guarantees that the EVM key has not been
compromised by a user level problem, and when sealed to a platform integrity
state, protects against boot and offline attacks. Create and save an
encrypted key "evm" using the above trusted key "kmk":”h]”hX«  The initial consumer of trusted keys is EVM, which at boot time needs a high
quality symmetric key for HMAC protection of file metadata. The use of a
trusted key provides strong guarantees that the EVM key has not been
compromised by a user level problem, and when sealed to a platform integrity
state, protects against boot and offline attacks. Create and save an
encrypted key â€œevmâ€ using the above trusted key â€œkmkâ€:”…””}”(hjÄ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h MihjQ  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒoption 1: omitting 'format'::”h]”hŒ option 1: omitting â€˜formatâ€™:”…””}”(hjÒ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h MphjQ  hžhubjÊ  )”}”(hŒ<$ keyctl add encrypted evm "new trusted:kmk 32" @u
159771175”h]”hŒ<$ keyctl add encrypted evm "new trusted:kmk 32" @u
159771175”…””}”hjà  sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”jÙ  jÚ  uh1jÉ  hŸh¶h MrhjQ  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒ5option 2: explicitly defining 'format' as 'default'::”h]”hŒ<option 2: explicitly defining â€˜formatâ€™ as â€˜defaultâ€™:”…””}”(hjî  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h MuhjQ  hžhubjÊ  )”}”(hX?  $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default trusted:kmk 32" @u
159771175

$ keyctl print 159771175
default trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b3
82dbbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0
24717c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc

$ keyctl pipe 159771175 > evm.blob”h]”hX?  $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default trusted:kmk 32" @u
159771175

$ keyctl print 159771175
default trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b3
82dbbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0
24717c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc

$ keyctl pipe 159771175 > evm.blob”…””}”hjü  sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”jÙ  jÚ  uh1jÉ  hŸh¶h MwhjQ  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒ-Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob::”h]”hŒ0Load an encrypted key â€œevmâ€ from saved blob:”…””}”(hj
  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h MhjQ  hžhubjÊ  )”}”(hX  $ keyctl add encrypted evm "load `cat evm.blob`" @u
831684262

$ keyctl print 831684262
default trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b3
82dbbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0
24717c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc”h]”hX  $ keyctl add encrypted evm "load `cat evm.blob`" @u
831684262

$ keyctl print 831684262
default trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b3
82dbbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0
24717c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc”…””}”hj  sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”jÙ  jÚ  uh1jÉ  hŸh¶h MƒhjQ  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒGInstantiate an encrypted key "evm" using user-provided decrypted data::”h]”hŒJInstantiate an encrypted key â€œevmâ€ using user-provided decrypted data:”…””}”(hj&  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h M‹hjQ  hžhubjÊ  )”}”(hXX  $ evmkey=$(dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=32 | xxd -c32 -p)
$ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 $evmkey" @u
794890253

$ keyctl print 794890253
default user:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b382d
bbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0247
17c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc”h]”hXX  $ evmkey=$(dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=32 | xxd -c32 -p)
$ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 $evmkey" @u
794890253

