From c567f2948f57bdc03ed03403ae0234085f376b7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ingo Molnar Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 11:47:51 +0100 Subject: Revert "x86/mm/ident_map: Use gbpages only where full GB page should be mapped." This reverts commit d794734c9bbfe22f86686dc2909c25f5ffe1a572. While the original change tries to fix a bug, it also unintentionally broke existing systems, see the regressions reported at: https://lore.kernel.org/all/3a1b9909-45ac-4f97-ad68-d16ef1ce99db@pavinjoseph.com/ Since d794734c9bbf was also marked for -stable, let's back it out before causing more damage. Note that due to another upstream change the revert was not 100% automatic: 0a845e0f6348 mm/treewide: replace pud_large() with pud_leaf() Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Cc: Russ Anderson Cc: Steve Wahl Cc: Dave Hansen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/3a1b9909-45ac-4f97-ad68-d16ef1ce99db@pavinjoseph.com/ Fixes: d794734c9bbf ("x86/mm/ident_map: Use gbpages only where full GB page should be mapped.") --- arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c | 23 +++++------------------ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c index a204a332c71fc5..968d7005f4a724 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c @@ -26,31 +26,18 @@ static int ident_pud_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pud_t *pud_page, for (; addr < end; addr = next) { pud_t *pud = pud_page + pud_index(addr); pmd_t *pmd; - bool use_gbpage; next = (addr & PUD_MASK) + PUD_SIZE; if (next > end) next = end; - /* if this is already a gbpage, this portion is already mapped */ - if (pud_leaf(*pud)) - continue; - - /* Is using a gbpage allowed? */ - use_gbpage = info->direct_gbpages; - - /* Don't use gbpage if it maps more than the requested region. */ - /* at the begining: */ - use_gbpage &= ((addr & ~PUD_MASK) == 0); - /* ... or at the end: */ - use_gbpage &= ((next & ~PUD_MASK) == 0); - - /* Never overwrite existing mappings */ - use_gbpage &= !pud_present(*pud); - - if (use_gbpage) { + if (info->direct_gbpages) { pud_t pudval; + if (pud_present(*pud)) + continue; + + addr &= PUD_MASK; pudval = __pud((addr - info->offset) | info->page_flag); set_pud(pud, pudval); continue; -- cgit 1.2.3-korg From b6540de9b5c867b4c8bc31225db181cc017d8cc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Uros Bizjak Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 12:01:09 +0100 Subject: x86/percpu: Disable named address spaces for KCSAN -fsanitize=thread (KCSAN) is at the moment incompatible with named address spaces in a similar way as KASAN - see GCC PR sanitizer/111736: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=111736 The patch disables named address spaces with KCSAN. Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Linus Torvalds Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325110128.615933-1-ubizjak@gmail.com --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 39886bab943a88..4fff6ed46e902c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -2439,6 +2439,8 @@ config USE_X86_SEG_SUPPORT # with named address spaces - see GCC PR sanitizer/111736. # depends on !KASAN + # -fsanitize=thread (KCSAN) is also incompatible. + depends on !KCSAN config CC_HAS_SLS def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all) -- cgit 1.2.3-korg From 3186b61812c007179f1852d8e63a0f0f7dd7c783 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Paul E. McKenney" Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2024 17:32:15 -0800 Subject: x86/nmi: Upgrade NMI backtrace stall checks & messages The commit to improve NMI stall debuggability: 344da544f177 ("x86/nmi: Print reasons why backtrace NMIs are ignored") ... has shown value, but widespread use has also identified a few opportunities for improvement. The systems have (as usual) shown far more creativity than that commit's author, demonstrating yet again that failing CPUs can do whatever they want. In addition, the current message format is less friendly than one might like to those attempting to use these messages to identify failing CPUs. Therefore, separately flag CPUs that, during the full time that the stack-backtrace request was waiting, were always in an NMI handler, were never in an NMI handler, or exited one NMI handler. Also, split the message identifying the CPU and the time since that CPU's last NMI-related activity so that a single line identifies the CPU without any other variable information, greatly reducing the processing overhead required to identify repeat-offender CPUs. Co-developed-by: Breno Leitao Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Linus Torvalds Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ab4d70c8-c874-42dc-b206-643018922393@paulmck-laptop --- arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c | 24 ++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c index 9a5b372c706fcc..ed163c8c8604e3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c @@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asm_exc_nmi_kvm_vmx); static char *nmi_check_stall_msg[] = { /* */ -/* +--------- nsp->idt_seq_snap & 0x1: CPU is in NMI handler. */ +/* +--------- nmi_seq & 0x1: CPU is currently in NMI handler. */ /* | +------ cpu_is_offline(cpu) */ /* | | +--- nsp->idt_calls_snap != atomic_long_read(&nsp->idt_calls): */ /* | | | NMI handler