€•žP      Œsphinx.addnodes”Œdocument”“”)”}”(Œ	rawsource”Œ ”Œchildren”]”(Œtranslations”ŒLanguagesNode”“”)”}”(hhh]”(h Œpending_xref”“”)”}”(hhh]”Œdocutils.nodes”ŒText”“”ŒChinese (Simplified)”…””}”Œparent”hsbaŒ
attributes”}”(Œids”]”Œclasses”]”Œnames”]”Œdupnames”]”Œbackrefs”]”Œ	refdomain”Œstd”Œreftype”Œdoc”Œ	reftarget”Œ./translations/zh_CN/driver-api/nvdimm/security”Œmodname”NŒ	classname”NŒrefexplicit”ˆuŒtagname”hhhubh)”}”(hhh]”hŒChinese (Traditional)”…””}”hh2sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œ	refdomain”h)Œreftype”h+Œ	reftarget”Œ./translations/zh_TW/driver-api/nvdimm/security”Œmodname”NŒ	classname”NŒrefexplicit”ˆuh1hhhubh)”}”(hhh]”hŒItalian”…””}”hhFsbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œ	refdomain”h)Œreftype”h+Œ	reftarget”Œ./translations/it_IT/driver-api/nvdimm/security”Œmodname”NŒ	classname”NŒrefexplicit”ˆuh1hhhubh)”}”(hhh]”hŒJapanese”…””}”hhZsbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œ	refdomain”h)Œreftype”h+Œ	reftarget”Œ./translations/ja_JP/driver-api/nvdimm/security”Œmodname”NŒ	classname”NŒrefexplicit”ˆuh1hhhubh)”}”(hhh]”hŒKorean”…””}”hhnsbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œ	refdomain”h)Œreftype”h+Œ	reftarget”Œ./translations/ko_KR/driver-api/nvdimm/security”Œmodname”NŒ	classname”NŒrefexplicit”ˆuh1hhhubh)”}”(hhh]”hŒPortuguese (Brazilian)”…””}”hh‚sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œ	refdomain”h)Œreftype”h+Œ	reftarget”Œ./translations/pt_BR/driver-api/nvdimm/security”Œmodname”NŒ	classname”NŒrefexplicit”ˆuh1hhhubh)”}”(hhh]”hŒSpanish”…””}”hh–sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œ	refdomain”h)Œreftype”h+Œ	reftarget”Œ./translations/sp_SP/driver-api/nvdimm/security”Œmodname”NŒ	classname”NŒrefexplicit”ˆuh1hhhubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œcurrent_language”ŒEnglish”uh1h
hhŒ	_document”hŒsource”NŒline”NubhŒsection”“”)”}”(hhh]”(hŒtitle”“”)”}”(hŒNVDIMM Security”h]”hŒNVDIMM Security”…””}”(hh¼h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hºhh·h²hh³ŒH/var/lib/git/docbuild/linux/Documentation/driver-api/nvdimm/security.rst”h´Kubh¶)”}”(hhh]”(h»)”}”(hŒ1. Introduction”h]”hŒ1. Introduction”…””}”(hhÎh²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hºhhËh²hh³hÊh´KubhŒ	paragraph”“”)”}”(hXÄ  With the introduction of Intel Device Specific Methods (DSM) v1.8
specification [1], security DSMs are introduced. The spec added the following
security DSMs: "get security state", "set passphrase", "disable passphrase",
"unlock unit", "freeze lock", "secure erase", and "overwrite". A security_ops
data structure has been added to struct dimm in order to support the security
operations and generic APIs are exposed to allow vendor neutral operations.”h]”hXà  With the introduction of Intel Device Specific Methods (DSM) v1.8
specification [1], security DSMs are introduced. The spec added the following
security DSMs: â€œget security stateâ€, â€œset passphraseâ€, â€œdisable passphraseâ€,
â€œunlock unitâ€, â€œfreeze lockâ€, â€œsecure eraseâ€, and â€œoverwriteâ€. A security_ops
data structure has been added to struct dimm in order to support the security
