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* tag 'v2.45.1': (42 commits)
Git 2.45.1
Git 2.44.1
Git 2.43.4
Git 2.42.2
Git 2.41.1
Git 2.40.2
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
...
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Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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* jc/git-gui-maintainer-update:
SubmittingPatches: welcome the new maintainer of git-gui part
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P4 update.
* fa/p4-error:
git-p4: show Perforce error to the user
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CI fix.
* ps/ci-fuzzers-at-gitlab-fix:
gitlab-ci: fix installing dependencies for fuzz smoke tests
gitlab-ci: add smoke test for fuzzers
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CI fix.
* jk/ci-test-with-jgit-fix:
ci: update coverity runs_on_pool reference
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CI fix.
* jk/ci-macos-gcc13-fix:
ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc
ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job
ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable
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Git 2.43 started using the tree of HEAD as the source of attributes
in a bare repository, which has severe performance implications.
For now, revert the change, without ripping out a more explicit
support for the attr.tree configuration variable.
* jc/no-default-attr-tree-in-bare:
stop using HEAD for attributes in bare repository by default
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Unbreak CI jobs so that we do not attempt to use Python 2 that has
been removed from the platform.
* ps/ci-python-2-deprecation:
ci: fix Python dependency on Ubuntu 24.04
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The maximum size of attribute files is enforced more consistently.
* tb/attr-limits:
attr.c: move ATTR_MAX_FILE_SIZE check into read_attr_from_buf()
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Tests that try to corrupt in-repository files in chunked format did
not work well on macOS due to its broken "mv", which has been
worked around.
* jc/test-workaround-broken-mv:
t/lib-chunk: work around broken "mv" on some vintage of macOS
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Build fix.
* ma/win32-unix-domain-socket:
win32: fix building with NO_UNIX_SOCKETS
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Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Our osx-gcc job explicitly asks to install gcc-13. But since the GitHub
runner image already comes with gcc-13 installed, this is mostly doing
nothing (or in some cases it may install an incremental update over the
runner image). But worse, it recently started causing errors like:
==> Fetching gcc@13
==> Downloading https://ghcr.io/v2/homebrew/core/gcc/13/blobs/sha256:fb2403d97e2ce67eb441b54557cfb61980830f3ba26d4c5a1fe5ecd0c9730d1a
==> Pouring gcc@13--13.2.0.ventura.bottle.tar.gz
Error: The `brew link` step did not complete successfully
The formula built, but is not symlinked into /usr/local
Could not symlink bin/c++-13
Target /usr/local/bin/c++-13
is a symlink belonging to gcc. You can unlink it:
brew unlink gcc
which cause the whole CI job to bail.
I didn't track down the root cause, but I suspect it may be related to
homebrew recently switching the "gcc" default to gcc-14. And it may even
be fixed when a new runner image is released. But if we don't need to
run brew at all, it's one less thing for us to worry about.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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On macOS, a bare "gcc" (without a version) will invoke a wrapper for
clang, not actual gcc. Even when gcc is installed via homebrew, that
only provides version-specific links in /usr/local/bin (like "gcc-13"),
and never a version-agnostic "gcc" wrapper.
As far as I can tell, this has been the case for a long time, and this
osx-gcc job has largely been doing nothing. We can point it at "gcc-13",
which will pick up the homebrew-installed version.
The fix here is specific to the github workflow file, as the gitlab one
does not have a matching job.
It's a little unfortunate that we cannot just ask for the latest version
of gcc which homebrew provides, but as far as I can tell there is no
easy alias (you'd have to find the highest number gcc-* in
/usr/local/bin yourself).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The last user of this variable went away in 4a6e4b9602 (CI: remove
Travis CI support, 2021-11-23), so it's doing nothing except making it
more confusing to find out which packages _are_ installed.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Commit 2d65e5b6a6 (ci: rename "runs_on_pool" to "distro", 2024-04-12)
renamed this variable for the main CI workflow, as well as in the ci/
scripts. Because the coverity workflow also relies on those scripts to
install dependencies, it needs to be updated, too. Without this patch,
the coverity build fails because we lack libcurl.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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There was a semantic merge conflict between 9cdeb34b96 (ci: merge
scripts which install dependencies, 2024-04-12), which has merged
"ci/install-docker-dependencies.sh" into "ci/install-dependencies.sh"
and c7b228e000 (gitlab-ci: add smoke test for fuzzers, 2024-04-29),
which has added a new fuzz smoke test job that makes use of the
now-removed script.
Adapt the job to instead use the new script to install dependencies.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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* ps/ci-python-2-deprecation:
ci: fix Python dependency on Ubuntu 24.04
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ps/ci-fuzzers-at-gitlab-fix
* ps/ci-enable-minimal-fuzzers-at-gitlab:
gitlab-ci: add smoke test for fuzzers
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During "git p4 clone" if p4 process returns an error from the server,
it will store the message in the 'err' variable. Then it will send a
text command "die-now" to git-fast-import. However, git-fast-import
raises an exception: "fatal: Unsupported command: die-now" and err is
never displayed. This patch ensures that err is shown to the end user.
Signed-off-by: Fahad Alrashed <fahad@keylock.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The color parsing code learned to handle 12-bit RGB colors, spelled
as "#RGB" (in addition to "#RRGGBB" that is already supported).
* bb/rgb-12-bit-colors:
color: add support for 12-bit RGB colors
t/t4026-color: add test coverage for invalid RGB colors
t/t4026-color: remove an extra double quote character
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Code clean-up to remove code that is now a noop.
* rs/diff-parseopts-cleanup:
diff-lib: stop calling diff_setup_done() in do_diff_cache()
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Command line completion support for zsh (in contrib/) has been
updated to stop exposing internal state to end-user shell
interaction.
* dk/zsh-git-repo-path-fix:
completion: zsh: stop leaking local cache variable
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zsh can pretend to be a normal shell pretty well except for some
glitches that we tickle in some of our scripts. Work them around
so that "vimdiff" and our test suite works well enough with it.
* bc/zsh-compatibility:
vimdiff: make script and tests work with zsh
t4046: avoid continue in &&-chain for zsh
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When the user responds to a prompt given by "git add -p" with an
unsupported command, list of available commands were given, which
was too much if the user knew what they wanted to type but merely
made a typo. Now the user gets a much shorter error message.
* rj/add-p-typo-reaction:
add-patch: response to unknown command
add-patch: do not show UI messages on stderr
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Developer doc update.
* jt/doc-submitting-rerolled-series:
doc: clarify practices for submitting updated patch versions
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Command line completion script (in contrib/) learned to complete
"git symbolic-ref" a bit better (you need to enable plumbing
commands to be completed with GIT_COMPLETION_SHOW_ALL_COMMANDS).
* rh/complete-symbolic-ref:
completion: add docs on how to add subcommand completions
completion: improve docs for using __git_complete
completion: add 'symbolic-ref'
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The singleton index_state instance "the_index" has been eliminated
by always instantiating "the_repository" and replacing references
to "the_index" with references to its .index member.
* ps/the-index-is-no-more:
repository: drop `initialize_the_repository()`
repository: drop `the_index` variable
builtin/clone: stop using `the_index`
repository: initialize index in `repo_init()`
builtin: stop using `the_index`
t/helper: stop using `the_index`
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The credential helper protocol, together with the HTTP layer, have
been enhanced to support authentication schemes different from
username & password pair, like Bearer and NTLM.
* bc/credential-scheme-enhancement:
credential: add method for querying capabilities
credential-cache: implement authtype capability
t: add credential tests for authtype
credential: add support for multistage credential rounds
t5563: refactor for multi-stage authentication
docs: set a limit on credential line length
credential: enable state capability
credential: add an argument to keep state
http: add support for authtype and credential
docs: indicate new credential protocol fields
credential: add a field called "ephemeral"
credential: gate new fields on capability
credential: add a field for pre-encoded credentials
http: use new headers for each object request
remote-curl: reset headers on new request
credential: add an authtype field
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Tests to ensure interoperability between reftable written by jgit
and our code have been added and enabled in CI.
* ps/ci-test-with-jgit:
t0612: add tests to exercise Git/JGit reftable compatibility
t0610: fix non-portable variable assignment
t06xx: always execute backend-specific tests
ci: install JGit dependency
ci: make Perforce binaries executable for all users
ci: merge scripts which install dependencies
ci: fix setup of custom path for GitLab CI
ci: merge custom PATH directories
ci: convert "install-dependencies.sh" to use "/bin/sh"
ci: drop duplicate package installation for "linux-gcc-default"
ci: skip sudo when we are already root
ci: expose distro name in dockerized GitHub jobs
ci: rename "runs_on_pool" to "distro"
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Code to write out reftable has seen some optimization and
simplification.
* ps/reftable-write-optim:
reftable/block: reuse compressed array
reftable/block: reuse zstream when writing log blocks
reftable/writer: reset `last_key` instead of releasing it
reftable/writer: unify releasing memory
reftable/writer: refactorings for `writer_flush_nonempty_block()`
reftable/writer: refactorings for `writer_add_record()`
refs/reftable: don't recompute committer ident
reftable: remove name checks
refs/reftable: skip duplicate name checks
refs/reftable: perform explicit D/F check when writing symrefs
refs/reftable: fix D/F conflict error message on ref copy
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Newer versions of Ubuntu have dropped Python 2 starting with Ubuntu
23.04. By default though, our CI setups will try to use that Python
version on all Ubuntu-based jobs except for the "linux-gcc" one.
We didn't notice this issue due to two reasons:
- The "ubuntu:latest" tag always points to the latest LTS release.
Until a few weeks ago this was Ubuntu 22.04, which still had Python
2.
- Our Docker-based CI jobs had their own script to install
dependencies until 9cdeb34b96 (ci: merge scripts which install
dependencies, 2024-04-12), where we didn't even try to install
Python at all for many of them.
Since the CI refactorings have originally been implemented, Ubuntu
24.04 was released, and it being an LTS versions means that the "latest"
tag now points to that Python-2-less version. Consequently, those jobs
that use "ubuntu:latest" broke.
Address this by using Python 2 on Ubuntu 20.04, only, whereas we use
Python 3 on all other Ubuntu jobs. Eventually, we should think about
dropping support for Python 2 completely.
