€•¾O      Œsphinx.addnodes”Œdocument”“”)”}”(Œ	rawsource”Œ ”Œchildren”]”(Œtranslations”ŒLanguagesNode”“”)”}”(hhh]”(h Œpending_xref”“”)”}”(hhh]”Œdocutils.nodes”ŒText”“”ŒChinese (Simplified)”…””}”Œparent”hsbaŒ
attributes”}”(Œids”]”Œclasses”]”Œnames”]”Œdupnames”]”Œbackrefs”]”Œ	refdomain”Œstd”Œreftype”Œdoc”Œ	reftarget”Œ./translations/zh_CN/driver-api/nvdimm/security”Œmodname”NŒ	classname”NŒrefexplicit”ˆuŒtagname”hhhubh)”}”(hhh]”hŒChinese (Traditional)”…””}”hh2sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œ	refdomain”h)Œreftype”h+Œ	reftarget”Œ./translations/zh_TW/driver-api/nvdimm/security”Œmodname”NŒ	classname”NŒrefexplicit”ˆuh1hhhubh)”}”(hhh]”hŒItalian”…””}”hhFsbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œ	refdomain”h)Œreftype”h+Œ	reftarget”Œ./translations/it_IT/driver-api/nvdimm/security”Œmodname”NŒ	classname”NŒrefexplicit”ˆuh1hhhubh)”}”(hhh]”hŒJapanese”…””}”hhZsbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œ	refdomain”h)Œreftype”h+Œ	reftarget”Œ./translations/ja_JP/driver-api/nvdimm/security”Œmodname”NŒ	classname”NŒrefexplicit”ˆuh1hhhubh)”}”(hhh]”hŒKorean”…””}”hhnsbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œ	refdomain”h)Œreftype”h+Œ	reftarget”Œ./translations/ko_KR/driver-api/nvdimm/security”Œmodname”NŒ	classname”NŒrefexplicit”ˆuh1hhhubh)”}”(hhh]”hŒSpanish”…””}”hh‚sbah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œ	refdomain”h)Œreftype”h+Œ	reftarget”Œ./translations/sp_SP/driver-api/nvdimm/security”Œmodname”NŒ	classname”NŒrefexplicit”ˆuh1hhhubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œcurrent_language”ŒEnglish”uh1h
hhŒ	_document”hŒsource”NŒline”NubhŒsection”“”)”}”(hhh]”(hŒtitle”“”)”}”(hŒNVDIMM Security”h]”hŒNVDIMM Security”…””}”(hh¨hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hh£hžhhŸŒH/var/lib/git/docbuild/linux/Documentation/driver-api/nvdimm/security.rst”h Kubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒ1. Introduction”h]”hŒ1. Introduction”…””}”(hhºhžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hh·hžhhŸh¶h KubhŒ	paragraph”“”)”}”(hXÄ  With the introduction of Intel Device Specific Methods (DSM) v1.8
specification [1], security DSMs are introduced. The spec added the following
security DSMs: "get security state", "set passphrase", "disable passphrase",
"unlock unit", "freeze lock", "secure erase", and "overwrite". A security_ops
data structure has been added to struct dimm in order to support the security
operations and generic APIs are exposed to allow vendor neutral operations.”h]”hXà  With the introduction of Intel Device Specific Methods (DSM) v1.8
specification [1], security DSMs are introduced. The spec added the following
security DSMs: â€œget security stateâ€, â€œset passphraseâ€, â€œdisable passphraseâ€,
â€œunlock unitâ€, â€œfreeze lockâ€, â€œsecure eraseâ€, and â€œoverwriteâ€. A security_ops
data structure has been added to struct dimm in order to support the security
operations and generic APIs are exposed to allow vendor neutral operations.”…””}”(hhÊhžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h Khh·hžhubeh}”(h]”Œintroduction”ah ]”h"]”Œ1. introduction”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hh£hžhhŸh¶h Kubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒ2. Sysfs Interface”h]”hŒ2. Sysfs Interface”…””}”(hhãhžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hhàhžhhŸh¶h KubhÉ)”}”(hŒThe "security" sysfs attribute is provided in the nvdimm sysfs directory. For
example:
/sys/devices/LNXSYSTM:00/LNXSYBUS:00/ACPI0012:00/ndbus0/nmem0/security”h]”hŒ¡The â€œsecurityâ€ sysfs attribute is provided in the nvdimm sysfs directory. For
example:
/sys/devices/LNXSYSTM:00/LNXSYBUS:00/ACPI0012:00/ndbus0/nmem0/security”…””}”(hhñhžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h KhhàhžhubhÉ)”}”(hŒóThe "show" attribute of that attribute will display the security state for
that DIMM. The following states are available: disabled, unlocked, locked,
frozen, and overwrite. If security is not supported, the sysfs attribute
will not be visible.”h]”hŒ÷The â€œshowâ€ attribute of that attribute will display the security state for
that DIMM. The following states are available: disabled, unlocked, locked,
frozen, and overwrite. If security is not supported, the sysfs attribute
will not be visible.”…””}”(hhÿhžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h KhhàhžhubhÉ)”}”(hX  The "store" attribute takes several commands when it is being written to
in order to support some of the security functionalities:
update <old_keyid> <new_keyid> - enable or update passphrase.