operations and generic APIs are exposed to allow vendor neutral operations.”…””}”(hhÞh²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´KhhËh²hubeh}”(h]”Œintroduction”ah ]”h"]”Œ1. introduction”ah$]”h&]”uh1hµhh·h²hh³hÊh´Kubh¶)”}”(hhh]”(h»)”}”(hŒ2. Sysfs Interface”h]”hŒ2. Sysfs Interface”…””}”(hh÷h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hºhhôh²hh³hÊh´KubhÝ)”}”(hŒThe "security" sysfs attribute is provided in the nvdimm sysfs directory. For
example:
/sys/devices/LNXSYSTM:00/LNXSYBUS:00/ACPI0012:00/ndbus0/nmem0/security”h]”hŒ¡The â€œsecurityâ€ sysfs attribute is provided in the nvdimm sysfs directory. For
example:
/sys/devices/LNXSYSTM:00/LNXSYBUS:00/ACPI0012:00/ndbus0/nmem0/security”…””}”(hj  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´Khhôh²hubhÝ)”}”(hŒóThe "show" attribute of that attribute will display the security state for
that DIMM. The following states are available: disabled, unlocked, locked,
frozen, and overwrite. If security is not supported, the sysfs attribute
will not be visible.”h]”hŒ÷The â€œshowâ€ attribute of that attribute will display the security state for
that DIMM. The following states are available: disabled, unlocked, locked,
frozen, and overwrite. If security is not supported, the sysfs attribute
will not be visible.”…””}”(hj  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´Khhôh²hubhÝ)”}”(hX  The "store" attribute takes several commands when it is being written to
in order to support some of the security functionalities:
update <old_keyid> <new_keyid> - enable or update passphrase.
disable <keyid> - disable enabled security and remove key.
freeze - freeze changing of security states.
erase <keyid> - delete existing user encryption key.
overwrite <keyid> - wipe the entire nvdimm.
master_update <keyid> <new_keyid> - enable or update master passphrase.
master_erase <keyid> - delete existing user encryption key.”h]”hX  The â€œstoreâ€ attribute takes several commands when it is being written to
in order to support some of the security functionalities:
update <old_keyid> <new_keyid> - enable or update passphrase.
disable <keyid> - disable enabled security and remove key.
freeze - freeze changing of security states.
erase <keyid> - delete existing user encryption key.
overwrite <keyid> - wipe the entire nvdimm.
master_update <keyid> <new_keyid> - enable or update master passphrase.
master_erase <keyid> - delete existing user encryption key.”…””}”(hj!  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´Khhôh²hubeh}”(h]”Œsysfs-interface”ah ]”h"]”Œ2. sysfs interface”ah$]”h&]”uh1hµhh·h²hh³hÊh´Kubh¶)”}”(hhh]”(h»)”}”(hŒ3. Key Management”h]”hŒ3. Key Management”…””}”(hj:  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hºhj7  h²hh³hÊh´K%ubhÝ)”}”(hŒøThe key is associated to the payload by the DIMM id. For example:
# cat /sys/devices/LNXSYSTM:00/LNXSYBUS:00/ACPI0012:00/ndbus0/nmem0/nfit/id
8089-a2-1740-00000133
The DIMM id would be provided along with the key payload (passphrase) to
the kernel.”h]”hŒøThe key is associated to the payload by the DIMM id. For example:
# cat /sys/devices/LNXSYSTM:00/LNXSYBUS:00/ACPI0012:00/ndbus0/nmem0/nfit/id
8089-a2-1740-00000133