$ keyctl print 794890253
default user:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b382d
bbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0247
17c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc”…””}”hj4  sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”jÙ  jÚ  uh1jÉ  hŸh¶h MhjQ  hžhubh¸)”}”(hX?  Other uses for trusted and encrypted keys, such as for disk and file encryption
are anticipated.  In particular the new format 'ecryptfs' has been defined
in order to use encrypted keys to mount an eCryptfs filesystem.  More details
about the usage can be found in the file
``Documentation/security/keys/ecryptfs.rst``.”h]”(hX  Other uses for trusted and encrypted keys, such as for disk and file encryption
are anticipated.  In particular the new format â€˜ecryptfsâ€™ has been defined
in order to use encrypted keys to mount an eCryptfs filesystem.  More details
about the usage can be found in the file
”…””}”(hjB  hžhhŸNh Nubj†  )”}”(hŒ,``Documentation/security/keys/ecryptfs.rst``”h]”hŒ(Documentation/security/keys/ecryptfs.rst”…””}”(hjJ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1j…  hjB  ubhŒ.”…””}”(hjB  hžhhŸNh Nubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h M–hjQ  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒÛAnother new format 'enc32' has been defined in order to support encrypted keys
with payload size of 32 bytes. This will initially be used for nvdimm security
but may expand to other usages that require 32 bytes payload.”h]”hŒßAnother new format â€˜enc32â€™ has been defined in order to support encrypted keys
with payload size of 32 bytes. This will initially be used for nvdimm security
but may expand to other usages that require 32 bytes payload.”…””}”(hjb  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h MœhjQ  hžhubeh}”(h]”Œ+examples-of-trusted-and-encrypted-key-usage”ah ]”h"]”Œ+examples of trusted and encrypted key usage”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hj}  hžhhŸh¶h M,ubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒTPM 2.0 ASN.1 Key Format”h]”hŒTPM 2.0 ASN.1 Key Format”…””}”(hj{  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hjx  hžhhŸh¶h M¢ubh¸)”}”(hŒÔThe TPM 2.0 ASN.1 key format is designed to be easily recognisable,
even in binary form (fixing a problem we had with the TPM 1.2 ASN.1
format) and to be extensible for additions like importable keys and
policy::”h]”hŒÓThe TPM 2.0 ASN.1 key format is designed to be easily recognisable,
even in binary form (fixing a problem we had with the TPM 1.2 ASN.1
format) and to be extensible for additions like importable keys and
policy:”…””}”(hj‰  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h M¤hjx  hžhubjÊ  )”}”(hŒÍTPMKey ::= SEQUENCE {
    type            OBJECT IDENTIFIER
    emptyAuth       [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL
    parent          INTEGER
    pubkey          OCTET STRING
    privkey         OCTET STRING
}”h]”hŒÍTPMKey ::= SEQUENCE {
    type            OBJECT IDENTIFIER
    emptyAuth       [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL
    parent          INTEGER
    pubkey          OCTET STRING
    privkey         OCTET STRING
}”…””}”hj—  sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”jÙ  jÚ  uh1jÉ  hŸh¶h M©hjx  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒÖtype is what distinguishes the key even in binary form since the OID
is provided by the TCG to be unique and thus forms a recognizable
binary pattern at offset 3 in the key.  The OIDs currently made
available are::”h]”hŒÕtype is what distinguishes the key even in binary form since the OID
is provided by the TCG to be unique and thus forms a recognizable
binary pattern at offset 3 in the key.  The OIDs currently made
available are:”…””}”(hj¥  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h M±hjx  hžhubjÊ  )”}”(hXI  2.23.133.10.1.3 TPM Loadable key.  This is an asymmetric key (Usually
                RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a
                TPM2_Load() operation.

2.23.133.10.1.4 TPM Importable Key.  This is an asymmetric key (Usually
                RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a
                TPM2_Import() operation.

2.23.133.10.1.5 TPM Sealed Data.  This is a set of data (up to 128
                bytes) which is sealed by the TPM.  It usually
                represents a symmetric key and must be unsealed before
                use.”h]”hXI  2.23.133.10.1.3 TPM Loadable key.  This is an asymmetric key (Usually
                RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a
                TPM2_Load() operation.

2.23.133.10.1.4 TPM Importable Key.  This is an asymmetric key (Usually
                RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a
                TPM2_Import() operation.