disable <keyid> - disable enabled security and remove key.
freeze - freeze changing of security states.
erase <keyid> - delete existing user encryption key.
overwrite <keyid> - wipe the entire nvdimm.
master_update <keyid> <new_keyid> - enable or update master passphrase.
master_erase <keyid> - delete existing user encryption key.”h]”hX  The â€œstoreâ€ attribute takes several commands when it is being written to
in order to support some of the security functionalities:
update <old_keyid> <new_keyid> - enable or update passphrase.
disable <keyid> - disable enabled security and remove key.
freeze - freeze changing of security states.
erase <keyid> - delete existing user encryption key.
overwrite <keyid> - wipe the entire nvdimm.
master_update <keyid> <new_keyid> - enable or update master passphrase.
master_erase <keyid> - delete existing user encryption key.”…””}”(hj  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h Khhàhžhubeh}”(h]”Œsysfs-interface”ah ]”h"]”Œ2. sysfs interface”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hh£hžhhŸh¶h Kubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒ3. Key Management”h]”hŒ3. Key Management”…””}”(hj&  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hj#  hžhhŸh¶h K%ubhÉ)”}”(hŒøThe key is associated to the payload by the DIMM id. For example:
# cat /sys/devices/LNXSYSTM:00/LNXSYBUS:00/ACPI0012:00/ndbus0/nmem0/nfit/id
8089-a2-1740-00000133
The DIMM id would be provided along with the key payload (passphrase) to
the kernel.”h]”hŒøThe key is associated to the payload by the DIMM id. For example:
# cat /sys/devices/LNXSYSTM:00/LNXSYBUS:00/ACPI0012:00/ndbus0/nmem0/nfit/id
8089-a2-1740-00000133
The DIMM id would be provided along with the key payload (passphrase) to
the kernel.”…””}”(hj4  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h K'hj#  hžhubhÉ)”}”(hXg  The security keys are managed on the basis of a single key per DIMM. The
key "passphrase" is expected to be 32bytes long. This is similar to the ATA
security specification [2]. A key is initially acquired via the request_key()
kernel API call during nvdimm unlock. It is up to the user to make sure that
all the keys are in the kernel user keyring for unlock.”h]”hXk  The security keys are managed on the basis of a single key per DIMM. The
key â€œpassphraseâ€ is expected to be 32bytes long. This is similar to the ATA
security specification [2]. A key is initially acquired via the request_key()
kernel API call during nvdimm unlock. It is up to the user to make sure that
all the keys are in the kernel user keyring for unlock.”…””}”(hjB  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h K-hj#  hžhubhÉ)”}”(hŒnA nvdimm encrypted-key of format enc32 has the description format of:
nvdimm:<bus-provider-specific-unique-id>”h]”hŒnA nvdimm encrypted-key of format enc32 has the description format of:
nvdimm:<bus-provider-specific-unique-id>”…””}”(hjP  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h K3hj#  hžhubhÉ)”}”(hŒ¼See file ``Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst`` for creating
encrypted-keys of enc32 format. TPM usage with a master trusted key is
preferred for sealing the encrypted-keys.”h]”(hŒ	See file ”…””}”(hj^  hžhhŸNh NubhŒliteral”“”)”}”(hŒ5``Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst``”h]”hŒ1Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst”…””}”(hjh  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1jf  hj^  ubhŒ~ for creating
encrypted-keys of enc32 format. TPM usage with a master trusted key is
preferred for sealing the encrypted-keys.”…””}”(hj^  hžhhŸNh Nubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h K6hj#  hžhubeh}”(h]”Œkey-management”ah ]”h"]”Œ3. key management”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hh£hžhhŸh¶h K%ubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒ4. Unlocking”h]”hŒ4. Unlocking”…””}”(hj‹  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hjˆ  hžhhŸh¶h K;ubhÉ)”}”(hXM  When the DIMMs are being enumerated by the kernel, the kernel will attempt to
retrieve the key from the kernel user keyring. This is the only time
a locked DIMM can be unlocked. Once unlocked, the DIMM will remain unlocked
until reboot. Typically an entity (i.e. shell script) will inject all the
relevant encrypted-keys into the kernel user keyring during the initramfs phase.