The DIMM id would be provided along with the key payload (passphrase) to
the kernel.”…””}”(hjH  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´K'hj7  h²hubhÝ)”}”(hXg  The security keys are managed on the basis of a single key per DIMM. The
key "passphrase" is expected to be 32bytes long. This is similar to the ATA
security specification [2]. A key is initially acquired via the request_key()
kernel API call during nvdimm unlock. It is up to the user to make sure that
all the keys are in the kernel user keyring for unlock.”h]”hXk  The security keys are managed on the basis of a single key per DIMM. The
key â€œpassphraseâ€ is expected to be 32bytes long. This is similar to the ATA
security specification [2]. A key is initially acquired via the request_key()
kernel API call during nvdimm unlock. It is up to the user to make sure that
all the keys are in the kernel user keyring for unlock.”…””}”(hjV  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´K-hj7  h²hubhÝ)”}”(hŒnA nvdimm encrypted-key of format enc32 has the description format of:
nvdimm:<bus-provider-specific-unique-id>”h]”hŒnA nvdimm encrypted-key of format enc32 has the description format of:
nvdimm:<bus-provider-specific-unique-id>”…””}”(hjd  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´K3hj7  h²hubhÝ)”}”(hŒ¼See file ``Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst`` for creating
encrypted-keys of enc32 format. TPM usage with a master trusted key is
preferred for sealing the encrypted-keys.”h]”(hŒ	See file ”…””}”(hjr  h²hh³Nh´NubhŒliteral”“”)”}”(hŒ5``Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst``”h]”hŒ1Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst”…””}”(hj|  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1jz  hjr  ubhŒ~ for creating
encrypted-keys of enc32 format. TPM usage with a master trusted key is
preferred for sealing the encrypted-keys.”…””}”(hjr  h²hh³Nh´Nubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´K6hj7  h²hubeh}”(h]”Œkey-management”ah ]”h"]”Œ3. key management”ah$]”h&]”uh1hµhh·h²hh³hÊh´K%ubh¶)”}”(hhh]”(h»)”}”(hŒ4. Unlocking”h]”hŒ4. Unlocking”…””}”(hjŸ  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hºhjœ  h²hh³hÊh´K;ubhÝ)”}”(hXM  When the DIMMs are being enumerated by the kernel, the kernel will attempt to
retrieve the key from the kernel user keyring. This is the only time
a locked DIMM can be unlocked. Once unlocked, the DIMM will remain unlocked
until reboot. Typically an entity (i.e. shell script) will inject all the
relevant encrypted-keys into the kernel user keyring during the initramfs phase.
This provides the unlock function access to all the related keys that contain
the passphrase for the respective nvdimms.  It is also recommended that the
keys are injected before libnvdimm is loaded by modprobe.”h]”hXM  When the DIMMs are being enumerated by the kernel, the kernel will attempt to
retrieve the key from the kernel user keyring. This is the only time
a locked DIMM can be unlocked. Once unlocked, the DIMM will remain unlocked
until reboot. Typically an entity (i.e. shell script) will inject all the
relevant encrypted-keys into the kernel user keyring during the initramfs phase.