Reported-by: Justin Tobler <jltobler@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Our GitLab CI setup has a test gap where the fuzzers aren't exercised at
all. Add a smoke test, similar to the one we have in GitHub Workflows.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Commit 3c50032ff52 (attr: ignore overly large gitattributes files,
2022-12-01) added a defense-in-depth check to ensure that .gitattributes
blobs read from the index do not exceed ATTR_MAX_FILE_SIZE (100 MB).
But there were two cases added shortly after 3c50032ff52 was written
which do not apply similar protections:
- 47cfc9bd7d0 (attr: add flag `--source` to work with tree-ish,
2023-01-14)
- 4723ae1007f (attr.c: read attributes in a sparse directory,
2023-08-11) added a similar
Ensure that we refuse to process a .gitattributes blob exceeding
ATTR_MAX_FILE_SIZE when reading from either an arbitrary tree object or
a sparse directory. This is done by pushing the ATTR_MAX_FILE_SIZE check
down into the low-level `read_attr_from_buf()`.
In doing so, plug a leak in `read_attr_from_index()` where we would
accidentally leak the large buffer upon detecting it is too large to
process.
(Since `read_attr_from_buf()` handles a NULL buffer input, we can remove
a NULL check before calling it in `read_attr_from_index()` as well).
Co-authored-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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With 23865355 (attr: read attributes from HEAD when bare repo,
2023-10-13), we started to use the HEAD tree as the default
attribute source in a bare repository. One argument for such a
behaviour is that it would make things like "git archive" run in
bare and non-bare repositories for the same commit consistent.
This changes was merged to Git 2.43 but without an explicit mention
in its release notes.
It turns out that this change destroys performance of shallowly
cloning from a bare repository. As the "server" installations are
expected to be mostly bare, and "git pack-objects", which is the
core of driving the other side of "git clone" and "git fetch" wants
to see if a path is set not to delta with blobs from other paths via
the attribute system, the change forces the server side to traverse
the tree of the HEAD commit needlessly to find if each and every
paths the objects it sends out has the attribute that controls the
deltification. Given that (1) most projects do not configure such
an attribute, and (2) it is dubious for the server side to honor
such an end-user supplied attribute anyway, this was a poor choice
of the default.
To mitigate the current situation, let's revert the change that uses
the tree of HEAD in a bare repository by default as the attribute
source. This will help most people who have been happy with the
behaviour of Git 2.42 and before.
Two things to note:
* If you are stuck with versions of Git 2.43 or newer, that is
older than the release this fix appears in, you can explicitly
set the attr.tree configuration variable to point at an empty
tree object, i.e.
$ git config attr.tree 4b825dc642cb6eb9a060e54bf8d69288fbee4904
* If you like the behaviour we are reverting, you can explicitly
set the attr.tree configuration variable to HEAD, i.e.
$ git config attr.tree HEAD
The right fix for this is to optimize the code paths that allow
accesses to attributes in tree objects, but that is a much more
involved change and is left as a longer-term project, outside the
scope of this "first step" fix.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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After 2406bf5f (Win32: detect unix socket support at runtime,
2024-04-03), it fails with:
compat/mingw.c:4160:5: error: no previous prototype for function 'mingw_have_unix_sockets' [-Werror,-Wmissing-prototypes]
4160 | int mingw_have_unix_sockets(void)
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because the prototype is behind `ifndef NO_UNIX_SOCKETS`.
Signed-off-by: Mike Hommey <mh@glandium.org>
Acked-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When the destination is read-only, "mv" on some version of macOS
asks whether to replace the destination even though in the test its
stdin is not a terminal (and thus doesn't conform to POSIX[1]).
The helper to corrupt a chunk-file is designed to work on the
files like commit-graph and multi-pack-index files that are
generally read-only, so use "mv -f" to work around this issue.
Helped-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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RGB color parsing currently supports 24-bit values in the form #RRGGBB.
As in Cascading Style Sheets (CSS [1]), also allow to specify an RGB color
using only three digits with #RGB.
In this shortened form, each of the digits is – again, as in CSS –
duplicated to convert the color to 24 bits, e.g. #f1b specifies the same
color as #ff11bb.
In color.h, remove the '0x' prefix in the example to match the actual
syntax.
[1] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/CSS/hex-color
Signed-off-by: Beat Bolli <dev+git@drbeat.li>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Make sure that the RGB color parser rejects invalid characters and
invalid lengths.
Signed-off-by: Beat Bolli <dev+git@drbeat.li>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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This is most probably just an editing left-over from cb357221a4 (t4026:
test "normal" color, 2014-11-20) which added this test.
Signed-off-by: Beat Bolli <dev+git@drbeat.li>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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d44e5267ea (diff-lib: plug minor memory leaks in do_diff_cache(),
2020-11-14) added the call to diff_setup_done() to release the memory
of the parseopt member of struct diff_options that repo_init_revisions()
had allocated via repo_diff_setup() and prep_parse_options().
189e97bc4b (diff: remove parseopts member from struct diff_options,
2022-12-01) did away with that allocation; diff_setup_done() doesn't
release any memory anymore. So stop calling this function on the blank
diffopt member before it is overwritten, as this is no longer necessary.
Signed-off-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Completing commands like "git rebase" in one repository will leak the
local __git_repo_path into the shell's environment so that completing
commands after changing to a different repository will give the old
repository's references (or none at all).
The bug report on the mailing list [1] suggests one simple way to observe
this yourself:
Enter the following commands from some directory:
mkdir a b b/c
for d (a b); git -C $d init && git -C $d commit --allow-empty -m init
cd a
git branch foo
pushd ../b/c
git branch bar
Now type these:
git rebase <TAB>… # completion for bar available; C-c to abort
declare -p __git_repo_path # outputs /path/to/b/.git
popd
git branch # outputs foo, main
git rebase <TAB>… # completion candidates are bar, main!
Ideally, the last typed <TAB> should be yielding foo, main.
Commit beb6ee7163 (completion: extract repository discovery from
__gitdir(), 2017-02-03) anticipated this problem by marking
__git_repo_path as local in __git_main and __gitk_main for Bash
completion but did not give the same mark to _git for Zsh completion.
Thus make __git_repo_path local for Zsh completion, too.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/git/CALnO6CBv3+e2WL6n6Mh7ZZHCX2Ni8GpvM4a-bQYxNqjmgZdwdg@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: D. Ben Knoble <ben.knoble+github@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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A scheduled "git maintenance" job is expected to work on all
repositories it knows about, but it stopped at the first one that
errored out. Now it keeps going.
* js/for-each-repo-keep-going:
maintenance: running maintenance should not stop on errors
for-each-repo: optionally keep going on an error
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In addition to building the objects needed, try to link the objects
that are used in fuzzer tests, to make sure at least they build
without bitrot, in Linux CI runs.
* js/build-fuzz-more-often:
fuzz: link fuzz programs with `make all` on Linux
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Advertise "git contacts", a tool for newcomers to find people to
ask review for their patches, a bit more in our developer
documentation.
* la/doc-use-of-contacts-when-contributing:
SubmittingPatches: demonstrate using git-contacts with git-send-email
SubmittingPatches: add heading for format-patch and send-email
SubmittingPatches: dedupe discussion of security patches
SubmittingPatches: discuss reviewers first
SubmittingPatches: quote commands
SubmittingPatches: mention GitGitGadget
SubmittingPatches: clarify 'git-contacts' location
MyFirstContribution: mention contrib/contacts/git-contacts
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"git stash -S" did not handle binary files correctly, which has
been corrected.
* aj/stash-staged-fix:
stash: fix "--staged" with binary files
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The "--rfc" option of "git format-patch" learned to take an
optional string value to be used in place of "RFC" to tweak the
"[PATCH]" on the subject header.
* jc/format-patch-rfc-more:
format-patch: "--rfc=-(WIP)" appends to produce [PATCH (WIP)]
format-patch: allow --rfc to optionally take a value, like --rfc=WIP
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The "-k" and "--rfc" options of "format-patch" will now error out
when used together, as one tells us not to add anything to the
title of the commit, and the other one tells us to add "RFC" in
addition to "PATCH".
* ds/format-patch-rfc-and-k:
format-patch: ensure that --rfc and -k are mutually exclusive
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The procedure to build multi-pack-index got confused by the
replace-refs mechanism, which has been corrected by disabling the
latter.
* xx/disable-replace-when-building-midx:
midx: disable replace objects
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"git rebase --signoff" used to forget that it needs to add a
sign-off to the resulting commit when told to continue after a
conflict stops its operation.
* pw/rebase-m-signoff-fix:
rebase -m: fix --signoff with conflicts
sequencer: store commit message in private context
sequencer: move current fixups to private context
sequencer: start removing private fields from public API
sequencer: always free "struct replay_opts"
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When the user gives an unknown command to the "add -p" prompt, the list
of accepted commands with their explanation is given. This is the same
output they get when they say '?'.
However, the unknown command may be due to a user input error rather
than the user not knowing the valid command.
To reduce the likelihood of user confusion and error repetition, instead
of displaying the list of accepted commands, display a short error
message with the unknown command received, as feedback to the user.
Include a reminder about the current command '?' in the new message, to
guide the user if they want help.
Signed-off-by: Rubén Justo <rjusto@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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There is no need to show some UI messages on stderr, and yet doing so
may produce some undesirable results, such as messages appearing in an
unexpected order.
Let's use stdout for all UI messages, and adjusts the tests accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Rubén Justo <rjusto@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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* maint-2.44: (41 commits)
Git 2.44.1
Git 2.43.4
Git 2.42.2
Git 2.41.1
Git 2.40.2
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
...