This provides the unlock function access to all the related keys that contain
the passphrase for the respective nvdimms.  It is also recommended that the
keys are injected before libnvdimm is loaded by modprobe.”h]”hXM  When the DIMMs are being enumerated by the kernel, the kernel will attempt to
retrieve the key from the kernel user keyring. This is the only time
a locked DIMM can be unlocked. Once unlocked, the DIMM will remain unlocked
until reboot. Typically an entity (i.e. shell script) will inject all the
relevant encrypted-keys into the kernel user keyring during the initramfs phase.
This provides the unlock function access to all the related keys that contain
the passphrase for the respective nvdimms.  It is also recommended that the
keys are injected before libnvdimm is loaded by modprobe.”…””}”(hj™  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h K<hjˆ  hžhubeh}”(h]”Œ	unlocking”ah ]”h"]”Œ4. unlocking”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hh£hžhhŸh¶h K;ubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒ	5. Update”h]”hŒ	5. Update”…””}”(hj²  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hj¯  hžhhŸh¶h KFubhÉ)”}”(hXñ  When doing an update, it is expected that the existing key is removed from
the kernel user keyring and reinjected as different (old) key. It's irrelevant
what the key description is for the old key since we are only interested in the
keyid when doing the update operation. It is also expected that the new key
is injected with the description format described from earlier in this
document.  The update command written to the sysfs attribute will be with
the format:
update <old keyid> <new keyid>”h]”hXó  When doing an update, it is expected that the existing key is removed from
the kernel user keyring and reinjected as different (old) key. Itâ€™s irrelevant
what the key description is for the old key since we are only interested in the
keyid when doing the update operation. It is also expected that the new key
is injected with the description format described from earlier in this
document.  The update command written to the sysfs attribute will be with
the format:
update <old keyid> <new keyid>”…””}”(hjÀ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h KGhj¯  hžhubhÉ)”}”(hŒRIf there is no old keyid due to a security enabling, then a 0 should be
passed in.”h]”hŒRIf there is no old keyid due to a security enabling, then a 0 should be
passed in.”…””}”(hjÎ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h KPhj¯  hžhubeh}”(h]”Œupdate”ah ]”h"]”Œ	5. update”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hh£hžhhŸh¶h KFubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒ	6. Freeze”h]”hŒ	6. Freeze”…””}”(hjç  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hjä  hžhhŸh¶h KTubhÉ)”}”(hŒpThe freeze operation does not require any keys. The security config can be
frozen by a user with root privilege.”h]”hŒpThe freeze operation does not require any keys. The security config can be
frozen by a user with root privilege.”…””}”(hjõ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h KUhjä  hžhubeh}”(h]”Œfreeze”ah ]”h"]”Œ	6. freeze”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hh£hžhhŸh¶h KTubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒ
7. Disable”h]”hŒ
7. Disable”…””}”(hj  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hj  hžhhŸh¶h KYubhÉ)”}”(hŒ7The security disable command format is:
disable <keyid>”h]”hŒ7The security disable command format is:
disable <keyid>”…””}”(hj  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h KZhj  hžhubhÉ)”}”(hŒkAn key with the current passphrase payload that is tied to the nvdimm should be
in the kernel user keyring.”h]”hŒkAn key with the current passphrase payload that is tied to the nvdimm should be
in the kernel user keyring.”…””}”(hj*  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h K]hj  hžhubeh}”(h]”Œdisable”ah ]”h"]”Œ
7. disable”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hh£hžhhŸh¶h KYubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒ8. Secure Erase”h]”hŒ8. Secure Erase”…””}”(hjC  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hj@  hžhhŸh¶h KaubhÉ)”}”(hŒ=The command format for doing a secure erase is:
erase <keyid>”h]”hŒ=The command format for doing a secure erase is:
erase <keyid>”…””}”(hjQ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h Kbhj@  hžhubhÉ)”}”(hŒkAn key with the current passphrase payload that is tied to the nvdimm should be
in the kernel user keyring.”h]”hŒkAn key with the current passphrase payload that is tied to the nvdimm should be
in the kernel user keyring.”…””}”(hj_  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h Kehj@  hžhubeh}”(h]”Œsecure-erase”ah ]”h"]”Œ8. secure erase”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hh£hžhhŸh¶h Kaubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒ9. Overwrite”h]”hŒ9. Overwrite”…””}”(hjx  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hju  hžhhŸh¶h KiubhÉ)”}”(hŒ?The command format for doing an overwrite is:
overwrite <keyid>”h]”hŒ?The command format for doing an overwrite is:
overwrite <keyid>”…””}”(hj†  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h Kjhju  hžhubhÉ)”}”(hŒvOverwrite can be done without a key if security is not enabled. A key serial
of 0 can be passed in to indicate no key.”h]”hŒvOverwrite can be done without a key if security is not enabled. A key serial
of 0 can be passed in to indicate no key.”…””}”(hj”  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h Kmhju  hžhubhÉ)”}”(hŒ’The sysfs attribute "security" can be polled to wait on overwrite completion.