This provides the unlock function access to all the related keys that contain
the passphrase for the respective nvdimms.  It is also recommended that the
keys are injected before libnvdimm is loaded by modprobe.”…””}”(hj­  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´K<hjœ  h²hubeh}”(h]”Œ	unlocking”ah ]”h"]”Œ4. unlocking”ah$]”h&]”uh1hµhh·h²hh³hÊh´K;ubh¶)”}”(hhh]”(h»)”}”(hŒ	5. Update”h]”hŒ	5. Update”…””}”(hjÆ  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hºhjÃ  h²hh³hÊh´KFubhÝ)”}”(hXñ  When doing an update, it is expected that the existing key is removed from
the kernel user keyring and reinjected as different (old) key. It's irrelevant
what the key description is for the old key since we are only interested in the
keyid when doing the update operation. It is also expected that the new key
is injected with the description format described from earlier in this
document.  The update command written to the sysfs attribute will be with
the format:
update <old keyid> <new keyid>”h]”hXó  When doing an update, it is expected that the existing key is removed from
the kernel user keyring and reinjected as different (old) key. Itâ€™s irrelevant
what the key description is for the old key since we are only interested in the
keyid when doing the update operation. It is also expected that the new key
is injected with the description format described from earlier in this
document.  The update command written to the sysfs attribute will be with
the format:
update <old keyid> <new keyid>”…””}”(hjÔ  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´KGhjÃ  h²hubhÝ)”}”(hŒRIf there is no old keyid due to a security enabling, then a 0 should be
passed in.”h]”hŒRIf there is no old keyid due to a security enabling, then a 0 should be
passed in.”…””}”(hjâ  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´KPhjÃ  h²hubeh}”(h]”Œupdate”ah ]”h"]”Œ	5. update”ah$]”h&]”uh1hµhh·h²hh³hÊh´KFubh¶)”}”(hhh]”(h»)”}”(hŒ	6. Freeze”h]”hŒ	6. Freeze”…””}”(hjû  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hºhjø  h²hh³hÊh´KTubhÝ)”}”(hŒpThe freeze operation does not require any keys. The security config can be
frozen by a user with root privilege.”h]”hŒpThe freeze operation does not require any keys. The security config can be
frozen by a user with root privilege.”…””}”(hj	  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´KUhjø  h²hubeh}”(h]”Œfreeze”ah ]”h"]”Œ	6. freeze”ah$]”h&]”uh1hµhh·h²hh³hÊh´KTubh¶)”}”(hhh]”(h»)”}”(hŒ
7. Disable”h]”hŒ
7. Disable”…””}”(hj"  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hºhj  h²hh³hÊh´KYubhÝ)”}”(hŒ7The security disable command format is:
disable <keyid>”h]”hŒ7The security disable command format is:
disable <keyid>”…””}”(hj0  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´KZhj  h²hubhÝ)”}”(hŒkAn key with the current passphrase payload that is tied to the nvdimm should be
in the kernel user keyring.”h]”hŒkAn key with the current passphrase payload that is tied to the nvdimm should be
in the kernel user keyring.”…””}”(hj>  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´K]hj  h²hubeh}”(h]”Œdisable”ah ]”h"]”Œ
7. disable”ah$]”h&]”uh1hµhh·h²hh³hÊh´KYubh¶)”}”(hhh]”(h»)”}”(hŒ8. Secure Erase”h]”hŒ8. Secure Erase”…””}”(hjW  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hºhjT  h²hh³hÊh´KaubhÝ)”}”(hŒ=The command format for doing a secure erase is:
erase <keyid>”h]”hŒ=The command format for doing a secure erase is:
erase <keyid>”…””}”(hje  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´KbhjT  h²hubhÝ)”}”(hŒkAn key with the current passphrase payload that is tied to the nvdimm should be
in the kernel user keyring.”h]”hŒkAn key with the current passphrase payload that is tied to the nvdimm should be
in the kernel user keyring.”…””}”(hjs  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´KehjT  h²hubeh}”(h]”Œsecure-erase”ah ]”h"]”Œ8. secure erase”ah$]”h&]”uh1hµhh·h²hh³hÊh´Kaubh¶)”}”(hhh]”(h»)”}”(hŒ9. Overwrite”h]”hŒ9. Overwrite”…””}”(hjŒ  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hºhj‰  h²hh³hÊh´KiubhÝ)”}”(hŒ?The command format for doing an overwrite is:
overwrite <keyid>”h]”hŒ?The command format for doing an overwrite is:
overwrite <keyid>”…””}”(hjš  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´Kjhj‰  h²hubhÝ)”}”(hŒvOverwrite can be done without a key if security is not enabled. A key serial
of 0 can be passed in to indicate no key.”h]”hŒvOverwrite can be done without a key if security is not enabled. A key serial
of 0 can be passed in to indicate no key.”…””}”(hj¨  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´Kmhj‰  h²hubhÝ)”}”(hŒ’The sysfs attribute "security" can be polled to wait on overwrite completion.
Overwrite can last tens of minutes or more depending on nvdimm size.”h]”hŒ–The sysfs attribute â€œsecurityâ€ can be polled to wait on overwrite completion.