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Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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l10n-2.45.0-rnd1
* tag 'l10n-2.45.0-rnd1' of https://github.com/git-l10n/git-po:
l10n: tr: Update Turkish translations
l10n: zh_CN: for git 2.45 rounds
l10n: zh-TW: Git 2.45
l10n: vi: Updated translation for 2.45
l10n: TEAMS: retire l10n teams no update in 1 year
l10n: uk: v2.45 update
l10n: sv.po: Update Swedish translation
l10n: Update German translation
l10n: po-id for 2.45
l10n: bg.po: Updated Bulgarian translation (5652t)
l10n: fr: v2.45.0
l10n: Update Vietnamese team contact
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* 'master' of github.com:alshopov/git-po:
l10n: bg.po: Updated Bulgarian translation (5652t)
|
|
* 'fr_v2.45.0' of github.com:jnavila/git:
l10n: fr: v2.45.0
|
|
Signed-off-by: Emir SARI <emir_sari@icloud.com>
|
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* 'l10n/zh-TW/240428' of github.com:l10n-tw/git-po:
l10n: zh-TW: Git 2.45
|
|
* 'tl/zh_CN_2.45.0_rnd' of github.com:dyrone/git:
l10n: zh_CN: for git 2.45 rounds
|
|
Signed-off-by: Teng Long <dyroneteng@gmail.com>
|
|
Co-Authored-By: Lumynous <lumynou5.tw@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: Kisaragi Hiu <mail@kisaragi-hiu.com>
Signed-off-by: Yi-Jyun Pan <pan93412@gmail.com>
|
|
* 'update-teams' of https://github.com/Nekosha/git-po:
l10n: Update Vietnamese team contact
|
|
Signed-off-by: Vũ Tiến Hưng <newcomerminecraft@gmail.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Jiang Xin <worldhello.net@gmail.com>
|
|
* '2.45-uk-update' of github.com:arkid15r/git-ukrainian-l10n:
l10n: uk: v2.45 update
|
|
* 'l10n-de-2.45' of github.com:ralfth/git:
l10n: Update German translation
|
|
* 'po-id' of github.com:bagasme/git-po:
l10n: po-id for 2.45
|
|
Co-authored-by: Kate Golovanova <kate@kgthreads.com>
Signed-off-by: Arkadii Yakovets <ark@cho.red>
Signed-off-by: Kate Golovanova <kate@kgthreads.com>
|
|
Also fix some inconsistencies, and fix issue reported by
Anders Jonsson <anders.jonsson@norsjovallen.se>.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krefting <peter@softwolves.pp.se>
|
|
When we process the $LAYOUT variable through sed, the result will end
with the character "#". We then split it at the shell using IFS so that
we can process it a character at a time.
POSIX specifies that only "IFS white space shall be ignored at the
beginning and end of the input". The hash mark is not a white space
character, so it is not ignored at the beginning and end of the input.
POSIX then specifies that "[e]ach occurrence in the input of an IFS
character that is not IFS white space, along with any adjacent IFS white
space, shall delimit a field, as described previously." Thus, the final
hash mark delimits a field, and the final field is the empty string.
zsh implements this behavior strictly in compliance with POSIX (and
differently from most other shells), such that we end up with a trailing
empty field. We don't want this empty field and processing it in the
normal way causes us to fail to parse properly and fail the tests with
"ERROR" entries, so let's just ignore it instead. This is the behavior
of bash and dash anyway and what was clearly intended, so this is a
reasonable thing to do.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
zsh has a bug in which the keyword "continue" within an &&-chain is not
effective and the code following it is executed nonetheless.
Fortunately, this bug has been fixed upstream in 12e5db145 ("51608:
Don't execute commands after "continue &&"", 2023-03-29). However, zsh
releases very infrequently, so it is not present in a stable release
yet.
That, combined with the fact that almost all zsh users get their shell
from their OS vendor, means that it will likely be a long time before
this problem is fixed for most users. We have other workarounds in
place for FreeBSD ash and dash, so it shouldn't be too difficult to add
one here, either.
Replace the existing code with a test and if-block, which comes only at
the cost of an additional indentation, and leaves the code a little more
idiomatic anyway.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
Reviewed-by: Matthias Rüster <matthias.ruester@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ralf Thielow <ralf.thielow@gmail.com>
|
|
Translate following new components:
* refs/reftable-backend.c
Update following components:
* branch.c
* builtin/column.c
* builtin/config.c
* builtin/for-each-ref.c
* builtin/pack-refs.c
* revision.c
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
|
|
The `SubmittingPatches` documentation briefly mentions that related
patches should be grouped together in their own e-mail thread. Expand on
this to explicitly state that updated versions of a patch series should
also follow this. Also provide add a link to existing documentation from
`MyFirstContribution` that provides detailed instructions on how to do
this via `git-send-email(1)`.
Signed-off-by: Justin Tobler <jltobler@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
Leakfix.
* rj/add-i-leak-fix:
add: plug a leak on interactive_add
add-patch: plug a leak handling the '/' command
add-interactive: plug a leak in get_untracked_files
apply: plug a leak in apply_data
|
|
Demote a BUG() to an die() when the failure from vsnprintf() may
not be due to a programmer error.
* rs/vsnprintf-failure-is-not-a-bug:
don't report vsnprintf(3) error as bug
|
|
Signed-off-by: Roland Hieber <rhi@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
It took me more than a few tries and a good lecture of __git_main to
understand that the two paragraphs really only refer to adding
completion functions for executables that are not called through git's
subcommand magic. Improve the docs and be more specific.
Signed-off-by: Roland Hieber <rhi@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
Even 'symbolic-ref' is only completed when
GIT_COMPLETION_SHOW_ALL_COMMANDS=1 is set, it currently defaults to
completing file names, which is not very helpful. Add a simple
completion function which completes options and refs.
Signed-off-by: Roland Hieber <rhi@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
Since 5e47215080 (fuzz: add basic fuzz testing target., 2018-10-12), we
have compiled object files for the fuzz tests as part of the default
'make all' target. This helps prevent bit-rot in lesser-used parts of
the codebase, by making sure that incompatible changes are caught at
build time.
However, since we never linked the fuzzer executables, this did not
protect us from link-time errors. As of 8b9a42bf48 (fuzz: fix fuzz test
build rules, 2024-01-19), it's now possible to link the fuzzer
executables without using a fuzzing engine and a variety of
compiler-specific (and compiler-version-specific) flags, at least on
Linux. So let's add a platform-specific option in config.mak.uname to
link the executables as part of the default `make all` target.
Since linking the fuzzer executables without a fuzzing engine does not
require a C++ compiler, we can change the FUZZ_PROGRAMS build rule to
use $(CC) by default. This avoids compiler mis-match issues when
overriding $(CC) but not $(CXX). When we *do* want to actually link with
a fuzzing engine, we can set $(FUZZ_CXX). The build instructions in the
CI fuzz-smoke-test job and in the Makefile comment have been updated
accordingly.
While we're at it, we can consolidate some of the fuzzer build
instructions into one location in the Makefile.
Suggested-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Helped-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Josh Steadmon <steadmon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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|
In https://github.com/microsoft/git/issues/623, it was reported that
maintenance stops on a missing repository, omitting the remaining
repositories that were scheduled for maintenance.
This is undesirable, as it should be a best effort type of operation.
It should still fail due to the missing repository, of course, but not
leave the non-missing repositories in unmaintained shapes.
Let's use `for-each-repo`'s shiny new `--keep-going` option that we just
introduced for that very purpose.
This change will be picked up when running `git maintenance start`,
which is run implicitly by `scalar reconfigure`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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|
In https://github.com/microsoft/git/issues/623, it was reported that
the regularly scheduled maintenance stops if one repo in the middle of
the list was found to be missing.
This is undesirable, and points out a gap in the design of `git
for-each-repo`: We need a mode where that command does not stop on an
error, but continues to try running the specified command with the other
repositories.
Imitating the `--keep-going` option of GNU make, this commit teaches
`for-each-repo` the same trick: to continue with the operation on all
the remaining repositories in case there was a problem with one
repository, still setting the exit code to indicate an error occurred.
Helped-by: Eric Sunshine <sunshine@sunshineco.com>
Helped-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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|
The "receive-pack" program (which responds to "git push") was not
converted to run "git maintenance --auto" when other codepaths that
used to run "git gc --auto" were updated, which has been corrected.
* ps/run-auto-maintenance-in-receive-pack:
builtin/receive-pack: convert to use git-maintenance(1)
run-command: introduce function to prepare auto-maintenance process
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When "git bisect" reports the commit it determined to be the
culprit, we used to show it in a format that does not honor common
UI tweaks, like log.date and log.decorate. The code has been
taught to use "git show" to follow more customizations.
* pk/bisect-use-show:
bisect: report the found commit with "show"
|
|
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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|
The filename used for rejected hunks "git apply --reject" creates
was limited to PATH_MAX, which has been lifted.
* rs/apply-reject-long-name:
apply: avoid using fixed-size buffer in write_out_one_reject()
|
|
When .git/rr-cache/ rerere database gets corrupted or rerere is fed to
work on a file with conflicted hunks resolved incompletely, the rerere
machinery got confused and segfaulted, which has been corrected.
* mr/rerere-crash-fix:
rerere: fix crashes due to unmatched opening conflict markers
|
|
Code simplification.
* rs/imap-send-simplify-cmd-issuing-codepath:
imap-send: increase command size limit
|
|
Docfix.
* xx/rfc2822-date-format-in-doc:
Documentation: fix typos describing date format
|
|
GIt 2.44 introduced a regression that makes the updated code to
barf in repositories with multi-pack index written by older
versions of Git, which has been corrected.
* ps/missing-btmp-fix:
pack-bitmap: gracefully handle missing BTMP chunks
|
|
The code to format trailers have been cleaned up.
* la/format-trailer-info:
trailer: finish formatting unification
trailer: begin formatting unification
format_trailer_info(): append newline for non-trailer lines
format_trailer_info(): drop redundant unfold_value()
format_trailer_info(): use trailer_item objects
|
|
The cvsimport tests required that the platform understands
traditional timezone notations like CST6CDT, which has been
updated to work on those systems as long as they understand
POSIX notation with explicit tz transition dates.
* dd/t9604-use-posix-timezones:
t9604: Fix test for musl libc and new Debian
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|
Git writes a "waiting for your editor" message on an incomplete
line after launching an editor, and then append another error
message on the same line if the editor errors out. It now clears
the "waiting for..." line before giving the error message.
* rj/launch-editor-error-message:
launch_editor: waiting message on error
|
|
Docfix.
* yb/replay-doc-linkfix:
Documentation: fix linkgit reference
|
|
Build fix.
* rs/no-openssl-compilation-fix-on-macos:
git-compat-util: fix NO_OPENSSL on current macOS
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|
The way "git fast-import" handles paths described in its input has
been tightened up and more clearly documented.