Overwrite can last tens of minutes or more depending on nvdimm size.”h]”hŒ–The sysfs attribute â€œsecurityâ€ can be polled to wait on overwrite completion.
Overwrite can last tens of minutes or more depending on nvdimm size.”…””}”(hj¢  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h Kphju  hžhubhÉ)”}”(hŒŒAn encrypted-key with the current user passphrase that is tied to the nvdimm
should be injected and its keyid should be passed in via sysfs.”h]”hŒŒAn encrypted-key with the current user passphrase that is tied to the nvdimm
should be injected and its keyid should be passed in via sysfs.”…””}”(hj°  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h Kshju  hžhubeh}”(h]”Œ	overwrite”ah ]”h"]”Œ9. overwrite”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hh£hžhhŸh¶h Kiubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒ10. Master Update”h]”hŒ10. Master Update”…””}”(hjÉ  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hjÆ  hžhhŸh¶h KwubhÉ)”}”(hŒOThe command format for doing a master update is:
update <old keyid> <new keyid>”h]”hŒOThe command format for doing a master update is:
update <old keyid> <new keyid>”…””}”(hj×  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h KxhjÆ  hžhubhÉ)”}”(hŒ³The operating mechanism for master update is identical to update except the
master passphrase key is passed to the kernel. The master passphrase key
is just another encrypted-key.”h]”hŒ³The operating mechanism for master update is identical to update except the
master passphrase key is passed to the kernel. The master passphrase key
is just another encrypted-key.”…””}”(hjå  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h K{hjÆ  hžhubhÉ)”}”(hŒ9This command is only available when security is disabled.”h]”hŒ9This command is only available when security is disabled.”…””}”(hjó  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h KhjÆ  hžhubeh}”(h]”Œmaster-update”ah ]”h"]”Œ10. master update”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hh£hžhhŸh¶h Kwubh¢)”}”(hhh]”(h§)”}”(hŒ11. Master Erase”h]”hŒ11. Master Erase”…””}”(hj  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1h¦hj	  hžhhŸh¶h K‚ubhÉ)”}”(hŒLThe command format for doing a master erase is:
master_erase <current keyid>”h]”hŒLThe command format for doing a master erase is:
master_erase <current keyid>”…””}”(hj  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h Kƒhj	  hžhubhÉ)”}”(hŒ©This command has the same operating mechanism as erase except the master
passphrase key is passed to the kernel. The master passphrase key is just
another encrypted-key.”h]”hŒ©This command has the same operating mechanism as erase except the master
passphrase key is passed to the kernel. The master passphrase key is just
another encrypted-key.”…””}”(hj(  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h K†hj	  hžhubhÉ)”}”(hŒnThis command is only available when the master security is enabled, indicated
by the extended security status.”h]”hŒnThis command is only available when the master security is enabled, indicated