has been invoked. */ @@ -628,22 +628,26 @@ void nmi_backtrace_stall_check(const struct cpumask *btp) nmi_seq = READ_ONCE(nsp->idt_nmi_seq); if (nsp->idt_nmi_seq_snap + 1 == nmi_seq && (nmi_seq & 0x1)) { msgp = "CPU entered NMI handler function, but has not exited"; - } else if ((nsp->idt_nmi_seq_snap & 0x1) != (nmi_seq & 0x1)) { - msgp = "CPU is handling NMIs"; - } else { - idx = ((nsp->idt_seq_snap & 0x1) << 2) | + } else if (nsp->idt_nmi_seq_snap == nmi_seq || + nsp->idt_nmi_seq_snap + 1 == nmi_seq) { + idx = ((nmi_seq & 0x1) << 2) | (cpu_is_offline(cpu) << 1) | (nsp->idt_calls_snap != atomic_long_read(&nsp->idt_calls)); msgp = nmi_check_stall_msg[idx]; if (nsp->idt_ignored_snap != READ_ONCE(nsp->idt_ignored) && (idx & 0x1)) modp = ", but OK because ignore_nmis was set"; - if (nmi_seq & 0x1) - msghp = " (CPU currently in NMI handler function)"; - else if (nsp->idt_nmi_seq_snap + 1 == nmi_seq) + if (nsp->idt_nmi_seq_snap + 1 == nmi_seq) msghp = " (CPU exited one NMI handler function)"; + else if (nmi_seq & 0x1) + msghp = " (CPU currently in NMI handler function)"; + else + msghp = " (CPU was never in an NMI handler function)"; + } else { + msgp = "CPU is handling NMIs"; } - pr_alert("%s: CPU %d: %s%s%s, last activity: %lu jiffies ago.\n", - __func__, cpu, msgp, modp, msghp, j - READ_ONCE(nsp->recv_jiffies)); + pr_alert("%s: CPU %d: %s%s%s\n", __func__, cpu, msgp, modp, msghp); + pr_alert("%s: last activity: %lu jiffies ago.\n", + __func__, j - READ_ONCE(nsp->recv_jiffies)); } } -- cgit 1.2.3-korg From 4969d75dd9077e19e175e60f3c5a6c7653252e63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 10:47:14 +0100 Subject: x86/vdso: Fix rethunk patching for vdso-image-x32.o too In a similar fashion to b388e57d4628 ("x86/vdso: Fix rethunk patching for vdso-image-{32,64}.o") annotate vdso-image-x32.o too for objtool so that it gets annotated properly and the unused return thunk warning doesn't fire. Reported-by: kernel test robot Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202403251454.23df6278-lkp@intel.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202403251454.23df6278-lkp@intel.com --- arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile index fd63051bbbbb82..3d64bcc403cfbe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI) += vdso-image-x32.o obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT_32) += vdso-image-32.o vdso32-setup.o OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_vdso-image-32.o := n +OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_vdso-image-x32.o := n OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_vdso-image-64.o := n OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_vdso32-setup.o := n -- cgit 1.2.3-korg From 0f4a1e80989aca185d955fcd791d7750082044a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kevin Loughlin Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2024 12:15:46 +0000 Subject: x86/sev: Skip ROM range scans and validation for SEV-SNP guests SEV-SNP requires encrypted memory to be validated before access. Because the ROM memory range is not part of the e820 table, it is not pre-validated by the BIOS. Therefore, if a SEV-SNP guest kernel wishes to access this range, the guest must first validate the range. The current SEV-SNP code does indeed scan the ROM range during early boot and thus attempts to validate the ROM range in probe_roms(). However, this behavior is neither sufficient nor necessary for the following reasons: * With regards to sufficiency, if EFI_CONFIG_TABLES are not enabled and CONFIG_DMI_SCAN_MACHINE_NON_EFI_FALLBACK is set, the kernel will attempt to access the memory at SMBIOS_ENTRY_POINT_SCAN_START (which falls in the ROM range) prior to validation. For example, Project Oak Stage 0 provides a minimal guest firmware that currently meets these configuration conditions, meaning guests booting atop Oak Stage 0 firmware encounter a problematic call chain during dmi_setup() -> dmi_scan_machine() that results in a crash during boot if SEV-SNP is enabled. * With regards to necessity, SEV-SNP guests generally read garbage (which changes across boots) from the ROM range, meaning these scans are unnecessary. The guest reads garbage because the legacy ROM range is unencrypted data but is accessed via an encrypted PMD during early boot (where the PMD is marked as encrypted due to potentially mapping actually-encrypted data in other PMD-contained ranges). In one exceptional case, EISA probing treats the ROM range as unencrypted data, which is inconsistent with other probing. Continuing to allow SEV-SNP guests to use garbage and to inconsistently classify ROM range encryption status can trigger undesirable behavior. For instance, if garbage bytes appear to be a valid signature, memory may be unnecessarily reserved for the ROM range. Future code or other use cases may result in more problematic (arbitrary) behavior that should be avoided. While one solution would be to overhaul the early PMD mapping to always treat the ROM region of the PMD as unencrypted, SEV-SNP guests do not currently rely on data from the ROM region during early boot (and even if they did, they would be mostly relying on garbage data anyways). As a simpler solution, skip the ROM range scans (and the otherwise- necessary range validation) during SEV-SNP guest early boot. The potential SEV-SNP guest crash due to lack of ROM range