* ta/fast-import-parse-path-fix:
fast-import: make comments more precise
fast-import: forbid escaped NUL in paths
fast-import: document C-style escapes for paths
fast-import: improve documentation for path quoting
fast-import: remove dead strbuf
fast-import: allow unquoted empty path for root
fast-import: directly use strbufs for paths
fast-import: tighten path unquoting
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|
The code to iterate over reftable blocks has seen some optimization
to reduce memory allocation and deallocation.
* ps/reftable-block-iteration-optim:
reftable/block: avoid copying block iterators on seek
reftable/block: reuse `zstream` state on inflation
reftable/block: open-code call to `uncompress2()`
reftable/block: reuse uncompressed blocks
reftable/reader: iterate to next block in place
reftable/block: move ownership of block reader into `struct table_iter`
reftable/block: introduce `block_reader_release()`
reftable/block: better grouping of functions
reftable/block: merge `block_iter_seek()` and `block_reader_seek()`
reftable/block: rename `block_reader_start()`
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In the previous step, the "--rfc" option of "format-patch" learned
to take an optional string value to prepend to the subject prefix,
so that --rfc=WIP can give "[WIP PATCH]".
There may be cases in which the extra string wants to come after the
subject prefix. Extend the mechanism to allow "--rfc=-(WIP)" [*] to
signal that the extra string is to be appended instead of getting
prepended, resulting in "[PATCH (WIP)]".
In the documentation, discourage (ab)using "--rfc=-RFC" to say
"[PATCH RFC]" just to be different, when "[RFC PATCH]" is the norm.
[Footnote]
* The syntax takes inspiration from Perl's open syntax that opens
pipes "open fh, '|-', 'cmd'", where the dash signals "the other
stuff comes here".
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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With the "--rfc" option, we can tweak the "[PATCH]" (or whatever
string specified with the "--subject-prefix" option, instead of
"PATCH") that we prefix the title of the commit with into "[RFC
PATCH]", but some projects may want "[rfc PATCH]". Adding a new
option, e.g., "--rfc-lowercase", to support such need every time
somebody wants to use different strings would lead to insanity of
accumulating unbounded number of such options.
Allow an optional value specified for the option, so that users can
use "--rfc=rfc" (think of "--rfc" without value as a short-hand for
"--rfc=RFC") if they wanted to.
This can of course be (ab)used to make the prefix "[WIP PATCH]" by
passing "--rfc=WIP". Passing an empty string, i.e., "--rfc=", is
the same as "--no-rfc" to override an option given earlier on the
same command line.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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|
Plug a leak we have since 5a76aff1a6 (add: convert to use
parse_pathspec, 2013-07-14).
This leak can be triggered with:
$ git add -p anything
Fixing this leak allows us to mark as leak-free the following tests:
+ t3701-add-interactive.sh
+ t7514-commit-patch.sh
Mark them with "TEST_PASSES_SANITIZE_LEAK=true" to notice and fix
promply any new leak that may be introduced and triggered by them in the
future.
Signed-off-by: Rubén Justo <rjusto@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
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Plug a leak we have since d6cf873340 (built-in add -p: implement the '/'
("search regex") command, 2019-12-13).
This leak can be triggered with:
$ printf "A\n\nB\n" >file
$ git add file && git commit -m file
$ printf "AA\n\nBB\n" >file
$ printf "s\n/ .\n" >lines
$ git add -p <lines
Signed-off-by: Rubén Justo <rjusto@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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|
Plug a leak we have since ab1e1cccaf (built-in add -i: re-implement
`add-untracked` in C, 2019-11-29).
This leak can be triggered with:
$ echo a | git add -i
As a curiosity, we have a somewhat similar function in builtin/stash.c,
which correctly frees the memory.
Signed-off-by: Rubén Justo <rjusto@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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We have an execution path in apply_data that leaks the local struct
image. Plug it.
This leak can be triggered with:
$ echo foo >file
$ git add file && git commit -m file
$ echo bar >file
$ git diff file >diff
$ sed s/foo/frotz/ <diff >baddiff
$ git apply --cached <baddiff
Fixing this leak allows us to mark as leak-free the following tests:
+ t2016-checkout-patch.sh
+ t4103-apply-binary.sh
+ t4104-apply-boundary.sh
+ t4113-apply-ending.sh
+ t4117-apply-reject.sh
+ t4123-apply-shrink.sh
+ t4252-am-options.sh
+ t4258-am-quoted-cr.sh
Mark them with "TEST_PASSES_SANITIZE_LEAK=true" to notice and fix
promply any new leak that may be introduced and triggered by them in the
future.
Signed-off-by: Rubén Justo <rjusto@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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"git stash --staged" errors out when given binary files, after saving the
stash.
This behaviour dates back to the addition of the feature in 41a28eb6c1
(stash: implement '--staged' option for 'push' and 'save', 2021-10-18).
Adding the "--binary" option of "diff-tree" fixes this. The "diff-tree" call
in stash_patch() also omits "--binary", but that is fine since binary files
cannot be selected interactively.
Helped-By: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Helped-By: Randall S. Becker <randall.becker@nexbridge.ca>
Signed-off-by: Adam Johnson <me@adamj.eu>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
Address some typos in the Git v2.45 changelog.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
The changelog entry for the new `git pack-refs --auto` mode only says
that the new flag is useful, but doesn't really say what it does. Add
some more information.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Orgad Shaneh <orgads@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
strbuf_addf() has been reporting a negative return value of vsnprintf(3)
as a bug since f141bd804d (Handle broken vsnprintf implementations in
strbuf, 2007-11-13). Other functions copied that behavior:
7b03c89ebd (add xsnprintf helper function, 2015-09-24)
5ef264dbdb (strbuf.c: add `strbuf_insertf()` and `strbuf_vinsertf()`, 2019-02-25)
8d25663d70 (mem-pool: add mem_pool_strfmt(), 2024-02-25)
However, vsnprintf(3) can legitimately return a negative value if the
formatted output would be longer than INT_MAX. Stop accusing it of
being broken and just report the fact that formatting failed.
Suggested-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Alexander Shopov <ash@kambanaria.org>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Jean-Noël Avila <jn.avila@free.fr>
|
|
The previous team has not maintained the translation since 2.37. Leader
has agreed to transfer leadership to me.
Signed-off-by: Vũ Tiến Hưng <newcomerminecraft@gmail.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
Update contact address for Linus Arver.
* la/mailmap-entry:
mailmap: change primary address for Linus Arver
|
|
Spellfix.
* pf/commitish-committish:
typo: replace 'commitish' with 'committish'
|
|
Fix a bug that allows the "--rfc" and "-k" options to be specified together
when "git format-patch" is executed, which was introduced in the commit
e0d7db7423a9 ("format-patch: --rfc honors what --subject-prefix sets").
Add a couple of additional tests to t4014, to cover additional cases of
the mutual exclusivity between different "git format-patch" options.
Signed-off-by: Dragan Simic <dsimic@manjaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
|
|
* maint-2.43: (40 commits)
Git 2.43.4
Git 2.42.2
Git 2.41.1
Git 2.40.2
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
...
|
|
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
|
|
* maint-2.42: (39 commits)
Git 2.42.2
Git 2.41.1
Git 2.40.2
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
has_dir_name(): do not get confused by characters < '/'
...
|
|
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
|
|
* maint-2.41: (38 commits)
Git 2.41.1
Git 2.40.2
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
has_dir_name(): do not get confused by characters < '/'
docs: document security issues around untrusted .git dirs
...
|
|
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
|
|
* maint-2.40: (39 commits)
Git 2.40.2
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
has_dir_name(): do not get confused by characters < '/'
docs: document security issues around untrusted .git dirs
upload-pack: disable lazy-fetching by default
...
|
|
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
|
|
* maint-2.39: (38 commits)
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
has_dir_name(): do not get confused by characters < '/'
docs: document security issues around untrusted .git dirs
upload-pack: disable lazy-fetching by default
fetch/clone: detect dubious ownership of local repositories
...
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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This topic addresses two CVEs:
- CVE-2024-32020:
Local clones may end up hardlinking files into the target repository's
object database when source and target repository reside on the same
disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user, then
those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the
untrusted user.
- CVE-2024-32021:
When cloning a local source repository that contains symlinks via the
filesystem, Git may create hardlinks to arbitrary user-readable files
on the same filesystem as the target repository in the objects/
directory.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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This topic branch adds a couple of measures designed to make it much
harder to exploit any bugs in Git's recursive clone machinery that might
be found in the future.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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In the wake of fixing a vulnerability where `git clone` mistakenly
followed a symbolic link that it had just written while checking out
files, writing into a gitdir, let's add some defense-in-depth by
teaching `git fsck` to report symbolic links stored in its trees that
point inside `.git/`.
Even though the Git project never made any promises about the exact
shape of the `.git/` directory's contents, there are likely repositories
out there containing symbolic links that point inside the gitdir. For
that reason, let's only report these as warnings, not as errors.
Security-conscious users are encouraged to configure
`fsck.symlinkPointsToGitDir = error`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Quite frequently, when vulnerabilities were found in Git's (quite
complex) clone machinery, a relatively common way to escalate the
severity was to trick Git into running a hook which is actually a script
that has just been laid on disk as part of that clone. This constitutes
a Remote Code Execution vulnerability, the highest severity observed in
Git's vulnerabilities so far.
Some previously-fixed vulnerabilities allowed malicious repositories to
be crafted such that Git would check out files not in the worktree, but
in, say, a submodule's `<git>/hooks/` directory.
A vulnerability that "merely" allows to modify the Git config would
allow a related attack vector, to manipulate Git into looking in the
worktree for hooks, e.g. redirecting the location where Git looks for
hooks, via setting `core.hooksPath` (which would be classified as
CWE-427: Uncontrolled Search Path Element and CWE-114: Process Control,
for more details see https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/427.html and
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/114.html).
To prevent that attack vector, let's error out and complain loudly if an
active `core.hooksPath` configuration is seen in the repository-local
Git config during a `git clone`.