Overwrite can last tens of minutes or more depending on nvdimm size.”…””}”(hj¶  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´Kphj‰  h²hubhÝ)”}”(hŒŒAn encrypted-key with the current user passphrase that is tied to the nvdimm
should be injected and its keyid should be passed in via sysfs.”h]”hŒŒAn encrypted-key with the current user passphrase that is tied to the nvdimm
should be injected and its keyid should be passed in via sysfs.”…””}”(hjÄ  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´Kshj‰  h²hubeh}”(h]”Œ	overwrite”ah ]”h"]”Œ9. overwrite”ah$]”h&]”uh1hµhh·h²hh³hÊh´Kiubh¶)”}”(hhh]”(h»)”}”(hŒ10. Master Update”h]”hŒ10. Master Update”…””}”(hjÝ  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hºhjÚ  h²hh³hÊh´KwubhÝ)”}”(hŒOThe command format for doing a master update is:
update <old keyid> <new keyid>”h]”hŒOThe command format for doing a master update is:
update <old keyid> <new keyid>”…””}”(hjë  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´KxhjÚ  h²hubhÝ)”}”(hŒ³The operating mechanism for master update is identical to update except the
master passphrase key is passed to the kernel. The master passphrase key
is just another encrypted-key.”h]”hŒ³The operating mechanism for master update is identical to update except the
master passphrase key is passed to the kernel. The master passphrase key
is just another encrypted-key.”…””}”(hjù  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´K{hjÚ  h²hubhÝ)”}”(hŒ9This command is only available when security is disabled.”h]”hŒ9This command is only available when security is disabled.”…””}”(hj  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´KhjÚ  h²hubeh}”(h]”Œmaster-update”ah ]”h"]”Œ10. master update”ah$]”h&]”uh1hµhh·h²hh³hÊh´Kwubh¶)”}”(hhh]”(h»)”}”(hŒ11. Master Erase”h]”hŒ11. Master Erase”…””}”(hj   h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hºhj  h²hh³hÊh´K‚ubhÝ)”}”(hŒLThe command format for doing a master erase is:
master_erase <current keyid>”h]”hŒLThe command format for doing a master erase is:
master_erase <current keyid>”…””}”(hj.  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´Kƒhj  h²hubhÝ)”}”(hŒ©This command has the same operating mechanism as erase except the master
passphrase key is passed to the kernel. The master passphrase key is just
another encrypted-key.”h]”hŒ©This command has the same operating mechanism as erase except the master
passphrase key is passed to the kernel. The master passphrase key is just
another encrypted-key.”…””}”(hj<  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´K†hj  h²hubhÝ)”}”(hŒnThis command is only available when the master security is enabled, indicated
by the extended security status.”h]”hŒnThis command is only available when the master security is enabled, indicated