by the extended security status.”…””}”(hj6  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h KŠhj	  hžhubhÉ)”}”(hŒ<[1]: https://pmem.io/documents/NVDIMM_DSM_Interface-V1.8.pdf”h]”(hŒ[1]: ”…””}”(hjD  hžhhŸNh NubhŒ	reference”“”)”}”(hŒ7https://pmem.io/documents/NVDIMM_DSM_Interface-V1.8.pdf”h]”hŒ7https://pmem.io/documents/NVDIMM_DSM_Interface-V1.8.pdf”…””}”(hjN  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œrefuri”jP  uh1jL  hjD  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h Khj	  hžhubhÉ)”}”(hŒd[2]: http://www.t13.org/documents/UploadedDocuments/docs2006/e05179r4-ACS-SecurityClarifications.pdf”h]”(hŒ[2]: ”…””}”(hjc  hžhhŸNh NubjM  )”}”(hŒ_http://www.t13.org/documents/UploadedDocuments/docs2006/e05179r4-ACS-SecurityClarifications.pdf”h]”hŒ_http://www.t13.org/documents/UploadedDocuments/docs2006/e05179r4-ACS-SecurityClarifications.pdf”…””}”(hjk  hžhhŸNh Nubah}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œrefuri”jm  uh1jL  hjc  ubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”uh1hÈhŸh¶h Khj	  hžhubeh}”(h]”Œmaster-erase”ah ]”h"]”Œ11. master erase”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hh£hžhhŸh¶h K‚ubeh}”(h]”Œnvdimm-security”ah ]”h"]”Œnvdimm security”ah$]”h&]”uh1h¡hhhžhhŸh¶h Kubeh}”(h]”h ]”h"]”h$]”h&]”Œsource”h¶uh1hŒcurrent_source”NŒcurrent_line”NŒsettings”Œdocutils.frontend”ŒValues”“”)”}”(h¦NŒ	generator”NŒ	datestamp”NŒsource_link”NŒ
source_url”NŒtoc_backlinks”Œentry”Œfootnote_backlinks”KŒsectnum_xform”KŒstrip_comments”NŒstrip_elements_with_classes”NŒstrip_classes”NŒreport_level”KŒ
halt_level”KŒexit_status_level”KŒdebug”NŒwarning_stream”NŒ	traceback”ˆŒinput_encoding”Œ	utf-8-sig”Œinput_encoding_error_handler”Œstrict”Œoutput_encoding”Œutf-8”Œoutput_encoding_error_handler”j³  Œerror_encoding”Œutf-8”Œerror_encoding_error_handler”Œbackslashreplace”Œlanguage_code”Œen”Œrecord_dependencies”NŒconfig”NŒ	id_prefix”hŒauto_id_prefix”Œid”Œdump_settings”NŒdump_internals”NŒdump_transforms”NŒdump_pseudo_xml”NŒexpose_internals”NŒstrict_visitor”NŒ_disable_config”NŒ_source”h¶Œ_destination”NŒ_config_files”]”Œ7/var/lib/git/docbuild/linux/Documentation/docutils.conf”aŒfile_insertion_enabled”ˆŒraw_enabled”KŒline_length_limit”M'Œpep_references”NŒpep_base_url”Œhttps://peps.python.org/”Œpep_file_url_template”Œpep-%04d”Œrfc_references”NŒrfc_base_url”Œ&https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/”Œ	tab_width”KŒtrim_footnote_reference_space”‰Œsyntax_highlight”Œlong”Œsmart_quotes”ˆŒsmartquotes_locales”]”Œcharacter_level_inline_markup”‰Œdoctitle_xform”‰Œdocinfo_xform”KŒsectsubtitle_xform”‰Œimage_loading”Œlink”Œembed_stylesheet”‰Œcloak_email_addresses”ˆŒsection_self_link”‰Œenv”NubŒreporter”NŒindirect_targets”]”Œsubstitution_defs”}”Œsubstitution_names”}”Œrefnames”}”Œrefids”}”Œnameids”}”(j  jŠ  hÝhÚj   j  j…  j‚  j¬  j©  já  jÞ  j  j  j=  j:  jr  jo  jÃ  jÀ  j  j  j…  j‚  uŒ	nametypes”}”(j  ‰hÝ‰j   ‰j…  ‰j¬  ‰já  ‰j  ‰j=  ‰jr  ‰jÃ  ‰j  ‰j…  ‰uh}”(jŠ  h£hÚh·j  hàj‚  j#  j©  jˆ  jÞ  j¯  j  jä  j:  j  jo  j@  jÀ  ju  j  jÆ  j‚  j	  uŒfootnote_refs”}”Œcitation_refs”}”Œautofootnotes”]”Œautofootnote_refs”]”Œsymbol_footnotes”]”Œsymbol_footnote_refs”]”Œ	footnotes”]”Œ	citations”]”Œautofootnote_start”KŒsymbol_footnote_start”K Œ
id_counter”Œcollections”ŒCounter”“”}”…”R”Œparse_messages”]”Œtransform_messages”]”Œtransformer”NŒinclude_log”]”Œ
decoration”Nhžhub.