There is one caveat: This changes Git's behavior in a slightly
backwards-incompatible manner. While it is probably a rare scenario (if
it exists at all) to configure `core.hooksPath` via a config in the Git
templates, it _is_ conceivable that some valid setup requires this to
work. In the hopefully very unlikely case that a user runs into this,
there is an escape hatch: set the `GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE=false`
environment variable. Obviously, this should be done only with utmost
caution.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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The ability to configuring the template directory is a delicate feature:
It allows defining hooks that will be run e.g. during a `git clone`
operation, such as the `post-checkout` hook.
As such, it is of utmost importance that Git would not allow that config
setting to be changed during a `git clone` by mistake, allowing an
attacker a chance for a Remote Code Execution, allowing attackers to run
arbitrary code on unsuspecting users' machines.
As a defense-in-depth measure, to prevent minor vulnerabilities in the
`git clone` code from ballooning into higher-serverity attack vectors,
let's make this a protected setting just like `safe.directory` and
friends, i.e. ignore any `init.templateDir` entries from any local
config.
Note: This does not change the behavior of any recursive clone (modulo
bugs), as the local repository config is not even supposed to be written
while cloning the superproject, except in one scenario: If a config
template is configured that sets the template directory. This might be
done because `git clone --recurse-submodules --template=<directory>`
does not pass that template directory on to the submodules'
initialization.
Another scenario where this commit changes behavior is where
repositories are _not_ cloned recursively, and then some (intentional,
benign) automation configures the template directory to be used before
initializing the submodules.
So the caveat is that this could theoretically break existing processes.
In both scenarios, there is a way out, though: configuring the template
directory via the environment variable `GIT_TEMPLATE_DIR`.
This change in behavior is a trade-off between security and
backwards-compatibility that is struck in favor of security.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Critical security issues typically combine relatively common
vulnerabilities such as case confusion in file paths with other
weaknesses in order to raise the severity of the attack.
One such weakness that has haunted the Git project in many a
submodule-related CVE is that any hooks that are found are executed
during a clone operation. Examples are the `post-checkout` and
`fsmonitor` hooks.
However, Git's design calls for hooks to be disabled by default, as only
disabled example hooks are copied over from the templates in
`<prefix>/share/git-core/templates/`.
As a defense-in-depth measure, let's prevent those hooks from running.
Obviously, administrators can choose to drop enabled hooks into the
template directory, though, _and_ it is also possible to override
`core.hooksPath`, in which case the new check needs to be disabled.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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In the next commit, Git will learn to disallow hooks during `git clone`
operations _except_ when those hooks come from the templates (which are
inherently supposed to be trusted). To that end, we add a function to
compare the contents of two files.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Arver <linusa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Arver <linusa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Arver <linusa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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No matter how well someone configures their email tooling, understanding
who to send the patches to is something that must always be considered.
So discuss it first instead of at the end.
In the following commit we will clean up the (now redundant) discussion
about sending security patches to the Git Security mailing list.
Signed-off-by: Linus Arver <linusa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Arver <linusa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Arver <linusa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Use a dash ("git-contacts", not "git contacts") because the script is
not installed as part of "git" toolset. This also puts the script on
one line, which should make it easier to grep for with a loose search
query, such as
$ git grep git.contacts Documentation
Also add a footnote to describe where the script is located, to help
readers who may not be familiar with such "contrib" scripts (and how
they are not accessible with the usual "git <subcommand>" syntax).
Signed-off-by: Linus Arver <linusa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Although we've had this script since 4d06402b1b (contrib: add
git-contacts helper, 2013-07-21), we don't mention it in our
introductory docs. Do so now.
Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Arver <linusa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When rebasing with "--signoff" the commit created by "rebase --continue"
after resolving conflicts or editing a commit fails to add the
"Signed-off-by:" trailer. This happens because the message from the
original commit is reused instead of the one that would have been used
if the sequencer had not stopped for the user interaction. The correct
message is stored in ctx->message and so with a couple of exceptions
this is written to rebase_path_message() when stopping for user
interaction instead. The exceptions are (i) "fixup" and "squash"
commands where the file is written by error_failed_squash() and (ii)
"edit" commands that are fast-forwarded where the original message is
still reused. The latter is safe because "--signoff" will never
fast-forward.
Note this introduces a change in behavior as the message file now
contains conflict comments. This is safe because commit_staged_changes()
passes an explicit cleanup flag when not editing the message and when
the message is being edited it will be cleaned up automatically. This
means user now sees the same message comments in editor with "rebase
--continue" as they would if they ran "git commit" themselves before
continuing the rebase. It also matches the behavior of "git
cherry-pick", "git merge" etc. which all list the files with merge
conflicts.
The tests are extended to check that all commits made after continuing a
rebase have a "Signed-off-by:" trailer. Sadly there are a couple of
leaks in apply.c which I've not been able to track down that mean this
test file is no-longer leak free when testing "git rebase --apply
--signoff" with conflicts.
Reported-by: David Bimmler <david.bimmler@isovalent.com>
Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Add an strbuf to "struct replay_ctx" to hold the current commit
message. This does not change the behavior but it will allow us to fix a
bug with "git rebase --signoff" in the next commit. A future patch
series will use the changes here to avoid writing the commit message to
disc unless there are conflicts or the commit is being reworded.
The changes in do_pick_commit() are a mechanical replacement of "msgbuf"
with "ctx->message". In do_merge() the code to write commit message to
disc is factored out of the conditional now that both branches store the
message in the same buffer.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The list of current fixups is an implementation detail of the sequencer
and so it should not be stored in the public options struct.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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"struct replay_opts" has a number of fields that are for internal
use. While they are marked as private having them in a public struct is
a distraction for callers and means that every time the internal details
are changed we have to recompile all the files that include sequencer.h
even though the public API is unchanged. This commit starts the process
of removing the private fields by adding an opaque pointer to a "struct
replay_ctx" to "struct replay_opts" and moving the "reflog_message"
member to the new private struct.
The sequencer currently updates the state files on disc each time it
processes a command in the todo list. This is an artifact of the
scripted implementation and makes the code hard to reason about as it is
not possible to get a complete view of the state in memory. In the
future we will add new members to "struct replay_ctx" to remedy this and
avoid writing state to disc unless the sequencer stops for user
interaction.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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sequencer_post_commit_cleanup() initializes an instance of "struct
replay_opts" but does not call replay_opts_release(). Currently this
does not leak memory because the code paths called don't allocate any of
the struct members. That will change in the next commit so add call to
replay_opts_release() to prevent a memory leak in "git commit" that
breaks all of the leak free tests.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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* pw/t3428-cleanup:
t3428: restore coverage for "apply" backend
t3428: use test_commit_message
t3428: modernize test setup
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Now that we have dropped `the_index`, `initialize_the_repository()`
doesn't really do a lot anymore except for setting up the pointer for
`the_repository` and then calling `initialize_repository()`. The former
can be replaced by statically initializing the pointer though, which
basically makes this function moot.
Convert callers to instead call `initialize_repository(the_repository)`
and drop `initialize_thee_repository()`.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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All users of `the_index` have been converted to use either a custom
`struct index_state *` or the index provided by `the_repository`. We can
thus drop the globally-accessible declaration of this variable. In fact,
we can go further than that and drop `the_index` completely now and have
it be allocated dynamically in `initialize_repository()` as all the
other data structures in it are.
This concludes the quest to make Git `the_index` free, which has started
with 4aab5b46f4 (Make read-cache.c "the_index" free., 2007-04-01).
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Convert git-clone(1) to use `the_repository->index` instead of
`the_index`.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When Git starts, one of the first things it will do is to call
`initialize_the_repository()`. This function sets up both the global
`the_repository` and `the_index` variables as required. Part of that
setup is also to set `the_repository.index = &the_index` so that the
index can be accessed via the repository.
When calling `repo_init()` on a repository though we set the complete
struct to all-zeroes, which will also cause us to unset the `index`
pointer. And as we don't re-initialize the index in that function, we
will end up with a `NULL` pointer here.
This has been fine until now becaues this function is only used to
create a new repository. git-init(1) does not access the index at all
after initializing the repository, whereas git-checkout(1) only uses
`the_index` directly. We are about to remove `the_index` though, which
will uncover this partially-initialized repository structure.
Refactor the code and create a common `initialize_repository()` function
that gets called from `repo_init()` and `initialize_the_repository()`.
This function sets up both the repository and the index as required.
Like this, we can easily special-case when `repo_init()` gets called
with `the_repository`.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Convert builtins to use `the_repository->index` instead of `the_index`.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Convert test-helper tools to use `the_repository->index` instead of
`the_index`.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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This topic branch fixes two vulnerabilities:
- Recursive clones on case-insensitive filesystems that support symbolic
links are susceptible to case confusion that can be exploited to
execute just-cloned code during the clone operation.
- Repositories can be configured to execute arbitrary code during local
clones. To address this, the ownership checks introduced in v2.30.3
are now extended to cover cloning local repositories.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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We will need to call this function from `hook.c` to be able to prevent
hooks from running that were written as part of a `clone` but did not
originate from the template directory.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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When looking for a hook and not finding one, and when `STRIP_EXTENSION`
is available (read: if we're on Windows and `.exe` is the required
extension for executable programs), we want to look also for a hook with
that extension.
Previously, we added that handling into the conditional block that was
meant to handle when no hook was found (possibly providing some advice
for the user's benefit). If the hook with that file extension was found,
we'd return early from that function instead of writing out said advice,
of course.
However, we're about to introduce a safety valve to prevent hooks from
being run during a clone, to reduce the attack surface of bugs that
allow writing files to be written into arbitrary locations.
To prepare for that, refactor the logic to avoid the early return, by
separating the `STRIP_EXTENSION` handling from the conditional block
handling the case when no hook was found.
This commit is best viewed with `--patience`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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When recursively cloning a repository with submodules, we must ensure
that the submodules paths do not suddenly contain symbolic links that
would let Git write into unintended locations. We just plugged that
vulnerability, but let's add some more defense-in-depth.
Since we can only keep one item on disk if multiple index entries' paths
collide, we may just as well avoid keeping a symbolic link (because that
would allow attack vectors where Git follows those links by mistake).