2.23.133.10.1.5 TPM Sealed Data.  This is a set of data (up to 128
                bytes) which is sealed by the TPM.  It usually
                represents a symmetric key and must be unsealed before
                use.”…””}”hj³  sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”jÙ  jÚ  uh1jÉ  hŸh¶h M¶hjx  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒ7The trusted key code only uses the TPM Sealed Data OID.”h]”hŒ7The trusted key code only uses the TPM Sealed Data OID.”…””}”(hjÁ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h MÃhjx  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒçemptyAuth is true if the key has well known authorization "".  If it
is false or not present, the key requires an explicit authorization
phrase.  This is used by most user space consumers to decide whether
to prompt for a password.”h]”hŒëemptyAuth is true if the key has well known authorization â€œâ€.  If it
is false or not present, the key requires an explicit authorization
phrase.  This is used by most user space consumers to decide whether
to prompt for a password.”…””}”(hjÏ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h MÅhjx  hžhubh¸)”}”(hX³  parent represents the parent key handle, either in the 0x81 MSO space,
like 0x81000001 for the RSA primary storage key.  Userspace programmes
also support specifying the primary handle in the 0x40 MSO space.  If
this happens the Elliptic Curve variant of the primary key using the
TCG defined template will be generated on the fly into a volatile
object and used as the parent.  The current kernel code only supports
the 0x81 MSO form.”h]”hX³  parent represents the parent key handle, either in the 0x81 MSO space,
like 0x81000001 for the RSA primary storage key.  Userspace programmes
also support specifying the primary handle in the 0x40 MSO space.  If
this happens the Elliptic Curve variant of the primary key using the
TCG defined template will be generated on the fly into a volatile
object and used as the parent.  The current kernel code only supports
the 0x81 MSO form.”…””}”(hjÝ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h MÊhjx  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒ—pubkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PRIVATE excluding the
initial TPM2B header, which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octet
string length.”h]”hŒ—pubkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PRIVATE excluding the
initial TPM2B header, which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octet
string length.”…””}”(hjë  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h MÒhjx  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒ–privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the
initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed
string length.”h]”hŒ–privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the
initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed
string length.”…””}”(hjù  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸh¶h MÖhjx  hžhubeh}”(h]”Œtpm-2-0-asn-1-key-format”ah ]”h"]”Œtpm 2.0 asn.1 key format”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hj}  hžhhŸh¶h M¢ubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒDCP Blob Format”h]”hŒDCP Blob Format”…””}”(hj	  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hj	  hžhhŸh¶h MÛubh¸)”}”(hXB  The Data Co-Processor (DCP) provides hardware-bound AES keys using its
AES encryption engine only. It does not provide direct key sealing/unsealing.
To make DCP hardware encryption keys usable as trust source, we define
our own custom format that uses a hardware-bound key to secure the sealing
key stored in the key blob.”h]”hXB  The Data Co-Processor (DCP) provides hardware-bound AES keys using its
AES encryption engine only. It does not provide direct key sealing/unsealing.
To make DCP hardware encryption keys usable as trust source, we define
our own custom format that uses a hardware-bound key to secure the sealing
key stored in the key blob.”…””}”(hj 	  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸŒy/var/lib/git/docbuild/linux/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted:477: ./security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c”h Khj	  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒÍWhenever a new trusted key using DCP is generated, we generate a random 128-bit
blob encryption key (BEK) and 128-bit nonce. The BEK and nonce are used to
encrypt the trusted key payload using AES-128-GCM.”h]”hŒÍWhenever a new trusted key using DCP is generated, we generate a random 128-bit
blob encryption key (BEK) and 128-bit nonce. The BEK and nonce are used to
encrypt the trusted key payload using AES-128-GCM.”…””}”(hj/	  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸŒy/var/lib/git/docbuild/linux/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted:477: ./security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c”h Khj	  hžhubh¸)”}”(hX   The BEK itself is encrypted using the hardware-bound key using the DCP's AES
encryption engine with AES-128-ECB. The encrypted BEK, generated nonce,
BEK-encrypted payload and authentication tag make up the blob format together
with a version number, payload length and authentication tag.”h]”hX"  The BEK itself is encrypted using the hardware-bound key using the DCPâ€™s AES
encryption engine with AES-128-ECB. The encrypted BEK, generated nonce,
BEK-encrypted payload and authentication tag make up the blob format together
with a version number, payload length and authentication tag.”…””}”(hj>	  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸŒy/var/lib/git/docbuild/linux/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted:477: ./security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c”h K!hj	  hžhubh Œindex”“”)”}”(hhh]”h}”(h]”•õ/      h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œentries”]”(Œsingle”Œdcp_blob_fmt (C struct)”Œc.dcp_blob_fmt”hNt”auh1jM	  hj	  hžhhŸŒy/var/lib/git/docbuild/linux/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted:480: ./security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c”h Nubh Œdesc”“”)”}”(hhh]”(h Œdesc_signature”“”)”}”(hŒdcp_blob_fmt”h]”h Œdesc_signature_line”“”)”}”(hŒstruct dcp_blob_fmt”h]”(h Œdesc_sig_keyword”“”)”}”(hŒstruct”h]”hŒstruct”…””}”(hjr	  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”Œk”ah"]”h$]”h&]”uh1jp	  hjl	  hžhhŸŒy/var/lib/git/docbuild/linux/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted:480: ./security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c”h Kubh Œdesc_sig_space”“”)”}”(hŒ ”h]”hŒ ”…””}”(hj„	  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”Œw”ah"]”h$]”h&]”uh1j‚	  hjl	  hžhhŸj	  h Kubh Œ	desc_name”“”)”}”(hŒdcp_blob_fmt”h]”h Œdesc_sig_name”“”)”}”(hjh	  h]”hŒdcp_blob_fmt”…””}”(hj›	  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”Œn”ah"]”h$]”h&]”uh1j™	  hj•	  ubah}”(h]”h ]”(Œsig-name”Œdescname”eh"]”h$]”h&]”jÙ  jÚ  uh1j“	  hjl	  hžhhŸj	  h Kubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”jÙ  jÚ  Œadd_permalink”ˆuh1jj	  Œsphinx_line_type”Œ
declarator”hjf	  hžhhŸj	  h Kubah}”(h]”j\	  ah ]”(Œsig”Œ
sig-object”eh"]”h$]”h&]”Œis_multiline”ˆŒ
_toc_parts”)Œ	_toc_name”huh1jd	  hŸj	  h Khja	  hžhubh Œdesc_content”“”)”}”(hhh]”h¸)”}”(hŒDCP BLOB format.”h]”hŒDCP BLOB format.”…””}”(hjÊ	  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸŒy/var/lib/git/docbuild/linux/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted:480: ./security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c”h K*hjÇ	  hžhubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1jÅ	  hja	  hžhhŸj	  h Kubeh}”(h]”h ]”(Œc”Œstruct”eh"]”h$]”h&]”Œdomain”jâ	  Œobjtype”jã	  Œdesctype”jã	  Œnoindex”‰Œnoindexentry”‰Œnocontentsentry”‰uh1j_	  hžhhj	  hŸj^	  h NubhŒ	container”“”)”}”(hX¹  **Definition**::