validation is thus avoided by simply not accessing the ROM range. In most cases, skip the scans by overriding problematic x86_init functions during sme_early_init() to SNP-safe variants, which can be likened to x86_init overrides done for other platforms (ex: Xen); such overrides also avoid the spread of cc_platform_has() checks throughout the tree. In the exceptional EISA case, still use cc_platform_has() for the simplest change, given (1) checks for guest type (ex: Xen domain status) are already performed here, and (2) these checks occur in a subsys initcall instead of an x86_init function. [ bp: Massage commit message, remove "we"s. ] Fixes: 9704c07bf9f7 ("x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active") Signed-off-by: Kevin Loughlin Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240313121546.2964854-1-kevinloughlin@google.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/eisa.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c | 10 ---------- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 3 +-- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 27 ++++++++++++--------------- arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h index 9477b4053bce2c..07e125f3252839 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h @@ -218,12 +218,12 @@ void early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned long npages); void early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned long npages); -void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, enum psc_op op); void snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long npages); void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long npages); void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void); bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp); void __noreturn snp_abort(void); +void snp_dmi_setup(void); int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio); void snp_accept_memory(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end); u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status); @@ -244,12 +244,12 @@ static inline void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned long npages) { } static inline void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned long npages) { } -static inline void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, enum psc_op op) { } static inline void snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long npages) { } static inline void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long npages) { } static inline void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void) { } static inline bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp) { return false; } static inline void snp_abort(void) { } +static inline void snp_dmi_setup(void) { } static inline int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) { return -ENOTTY; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h index b89b40f250e6f5..6149eabe200f5b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h @@ -30,12 +30,13 @@ struct x86_init_mpparse { * @reserve_resources: reserve the standard resources for the * platform * @memory_setup: platform specific memory setup - * + * @dmi_setup: platform specific DMI setup */ struct x86_init_resources { void (*probe_roms)(void); void (*reserve_resources)(void); char *(*memory_setup)(void); + void (*dmi_setup)(void); }; /** diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/eisa.c b/arch/x86/kernel/eisa.c index e963344b044902..53935b4d62e305 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/eisa.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/eisa.c @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ /* * EISA specific code */ +#include #include #include #include @@ -12,7 +13,7 @@ static __init int eisa_bus_probe(void) { void __iomem *p; - if (xen_pv_domain() && !xen_initial_domain()) + if ((xen_pv_domain() && !xen_initial_domain()) || cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP)) return 0; p = ioremap(0x0FFFD9, 4); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c b/arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c index 319fef37d9dce4..cc2c34ba7228ac 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c @@ -203,16 +203,6 @@ void __init probe_roms(void) unsigned char c; int i; - /* - * The ROM memory range is not part of the e820 table and is therefore not - * pre-validated by BIOS. The kernel page table maps the ROM region as encrypted - * memory, and SNP requires encrypted memory to be validated before access. - * Do that here. - */ - snp_prep_memory(video_rom_resource.start, - ((system_rom_resource.end + 1) - video_rom_resource.start), - SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE); - /* video rom */ upper = adapter_rom_resources[0].start; for (start = video_rom_resource.start; start < upper; start += 2048) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c index ef206500ed6f22..0109e6c510e02f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -902,7 +901,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) efi_init(); reserve_ibft_region(); - dmi_setup(); + x86_init.resources.dmi_setup(); /* * VMware detection requires dmi to be available, so this diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c index b59b09c2f28406..7e1e63cc48e67d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -795,21 +796,6 @@ void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr early_set_pages_state(vaddr, paddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED); } -void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, enum psc_op op) -{ - unsigned long vaddr, npages; - - vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(paddr); - npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT; - - if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE) - early_snp_set_memory_private(vaddr, paddr, npages); - else if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED) - early_snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, paddr, npages); - else - WARN(1, "invalid memory op %d\n", op); -} - static unsigned long __set_pages_state(struct snp_psc_desc *data, unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long vaddr_end, int op) { @@ -2136,6 +2122,17 @@ void __head __noreturn snp_abort(void) sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED); } +/* + * SEV-SNP guests should only execute dmi_setup() if EFI_CONFIG_TABLES are + * enabled, as the alternative (fallback) logic for DMI probing in the legacy + * ROM region can cause a crash since this region is not pre-validated. + */ +void __init snp_dmi_setup(void) +{ + if (efi_enabled(EFI_CONFIG_TABLES)) + dmi_setup(); +} + static void dump_cpuid_table(void) { const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table = snp_cpuid_get_table(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c index a42830dc151bc4..d5dc5a92635a82 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ * * For licencing details see kernel-base/COPYING */ +#include #include #include #include @@ -66,6 +67,7 @@ struct x86_init_ops x86_init __initdata = { .probe_roms = probe_roms, .reserve_resources = reserve_standard_io_resources, .memory_setup = e820__memory_setup_default, + .dmi_setup = dmi_setup, }, .mpparse = { diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c index 70b91de2e053ab..422602f6039b82 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c @@ -492,6 +492,24 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void) */ if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED) ia32_disable(); + + /* + * Override init functions that scan the ROM region in SEV-SNP guests, + * as this memory is not pre-validated and would thus cause a crash. + */ + if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED) { + x86_init.mpparse.find_mptable = x86_init_noop; + x86_init.pci.init_irq = x86_init_noop; + x86_init.resources.probe_roms = x86_init_noop; + + /* + * DMI setup behavior for SEV-SNP guests depends on + * efi_enabled(EFI_CONFIG_TABLES), which hasn't been + * parsed yet. snp_dmi_setup() will run after that + * parsing has happened. + */ + x86_init.resources.dmi_setup = snp_dmi_setup; + } } void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) -- cgit 1.2.3-korg From 3f1a9bc5d878004ed4bc3904e5cb9b7fb317fbe2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada Date: Sat, 30 Mar 2024 15:05:54 +0900 Subject: x86/build: Use obj-y to descend into arch/x86/virt/ Commit c33621b4c5ad ("x86/virt/tdx: Wire up basic SEAMCALL functions") introduced a new instance of core-y instead of the standardized obj-y syntax. X86 Makefiles descend into subdirectories of arch/x86/virt inconsistently; into arch/x86/virt/ via core-y defined in arch/x86/Makefile, but into arch/x86/virt/svm/ via obj-y defined in arch/x86/Kbuild. This is problematic when you build a single object in parallel because multiple threads attempt to build the same file. $ make -j$(nproc) arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.o [ snip ] AS arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.o AS arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.o fixdep: error opening file: arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/.seamcall.o.d: No such file or directory make[4]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:362: arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.o] Error 2 Use the obj-y syntax, as it works correctly. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240330060554.18524-1-masahiroy@kernel.org --- arch/x86/Kbuild | 2 +- arch/x86/Makefile | 2 -- arch/x86/virt/Makefile | 2 +- 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/Kbuild b/arch/x86/Kbuild index 6a1f36df6a1817..cf0ad89f5639da 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kbuild +++ b/arch/x86/Kbuild @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ obj-y += net/ obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE) += purgatory/ -obj-y += virt/svm/ +obj-y += virt/ # for cleaning subdir- += boot tools diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile index 662d9d4033e6b8..5ab93fcdd691dc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile @@ -251,8 +251,6 @@ archheaders: libs-y += arch/x86/lib/ -core-y += arch/x86/virt/ - # drivers-y are linked after core-y drivers-$(CONFIG_MATH_EMULATION) += arch/x86/math-emu/ drivers-$(CONFIG_PCI) += arch/x86/pci/ diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/Makefile b/arch/x86/virt/Makefile index 1e36502cd7383a..ea343fc392dcc8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/virt/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/virt/Makefile @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -obj-y += vmx/ +obj-y += svm/ vmx/ -- cgit 1.2.3-korg