Technically, we handle more situations than cloning submodules into
paths that were (partially) replaced by symbolic links. This provides
defense-in-depth in case someone finds a case-folding confusion
vulnerability in the future that does not even involve submodules.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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In b878579ae7 (clone: report duplicate entries on case-insensitive
filesystems, 2018-08-17) code was added to warn about index entries that
resolve to the same file system entity (usually the cause is a
case-insensitive filesystem).
In Git for Windows, where inodes are not trusted (because of a
performance trade-off, inodes are equal to 0 by default), that check
does not compare inode numbers but the verbatim path.
This logic works well when index entries' paths differ only in case.
However, for file/directory conflicts only the file's path was reported,
leaving the user puzzled with what that path collides.
Let's try ot catch colliding paths even if one path is the prefix of the
other. We do this also in setups where the file system is case-sensitive
because the inode check would not be able to catch those collisions.
While not a complete solution (for example, on macOS, Unicode
normalization could also lead to file/directory conflicts but be missed
by this logic), it is at least another defensive layer on top of what
the previous commits added.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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The most critical vulnerabilities in Git lead to a Remote Code Execution
("RCE"), i.e. the ability for an attacker to have malicious code being
run as part of a Git operation that is not expected to run said code,
such has hooks delivered as part of a `git clone`.
A couple of parent commits ago, a bug was fixed that let Git be confused
by the presence of a path `a-` to mistakenly assume that a directory
`a/` can safely be created without removing an existing `a` that is a
symbolic link.
This bug did not represent an exploitable vulnerability on its
own; Let's make sure it stays that way.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Submodules are stored in subdirectories of their superproject. When
these subdirectories have been replaced with symlinks by a malicious
actor, all kinds of mayhem can be caused.
This _should_ not be possible, but many CVEs in the past showed that
_when_ possible, it allows attackers to slip in code that gets executed
during, say, a `git clone --recursive` operation.
Let's add some defense-in-depth to disallow submodule paths to have
anything except directories in them.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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In 0060fd1511b (clone --recurse-submodules: prevent name squatting on
Windows, 2019-09-12), I introduced code to verify that a git dir either
does not exist, or is at least empty, to fend off attacks where an
inadvertently (and likely maliciously) pre-populated git dir would be
used while cloning submodules recursively.
The logic used `access(<path>, X_OK)` to verify that a directory exists
before calling `is_empty_dir()` on it. That is a curious way to check
for a directory's existence and might well fail for unwanted reasons.
Even the original author (it was I ;-) ) struggles to explain why this
function was used rather than `stat()`.
This code was _almost_ copypastad in the previous commit, but that
`access()` call was caught during review.
Let's use `stat()` instead also in the code that was almost copied
verbatim. Let's not use `lstat()` because in the unlikely event that
somebody snuck a symbolic link in, pointing to a crafted directory, we
want to verify that that directory is empty.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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When creating a submodule path, we must be careful not to follow
symbolic links. Otherwise we may follow a symbolic link pointing to
a gitdir (which are valid symbolic links!) e.g. while cloning.
On case-insensitive filesystems, however, we blindly replace a directory
that has been created as part of the `clone` operation with a symlink
when the path to the latter differs only in case from the former's path.
Let's simply avoid this situation by expecting not ever having to
overwrite any existing file/directory/symlink upon cloning. That way, we
won't even replace a directory that we just created.
This addresses CVE-2024-32002.
Reported-by: Filip Hejsek <filip.hejsek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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While it is expected to have several git dirs within the `.git/modules/`
tree, it is important that they do not interfere with each other. For
example, if one submodule was called "captain" and another submodule
"captain/hooks", their respective git dirs would clash, as they would be
located in `.git/modules/captain/` and `.git/modules/captain/hooks/`,
respectively, i.e. the latter's files could clash with the actual Git
hooks of the former.
To prevent these clashes, and in particular to prevent hooks from being
written and then executed as part of a recursive clone, we introduced
checks as part of the fix for CVE-2019-1387 in a8dee3ca61 (Disallow
dubiously-nested submodule git directories, 2019-10-01).
It is currently possible to bypass the check for clashing submodule
git dirs in two ways:
1. parallel cloning
2. checkout --recurse-submodules
Let's check not only before, but also after parallel cloning (and before
checking out the submodule), that the git dir is not clashing with
another one, otherwise fail. This addresses the parallel cloning issue.
As to the parallel checkout issue: It requires quite a few manual steps
to create clashing git dirs because Git itself would refuse to
initialize the inner one, as demonstrated by the test case.
Nevertheless, let's teach the recursive checkout (namely, the
`submodule_move_head()` function that is used by the recursive checkout)
to be careful to verify that it does not use a clashing git dir, and if
it does, disable it (by deleting the `HEAD` file so that subsequent Git
calls won't recognize it as a git dir anymore).
Note: The parallel cloning test case contains a `cat err` that proved to
be highly useful when analyzing the racy nature of the operation (the
operation can fail with three different error messages, depending on
timing), and was left on purpose to ease future debugging should the
need arise.
Signed-off-by: Filip Hejsek <filip.hejsek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Submodule operations must not follow symlinks in working tree, because
otherwise files might be written to unintended places, leading to
vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Filip Hejsek <filip.hejsek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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There is a bug in directory/file ("D/F") conflict checking optimization:
It assumes that such a conflict cannot happen if a newly added entry's
path is lexicgraphically "greater than" the last already-existing index
entry _and_ contains a directory separator that comes strictly after the
common prefix (`len > len_eq_offset`).
This assumption is incorrect, though: `a-` sorts _between_ `a` and
`a/b`, their common prefix is `a`, the slash comes after the common
prefix, and there is still a file/directory conflict.
Let's re-design this logic, taking these facts into consideration:
- It is impossible for a file to sort after another file with whose
directory it conflicts because the trailing NUL byte is always smaller
than any other character.
- Since there are quite a number of ASCII characters that sort before
the slash (e.g. `-`, `.`, the space character), looking at the last
already-existing index entry is not enough to determine whether there
is a D/F conflict when the first character different from the
existing last index entry's path is a slash.
If it is not a slash, there cannot be a file/directory conflict.
And if the existing index entry's first different character is a
slash, it also cannot be a file/directory conflict because the
optimization requires the newly-added entry's path to sort _after_ the
existing entry's, and the conflicting file's path would not.
So let's fall back to the regular binary search whenever the newly-added
item's path differs in a slash character. If it does not, and it sorts
after the last index entry, there is no D/F conflict and the new index
entry can be safely appended.
This fix also nicely simplifies the logic and makes it much easier to
reason about, while the impact on performance should be negligible:
After this fix, the optimization will be skipped only when index
entry's paths differ in a slash and a space, `!`, `"`, `#`, `$`,
`%`, `&`, `'`, | ( `)`, `*`, `+`, `,`, `-`, or `.`, which should
be a rare situation.
Signed-off-by: Filip Hejsek <filip.hejsek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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For a long time our general philosophy has been that it's unsafe to run
arbitrary Git commands if you don't trust the hooks or config in .git,
but that running upload-pack should be OK. E.g., see 1456b043fc (Remove
post-upload-hook, 2009-12-10), or the design of uploadpack.packObjectsHook.
But we never really documented this (and even the discussions that led
to 1456b043fc were not on the public list!). Let's try to make our
approach more clear, but also be realistic that even upload-pack carries
some risk.
Helped-by: Filip Hejsek <filip.hejsek@gmail.com>
Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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The upload-pack command tries to avoid trusting the repository in which
it's run (e.g., by not running any hooks and not using any config that
contains arbitrary commands). But if the server side of a fetch or a
clone is a partial clone, then either upload-pack or its child
pack-objects may run a lazy "git fetch" under the hood. And it is very
easy to convince fetch to run arbitrary commands.
The "server" side can be a local repository owned by someone else, who
would be able to configure commands that are run during a clone with the
current user's permissions. This issue has been designated
CVE-2024-32004.
The fix in this commit's parent helps in this scenario, as well as in
related scenarios using SSH to clone, where the untrusted .git directory
is owned by a different user id. But if you received one as a zip file,
on a USB stick, etc, it may be owned by your user but still untrusted.
This has been designated CVE-2024-32465.
To mitigate the issue more completely, let's disable lazy fetching
entirely during `upload-pack`. While fetching from a partial repository
should be relatively rare, it is certainly not an unreasonable workflow.
And thus we need to provide an escape hatch.
This commit works by respecting a GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH environment variable
(to skip the lazy-fetch), and setting it in upload-pack, but only when
the user has not already done so (which gives us the escape hatch).
The name of the variable is specifically chosen to match what has
already been added in 'master' via e6d5479e7a (git: extend
--no-lazy-fetch to work across subprocesses, 2024-02-27). Since we're
building this fix as a backport for older versions, we could cherry-pick
that patch and its earlier steps. However, we don't really need the
niceties (like a "--no-lazy-fetch" option) that it offers. By using the
same name, everything should just work when the two are eventually
merged, but here are a few notes:
- the blocking of the fetch in e6d5479e7a is incomplete! It sets
fetch_if_missing to 0 when we setup the repository variable, but
that isn't enough. pack-objects in particular will call
prefetch_to_pack() even if that variable is 0. This patch by
contrast checks the environment variable at the lowest level before
we call the lazy fetch, where we can be sure to catch all code
paths.
Possibly the setting of fetch_if_missing from e6d5479e7a can be
reverted, but it may be useful to have. For example, some code may
want to use that flag to change behavior before it gets to the point
of trying to start the fetch. At any rate, that's all outside the
scope of this patch.
- there's documentation for GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH in e6d5479e7a. We can
live without that here, because for the most part the user shouldn't
need to set it themselves. The exception is if they do want to
override upload-pack's default, and that requires a separate
documentation section (which is added here)
- it would be nice to use the NO_LAZY_FETCH_ENVIRONMENT macro added by
e6d5479e7a, but those definitions have moved from cache.h to
environment.h between 2.39.3 and master. I just used the raw string
literals, and we can replace them with the macro once this topic is
merged to master.
At least with respect to CVE-2024-32004, this does render this commit's
parent commit somewhat redundant. However, it is worth retaining that
commit as defense in depth, and because it may help other issues (e.g.,
symlink/hardlink TOCTOU races, where zip files are not really an
interesting attack vector).