  struct dcp_blob_fmt {
      __u8 fmt_version;
      __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
      __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
      __le32 payload_len;
      __u8 payload[];
  };

**Members**

``fmt_version``
  Format version, currently being ``1``.

``blob_key``
  Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt **payload**,
  **blob_key** itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in
  AES-128-ECB mode by DCP.

``nonce``
  Random nonce used for **payload** encryption.

``payload_len``
  Length of the plain text **payload**.

``payload``
  The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and **blob_key**,
  GCM auth tag of size DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN is attached at the end of it.”h]”(h¸)”}”(hŒ**Definition**::”h]”(hŒstrong”“”)”}”(hŒ**Definition**”h]”hŒ
Definition”…””}”(hjù	  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1j÷	  hjó	  ubhŒ:”…””}”(hjó	  hžhhŸNh Nubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸŒy/var/lib/git/docbuild/linux/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted:480: ./security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c”h K.hjï	  ubjÊ  )”}”(hŒŸstruct dcp_blob_fmt {
    __u8 fmt_version;
    __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
    __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
    __le32 payload_len;
    __u8 payload[];
};”h]”hŒŸstruct dcp_blob_fmt {
    __u8 fmt_version;
    __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
    __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
    __le32 payload_len;
    __u8 payload[];
};”…””}”hj
  sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”jÙ  jÚ  uh1jÉ  hŸŒy/var/lib/git/docbuild/linux/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted:480: ./security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c”h K0hjï	  ubh¸)”}”(hŒ**Members**”h]”jø	  )”}”(hj#
  h]”hŒMembers”…””}”(hj%
  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1j÷	  hj!
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GCM auth tag of size DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN is attached at the end of it.”…””}”(hj¢  hžhhŸNh Nubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸjž  h K3hjŸ  ubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1j^
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  hjï	  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”Œkernelindent”ah"]”h$]”h&]”uh1jí	  hj	  hžhhŸj^	  h Nubh¸)”}”(hŒ**Description**”h]”jø	  )”}”(hjÝ  h]”hŒDescription”…””}”(hjß  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1j÷	  hjÛ  ubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h·hŸŒy/var/lib/git/docbuild/linux/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted:480: ./security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c”h K7hj	  hžhubh¸)”}”(hŒaThe total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + **payload_len** +
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