by the extended security status.”…””}”(hjJ  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´KŠhj  h²hubhÝ)”}”(hŒ<[1]: https://pmem.io/documents/NVDIMM_DSM_Interface-V1.8.pdf”h]”(hŒ[1]: ”…””}”(hjX  h²hh³Nh´NubhŒ	reference”“”)”}”(hŒ7https://pmem.io/documents/NVDIMM_DSM_Interface-V1.8.pdf”h]”hŒ7https://pmem.io/documents/NVDIMM_DSM_Interface-V1.8.pdf”…””}”(hjb  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œrefuri”jd  uh1j`  hjX  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´Khj  h²hubhÝ)”}”(hŒd[2]: http://www.t13.org/documents/UploadedDocuments/docs2006/e05179r4-ACS-SecurityClarifications.pdf”h]”(hŒ[2]: ”…””}”(hjw  h²hh³Nh´Nubja  )”}”(hŒ_http://www.t13.org/documents/UploadedDocuments/docs2006/e05179r4-ACS-SecurityClarifications.pdf”h]”hŒ_http://www.t13.org/documents/UploadedDocuments/docs2006/e05179r4-ACS-SecurityClarifications.pdf”…””}”(hj  h²hh³Nh´Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œrefuri”j  uh1j`  hjw  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÜh³hÊh´Khj  h²hubeh}”(h]”Œmaster-erase”ah ]”h"]”Œ11. master erase”ah$]”h&]”uh1hµhh·h²hh³hÊh´K‚ubeh}”(h]”Œnvdimm-security”ah ]”h"]”Œnvdimm security”ah$]”h&]”uh1hµhhh²hh³hÊh´Kubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œsource”hÊuh1hŒcurrent_source”NŒcurrent_line”NŒsettings”Œdocutils.frontend”ŒValues”“”)”}”(hºNŒ	generator”NŒ	datestamp”NŒsource_link”NŒ
source_url”NŒtoc_backlinks”Œentry”Œfootnote_backlinks”KŒsectnum_xform”KŒstrip_comments”NŒstrip_elements_with_classes”NŒstrip_classes”NŒreport_level”KŒ
halt_level”KŒexit_status_level”KŒdebug”NŒwarning_stream”NŒ	traceback”ˆŒinput_encoding”Œ	utf-8-sig”Œinput_encoding_error_handler”Œstrict”Œoutput_encoding”Œutf-8”Œoutput_encoding_error_handler”jÇ  Œerror_encoding”Œutf-8”Œerror_encoding_error_handler”Œbackslashreplace”Œlanguage_code”Œen”Œrecord_dependencies”NŒconfig”NŒ	id_prefix”hŒauto_id_prefix”Œid”Œdump_settings”NŒdump_internals”NŒdump_transforms”NŒdump_pseudo_xml”NŒexpose_internals”NŒstrict_visitor”NŒ_disable_config”NŒ_source”hÊŒ_destination”NŒ_config_files”]”Œ7/var/lib/git/docbuild/linux/Documentation/docutils.conf”aŒfile_insertion_enabled”ˆŒraw_enabled”KŒline_length_limit”M'Œpep_references”NŒpep_base_url”Œhttps://peps.python.org/”Œpep_file_url_template”Œpep-%04d”Œrfc_references”NŒrfc_base_url”Œ&https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/”Œ	tab_width”KŒtrim_footnote_reference_space”‰Œsyntax_highlight”Œlong”Œsmart_quotes”ˆŒsmartquotes_locales”]”Œcharacter_level_inline_markup”‰Œdoctitle_xform”‰Œdocinfo_xform”KŒsectsubtitle_xform”‰Œimage_loading”Œlink”Œembed_stylesheet”‰Œcloak_email_addresses”ˆŒsection_self_link”‰Œenv”NubŒreporter”NŒindirect_targets”]”Œsubstitution_defs”}”Œsubstitution_names”}”Œrefnames”}”Œrefids”}”Œnameids”}”(j¡  jž  hñhîj4  j1  j™  j–  jÀ  j½  jõ  jò  j  j  jQ  jN  j†  jƒ  j×  jÔ  j  j  j™  j–  uŒ	nametypes”}”(j¡  ‰hñ‰j4  ‰j™  ‰jÀ  ‰jõ  ‰j  ‰jQ  ‰j†  ‰j×  ‰j  ‰j™  ‰uh}”(jž  h·hîhËj1  hôj–  j7  j½  jœ  jò  jÃ  j  jø  jN  j  jƒ  jT  jÔ  j‰  j  jÚ  j–  j  uŒfootnote_refs”}”Œcitation_refs”}”Œautofootnotes”]”Œautofootnote_refs”]”Œsymbol_footnotes”]”Œsymbol_footnote_refs”]”Œ	footnotes”]”Œ	citations”]”Œautofootnote_start”KŒsymbol_footnote_start”K Œ
id_counter”Œcollections”ŒCounter”“”}”…”R”Œparse_messages”]”Œtransform_messages”]”Œtransformer”NŒinclude_log”]”Œ
decoration”Nh²hub.