The tests in t0411 still pass, but now we have _two_ mechanisms ensuring
that the evil command is not run. Let's beef up the existing ones to
check that they failed for the expected reason, that we refused to run
upload-pack at all with an alternate user id. And add two new ones for
the same-user case that both the restriction and its escape hatch.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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When cloning from somebody else's repositories, it is possible that,
say, the `upload-pack` command is overridden in the repository that is
about to be cloned, which would then be run in the user's context who
started the clone.
To remind the user that this is a potentially unsafe operation, let's
extend the ownership checks we have already established for regular
gitdir discovery to extend also to local repositories that are about to
be cloned.
This protection extends also to file:// URLs.
The fixes in this commit address CVE-2024-32004.
Note: This commit does not touch the `fetch`/`clone` code directly, but
instead the function used implicitly by both: `enter_repo()`. This
function is also used by `git receive-pack` (i.e. pushes), by `git
upload-archive`, by `git daemon` and by `git http-backend`. In setups
that want to serve repositories owned by different users than the
account running the service, this will require `safe.*` settings to be
configured accordingly.
Also note: there are tiny time windows where a time-of-check-time-of-use
("TOCTOU") race is possible. The real solution to those would be to work
with `fstat()` and `openat()`. However, the latter function is not
available on Windows (and would have to be emulated with rather
expensive low-level `NtCreateFile()` calls), and the changes would be
quite extensive, for my taste too extensive for the little gain given
that embargoed releases need to pay extra attention to avoid introducing
inadvertent bugs.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Cloning from a partial repository must not fetch missing objects into
the partial repository, because that can lead to arbitrary code
execution.
Add a couple of test cases, pretending to the `upload-pack` command (and
to that command only) that it is working on a repository owned by
someone else.
Helped-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Filip Hejsek <filip.hejsek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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We observed a series of clone failures arose in a specific set of
repositories after we fully enabled the MIDX bitmap feature within our
Codebase service. These failures were accompanied with error messages
such as:
Cloning into bare repository 'clone.git'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 8, done.
remote: Total 8 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 8 (from 1)
Receiving objects: 100% (8/8), done.
fatal: did not receive expected object ...
fatal: fetch-pack: invalid index-pack output
Temporarily disabling the MIDX feature eliminated the reported issues.
After some investigation we found that all repositories experiencing
failures contain replace references, which seem to be improperly
acknowledged by the MIDX bitmap generation logic.
A more thorough explanation about the root cause from Taylor Blau says:
Indeed, the pack-bitmap-write machinery does not itself call
disable_replace_refs(). So when it generates a reachability bitmap, it
is doing so with the replace refs in mind. You can see that this is
indeed the cause of the problem by looking at the output of an
instrumented version of Git that indicates what bits are being set
during the bitmap generation phase.
With replace refs (incorrectly) enabled, we get:
[2, 4, 6, 8, 13, 3, 6, 7, 3, 4, 6, 8]
and doing the same after calling disable_replace_refs(), we instead get:
[2, 5, 6, 13, 3, 6, 7, 3, 4, 6, 8]
Single pack bitmaps are unaffected by this issue because we generate
them from within pack-objects, which does call disable_replace_refs().
This patch updates the MIDX logic to disable replace objects within the
multi-pack-index builtin, and a test showing a clone (which would fail
with MIDX bitmap) is added to demonstrate the bug.
Helped-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Xing Xin <xingxin.xx@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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In 850b6edefa (auto-gc: extract a reusable helper from "git fetch",
2020-05-06), we have introduced a helper function `run_auto_gc()` that
kicks off `git gc --auto`. The intent of this function was to pass down
the "--quiet" flag to git-gc(1) as required without duplicating this at
all callsites. In 7c3e9e8cfb (auto-gc: pass --quiet down from am,
commit, merge and rebase, 2020-05-06) we then converted callsites that
need to pass down this flag to use the new helper function. This has the
notable omission of git-receive-pack(1), which is the only remaining
user of `git gc --auto` that sets up the proccess manually. This is
probably because it unconditionally passes down the `--quiet` flag and
thus didn't benefit much from the new helper function.
In a95ce12430 (maintenance: replace run_auto_gc(), 2020-09-17) we then
replaced `run_auto_gc()` with `run_auto_maintenance()` which invokes
git-maintenance(1) instead of git-gc(1). This command is the modern
replacement for git-gc(1) and is both more thorough and also more
flexible because administrators can configure which tasks exactly to run
during maintenance.
But due to git-receive-pack(1) not using `run_auto_gc()` in the first
place it did not get converted to use git-maintenance(1) like we do
everywhere else now. Address this oversight and start to use the newly
introduced function `prepare_auto_maintenance()`. This will also make it
easier for us to adapt this code together with all the other callsites
that invoke auto-maintenance in the future.
This removes the last internal user of `git gc --auto`.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The `run_auto_maintenance()` function is responsible for spawning a new
`git maintenance run --auto` process. To do so, it sets up the `sturct
child_process` and then runs it by executing `run_command()` directly.
This is rather inflexible in case callers want to modify the child
process somewhat, e.g. to redirect stderr or stdout.
Introduce a new `prepare_auto_maintenance()` function to plug this gap.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Right now, there's no specific way to determine whether a credential
helper or git credential itself supports a given set of capabilities.
It would be helpful to have such a way, so let's let credential helpers
and git credential take an argument, "capability", which has it list the
capabilities and a version number on standard output.
Specifically choose a format that is slightly different from regular
credential output and assume that no capabilities are supported if a
non-zero exit status occurs or the data deviates from the format. It is
common for users to write small shell scripts as the argument to
credential.helper, which will almost never be designed to emit
capabilities. We want callers to gracefully handle this case by
assuming that they are not capable of extended support because that is
almost certainly the case, and specifying the error behavior up front
does this and preserves backwards compatibility in a graceful way.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Now that we have full support in Git for the authtype capability, let's
add support to the cache credential helper.
When parsing data, we always set the initial capabilities because we're
the helper, and we need both the initial and helper capabilities to be
set in order to have the helper capabilities take effect.
When emitting data, always emit the supported capability and make sure
we emit items only if we have them and they're supported by the caller.
Since we may no longer have a username or password, be sure to emit
those conditionally as well so we don't segfault on a NULL pointer.
Similarly, when comparing credentials, consider both the password and
credential fields when we're matching passwords.
Adjust the partial credential detection code so that we can store
credentials missing a username or password as long as they have an
authtype and credential.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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It's helpful to have some basic tests for credential helpers supporting
the authtype and credential fields. Let's add some tests for this case
so that we can make sure newly supported helpers work correctly.
Note that we explicitly check that credential helpers can produce
different sets of authtype and credential values based on the username.
While the username is not used in the HTTP protocol with authtype and
credential, it can still be specified in the URL and thus may be part of
the protocol. Additionally, because it is common for users to have
multiple accounts on one service (say, both personal and professional
accounts), it's very helpful to be able to store different credentials
for different accounts in the same helper, and that doesn't become less
useful if one is using, say, Bearer authentication instead of Basic.
Thus, credential helpers should be expected to support this
functionality as basic functionality, so verify here that they do so.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Over HTTP, NTLM and Kerberos require two rounds of authentication on the
client side. It's possible that there are custom authentication schemes
that also implement this same approach. Since these are tricky schemes
to implement and the HTTP library in use may not always handle them
gracefully on all systems, it would be helpful to allow the credential
helper to implement them instead for increased portability and
robustness.
To allow this to happen, add a boolean flag, continue, that indicates
that instead of failing when we get a 401, we should retry another round
of authentication. However, this necessitates some changes in our
current credential code so that we can make this work.
Keep the state[] headers between iterations, but only use them to send
to the helper and only consider the new ones we read from the credential
helper to be valid on subsequent iterations. That avoids us passing
stale data when we finally approve or reject the credential. Similarly,
clear the multistage and wwwauth[] values appropriately so that we
don't pass stale data or think we're trying a multiround response when
we're not. Remove the credential values so that we can actually fill a
second time with new responses.
Limit the number of iterations of reauthentication we do to 3. This
means that if there's a problem, we'll terminate with an error message
instead of retrying indefinitely and not informing the user (and
possibly conducting a DoS on the server).
In our tests, handle creating multiple response output files from our
helper so we can verify that each of the messages sent is correct.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Some HTTP authentication schemes, such as NTLM- and Kerberos-based
options, require more than one round trip to authenticate. Currently,
these can only be supported in libcurl, since Git does not have support
for this in the credential helper protocol.
However, in a future commit, we'll add support for this functionality
into the credential helper protocol and Git itself. Because we don't
really want to implement either NTLM or Kerberos, both of which are
complex protocols, we'll want to test this using a fake credential
authentication scheme. In order to do so, update t5563 and its backend
to allow us to accept multiple sets of credentials and respond with
different behavior in each case.
Since we can now provide any number of possible status codes, provide a
non-specific reason phrase so we don't have to generate a more specific
one based on the response. The reason phrase is mandatory according to
the status-line production in RFC 7230, but clients SHOULD ignore it,
and curl does (except to print it).
Each entry in the authorization and challenge fields contains an ID,
which indicates a corresponding credential and response. If the
response is a 200 status, then we continue to execute git-http-backend.
Otherwise, we print the corresponding status and response. If no ID is
matched, we use the default response with a status of 401.
Note that there is an implicit order to the parameters. The ID is
always first and the creds or response value is always last, and
therefore may contain spaces, equals signs, or other arbitrary data.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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We recently introduced a way for credential helpers to add arbitrary
state as part of the protocol. Set some limits on line length to avoid
helpers passing extremely large amounts of data. While Git doesn't have
a fixed parsing length, there are other tools which support this
protocol and it's kind to allow them to use a reasonable fixed-size
buffer for parsing. In addition, we would like to be moderate in our
memory usage and imposing reasonable limits is helpful for that purpose.
In the event a credential helper is incapable of storing its serialized
state in 64 KiB, it can feel free to serialize it on disk and store a
reference instead.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Now that we've implemented the state capability, let's send it along by
default when filling credentials so we can make use of it.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Until now, our credential code has mostly deal with usernames and
passwords and we've let libcurl deal with the variant of authentication
to be used. However, now that we have the credential value, the
credential helper can take control of the authentication, so the value
provided might be something that's generated, such as a Digest hash
value.
In such a case, it would be helpful for a credential helper that gets an
erase or store command to be able to keep track of an identifier for the
original secret that went into the computation. Furthermore, some types
of authentication, such as NTLM and Kerberos, actually need two round
trips to authenticate, which will require that the credential helper
keep some state.
In order to allow for these use cases and others, allow storing state in
a field called "state[]". This value is passed back to the credential
helper that created it, which avoids confusion caused by parsing values
from different helpers.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Now that we have the credential helper code set up to handle arbitrary
authentications schemes, let's add support for this in the HTTP code,
where we really want to use it. If we're using this new functionality,
don't set a username and password, and instead set a header wherever
we'd normally do so, including for proxy authentication.
Since we can now handle this case, ask the credential helper to enable
the appropriate capabilities.
Finally, if we're using the authtype value, set "Expect: 100-continue".
Any type of authentication that requires multiple rounds (such as NTLM
or Kerberos) requires a 100 Continue (if we're larger than
http.postBuffer) because otherwise we send the pack data before we're
authenticated, the push gets a 401 response, and we can't rewind the
stream. We don't know for certain what other custom schemes might
require this, the HTTP/1.1 standard has required handling this since
1999, the broken HTTP server for which we disabled this (Google's) is
now fixed and has been for some time, and libcurl has a 1-second
fallback in case the HTTP server is still broken. In addition, it is
not unreasonable to require compliance with a 25-year old standard to
use new Git features. For all of these reasons, do so here.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Now that we have new fields (authtype and credential), let's document
them for users and credential helper implementers.
Indicate specifically what common values of authtype are and what values
are allowed. Note that, while common, digest and NTLM authentication
are insecure because they require unsalted, uniterated password hashes
to be stored.
Tell users that they can continue to use a username and password even if
the new capability is supported.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Now that we have support for a wide variety of types of authentication,
it's important to indicate to other credential helpers whether they
should store credentials, since not every credential helper may
intuitively understand all possible values of the authtype field. Do so
with a boolean field called "ephemeral", to indicate whether the
credential is expected to be temporary.
For example, in HTTP Digest authentication, the Authorization header
value is based off a nonce. It isn't useful to store this value
for later use because reusing the credential long term will not result
in successful authentication due to the nonce necessarily differing.
An additional case is potentially short-lived credentials, which may
last only a few hours. It similarly wouldn't be helper for other
credential helpers to attempt to provide these much later.
We do still pass the value to "git credential store" or "git credential
erase", since it may be helpful to the original helper to know whether
the operation was successful.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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We support the new credential and authtype fields, but we lack a way to
indicate to a credential helper that we'd like them to be used. Without
some sort of indication, the credential helper doesn't know if it should
try to provide us a username and password, or a pre-encoded credential.
For example, the helper might prefer a more restricted Bearer token if
pre-encoded credentials are possible, but might have to fall back to
more general username and password if not.
Let's provide a simple way to indicate whether Git (or, for that matter,
the helper) is capable of understanding the authtype and credential
fields. We send this capability when we generate a request, and the
other side may reply to indicate to us that it does, too.
For now, don't enable sending capabilities for the HTTP code. In a
future commit, we'll introduce appropriate handling for that code,
which requires more in-depth work.
The logic for determining whether a capability is supported may seem
complex, but it is not. At each stage, we emit the capability to the
following stage if all preceding stages have declared it. Thus, if the
caller to git credential fill didn't declare it, then we won't send it
to the helper, and if fill's caller did send but the helper doesn't
understand it, then we won't send it on in the response. If we're an
internal user, then we know about all capabilities and will request
them.
For "git credential approve" and "git credential reject", we set the
helper capability before calling the helper, since we assume that the
input we're getting from the external program comes from a previous call
to "git credential fill", and thus we'll invoke send a capability to the
helper if and only if we got one from the standard input, which is the
correct behavior.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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At the moment, our credential code wants to find a username and password
for access, which, for HTTP, it will pass to libcurl to encode and
process. However, many users want to use authentication schemes that
libcurl doesn't support, such as Bearer authentication. In these
schemes, the secret is not a username and password pair, but some sort
of token that meets the production for authentication data in the RFC.
In fact, in general, it's useful to allow our credential helper to have
knowledge about what specifically to put in the protocol header. Thus,
add a field, credential, which contains data that's preencoded to be
suitable for the protocol in question. If we have such data, we need
neither a username nor a password, so make that adjustment as well.
It is in theory possible to reuse the password field for this. However,
if we do so, we must know whether the credential helper supports our new
scheme before sending it data, which necessitates some sort of
capability inquiry, because otherwise an uninformed credential helper
would store our preencoded data as a password, which would fail the next
time we attempted to connect to the remote server. This design is
substantially simpler, and we can hint to the credential helper that we
support this approach with a simple new field instead of needing to
query it first.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Currently we create one set of headers for all object requests and reuse
it. However, we'll need to adjust the headers for authentication
purposes in the future, so let's create a new set for each request so
that we can adjust them if the authentication changes.
Note that the cost of allocation here is tiny compared to the fact that
we're making a network call, not to mention probably a full TLS
connection, so this shouldn't have a significant impact on performance.
Moreover, nobody who cares about performance is using the dumb HTTP
protocol anyway, since it often makes huge numbers of requests compared
to the smart protocol.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When we retry a post_rpc request, we currently reuse the same headers as
before. In the future, we'd like to be able to modify them based on the
result we get back, so let's reset them on each retry so we can avoid
sending potentially duplicate headers if the values change.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When Git makes an HTTP request, it can negotiate the type of
authentication to use with the server provided the authentication scheme
is one of a few well-known types (Basic, Digest, NTLM, or Negotiate).
However, some servers wish to use other types of authentication, such as
the Bearer type from OAuth2. Since libcurl doesn't natively support
this type, it isn't possible to use it, and the user is forced to
specify the Authorization header using the http.extraheader setting.
However, storing a plaintext token in the repository configuration is
not very secure, especially if a repository can be shared by multiple
parties. We already have support for many types of secure credential
storage by using credential helpers, so let's teach credential helpers
how to produce credentials for an arbitrary scheme.
If the credential helper specifies an authtype field, then it specifies
an authentication scheme (e.g., Bearer) and the password field specifies
the raw authentication token, with any encoding already specified. We
reuse the password field for this because some credential helpers store
the metadata without encryption even though the password is encrypted,
and we'd like to avoid insecure storage if an older version of the
credential helper gets ahold of the data.
The username is not used in this case, but it is still preserved for the
purpose of finding the right credential if the user has multiple
accounts.
If the authtype field is not specified, then the password behaves as
normal and it is passed along with the username to libcurl.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Linus will lose access to his work email soon.
Signed-off-by: Linus Arver <linusa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When performing a local clone of a repository we end up either copying
or hardlinking the source repository into the target repository. This is
significantly more performant than if we were to use git-upload-pack(1)
and git-fetch-pack(1) to create the new repository and preserves both
disk space and compute time.
Unfortunately though, performing such a local clone of a repository that
is not owned by the current user is inherently unsafe:
- It is possible that source files get swapped out underneath us while
we are copying or hardlinking them. While we do perform some checks
here to assert that we hardlinked the expected file, they cannot
reliably thwart time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) style races. It
is thus possible for an adversary to make us copy or hardlink
unexpected files into the target directory.
Ideally, we would address this by starting to use openat(3P),
fstatat(3P) and friends. Due to platform compatibility with Windows
we cannot easily do that though. Furthermore, the scope of these
fixes would likely be quite broad and thus not fit for an embargoed
security release.
- Even if we handled TOCTOU-style races perfectly, hardlinking files
owned by a different user into the target repository is not a good
idea in general. It is possible for an adversary to rewrite those
files to contain whatever data they want even after the clone has
completed.
Address these issues by completely refusing local clones of a repository
that is not owned by the current user. This reuses our existing infra we
have in place via `ensure_valid_ownership()` and thus allows a user to
override the safety guard by adding the source repository path to the
"safe.directory" configuration.
This addresses CVE-2024-32020.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Introduce a new function `die_upon_dubious_ownership()` that uses
`ensure_valid_ownership()` to verify whether a repositroy is safe for
use, and causes Git to die in case it is not.
This function will be used in a subsequent commit.
Helped-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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When performing local clones with hardlinks we refuse to copy source
files which are symlinks as a mitigation for CVE-2022-39253. This check
can be raced by an adversary though by changing the file to a symlink
after we have checked it.
Fix the issue by checking whether the hardlinked destination file
matches the source file and abort in case it doesn't.
This addresses CVE-2024-32021.
Reported-by: Apple Product Security <product-security@apple.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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When a user performs a local clone without `--no-local`, then we end up
copying the source repository into the target repository directly. To
optimize this even further, we try to hardlink files into place instead
of copying data over, which helps both disk usage and speed.
There is an important edge case in this context though, namely when we
try to hardlink symlinks from the source repository into the target
repository. Depending on both platform and filesystem the resulting
behaviour here can be different:
- On macOS and NetBSD, calling link(3P) with a symlink target creates
a hardlink to the file pointed to by the symlink.
- On Linux, calling link(3P) instead creates a hardlink to the symlink
itself.
To unify this behaviour, 36596fd2df (clone: better handle symlinked
files at .git/objects/, 2019-07-10) introduced logic to resolve symlinks
before we try to link(3P) files. Consequently, the new behaviour was to
always create a hard link to the target of the symlink on all platforms.
Eventually though, we figured out that following symlinks like this can
cause havoc when performing a local clone of a malicious repository,
which resulted in CVE-2022-39253. This issue was fixed via 6f054f9fb3
(builtin/clone.c: disallow `--local` clones with symlinks, 2022-07-28),
by refusing symlinks in the source repository.
But even though we now shouldn't ever link symlinks anymore, the code
that resolves symlinks still exists. In the best case the code does not
end up doing anything because there are no symlinks anymore. In the
worst case though this can be abused by an adversary that rewrites the
source file after it has been checked not to be a symlink such that it
actually is a symlink when we call link(3P). Thus, it is still possible
to recreate CVE-2022-39253 due to this time-of-check-time-of-use bug.
Remove the call to `realpath()`. This doesn't yet address the actual
vulnerability, which will be handled in a subsequent commit.
Reported-by: Apple Product Security <product-security@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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